JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - A suit was instituted by the plaintiff-respondents against the defendant-appellants for recovery of a sura of Rs. 7,500/- along with pendente lite and future interest on the allegations that one Sri Brij Basi Lal advanced a loan of Rs. 5,000/- to the appellants on 18th May, 1973, out of the funds of firm Brij Basi Lal Jain and Company and that the appellants had executed a promissory note in lieu of the loan which was repayable on demand together with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. Out of the sum of Rs. 7,500 for which decree was claimed as aforesaid, Rs. 5,000/- represented the principal amount and Rs. 2,500/- represented interest at the rate of 24% per annum. The suit was contested by the appellants, but was decreed by the trial court in favour of respondents 3 and 4. On appeal the decree of the trial court was modified to this extent that the decree was passed in favour of all the respondents 1 to 4. Aggrieved the defendants have preferred this second Appeal. 2. It was urged by counsel for the appellants that the loan in the instant case was advanced by Brij Basi Lal not on behalf of the firm Brij Basi Lal Jain and Company, as asserted by the plaintiff-respondents, but had been advanced by Brij Basi Lal in his individual capacity and the finding recorded by the two,courts below accepting the case of the plaintiff-respondents was erroneous. It was also urged that a subsequent promissory note had been got executed from the appellants on 4th January, 1976 and the promissory note dated 18th May, 1973, on the basis of which the instant suit had been instituted, was discharged by the subsequent promissory note and that the courts below have erred in taking a contrary view. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that the findings on both these points recorded by the lower appellate court are essentially findings of fact based on appraisal of evidence and cannot be challenged in a Second Appeal. The entire argument of counsel for the appellants on these two points was that the findings recorded by the two courts below were erroneous. The entire argument of counsel for the appellants on these two points was that the findings recorded by the two courts below were erroneous. This, however, cannot be a ground for interference in a second appeal under Section 100 C. P. C. If authority were needed for this proposition reference may be made to Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and others ( AIR 1959 SC 57 ), where it was held that the provisions of Section 100 are clear and unambiguous. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in several subsequent cases but I do not find it necessary to refer to all those cases. 4. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioners that the suit was not maintainable in view of sub-section (4) of Section 26 of U.P. Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This sub-section, reads as follows : "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, decree or order or any other law for the time being in force, no money-lender shall be entitled to claim any amount from a debtor in respect of any loan advanced before the commencement of this Act, unless the name of such debtor and the amount due from him has been specified in the statement referred to in sub-section (1). This plea had not been raised by the appellants in the two courts below nor had it been raised even in the grounds of the Second Appeal. An application, however, was made on behalf of the appellants on 6th February, 1981 in the Second Appeal for permission to raise the aforesaid ground and the said application was allowed on that date subject to objection by the respondents. The respondents have filed a written objection. They have also filed a certified copy of the necessary certificate contemplated by section 26 (4) of the Act along with the said objection. The necessary certificate was granted on 10th December, 1976 and the loan in question has been mentioned therein. In view of that certificate, there is no substance in this ground either. 5. Lastly it was urged by counsel for the appellants that the decree for Rs. 2,500/- out of the sum of Rs. The necessary certificate was granted on 10th December, 1976 and the loan in question has been mentioned therein. In view of that certificate, there is no substance in this ground either. 5. Lastly it was urged by counsel for the appellants that the decree for Rs. 2,500/- out of the sum of Rs. 7,500/-, which represents interest at the rate of 24% per annum is illegal in view of section 12 (2) of the Act read with Notification No. 3.3. (2)/70-1-5 (V), dated August 10, 1976, published in U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 10th August, 1976, whereby 17% per annum has been fixed as the maximum rate of interest on unsecured loan under section 12 (2) of the Act. 6. Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents in reply urged that since no substantial question of law on this point has been formulated in the second appeal as contemplated by Section 100 C. P. C., the appellants are not entitled to raise this point. In this connection it may be pointed out that Section 100 C. P. C. does not place an absolute law in this behalf but leaves it to the discretion of the court to permit even -such a point to be argued in respect of which no substantial question of law has been formulated at the stage of the admission of the appeal. Since Section 12 (2) of the Act places a statutory restriction in regard to the rate of interest, I am of opinion that it is a fit case. In which the appellants may be permitted to raise this point. In view of Section 12 of the Act and the notification referred to above, there seems to be no doubt that the decree for Rs. 2,500/- as interest calculated at the rate of 24% cannot be sustained. It has to be reduced so as to bring, it in conformity with the aforesaid statutory provision. Counsel for the parties are agreed that if interest is calculated at the rate of 17% in place of 24% on the principal sum of Rs. 5,000/- for the period before the institution of the suit it would come to Rs. 1800/-. 7. It has to be reduced so as to bring, it in conformity with the aforesaid statutory provision. Counsel for the parties are agreed that if interest is calculated at the rate of 17% in place of 24% on the principal sum of Rs. 5,000/- for the period before the institution of the suit it would come to Rs. 1800/-. 7. In the result the second appeal succeeds in part and is allowed to this extent that the decree passed by the lower appellants court is modified to this extent that the suit of the plaintiff-respondents stands decreed against the appellants for a sum of Rs. 6,800/- in place of Rs. 7,500/-. The decree, in so far as pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 6% per annum and costs of the suit of the two courts below is concerned maintained. In view of their divided success the parties shall bear their own costs of the Second Appeal.