ORDER The petitioners in this criminal miscellaneous petition filed under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, are accused 1 to 19 and 21 and 22 in S.C. No. 60 of 1981 on the file of the Court of Session, Srikakulam. 2. On 6th June, 1980, Havildar 361 of ‘A’ Company of 5 A.P.S.P. gave a report to the Kasibugga police station stating that a Special Police Party was being kept at Kam-brigam to maintain law and order; that on the same day, he and his party went there to relieve the previous party; that the Police Party was camping in a vacant school building; that at about 12 noon the petitioners and some others of Kedaripuram, about 70 in all, came there armed with sticks and knives, that they raised cries that unless one or two police were killed, the police dogs would not go away from the village and that they would not be able to cultivate the lands unless the police went away. Shouting those slogans, they were said to have pelted stones at the police camp and damaged the building. Not heeding the advice of the police party not to resort to violence the accused were said to have dragged to some distance the Havildar and three constables, two of whom were said to have escaped from the clutches of the mob. The Havildar was given some blows with hands. At that stage, the Havildar ordered one of the party to open fire. On the hearing of those orders the mob began to run away. The Havildar and his constables pursued those persons and arrested 18 of them and recovered knives and sticks from those persons. The Havildar and four constables received simple injuries during the occurrence of pelting stones. 3. The Kasibugga Police Station registered Crime No. 68 of 1980 for offences under sections 147 ,148 ,308 ,332 and323, Indian Penal Code, on the strength of the above report and filed a charge-sheet before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palasa, for the above mentioned offences. 4. The Judicial First Class Magistrate took the case on file as P.R.C. No. 6 of 1980. A petition was filed on behalf of the petitioners before the Judicial First Class Magistrate to convert the case into a calendar case and try it alleging that the facts alleged did not disclose an offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code. 4. The Judicial First Class Magistrate took the case on file as P.R.C. No. 6 of 1980. A petition was filed on behalf of the petitioners before the Judicial First Class Magistrate to convert the case into a calendar case and try it alleging that the facts alleged did not disclose an offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate rejected the petition and committed the case to the Sessions Court. 5. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge, after hearing arguments, framed charges for all the offences mentioned in the charge-sheet, including an offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, and posted the, case for hearing to 2nd November, 1981. 6. The present application has been filed by the petitioners alleging that the charge under section 307, Indian Penal Code, thus framed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge is liable to be quashed. 7. The argument of Mr. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the accused-petitioners, is that the framing of the charge under section 307 , is wholly unjustified, because even taking all the allegations of the prosecution to be true and correct, no offence under section 307, Indian Indian Code, can be made out. It is Ms argument that there were no overt-acts attributed to the accused which would show the existence of an intention on the part of the accused to cause death. In support of his contention Sri Satyanarayana relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Muniswami, (1977) 3 S.C.R. 113 :A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1489, and State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 2 S.C.J. 376:(1977) MLJ. (Crl.) 538: (1978) 1 S.C.R. 257 : (1977) 4 S.C.C. 39 :(1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 533:A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2018. Before referring to these decisions, it appears to me useful to refer to the statutory provisions contained in Chapter XVIII of the. Criminal Procedure Code, relating to trial before a Court of Session. 8. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, says that, if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. On the other hand, section 228 of the Code says that if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence….he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has framed the charge under the section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Obviously he has done so after consideration of the record of the case and, the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. There cannot, therefore, be any complaint that the framing of the charge under the section 307 , Indian Penal Code, is not in compliance with section 228 of Criminal Procedure Code. 9. But what Mr. Satyanarayana says is that, mere gathering in a crowd armed with nothing more than deadly than knives, stones and sticks and without committing any overt act on the police would not bring the offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, because no intention or knowledge to cause death can be inferred from those circumstances. In my opinion, this argument cannot be considered as tenable. The charge against the accused is that they have not only been aimed with sticks, knives and stones but some of the crowd have shouted exhorting the rest to kill the police and caused simple injuries to the police by pelting stones. They are also alleged to have given blows with hands and captured the Havildar. Whether that evidence is to be believed or not cannot be the basis for quashing the charge. Taking those allegations to be correct, I think it cannot be said that there is no material against the accused which would justify the framing of a charge under section 307, in this case. This is not, therefore, a case where there was no material on the record on the basis of which any tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion that the accused were liable to be proceeded against under section 307, Indian Penal Code. 10. State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy, (1977) 3 S.C.R. 113 :A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1489, is a case where the Supreme Court had upheld the power of the High Court in revision to quash any charge. 10. State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy, (1977) 3 S.C.R. 113 :A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1489, is a case where the Supreme Court had upheld the power of the High Court in revision to quash any charge. That judgment is based upon a finding that the material on which the prosecution proposes to rely is wholly inadequate to sustain the charge. 11. State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 2 S.C.J. 316:A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2018, does not help the petitioners either. On the other-hand, it appears to me that the general principles laid down therein would greatly militate against the argument of Sri Satyanarayani. That judgment lays down that at the initial stage of the trial, the truth, veracity and the effect of the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged; nor any weight is to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. Further, that decision observes that it is not obligatory for the Judge at that, stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment, which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under section 227 or section 228, Criminal Procedure Code, says that ruling. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. 12. A judgment of the. Queen's Bench reported in R. v. Hormes ex parte Sherman and another, (1981) 2 All E.R. 612, holds that according to common law rule, a person arrested for a suspected offence has to be changed with an offence or informed that he may be prosecuted for it as soon as there is sufficient evidence to prefer a charge. That requirement of common law rule is mandatory and cannot be made subject to any qualification by, for example, the police setting an unduly high standard of sufficient evidence. 13. In the circumstances of the case, I dismiss this criminal miscellaneous petition. 14. That requirement of common law rule is mandatory and cannot be made subject to any qualification by, for example, the police setting an unduly high standard of sufficient evidence. 13. In the circumstances of the case, I dismiss this criminal miscellaneous petition. 14. In view of what I have said in Crl.M. P. No. 2457 of 1981, I dismiss Crl.R.C. No. 638 of 1981 also. R.S. ----- Petition dismissed.