Vishnu Madhav Bhagwat v. Ramdevi — 1981 DIGILAW 6 (MP)

JUDGMENT K.K. Dubey, J. 1. This reference is made to a larger Bench for considering the decision of a Full Bench in Smt. Rampyari v. Ram Autar 1968 JLJ 146 in the light of certain observations made by the Supreme Court in B.C. Kame v. Nemichand Jain 1970 JLJ 703=1970 MPLJ 544. 2. The facts of the case necessary for appreciating the controversy are merely these :-- A suit was instituted for eviction of the appellant-tenant from a residential accommodation on the ground that the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arreaes of rent within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord. The landlord-respondent claimed rent and mesne profits amounting to Rs. 285/- for a period between 20-2-1969 and 5-12-1969. The service of the writ of summons was effected on the defendant-appellant on 3-2-1970. The appellant deposited the entire claim amount on 20th February 1970. The appellant, therefore, complied the first part of the provisions of section 13(1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (here in after referred to as the Act). When the matter in second appeal came before Mishra, J., notice was taken of the observation of the Supreme Court in B. C. Kame v. Nemichand Jain [2], which run as under :-- If the tenant pays the amount of rent in arrears within one month he is immune from the liability to be evicted for default in that behalf." In the second appeal in question, the suit solely tested on the ground tinder S. 12(1)(a) of the Act. The tenant-appellant had also deposited the entire claim amount within one month of the service of summons on him. The suit now continued for passing of adecree as regards the costs in the suit. In such a situation, the Court felt that the observance of the second part of Section 13(1) of the Act was inconsequential and it was not necessary even to go into the fact whether the tenant was regularly paying the rent on the due date and had made any default in the payment of the monthly rent. The two questions referred to run as under :-- (1) "Whether in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, the case of Gangadevi v. Vishwanath Singh and another is still a good law ? The two questions referred to run as under :-- (1) "Whether in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, the case of Gangadevi v. Vishwanath Singh and another is still a good law ? and (2) Whether in a suit for ejectment based only on ground under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act, the Defendant-tenant will earn immunity from being evicted, on the first deposit of arrears of rent being made within the period stipulated by the first limb of Section 13(1) of the Act and, thereafter, the suit will only pend for decision on question of costs only ? OR Whether in order to earn such immunity, it is necessary for the defendant to show compliance with the second limb of section 13(1) of the Act, till disposal of the suit in addition to showing compliance with the first limb thereof ? In the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Rampyari's case (supra), it was held that compliance of both the parts of S. 13(1) is neccessary and therefore, so long as the suit continued, it enjoined upon the tenant to continue to deposit or pay month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to rent at that rate to earn protection from eviction in the matter. 3. The provisions that would require to be noticed for the decision of this case are sections 12(1)(a), 12(3), 13(1) and 13 (5) and (6) of the Act. These provisions read as under :-- 12. Restriction on eviction of tenants--(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :-- (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served no him by the landlord in the prescribed manner, X X X z "12(3). No order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 13 : Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any accommodation, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for three consecutive months. 13. When tenant can get, benefit of protection against eviction--(1) On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf deposit in the Court to pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made, and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. (2) x (3) x (1) X (5) if a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (1) of sub-section (2) no decree or order shall be made by the Court forth- recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Court may allow such cost as it may deem fit to the landlord. (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. 4. (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. 4. In Smt. Rampyari's case (supra), the Full Bench of this Court observed as under :-- We are unable to acceed to this contention The main part of sub section (3) of Section 12 lays down that if a tenant makes payment or deposit of rent as required by Section 13, then no order for his eviction shall be made on the ground of default in the payment of rent, that is, on the ground specified in Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. In order to avoid a decree for eviction on the aforesaid ground, the tenant has to make not only the initial deposit as required by sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), but has else to continue to deposit rend during the pendency of the suit as enjoined by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. The same provision has been repeated in sub-section (5) of Section 13, albeit with the addition "but the Court may allow such cost as it may deem fit to the landlord". Neither the main part of sub-section (3) of Section 12, nor Section 13(), admits of any qualification on account of a default in the making of any payment or deposit as required by Section 13. Indeed, it is the compliance of Section 13 that gives to the tenant the benefit of avoiding a decree on the ground stated in Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. 5. The argument advanced before us is that the landlord can institute a suit for evicting a tenant only on grounds falling under S. 12(1). It is then urged that when the suit is filed on the sole ground that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole amount of arrears of rent within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the prescribed manner, on the compliance of the first part of Section 13(1), i.e. deposit by the tenant of the amount within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him, the ground on which the cause of action was founded, comes to an end. If, now the suit is continued for the purpose of costs, it could not be said that the cause of action contemplated under Section 12(1) subsists. Since the ground which sustained the suit came to an end, there could be no eviction of the tenant by virtue of the non obstante sub-section (1) of S. 12 of the Act. It would follow, therefore, that the provisions of the Act including Section 13 would not be applicable for subsequent proceedings. The suit subsists merely for he purpose of drawing up of a decree for costs, as the lis in respect of eviction became unenforceable, in other words, the contention is, since the lis which arose under the Act, comes to an end, the matter surviving before the Court for drawing up the decree after consideration of the question of costs in the suit would not be a matter under the Act and, consequently, the second part of Section 13(1) which comes into play when the suit continues, would not be available to the landlord for seeking eviction of the tenant. 6. The scheme appears to be that Section 12(1) lays down the grounds on which the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 lays down that the tenant could be evicted when the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the prescribed manner. Having provided the grounds on which the suit could be maintained, the Section proceeds to enumerate the terms and conditions which, when fulfilled, provides a locus paenitentiae to the tenant. This we find in sub section (3) of Section 12. (The ground here is merely default in the payment of rent). Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides that a decree for eviction against a tenant on the ground specified in clause (a) of subsection (1) of S. 12 shall not be made, if there is a compliance of S. 13 (1) and (5) of the Act. (The ground here is merely default in the payment of rent). Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides that a decree for eviction against a tenant on the ground specified in clause (a) of subsection (1) of S. 12 shall not be made, if there is a compliance of S. 13 (1) and (5) of the Act. For availing the protection, the tenant has, therefore, to comply with S. 13(1) which, as already stated above, comprises of two limbs: first, that the tenant must within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as extended by the Court, deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made and, secondly, (hereinafter referred to as the second part or second limb), that he is required to continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. When these two limbs are satisfied a decree for eviction shall not be made against the tenant. 7 In Shyama Charan Sharma v. Dharamdas 1980 JLJ 280, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the entire scheme of the Act. After examining the scheme, it was observed in para 4 of the above case as under:-- It is true that in order to entitle a tenant to claim the protection of Section 12(3) the tenant has to make a payment or deposit as required by Section 13, that is to say, the arrears of rent should be paid or deposited within one month of the service of the writ of summons on the tenant or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, and should further deposit or pay every month by the 15th, a sum equivalent to the rent. The above observations would indicate that the entitlement to protection could be availed of only if the two conditions are satisfied. The above observations would indicate that the entitlement to protection could be availed of only if the two conditions are satisfied. Referring to B.C. Kame's case (supra), the Supreme Court pointed out that Kame had committed defaults both in payment of arrears of rent as well as in the payment of monthly rent, i.e., there was no compliance of both the limbs of Section 13(1) of the Act. Kame had not applied to the Court for extention of time for payment of the defaulted arrears of rent as also of the defaults in payment of monthly rent. The question which the Supreme Court was considering, was whether it was open to the Court to extend time for paying monthly deposits as contemplated by the second part of Section 13(1) and condone the delay. The Supreme Court was of the view that the Court had power not only to grant time on an application made on that behalf but also to condone defaults. The Supreme Court observed as under :-- This Court took the view that on an application made by the tenant, time for deposit or payment could be extended. Though the observations made by the Court read as if they were made with reference to the default in payment of arrears, a reference to the facts of the case as set out in the very judgment shows that there was default both in payment of the arrears of rent that had accrued before the filing of the suit and in payment of the monthly rent that fell due after the filing of the suit. The very discussion of the defaults of the second part of Section 13(1) would indicate the necessity of its observance. The two Supreme Court cases, namely, of Kame and Shyama Charan, would show that the second part was as much necessary to be observed as the first. The Court was given power to condone the defaults of either nature on a proper application being made. The locus paenitcntiae provided under Section 12(3) to the defaulting tenant, as already stated above, was that the tenant must fulfil the two conditions under Section 13(1). 8. The observations of the Supreme Court as regards immunity from liability from eviction have to be read in the context in which they have been made. The locus paenitcntiae provided under Section 12(3) to the defaulting tenant, as already stated above, was that the tenant must fulfil the two conditions under Section 13(1). 8. The observations of the Supreme Court as regards immunity from liability from eviction have to be read in the context in which they have been made. It is manifest from the scheme of S. 13(1) of the Act that a decree for eviction could be avoided if the two conditions mentioned therein were fulfilled by the tenant. In Kame's case (supra) their Lordships were dealing with the first condition, viz., the deposit of arrears of rant by the tenant. Section 13(1), however, lays down another condition that after the first condition of deposit of arrears of rent is fulfilled, the tenant must continue to deposit rent month by month. Now, the immunity alluded to by the Supreme Court was referable to the first part of section 13(1) and the entitlement comes the moment the first part is observed. Their Lordships did not in so many words refer to the second condition under S. 13(1) But that does not mean that it was intended to be a rule despite the explicit provisions of the Section. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the above observations of the Supreme Court cannot be construed as meaning that the necessity of observance of the second part of Section 13(1) was obviated on the compliance of the first part, nor do we find any reason why the necessity of compliance of the second part under S. 13(1) be dispensed with. 9. The suit on whatsoever grounds may have been founded does not come to an end till the dispute is settled by pronouncement of a judgment followed by a decree. The Court was enjoined to see whether there has been full compliance of Section 13(1) of the Act before pronouncing the judgment. It would necessarily imply that the Court went into the question as to the compliance of Section 13(1) and which, as stated above, requires compliance of both the limbs of sub-section (1) of S. 13. We do not think that it would be possible to hold that on compliance of the first part of the Section, the lis in the suit ends. 10. The obligation of the tenant to pay rent month by month is reiterated under Section 13(1) of the Act. We do not think that it would be possible to hold that on compliance of the first part of the Section, the lis in the suit ends. 10. The obligation of the tenant to pay rent month by month is reiterated under Section 13(1) of the Act. The intention seems to be clear that at least as long as the suit continues the landlord gets his due rent within time a right which the landlord always enjoyed and which cannot be taken away merely because he had filed a suit against the defaulting tenant. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the compliance of both the parts of Section 13(1) would be necessary so entitle a tenant to enable him to avoid eviction when a suit had been filed against him in ejectment, on grounds stated under S. 12(1) of the Act. In view of the above discussion, we think that the two cases, viz., Gangadevi v. Vishwanath Singh and another 1968 JLJ SN 62, and Smt. Rampyari v. Ram Autar 1968 JLJ 146 , are correctly decided. 11. As regards the second question, it would be necessary for the defendant-tenant to comply with the second limb also of Section 13(1) of the Act in addition to compliance with the first limb, for seeking protection from eviction. 12. The case may now go to the proper Bench for decision according as discussed above. Mishra, J.— 13. I have gone through the opinion proposed by Dubey, J. However, I regret my inability to agree with the same. The reference, which has to be answered, was initially made by a Single Bench (consisting of myself). The matter was first placed before a Division Bench, later on before a Full Bench consisting of three members and thereafter before a Bench consisting of five members (K. K. Dubey. J., R. L. Murab, J, J. P. Bajpai, J. S. J Surana, J. and myself) The matter was heard and reserved for orders on 9-2-1979. On account of demise of Bajpai, J., the present Bench was reconstituted. 14. J., R. L. Murab, J, J. P. Bajpai, J. S. J Surana, J. and myself) The matter was heard and reserved for orders on 9-2-1979. On account of demise of Bajpai, J., the present Bench was reconstituted. 14. The facts giving rise to the reference and the questions referred need not be restated, as they have already been mentioned in the order proposed by Dubey, J. Answers to the questions referred depend on construction of Section 12(1)(a), 12(3) and section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') as well as on the question of applicability of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in B. C. Kame v. Nemi Chanel Jain (11, and in Shyama Charan Sharma v. Dharam Das. 1980 JLJ 280=AIR 1980 SC 3(sic)5. Section 12(1)(a) reads as under : 12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.--(1) Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :-- (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on hurt by the landlord in the prescribed manner. Section 12(3) provides that: No order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by Section 13 : Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any accommodation, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for three consecutive months. Section 13 runs as under :-- 13 When tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction (1)--On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in Section 12, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court to pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made; and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. (2) If in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court shall fix a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation to be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) till the decision of the suit or appeal. (3) If, in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the Court may direct the tenant to deposit with the Court the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), and in such a case, no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same. (4) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. (4) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. (5) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), no decree or order shall be made by the Court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Court may allow such cost as it may deem fit to the landlord. (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. Now construing the aforesaid provisions of the Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have, in paragraph 5 of the case of B. C. Kame (supra), observed as under: 5. (A) It is clearly intended thereby that for non-payment of rent, the tenancy shall not be terminated and the Court shall not pass a decree in ejectment if within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for rent has been served on the tenant, he makes payment of the amount or tenders the amount of rent due by him to the landlord. (B) If he does so, no suit will lie against him on the ground of default in the payment of rent (C) Even if no such payment is made within two months as provided by section 12(1)(a) the tenant may within one month from the service of the writ of summons deposit the amount in Court or pay to the landlord the amount due by him till then and continue to pay or deposit "month by month" the rent accruing due. (D) Even if he does not pay the amount within one month, he may on an application made by him ask for extension of time, and if the Court grants the extension, the amount may be paid by him within such extended time. (E) In such a case by virtue of sub-section ( ) of section 13, on the ground of default in payment of rent, the Court will not proceed to pass a decree in ejectment. (E) In such a case by virtue of sub-section ( ) of section 13, on the ground of default in payment of rent, the Court will not proceed to pass a decree in ejectment. (F) But it is clear that under sub-section (1) of section 13, the normal period during which the amount has to be paid to the landlord or deposited in Court is one month from the service of the writ of summons. (G) If the tenant pays the amount of rent in arrears within one month, he is immune from liability to be evicted for default in that behalf (H) If, however, he does not pay the amount or deposit it in Court, any subsequent payment made by him will come to his aid only if on an application made by him the Court extends the time. NOTE : Numbering of the para into such para A to H is mine). In paragraph 4 of the case of Shyama Charan Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:-- It is true that in order to entitle a tenant to claim the protection of Section 12(3), the tenant has to make a payment or deposit as required by section 13, that is to say, the arrears of rent should be paid or deposited within one month of the service of the writ of summons on the tenant or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court and should further deposit or pay every month by the 15th, a sum equivalent to the rent. It does not, however, follow that failure to pay or deposit a sum equivalent to the rent by the 15th of every month, subsequent to the filing of the suit for eviction, will entitle the landlord straightway to a decree for eviction. The consequences of the deposit or payment and non-payment or non-deposit are prescribed by sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 13. Since there is a statutory provision expressly prescribing the consequence of non-deposit or non payment of the rent, we must look to and be guided by that provision only to determine what shall follow. 15. The principles (F) and (G) laid down in paragraph 5 of the case of B C. Kame (supra) appear to be significant for present purposes. Since there is a statutory provision expressly prescribing the consequence of non-deposit or non payment of the rent, we must look to and be guided by that provision only to determine what shall follow. 15. The principles (F) and (G) laid down in paragraph 5 of the case of B C. Kame (supra) appear to be significant for present purposes. Accordingly, the normal period, during which the amount has to be paid to the landlord or deposited in the Court, is one month from the service of writ of summons on the tenant If the tenant pays the amount of rent and arrears within one month, he is immune from liability to be evicted for default in that behalf. The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act is a special law, while it makes default, as prescribed in clause (a) of section 12(1) as a ground for ejectment, it also provides the method and manner in which that ground can be wiped away and the tenant can earn immunity from ejectment on that ground It will be significant to note that the provisions placed in various sub-sections of section 13 appear to have been enacted in a manner so as to become operative at different stages of the suit Sub-section (2) becomes operative no sooner than any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant is raised and the obligation of tenant to deposit rent remains suspended till the Court fixes a reasonable provisional rent to be deposited or paid in accordance with sub section (1) of section 13 "till the decision of the suit or appeal." Sub-section (3) becomes operative if there is no dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable and the obligation of the tenant to deposit rent remains suspended until the Court directs him to deposit with the Court the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and in such a case, no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same. According to sub-section (4), if the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in Sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. Sub-sections (5) and (6) purport to lay down the consequences of making deposit or payment and those of failure to deposit or pay any amount as required by section 13. Framers of the law do not use the expression "till the decision of the suit or appeal" in subsection (1) of section 13 whereas it has been used in the sub-section (2). Accordingly, by no process of construction of statute, the Courts can read that expression into sub-section (1). 16 Sub-section (1) of section 13 consists of two limbs : (1) on a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, the tenant shall within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time, as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court to pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit is made and (2) shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. According to section 24(1) of the Act, every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. Thus, the maximum time lag in which the tenant is under obligation to deposit rent according to second limb of section 13(1) is fortyfive days. Now the question, which arises is, if within the normal period envisaged by sub-section (1) of section 13 the tenant makes the deposit will he earn immunity for ejectment on the ground of default in that behalf or not. Now the question, which arises is, if within the normal period envisaged by sub-section (1) of section 13 the tenant makes the deposit will he earn immunity for ejectment on the ground of default in that behalf or not. In the light of the principles (F) and (G) in paragraph 5 of B C. Kame's case, the inescapable conclusion appears to be that the tenant will earn immunity from liability to be evicted for default in that behalf and there will be no occasion for coming into operation of the second limb of sub-section (1) of section (13). The consequences of making payment to the landlord or depositing in the Court have not been provided in sub-section (5) of section 13. In order to find out the effect of making of deposit with the Court, we have not to make a search outside those provisions, to hold otherwise will lead to the perversion of object of the relevant provisions of the Act i.e. adequate protection to the tenants. It is true that in the case of B. C. Kame and that of Shyama Charon Sharma (supra), the actual question which fell for decision, was not with regard to the consequence of deposit in accordance with the first limb of section 13(1) yet from the principles, which have been laid down in those cases, the principle which appears, can be logically deducted from them. It appears to be that on making of the deposit of the amount of arrears of rent within the normal period, the tenant will become immune from his liability to be evicted for default in that behalf and the ground under section 12(1)(a) will be wiped off. From this stage, the legislative injunction enacted by sub section (5) of section 13 will begin to operate precluding the Courts from passing a decree or order for recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant and the jurisdiction of the Courts will remain restricted to allow or disallow only costs of the suit to the landlord. 17. The cases of this Court reported in Ram Pyaribai v Ram Avatar 1968 JLJ 146 , and in Gangadevi v Vishwanath Singh and another 1968 JLJ 62 came to be decided before laying down of the law by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above. 17. The cases of this Court reported in Ram Pyaribai v Ram Avatar 1968 JLJ 146 , and in Gangadevi v Vishwanath Singh and another 1968 JLJ 62 came to be decided before laying down of the law by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above. After pronouncement of the principles in the aforesaid cases, the view taken by this Court in the cases of Rampyaribai Gangadevi (supra) cannot be regarded to hold water. One fails to understand that on deposit within time extended by the Court, if a tenant can earn immunity from ejectment on the ground for default, how can he not be regarded to earn immunity from liability to be evicted for default in that behalf, if he deposits the amount in question within the normal period allowed by the law. 18. In paragraph 6 of the proposed order, it has been observed that sub-section (3) of section 12 provides that "a decree for eviction against a tenant on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12 shall not be made, if there is a compliance of section 13(1) and (5) of the Act." This statement of law appears to be obviously either incorrect or mistaken. If these observations are intended to lay down law, with a due difference, I may venture to observe that it will amount to re-writing section 12(3) of the Act. In paragraph 8 of the proposed order, it has been observed inter alia that 'not the immunity alluded to by the Supreme Court was referable to the first part of section 13(1) and the entitlement comes the moment the first part is observed " Further conclusions drawn appear to be inconsistent with this observation. The construction put on the relevant provisions in the proposed order appear to run contrary to the law of land laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, specially that of B. C. Kame (supra) 19. Accordingly. I am of the opinion that the question No, I referred should be answered as under :-- In view of the case of B. C. Kame (supra), the case of Gangadevi v. Vishwanath Singh and another 1960 JLJ SN 62. cannot be regarded to be a good law. Accordingly. I am of the opinion that the question No, I referred should be answered as under :-- In view of the case of B. C. Kame (supra), the case of Gangadevi v. Vishwanath Singh and another 1960 JLJ SN 62. cannot be regarded to be a good law. The answer to question No 2 should be that if the tenant pays the amount of rent in arrears within one month, he is immune from the liability to be evicted in that behalf and the case will also depend for decision on the question of costs only and in such an event, it may not be necessary for the tenant to show compliance of the second limb of section 13(1) of the Act till the decision of the suit.