Judgment A.N. Varma, J. 1. THIS petition is directed against an order dated 11-10-1979 passed by the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut rejecting an application filed by the petitioner for impleadment of certain persons as proforma respondents in an appeal filed by him under section 22 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. By the impugned order, the learned District Judge has also dismissed the appeal itself as having become incompetent. 2. THESE are the facts. The respondents nos. 3 to 6 moved an application for an order of eviction against the petitioner from a certain accommodation of which the said respondents were admittedly the landlords and Kallu the husband of the petitioner was the tenant. The application was moved after the death of Kalloo impleading only the petitioner as the sole opposite party. Upon an objection raised by the petitioner herself that the other heirs of Kalloo had not been impleaded in the application, the respondents nos. 7 to 12 were also directed to be impleaded as opp. parties in that application. By an order dated 14th of July 1979 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord and directed the eviction of the petitioner and other parties who were subsequently impleaded in the application. Aggrieved by that order the petitioner filed an appeal under section 22 of the aforesaid Act within 30 days of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. It appears that immediately after the filing of the appeal an objection was raised on behalf of the landlords to the effect that, inasmuch as the other heirs of Kalloo had neither filed appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority nor were they impleaded as respondent in the appeal, the appeal filed by the petitioner, had become incompetent. Immediately, thereafter the petitioner moved an application on 30th of August, 1979 praying that the other heirs of Kalloo who have been left out might be impleaded in the appeal as proforma respondents. This application was opposed by the landlords on the ground that the period of limitation for filing an appeal having expired, the court had' no jurisdiction to allow the impleadment of those parties at the instance of the petitioner. This objection has found favour with the learned Additional District Judge who has by impuged order rejected that application as well as the appeal itself. This objection has found favour with the learned Additional District Judge who has by impuged order rejected that application as well as the appeal itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the application as well as the appeal filed by the petitioner have been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge under an obvious misapprehension of law. It was contended that the view taken by the court below that if those parties were permitted to be impleaded as proforma respondents, there would be a possibility of two conflicting decrees coming into existence, is manifestly erroneous. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that there were ample powers both under the aforesaid Act as well as under the inherent powers of the court under Rule 22 (f) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act for entertaining the petitioner's application and for directing the impleadment of those parties. In support, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on a decision of this court dated 16-8-1978 in the case of Radhey Lal v. District and Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr in which K. C. Agarwal, J. had occasion to consider an almost identical problem. He held that the court was not justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner before him merely on the ground that some of the co-heirs had not been impleaded in the appeal initially. 4. SRI G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the landlord respondents on the other hand submitted that on the facts stated in the counter-affidavit, which were not controverted by any rejoinder affidavit, the landlords are clearly entitled to an order under section 21 for the eviction of the petitioner and that irrespective of the view which this court might form on the legal questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this court ought not to interfere. He also supported the impugned order on the ground that it has always been the view of this court that where a discretion has been exercised by the courts below condoning or refusing to condone the delay, this court does not normally interfere. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that this petition is entitled to succeed. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that this petition is entitled to succeed. I agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the mere fact that if an appeal had been filed by respondents who were left out by the petitioner in her appeal, on the date on which the petitioner moved the application for impleadment, the same would have been barred by time, did not take away the jurisdiction of the court to direct the impleadment of those persons, as proforma respondents in the petitioner's appeal. 5. RULE 22 (f) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act vests discretion in the authorities exercising various powers under this Act to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned. RULE 22 (d) also confers power on the authorities to allow amendment of an application, memorandum of an appeal or revision. There is then section 35 of the aforesaid Act which expressly makes section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to all the proceedings under the said Act. 6. THESE various Statutory provisions confer ample powers on the authorities exercising jurisdiction under the Act, in appropriate cases, to direct the impleadment of respondents who have been for sufficient cause, left out from being impleaded initially in the proceedings even after the expiry of the period of limitation for initiating any proceedings or for filing any appeal under the Act by those left out parties. It is, therefore, not correct to say that merely because limitation for filing an appeal had expired, the court below ipso facto lost jurisdiction to allow the impleadment of 1 the persons who were omitted from the memorandum of appeal. If the court in any given case comes to the conclusion that certain persons were left out from being impleaded initially in the appeal as respondents for good and sufficient cause, in my opinion it does have powers under the statutory provisions mentioned above to direct the impleadment of such persons for the ends of justice. It is clear that the amendment which will follow in consequence of such order in the memorandum of appeal shall be deemed to relate back to the date of filing of an appeal. It is clear that the amendment which will follow in consequence of such order in the memorandum of appeal shall be deemed to relate back to the date of filing of an appeal. In either view of the matter, therefore, the court below was not right in taking the view that because of the fact that the parties which had been left out had not filed any appeal within time, it has no jurisdiction to implead them as respondents in the appeal. The other ground upon which the court below has rejected the application of the petitioner is equally unsustainable. The ground is that two conflicting orders would come into existence if those persons are impleaded as respondents against whom the order passed by the Prescribed Authority has already become final. I do not agree. The petitioner had a right of appeal even if, the other heirs had not chosen to file any appeal. The interest of these various heirs were joint and inseverable. On the principle of Order 41 Rule 4 CPC therefore, the petitioner had a clear right to invite a decision of the appellate court upon merits independently of the other heirs. I also agree with the decision of K. C. Agarwal, J. in the case Radhey Lal v. District and Sessions Judge, Bulandshahar (supra) that under these circumstances, there would not be any possibility of two conflicting orders coming into existence. At any rate, I do not see how by the mere impleadment of those persons as respondents in the petitioner's appeal, the situation would alter. 7. COMING to the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents that this court should not interfere with the impugned order, I find that the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed on an erroneous view of law, without going into the merits of the case. The appellant has been deprived of a valuable right of appeal, as a result of the impugned order. This court would, therefore, not be justified in dismissing the writ petition merely on the allegations made in the counter-affidavit filed in this court. The question whether the application of the landlords deserves to be allowed or not has to be decided on the basis of material which was brought on the record of this case in the court below. This court would, therefore, not be justified in dismissing the writ petition merely on the allegations made in the counter-affidavit filed in this court. The question whether the application of the landlords deserves to be allowed or not has to be decided on the basis of material which was brought on the record of this case in the court below. It is not possible to decide the application of the landlords under section 21 in the absence of the record of the case. This would, therefore, not be justified in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents. 8. AS regards the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that this Court ought not to interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below, normally this would be so. But where the court or authority exercises its discretion contrary to statutory provisions of law or in disregard thereof, this court cannot but must interfere with the discretion exercised. The court below was clearly wrong in the view of law which he took as regards his powers to direct the impleadment of the parties. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut is quashed. The VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut shall now hear and dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner on merits after permitting the impleadment of the parties. The parties shall bear their own costs of the petition. The learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, is directed to dispose of the appeal filed by the respondents expeditiously, if possible within three months from the date on which either party produces before it a certified copy of the order. Since the parties which are sought to be impleaded on the own showing of the petitioners are merely proforma respondents, the court below shall ensure that the hearing of the appeal is not unduly delayed.