JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition seeks quashing of an order of the Committee of Management of D.A.V. Post-Graduate Degree College, Bulandshahr, dated June 22, 1974, terminating the petitioner's service from the post of lecturer in Economics. 2. Pursuant to an advertisement in the newspaper dated 1-6-1973, for appointment of a lecturer in Economics, the petitioner applied for the same. The petitioner was called for interview of July 21, 1973, by the Selection Committee consisting of A. K. Das, Collector, Bulandshahr, Raghunandan Sharma, Principal, Dr. K.S. Shartna, Head of the Department of Economics, and Dr. S.K. Srivastava, Expert, appointed by the Meerut University. Out of the fifteen candidates called for the interview, excepting the petitioner no other candidate possessed a Doctorate in the subject. The petitioner was selected and was thereafter informed about it orally. The petitioner joined the service and started teaching in the D.A.V. (Post-Graduate) College, Bulandshahr. Since his appointment was subject to the approval, the Committee of Management sought approval from the Vice-Chancellor. The same was accorded on March 19, 197-4. 3. On July 12. 1974, then petitioner received a letter dated June 22, 1974, terminating his services with effect from July I, 1974. The petitioner, thereafter, approached the Vice Chancellor through a representation made on July 13, 1964, alleging that the termination was illegal. He, however, did not receive any reply to the said representation, which compelled him to sent a reminder to the Vice-Chancellor on July 25, 1974. He did not receive reply of the reminder as well. Ultimately, the petitioner having realised that he was not likely to get relief from the Vice-Chancellor, approached this Court by means of the present writ. The grounds taken in his petition were (t) that the termination of the petitioner's service without having obtained the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor was illegal, and (2) that the advertisement for appointment being for a permanent post, the Committee of Management could not have given him temporary assignment. The appointment of the petitioner was thus permanent and was not liable to be terminated by giving him one month's notice. 4. The writ petition was contested by the Committee of Management by filing a counter-affidavit, the gist of which is that although the post advertised was for permanent appointment, but the petitioner was selected for being appointed as a temporary lecturer. 4. The writ petition was contested by the Committee of Management by filing a counter-affidavit, the gist of which is that although the post advertised was for permanent appointment, but the petitioner was selected for being appointed as a temporary lecturer. Pleading justification for the termination order, the Committee of Management claimed that on assessment of work of the petitioner, he was not found suitable, hence the Committee of Management passed a resolution deciding to terminate the service of the petitioner. The Committee of Management claimed that the Vice Chancellor held that as the petitioner was appointed temporarily by the Committee of Management of the College, the Committee was competent to terminate his services without seeking the approval of the Vice Chancellor. 5. Having heard counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the Vice-Chancellor illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by holding that his approval was not required to be accorded as the petitioner had been temporarily appointed as lecturer in the Economics Department. 6. Section 35 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. lays down the conditions of service of teachers of affiliated or associated Degree Colleges, other than those maintained by the Government. Sub-section (2) of the aforesaid section provides that no teacher will be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank in any manner before the decision in respect thereof is reported to the Vice-Chancellor. The provision made is that the decision of the Management to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank, as the case may be, would not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor, sub-section (3)deals with the requirement of obtaining prior approval in the case of temporary teachers. It lays down that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall also apply to any decision to terminate the service of a teacher, whether by way of punishment or otherwise, but shall not apply to any termination of service on the expiry of the period for which the teacher was appointed. 7. On the interpretation of this provision, it would be found that its scope is very wide, and that it applies to a case of termination of service of a teacher whether that is done by way of punishment or otherwise. It may is true that in the instant case the termination order was not by way of punishment, but on assessment of work of the petitioner. It may is true that in the instant case the termination order was not by way of punishment, but on assessment of work of the petitioner. An order of termination of service of a temporary teacher based on valuation or assessment of work is not considered as punishment. The expression "otherwise" used in the subsection is indicative oi not only termination by way of punishment but also otherwise.' The expression `otherwise'means in a different manner, in another way, or in other ways. Therefore even where termination of services of a teachers is on the basis of assessment of his work, sub-section (3) would apply. Applying his provision, one would find that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall be applicable to any decision to terminate the services of a teacher employed temporarily. 8. For what we have said above, we find that the Vice-Chancellor on a wrong interpretation of sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the U. P. State Universities Act took a wrong view that 1 is approval was not required for effectuating the termination of service of the petitioner. As a result of a wrong interpretation of Section 35 (3). the Vice-Chancellor did not exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the Statute. 9. Counsel for the respondent urged that as this Court had no jurisdiction to grant any relief which may result in enforcing a contract between the petitioner and Respondent 2, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. For the proposition argued, counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (the Executive Committ of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others Laxmi Narain and others, (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 880). This case is distinguishable and does not apply to the present case. In the said case, Dr. Laxmi Narain was the Principal of the Vaish Degree College, Shamli, which was affiliated to the Agra University and as a consequence thereof the College agreed to be governed by the provisions of Agra University Act and the Statutes and Ordinances made thereunder. The Executive Committee passed a resolution terminating his services. Thereupon, Dr. Laxmi Narain filed a civil suit; The ground raised was that the termination order was invalid as prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor had not been obtained by the Management concerned. The Executive Committee passed a resolution terminating his services. Thereupon, Dr. Laxmi Narain filed a civil suit; The ground raised was that the termination order was invalid as prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor had not been obtained by the Management concerned. The Supreme Court found that it was incumbent on the Executive Committee of the College to have taken the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor before terminating the services of Dr. Laxmi Narain, but as in its opinion granting of a declaration and injunction was purely discretionary, the same could be refused by the Court. This was specially when the Specific Relief Act prohibited enforcement of service contracts calling upon the employer to take a person in service. In that case, the Committee of Management did not approach the Vice-Chancellor for approval at all. 10. In the instant case, however, the petition is different. The Vice-Chancellor was approached, but he took an erroneous view of sub-section (3) o Section 35 and held that approval was not required to be obtained by the Committee of Management. We would only be calling upon the Vice-Chancellor to reconsider the proposal of the Committee of Management sent to him for approval. By doing so, we would not be specifically enforcing any contract, rather we would be directing the Vice-Chancellor to perform his duty cast upon him by Section 35. which he omitted to do on account of a wrong interpretation of law. The Vice-Chancellor is an authority created by the U. P. State Universities Act. He is, therefore, amenable is writ through which he can be aced to do a thing which he sought to have done. It will be open to him to consider the request of the Committee of Management about the approval and pass an order on merits. 11. It may be correct that the petitioner did not annex the letter of the Vice-Chancellor intimating the petitioner and Respondent No. 2 that his approval was not necessary, but that by itself can be no ground to reject the petition and to refuse is grant relief to the petitioner to which he is entitled to under the law. Learned counsel for the respondent also attempted to pursuade us to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of consequences which might ensure it the writ petition was allowed. We are not prepared to decline to interfere on this ground. Learned counsel for the respondent also attempted to pursuade us to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of consequences which might ensure it the writ petition was allowed. We are not prepared to decline to interfere on this ground. The consequences of allowing the writ petition would be only those which are provided for by the law. This should not deter us from issuing the writ, to which the petitioner is eminently entitled. 12. Since we have allowed the writ -petition on the ground stated above, we need not investigate into the others. 13. For those reasons, that writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Vice-Chancellor contained in Annexure IX' to the counter-affidavit, is quashed, and the Vice-Chancellor is directed to consider the application of Respondent No. 2 seeking approval for termination of the petitioner's services afresh. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.