V. V. BEDARKAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge Bhavnagar in Regular Civil Appeal no. 23 of 1977 allowing the appeal of Savarkundla Municipality and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge. Junior Division Savarkundla in Civil Suit no. 22 of 1973 in favour of the plaintiff (present appellant) restraining the defendant Municipality (present respondent) from re-auctioning or reselling plots nos. 1 and 8 from the land of Krishna Oil Mill Savarkundla. ( 2 ) THE case of the appellant-plaintiff is that the defendant-Munici- pality had published an advertisement for auctioning various plots of Krishna Oil Mill land of Savarkundla and according to the accepted position at the auction held on 25-4-1968 he was the highest bidder for plot no. 1 and 8 and his bid for plot no. 1 was Rs. 10 325 and for plot no. 8 was Rs. 11 501 According to the plaintiff this auction was confirmed by the municipality and therefore as per the conditions plots were to be given to the highest bidder and the highest bidder had to pay one-half of the purchase price on acceptance of the bid and second condition was that the balance of the purchase price was to be paid within 15 days of the acceptance on the information given by the muni- cipality. According to the plaintiff he was given notices by the munici- pality on 26-4-1968 to deposit half the price for those two plots. Those notices are Exs. 44 and 45. According to the plaintiff he went to pay the said amount but he was informed that as there was stay order from the Collector the amount would not be accepted. It is therefore his case that he did not receive any intimation thereafter to pay the amount. ( 3 ) AS against this it is the case of the defendant-municipality that the plaintiff was sent intimation to pay up the amounts) hut as he did not pay the same the auction in favour of the plaintiff was cancelled and the municipality arranged to re-auction the plots. As the municipality attempted to re-auction the plots the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for injunction restraining the municipality from auctioning the said plots which were purchased by him as a highest bidder in the auction. As the municipality attempted to re-auction the plots the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for injunction restraining the municipality from auctioning the said plots which were purchased by him as a highest bidder in the auction. ( 4 ) THE trial Court as stated earlier granted the relief prayed for by the plaintiff but the appellate Court set aside the decree of the trial Court. Therefore the plaintiff has come in appeal. ( 5 ) DURING the arguments permission was sought from me also to argue whether this was a completed contract and whether there was any scope for the plaintiff to ask for mere injunction restraining the munici- pality from not selling the said plots without asking for possession. This argument was advanced by Mr. A. P. Ravani learned Advocate for the respondent-defendant (municipality) mainly because the plaintiff has come with a suit in a very peculiar manner to restrain the municipality from selling the plots for all time to come without asking for possession by making a prayer to make payment of sale consideration or depositing that amount before the Court at any time and therefore he wants to hold the municipality at ransom by adopting the dog in the manger policy by asking for an injunction simpliciter without asking relief for possession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) BEFORE going into the details of this aspect without entering into the minutest details of facts it will be proper for me to narrate some facts and one of the facts is that according to the municipality it had sent notices to the plaintiff to pay up the amounts but the plaintiff did not pay up the said amounts and therefore the munici- pality was required to sell the plots by holding the auction again. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 7 ) IN this background now it has to be considered whether the plaintiff can get an injunction. Under the provisions of sec. 37 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the modes of granting temporary and perpetual injunctions are given. Sub-sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 7 ) IN this background now it has to be considered whether the plaintiff can get an injunction. Under the provisions of sec. 37 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the modes of granting temporary and perpetual injunctions are given. Sub-sec. (1) of it shows the types of temporary injunctions to be those which will continue until a specified time or until the further order of the Court and may be granted at any stage of a suit and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 while sub-sec. (2) of it shows that a perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right or from the commission of an act which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff. It is the submission of Mr. D. U. Shah that in the instant case the plaintiff has a right to purchase the plots in question and therefore when the municipality wanted to commit an act which was contrary to the rights of the plaintiff the plaintiff has a right to obtain a perpetual injunction. ( 8 ) THE question that is relevant for consideration is whether the plaintiff has really obtained a right which can be considered to be a right in terms of law so that he can obtain the perpetual injunction ? Under sec. 38 of the Act perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of obligation existing in his favour whether expressly or by implication. Sub-sec. (2) of it provides that when any such obligation arises from contract the Court shall be guided the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II. Chapter II of the Act refers to Specific Perfor- mance of Contracts. Question that has been posed before me is whether there was a contract. It is submitted that in order that this auction can be complete and the municipality would be liable to sell the lands to the plaintiff it should be necessary for the amount to prove that he had paid the amount to the municipality according to the conditions of the auction The conditions of auction are produced at Mark 13/1. It is submitted that in order that this auction can be complete and the municipality would be liable to sell the lands to the plaintiff it should be necessary for the amount to prove that he had paid the amount to the municipality according to the conditions of the auction The conditions of auction are produced at Mark 13/1. Those conditions are as stated earlier that one-half of the amount shall be deposited immediately on the acceptance of the auction and the remaining one-half of the amount shall be paid after the person is informed of the approval of the General Board of the municipality and that amount should be paid within 15 days of that information and if there will be a default then there will be re-auction. Clause 5 of the said conditions is that possession of the plots will be handed-over after the sanction by the General Board of the Municipality and after an application is made after the entire amount of the plots is paid. The defendant-municipality has come out with a case that so far as the plaintiff was concerned the municipality did not pass any resolution to grant the plots to him. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) NOW what is the effect of the municipality not having passed the resolution ? This has become material because under sec. 41 (e) of the Act an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract for performance of which would not be specifically enforced. So far as specific performance of contracts is concerned there is already Cha- pter II about which reference is made in sec. 38 of the Act. This Chapter II refers to the contracts which are complete in themselves while under secs. 65 and 66 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 there are some formalities which are required to be completed before the contract with the municipality can he said to have been entered into. If from those provisions it can be shown that the contract was not complete then specific performance cannot be ordered and if so under sec. 41 (e) of the Act an injunction cannot be granted. ( 10 ) UNDER sec. If from those provisions it can be shown that the contract was not complete then specific performance cannot be ordered and if so under sec. 41 (e) of the Act an injunction cannot be granted. ( 10 ) UNDER sec. 65 (3) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act in the case of a lease for a period exceeding one year or of a sale or other transfer of immoveable property the market value of which does not exceed one lakh of rupees or contract for the purchase of any immoveable property the sanction of the municipality by a resolution passed at a general meeting is required. As rightly observed by the learned appellate Judge there is no evidence to show that such a resolution was passed by the municipality and if that is so the contract was not complete. Under sec. 65 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act no contract shall be binding on a municipality unless the requirements of this section have been complied with and if there was to be a completed contract then the provisions of sec. 66 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act would come into operation wherein there would be a contract entered into by a Chief Officer on behalf of a municipality and should be entered into in such a manner and form as would bind such Chief Officer if such contracts were on his own behalf and may in the like manner and form be varied or dis- charged and that contract shall have to be entered into under the common seal of the municipality. So this was not a perfect and completed contract and therefore without the resolution of the municipality the plaintiff could not get any vested right so far as the plots in question were concerned. ( 11 ) THERE is a decision of the Supreme Court in H. R. Rikhy v. New Delhi Municipality AIR 1962 Supreme Court 554 pertaining to the tenancy of a municipal shop under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 It has been specifically observed therein:" Where the statute thus makes it obligatory that there should be a contract in writing and duly executed by the persons authorised by the Act to do so the absence of such a contract cannot be cured by the mere receipt of rent from the occupiers of the shops owned by the municipality. There being thus no relationship of landlord and tenant between the Municipal Committee and the occupiers of shops in Municipal market the occupiers having been allotted shops on the acceptance of their tenders the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 does not apply and the application of the said occupiers under sec. 8 of the said Rent Control Act for the fixation of the standard rent is incompetent". Under sec. 18 of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911 the municipality is authorised to enter into contract and to transfer property belonging to it But that provision is subject to other provisions of that Act and the contract to transfer property has to satisfy the conditions laid down in sec. 46 (2) if the value or amount thereof exceeds Rs. 500. 00. It was provided under that Act that in order that the transfer of the property should be binding on the municipal Committee it is essential that it should have as required by sec. 47 been made by an instrument in writing executed by the president or the vice-President and at least two other members of the Committee and the execution by them should have been attested by the Secretary. It was therefore observed by the Supreme Court that if those two conditions are not fulfilled the contract of transfer shall not be binding on the Committee and it was held that the provisions of sec. 47 (3) of the said Punjab Municipal Act are mandatory and are not merely directory. Therefore in view of those provisions the Supreme Court held that those persons who had occupied as tenants and were actually paying rent as tenants cannot get the benefit of tenancy because the contract of tenancy was not entered into with them legally. Provisions of sec. 65 and 66 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act to which I have made some reference above are of the like nature and if that is so it can well be said that there was no contract which would bind the municipality and therefore there was no contract which could be specifically enforced and therefore no injunction could be available. ( 12 ) FURTHER on equitable grounds also the claim of the plaintiff was such that he merely wanted an injunction keeping a perpetual sword of uncertainty hanging on the municipality so far as the plots in question were concerned without asking for possession. ( 12 ) FURTHER on equitable grounds also the claim of the plaintiff was such that he merely wanted an injunction keeping a perpetual sword of uncertainty hanging on the municipality so far as the plots in question were concerned without asking for possession. ( 13 ) CONSIDERING all these aspects I do not find any substance in this second appeal and therefore the same is dismissed. Looking to the nature of dispute there shall be no order as to costs all throughout. Appeal dismissed. .