JUDGMENT : S. Shamsul Hasan, J. 1. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing Annexure 16, the ORDER :dated 7-7-1979 and Annexure 19 the Award dated 10-7-1980 passed by the Labour Court, Ranchi, in Reference Case No. 4 of 1975. The writ petitioner is the Management of Marine Diesel Engine Project, Dhurwa, which is an unit of Garden Reach Workshop Limited. The workmen are represented by the Marine Diesel Engine Project Workers' Union, Respondent No. 3. The concerned workmen are Shri Indradeo Prasad, General Secretary of the Workers' Union and Shri Kamta Prasad Singh, Joint Secretary of the said Union. It may be stated that the writ petitioner is a Central Government undertaking and is admittedly a public limited company registered under Section 617 of the Indian Companies Act. By a supplementary affidavit, the writ petitioner has given details of the involvement of the Central Government in this Company. It is stated that this Company, previously known as Garden Reach Ship Builders and Engineers Limited, was purchased by the Central Government in the year 1960. The shares owned by the private owners were, thereafter, transferred to the Central Government in the name of the President of India and five other officials on his behalf. Out of 23,00,000.00 equity shares 22,99,995 were in the name of the President of India and one share each in the name of five officers, one of whom appears to be the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal. 2. Sifting the relevant from the irrelevant the facts leading to this writ application based on the pleadings of the parties in this Court are that one workman Shri G.L. Karan, was issued with a suspension ORDER :for the disobedience of a lawful ORDER :issued by Shri B.R. Das, Senior Production Engineer, under whom Shri Karan used to work. This was done on the 29th April, 1974 at about 11 A.M. At about 11.30 A.M. on the same day, Shri Indradeo Prasad, General Secretary and Shri Kamta Prasad Singh, Joint Secretary of the said Union along with 10-15 workmen entered into the office chambers of Shri B.R. Das, according to the petitioner, without his permission but according to the workmen having obtained prior permission from Mr. Das. The two other officers, according to the petitioner, were present. Das. The two other officers, according to the petitioner, were present. They were Shri S. Mukherjee and Shri J.D. Sarkar. Their presence, however, were denied by the workmen. Mr. Sarkar was physically pushed out from and Mr. Mukherjee wanted to go out of the room and proceeded towards the door to call the security personnel. In the meantime, on the refusal of Mr. B.R. Das to withdraw the suspension ORDER :of Mr. Karan, one workman, namely, Rambyas Singh banged his fists on the table, as a result of which the glass portion of the table was broken into pieces. Mr. Mukherjee then did not go out and turned toward Mr. Das. It is stated that Sri Indradeo Prasad pushed Mr. Das and assaulted him with fists and blows causing injuries on his face. On alarm being raised, the officers in the adjoining Chambers came to Mr. Das's Chambers and one Mr. Aukufer, a German Expert, intervened and pushed out the workmen from the Chambers of Mr. Das. The matter was reported to the Deputy General Manager and Mr. Das was also examined by the Medical Officer. Reports were also submitted by Mr. S. Mukherjee and Mr. J.D. Sarkar and then on the advice of the Deputy General Manager, Mr. Das lodged a first information report before the police and he also submitted injury report to the police. This version is denied by the workmen. They denied banging the table. The presence of Mr. Mukherjee is also denied. Action of Aukufer is also not accepted. They further stated that the injuries of Mr. Das was mainly as a result of conspiracy so as (sic) them in a case in ORDER :to (sic) rid of them for their union act (sic). The version of the workmen is chat on the date of occurrence they entered the room of Mr. Das after obtaining his permission and Shri Kamta Prasad Singh made enquiry from Mr. Das in respect of the suspension of Shri G.L. Karan, upon which, Shri B.E. Das, became angry and started abusing Kamata Prasad Singh, on which Kamta Prasad Singh protested. Mr. B.R. Das caught hold of him and inflicted blows of fists and slaps. Kamta Prasad Singh was taken to hospital and on his statement before the police, a case was started. According to Mr. Mr. B.R. Das caught hold of him and inflicted blows of fists and slaps. Kamta Prasad Singh was taken to hospital and on his statement before the police, a case was started. According to Mr. Das he was arrested because the Investigating Officer was the father-in-law of Shri Kamta Prasad Singh and this was done to humiliate him in the eye of public. According to the version of the workmen, the Investigating Officer is not the father-in-law of Kamta Prasad Singh and Mr. Das was arrested on the ORDER :of the Court since he was evading from appearing in court. Two criminal cases were started in one case Shri Das was acquitted by the trial court and in the other Shri Kamta Prasad Singh and Shri Indra Deo Prasad were convicted by the Judicial Magistrate and their appeals were also dismissed by the learned Judicial Commissioner Kanchi. They were, however, acquitted by this Court on the technical ground that there has been violation of Section 68(1) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, that is to say that the offences were triable by a Bench of Gram Kutchery. This Court further directed that it would be open to the complainant to file a fresh complaint in accordance with law before the appropriate authority. The Management did not file any further complaint. It is necessary to reproduce the report dated 29-4-1974 submitted by Shri B.R. Das to the General Manager which is Annexure 5 to this writ application which runs as follows:-- Today at about 11.45 Hrs. some workers from K.Z. Assyl. Machine Shop and Maintenance Department entered into my room and shouted for withdrawal of suspension ORDER :given to Mr. Karan. Out of all the men Mr. Kamta Prasad and Mr. Indra Deo asked me whether I would withdraw not at that moment the suspension ORDER :given to Sri Karan. On my refusal Mr. Kamta Prasad and Indra Deo Mr. started giving blows to me. They hammered with their fists and for a considerable time till Mr. Aukufer came in my room and removed all the men. Doctor came and examined me. Mr. R.B. Singh has given blows on the table and the glass of table was broken. Action may be taken against Mr. Kamta Prasad and Mr. Indra Deo. The report of Mr. They hammered with their fists and for a considerable time till Mr. Aukufer came in my room and removed all the men. Doctor came and examined me. Mr. R.B. Singh has given blows on the table and the glass of table was broken. Action may be taken against Mr. Kamta Prasad and Mr. Indra Deo. The report of Mr. S. Mukherjee against the workmen which is Annexure 5/1 to this application is as follows:-- Manager, MDEP A very sad incident occurred in our chamber on date at about 11.45 Hrs which I would like to bring to your kind notice. A group of workmen including Shri Indradeo Pd., Kamta Prasad Singh and Ram Byas entered our chamber and started shouting at Mr. B.R. Das for withdrawal of suspension ORDER :served on Mr. G.L. Karan. Mr. Das refused to withdraw the same and always insisted that he does not agree to talk to them on this issue. Shri J.D. Sarkar, who was already with Mr. Das for same work, was pushed towards the door by them then they slowly closed in around Mr. Das. Mr. K.P. Singh requested me to leave the room to avoid anything odd to me. With his statement I became suspicious and wanted our security personnel to intervene. As the telephone in our Chamber could not be approached by me I wanted to give a call from next chamber. For my exit the passage was cleared by them but no sooner than I reached near the door Shri Ram Byas Singh gave a blow on the table glass of Mr. B.R. Das and it was broken to pieces. With this I did not feel proper to leave the room and tried to re-enter but my entry was blocked by them. Then Shri K.P. Singh followed by Shri Indradeo Prasad started assaulting Mr. B.R. Das, (Sic) for a moment security immediately who followed by Mr. K. Sen were in their way towards our Chamber. In the meantime our German Expert rushed into the room and tried to get the people out. Messrs Gautam and Sen also entered the room in the meantime. When I could reach Mr. Das I found him in a state of shock leaning on his right side arm of chair. He was speaking painfully that 'I have been beaten. These people have beaten me,' and kept on repeating the same. Messrs Gautam and Sen also entered the room in the meantime. When I could reach Mr. Das I found him in a state of shock leaning on his right side arm of chair. He was speaking painfully that 'I have been beaten. These people have beaten me,' and kept on repeating the same. The remaining group left after that they rushed towards your chamber. The report of Mr. J.D. Sarkar against the workmen which is Annexure 5/2 to this application is as follows:-- The Manager, M.D.E.P., Ranchi. At 11.45 a.m. I was in Mr. Das's Chamber discussing something about my work. At that time quite a number of people of our Unit entered in his chamber and they started arguing with Mr. Das. Suddenly amongst them few people dragged me out of his chamber and when I tried to enter again they pushed me back and threatened me not to go inside the chamber. Amongst them I could recognise Shri Ram Byas Singh, Crane Operator, Shri Yadav, M/c. Shop etc. Mr. B.R. Das has witnessed this incident and I feel that this is a direct assault on me. This is for your information and necessary action. (Sd.) J.D. Sarkar. On the basis of this report, the charge-sheets were issued by the Management against Shri Kamta Prasad Singh and Indradeo Prasad and they were suspended with immediate effect. Charge-sheets are dated 29th April, 1974 and are Annexure 3 and 3/1 to this writ application. The relevant portion of the charge-sheet as against Shri Kamta Prasad Singh which is signed by Mr. S.K. Chatterjee, is as follows: It has been reported that on 29.4.1974 at 11.45 Hrs., you left your place of work without permission of your supervisor and entered the room of Shri B.R. Das, Sr. Production Engineer with a group of workmen demanded withdrawal of suspension ORDER :served by him on Shri G.L. Karan, Mech. intimidated him and physically assaulted the person of Shri B.R. Das. These constitute major misdemeanors on your part. Mr. Chandra Kumar signed the charge-sheet as against Shri lndradeo Prasad which runs as follows:-- It has been reported that on 29.4.74 at 1145 Hrs., you left your place of work without permission of your Supervisor and entered the room of Shri B.R. Das, Sr. These constitute major misdemeanors on your part. Mr. Chandra Kumar signed the charge-sheet as against Shri lndradeo Prasad which runs as follows:-- It has been reported that on 29.4.74 at 1145 Hrs., you left your place of work without permission of your Supervisor and entered the room of Shri B.R. Das, Sr. Production Engineer with a group of workmen, demanded withdrawal of suspension ORDER :served by him on Shri G.L. Karan, Mechinist, intimidated him and physically assaulted the person of Shri B.R. Das. These constitute major mis-demeanours on your part. Shri Kamta Prasad Singh gave his explanation which is Annexure 4 to this writ application, the relevant portion of which is as follows:-- That on 29.4.1974 I went to discuss the case of Shri G.L. Karan, Machinist in the capacity of workers representative (Jt. General Secretary of the Union) with prior intimation. I am surprised to see the suspension ORDER :and chargesheet levelled against me which is totally false. Shri Das himself misbehaved with me and he caught hold and assaulted. I got injury also then Dr. Y.M. Sinha referred me to H.E.C. Plant Hospital where I was admitted. The police also instituted a case against Shri Das. Hence, question of physical assault does not arise at all. So far the question of leaving the work place at 11.45 Hrs., does not arise, because as per Trade Union Act, I am a Jt. General Secretary of Registered Union and I have to deal with the Management regarding the problems of the workers as per the Trade Union Rules during the duty hours with prior appointment. Hence the allegation is also far from truth. The relevant portion of the explanation submitted by Shri Indradeo Singh, which is at Annexure 4/1 is as follows:-- That on 23.4.1974 at 11.45 Hrs. myself along with other workers approached Shri B.R. Das, Sr. Production Engg. on previously appointed time on 27.4.1974 at 1 p.m. while shift was closed. I approached Mr. Das for Mr. Karan's case then he asked to see on Monday that is 29.4.1974 in morning. At that time we approached him. Then he asked us to see after 11.30 Hrs. In the meanwhile, a letter of suspension was issued by his signature at about 11 Hrs. Thus, other workmen also became aggrieved and we approached Mr. Das for Mr. Karan's case then he asked to see on Monday that is 29.4.1974 in morning. At that time we approached him. Then he asked us to see after 11.30 Hrs. In the meanwhile, a letter of suspension was issued by his signature at about 11 Hrs. Thus, other workmen also became aggrieved and we approached Mr. Das accordingly in the capacity of workers' representative (General Secretary, M.D.E.P. Workers' Union), in connection with the said case. It is not the fact that we approached Mr. Das without permission. It is not a fact that myself along with other have ever intimidated or physically assaulted in person to Mr. Das. Rather Mr. Das started abusive language to us. Then Kamta Prasad Singh was caught hold by Shri B.R. Das and some blow on his abdomen parts of his body then we took him for medical treatment. Shri K.P. Singh was referred to H.E.C. Plant hospital by Dr. Y.N. Sinha, Medical Officer of the Company. 3. The Management not being satisfied with the explanation held domestic inquiry which was conducted by Captain P.G. Reddy of Indian Army. Proceeding of enquiry is Annexure 6 to this application. The details of the report will be referred to later on. Suffice it to say that the management after considering the reports and the proceeding of enquiry, dismissed the concerned workmen. Shri Kamta Prasad Singh and Shri Indradeo Prasad were dismissed by ORDER :s dated 4-7-1974 which are Annexure 8 and 8/1 respectively to this application. The concerned Union, thereafter, made an application before the Conciliation Officer where attempts of conciliation did not succeed. Thereafter, the State Government made a reference under Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial disputes Act (briefly the Act) to the Labour Court, Ranchi, by notification dated 8-3-1973 (Annexure-9) which is as follows:-- S.O.--whereas the Governor of Bihar is of opinion that industrial disputes exist or is apprehended between the management of M/s. Marine Diesel Engine Project, Dhurwa, Ranchi, and their workmen represented by Marine Diesel Engine Project Workers' Union, Dhurwa, Ranchi, regarding the matter specified in Annexure 4, annexed hereto:-- And whereas the Governor considers it desirable to refer the said dispute to adjudication. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(14 of 1947), the Governor of Bihar is pleased to refer the said dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court Ranchi, constituted in the State Government Notification No. III/DI-1204/67L & E--635, dated the 30th January, 1967 read with Notification No. S.O. 913 dated the 16th March, 1973. ANNEXURE 'A' Whether the dismissal of Sarvashri Indradeo Prasad, Rigger and Kamta Prasad Singh, Blue Printer Operator is proper and justified? If not, whether they are entitled to reinstatement or/and any other relief? The Labour Court first took up the question when the matter came up before it as to whether the domestic enquiry was properly conducted or not and by its ORDER :dated 7-7-1979 which is Annexure 16 to this application held that the domestic enquiry was not validly conducted. Parties, thereafter, were allowed to lead evidence in the Labour Court after which a final award WAS given on the 10th July, 1980 which is Annexure 19 to this application. The Labour Court also held that the Management has failed to prove the charges of misconduct against the workmen and, therefore, they were improperly dismissed and directed for their reinstatement with full back wages. These two ORDER :s, namely the ORDER :s dated 7-7-1979 and 10-7-1980 are impugned before us. 4. In this case, four broad points have been urged before this Court by Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. The first point urged by Mr. Roy is that the reference in view of the nature of inception and function of the Garden Reach Workshop Limited should have been made by the Central Government and not by the State Government. 5. In ORDER :to appreciate this point, Section 2(a)(i), (ii) of the said Act has been referred to by Mr. Roy. The words relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the dispute in this application are "any industry carried on by or under the authority of" the Central Government. In this case our attention has been drawn to several decisions of the Supreme Court. Mr. Roy. The words relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the dispute in this application are "any industry carried on by or under the authority of" the Central Government. In this case our attention has been drawn to several decisions of the Supreme Court. Mr. Roy on the basis of these decisions has submitted that a Company whether it is established under a statute or by a statute being an agency or an instrumentality of the Central Government, reference therefore, could be made only by the Central Government. Mr. B.C. Ghosh and Mr. S.B. Sinha learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 submitted that even if there is no distinction in view of the Supreme Court decision between a Company formed by a statute or under a statute, this only relates to the scope of the words "any other authority" in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. As far as Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act in concerned, the distinction, in other words, still exists between a Company formed under a statute and by a statute. The first decision relevant to the question placed before us is the case of (1) Heavy Engineering Mazoor Union v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1970 SC 82 . The question involved in this decision was exactly similar to the question to be considered in this case and like the present petitioner, the Management of Marine Diesel Engine Project, Dhurwa, the industry involved was of a similar character i.e. the Heavy Engineering Corporation. This decision deals with Section 2(a) of the Act. The scope of the words "appropriate Government" and "carried on by or under the authority of" were considered under this decision at a great length. It was held in that case that the words "carried on by or under the authority of" means pursuant to the authority such as where an agent or a servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master and not by any other instrument. It is appropriate to cite Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said decision in extense:-- 4. Before considering the authorities cited by counsel before us, we proceed first to examine the meaning of the words used by Parliament in the definition clause of 'appropriate Government'. It is appropriate to cite Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said decision in extense:-- 4. Before considering the authorities cited by counsel before us, we proceed first to examine the meaning of the words used by Parliament in the definition clause of 'appropriate Government'. It is an undisputed fact that the company was incorporated under the Companies Act and it is the Company so incorporated which carries oh the undertaking. The undertaking, therefore, is not one carried on directly by the Central Government or by any one of its departments as in the case of Posts and Telegraphs or the Railways. It was, therefore, rightly conceded both in the High Court as also before us that it is not an industry carried on by the Central Government. That being the position, the question then is, is the undertaking carried on under the authority of the Central Government. There being nothing in Section 2(a) to the contrary, the word 'authority' must be construed according to its ordinary meaning and therefore must mean a legal power given by one person to another to do an act. A person is said to be authorised or to have an authority when he is in such a position that he can act in a certain manner without incurring liability, to which he would be exposed but for the authority, or, so as to produce the same effect as if the person granting the authority had for himself done the act. For instance, if A authorises B to sell certain goods for and on his behalf and B does so B incurs no liability for so doing in respect of such goods and confers a good title on the purchaser. There clearly arises in such a case the relationship of a principal and an agent. The words "under the authority of" mean pursuant to the authority, such as where an agent or a servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master. Can, the respondent-company, therefore, be said to be carrying on its business pursuant to the authority of the Central Government. That obviously cannot be said of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act whose constitution, powers and functions are provided for and regulated by its memorandum of association, and the articles of association. Can, the respondent-company, therefore, be said to be carrying on its business pursuant to the authority of the Central Government. That obviously cannot be said of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act whose constitution, powers and functions are provided for and regulated by its memorandum of association, and the articles of association. An incorporated company, as is well known, has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation and from that date the persons subscribing to its memorandum of association and others joining it as members are regarded as a body incorporate or a corporation aggregate and the new person begins to function as an entity (C.F. Saloman v. Saloman and Co. 1897 AC 22.) Its rights and obligations are different from those of its shareholders. Action taken against it does not directly affect its share holders. The Company in holding its property and carrying on its business is not the agent of the shareholders. An infringement of its rights does not give a cause of action to its shareholders. Consequently, it has been said that if a man trusts a corporation he trusts that legal persons and must look to its assets for payment; he can call upon the individual shareholders to contribute only if the Act or charter creating the corporation so provides. The liability of an individual members is not increased by the fact that he is the sole person beneficially interested in the property of the Corporation and that the other members have become members merely for the purpose of enabling the corporation to become incorporated and possess only a nominal interest in its property or hold it in trust for him. (C.F. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed, Vol. 9, P. 9.) Such a company even possesses the nationality of the country under the laws of which it is incorporated, irrespective of the nationality of its members and does not cease to have that nationality even if in times of war it falls under enemy control. [C.F. Janson v. Driefontain Consolidated Mines, 1902 AC 484 and Kuenigl v. Donners Mark, (1955) 1 QB 515.] The Company so incorporated derives its powers and functions from and by virtue of its memorandum of association and its articles of association. [C.F. Janson v. Driefontain Consolidated Mines, 1902 AC 484 and Kuenigl v. Donners Mark, (1955) 1 QB 515.] The Company so incorporated derives its powers and functions from and by virtue of its memorandum of association and its articles of association. Therefore, the mere fact that the entire share capital of the respondent-company was contributed by the Central Government and the fact that all its shares are held by the President and certain officers of the Central Government does not make any difference. The Company and the shareholders being, as aforesaid, distinct entities the fact that the President of India and certain officers hold all its shares does not make the company an agent either of the President or the Central Government. A notice to the President of India and the said Officers of the Central Government, who hold between them all the shares of the company, would not be a notice to the company nor can a suit maintainable by and in the name of the Company be sustained by or in the name of the President and the said officers. 5. It is true that besides the Central Government having contributed the entire share capital, extensive powers are conferred on it, including the power to give directions as to how the company should function, the power to appoint directors and even the power to determine the wages and salaries payable by the company to its employees. But, these powers are derived from the company's memorandum of association and the articles of association and not by reason of the Company being the agent of the Central Government. The question whether a corporation is an agent of the State must depend on the facts of each case. Where a statute setting up a corporation so provides such a corporation can easily be identified as the agent of the State as in Graham v. Public Works Commissioner, (1901) 2 KB 731, where Philimore, J., said that the crown does in certain cases establish with the consent of Parliament certain officials or bodies who are to be treated as agents of the Crown even though they have the power of contracting the principals. In the absence of statutory provisions, however, a commercial corporation acting on its own behalf even though it is controlled wholly or partially by a Government department, will be ordinarily presumed not to be a servant or agent of the State. The fact that a minister appoints the members or directors of a Corporation and he is entitled to call for information, to give directions which are binding on the Directors and to supervise over the conduct of the business of the Corporation does not render the corporation an agent of the Government (See State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. V. Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatnam, (1964) 4 SCR 99 at P. 188 : AIR 1962 SC 1811 at page 1849) per Shah, J. and Tamlin v. Bannaford, (1950) 1 KB 18 at pp. 25, 26). Such an inference that the corporation is the agent of the Government may be drawn where it is performing in substance governmental and not commercial functions [C.F. London Country Territorial and Auxiliary Force Association v. Nichols, (1948) 2 All ER 432.] As I understand it this decision means that a distinction has been made between a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and regulated by its memorandum of association and articles of Association and those established by a statute and thereby controlled by its provisions. The former company is not an agency of the Government oven if the Central Government contributes the entire share capital and is empowered to give directions and determine various salaries payable by the company to its employees because these powers are derived from company's Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association, the latter company becomes an agent of the Government. The real point of distinction, as far as Section 2(a) of the Act is concerned, appears to be between a company governed by a statute and a company formed under the statute that is the company's acts controlled by Articles of Association and Memorandum of Association, Mr. Roy submitted that when subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have removed the distinction between a company incorporated under the statute and those formed by a statute for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, all companies thus become the agency or instrumentality of the Government and, therefore, the appropriate authority would be the Central Government. He has relied on the following decisions: (2). He has relied on the following decisions: (2). Ramana Dayaram Shetty, v. The International Airport Authority of India and others AIR 1979 SC 1628 . (3) The Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation and others v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC 840 . (4). Ajay Hasia etc. V. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others etc. AIR 1981 SC 487 . In my view there is no substance in this submission. So far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, the decision of the case of Heavy Engineering Corporation Mazdoor Union stands un-altered and as I understand it, the situation that emerges is this that even if a company is an instrumentality or an agency of the Government so far as Article 12 of the Constitution is concerned, for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act, the distinction still exists between the company controlled by a statute and a company governed by its Memorandum and Articles of Association. The words "any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government" in Section 2(a) of the Act clearly excludes a company controlled and governed by its Articles of Association and Memorandum of Association and formed under the Company Law. Mr. Roy relied on the following observations in the aforesaid decision. 'An inference that the corporation is the agent of the Government may be drawn whether it is performing in substance Governmental and not commercial function? Thus, according to him since this company is a company owned by the Central Government and is performing only Governmental functions it becomes an agent of the Central Government and it is that Government which is an appropriate authority. It may be stated, the averment that the petitioner company is performing only Governmental function has been denied by the respondents. As I have already held on the basis of the decision in 1970 Supreme Court, supra, merely being an agent of the Government and not enjoying any commercial function does not make any difference as far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned. My attention is also drawn to the case of (2) Ramana Dayaran Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 at page 1647 which has been relied upon also by the petitioner. My attention is also drawn to the case of (2) Ramana Dayaran Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 at page 1647 which has been relied upon also by the petitioner. It will be proper to refer in extense to paragraph 29 of the JUDGMENT :, which runs as follows:-- The second decision to which we must refer is that in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar (1969) 3 SCR 995 : AIR 1970 SC. 82 . The question which arose in this case was whether a reference of an industrial dispute between the Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) and the Union made by the State of Bihar under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was valid. The argument of the Onion was that the industry in question was 'carried on under the authority of the Central Government' and the reference could, therefore, be made only by the Central Government. The Court held that the words 'under the authority' mean 'pursuant to the authority, such as where an agent or a servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master' and on this view, the Court addressed itself to the question whether the Corporation could be said to be carrying on business pursuant to the authority of the Central Government. The answer to this question was obviously 'no' because the Corporation was carrying on business in virtue of the authority derived from its memorandum or articles of association and not by reason of any authority granted by the Central Government. The Corporation, in carrying on business, was acting on its own behalf and not on behalf of the Central Government and it was therefore, not a servant or agent of the Central Government in the sense that its actions would bind the Central Government. There was no question in this case whether the Corporation was an instrumentality of the Central Government and, therefore, an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12. We may point out here that when we speak of a Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government, we do not mean to suggest that the Corporation should be an agent of the Government in the sense that whatever it does should be binding on the Government. We may point out here that when we speak of a Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government, we do not mean to suggest that the Corporation should be an agent of the Government in the sense that whatever it does should be binding on the Government. It is not the relationship of principal and agent which is relevant and material but whether the Corporation is an instrumentality of the Government in the sense that a part of the governing power of the State is located in the Corporation and though the Corporation is acting on its own behalf and not on behalf of the Government, its action is really in the nature of State action. This decision dealing with an altogether different point has no bearing on the present issue. (Underlining by me) 6. The quotation above indicates that the decisions holding that all Companies whether incorporated under Section 617 of the Indian Companies Act or created by a statute are instrumentality and agents of the Government are limited to the scope of the words "other authority" in Article 12 of the Constitution of India and does not apply to Section 2(a) of the Act. The case of (5) M/s. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs. The Workmen ant others, AIR 1975 SC 1737 , was also placed before us by the respondents. This relates to M/s. Hindustan Aeronautic Ltd. The question was whether Karnataka, where the Head Office of the Company situate, or West Bengal, where a Branch Office situate, would be the appropriate authority to make a reference under Section 10 of the Act. In this decision it was held that since the dispute arose at Barrackpore, reference was rightly made by the West Bengal Government. In that decision it has been observed that 'no public company even if the shares were exclusively owned by the Government was attempted to be roped in the said definition'. 7. The net result is that since the petitioner company incorporated under Section 617 of the Indian Companies Act and is governed by its Articles and Memorandum of Association, the reference, therefore, has been rightly made by the State Government within whose jurisdiction the company is situate and which Government is responsible for maintaining the industrial peace. 8. 7. The net result is that since the petitioner company incorporated under Section 617 of the Indian Companies Act and is governed by its Articles and Memorandum of Association, the reference, therefore, has been rightly made by the State Government within whose jurisdiction the company is situate and which Government is responsible for maintaining the industrial peace. 8. In this connection it will be proper to state hero that an objection has been raised by the respondents that the aforesaid point, that is, the invalidity of the Reference not having been raised in the Labour Court could not, therefore, be raised here since, according, to the learned counsel for the respondent, the point, in fact was specifically raised in the written statement of the company but abandoned during trial. Consequently, the facts essential to substantiate the point was not brought on the record before the Labour Court and for the first time it was raised in the supplementary affidavit in this Court, which, according to them, could not be done. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that this point was never specifically raised before the Labour Court and it can be raised for the first time in this application since this involves the jurisdiction of the Court. Mr. Roy drew my attention to the case of (6) State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Sardar D.K. Jadav and another, AIR 1968 SC 1186 at page 1190, para 7 of the said JUDGMENT :. He relied on the following observations: It is well established that where the jurisdiction of an administrative authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact, the High Court is entitled, in a proceeding for a writ to determine upon its own independent JUDGMENT : whether or not that finding is correct? It cannot be disputed that in view of this decision, a High Court can decide the question of jurisdiction by going into the relevant facts but question, however, remains as to whether the facts which had to be raised before the Labour Court in the first instance but raised for the first time in this Court and that too not in the original writ petition but in a belated supplementary affidavit, some of which facts having been denied by the respondents, could be the basis of an inquiry. I feel that in a situation where the foundation for challenging the validity of the reference could only be based on certain facts and they were not properly brought before the appropriate court on an appropriate occasion it cannot be raised in the High Court. As far as I understand the aforesaid Supreme Court decision it does not apply to such a situation and it does not lay down the proposition that the question of jurisdiction could be decided on fact brought on the record for the first time at the High Court. It held that a High Court can go into the question of jurisdiction on facts that are already on record. The Supreme Court in the case of (7) Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others etc., AIR 1969 SC 1335 , clearly holds that the question of jurisdiction can be gone into on the basis of the facts on the record. Another aspect of the matter is that this point was specifically taken and then abandoned by the petitioner. Part A of the written statement (Annexure 10) filed before the Labour Court reads as follows: The Company submits that the present reference is bad in law, without jurisdiction and not maintainable. Other points were also taken in Part A of the said written statement filed on behalf of the petitioner before the Labour Court. In Annexure-12 which is the rejoinder filed by the petitioner to the written statement filed on behalf of the workmen in the Labour Court it has been stated that "the Company has raised certain points of jurisdictional objection to the maintainability of the instant pretended Government ORDER :of reference and/or the issue framed and referred thereunder and/or the proceedings so far taken thereon in its written statement as filed in the matter earlier and relied thereon." The Labour Court in its Award (Annexure 19 to this application) has stated as follows: The points raised by the management in Part A of the written statement and those raised in the rejoinder filed by them to the written statement of the workmen about the maintainability of the ORDER :of reference were not pressed by the management at the time of hearing. Therefore, it is needless to mention those points here. Therefore, it is needless to mention those points here. Therefore, in my view it is not open to the petitioner to raise this question at this stage particularly when the facts which formed the basis of the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner have been brought on the record for the first time in this Court and has not been accepted in its entirety by the respondents and is disputed. In the supplementary affidavit an attempt was made to show that the company is financed by the Central Government and is controlled by the Defence department and the amount of expenditure is approved in the budget of the Central Government relating to the Ministry of Defence and the accounts of this Company are placed before the Parliament and the entire production of this Company is meant for the use of the Central Government. The respondents have shown in reply that it is not correct that the entire supplies were made to the Defence Ministry and some commercial transaction has taken place. They have also shown that Section 196 of the Indian Companies Act applies to this Company and have submitted that providing for the amount in the budget of the Defence Ministry or placing the audited amount in the Parliament makes no difference. Having found the reference to be valid, there was really no need to go into this question that has been raised before this Court in detail but since it has been raised I thought it is desirable to deal with it. 9. The next question that has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Reference is bad in view of the language of the notification that "industrial dispute exists or is apprehended." This shows that the Government has not applied its mind at all and has made a reference without going into the matter. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner this is a mandatory requirement. One of the points taken in Part-A of the written statement, Annexure-10 to this application, in paragraph 6 is as follows: The Company submitted that the State Government did not apply its mind to the factual existence or apprehension of an Industrial Dispute and the ORDER :of reference is, therefore, illegal and inoperative. One of the points taken in Part-A of the written statement, Annexure-10 to this application, in paragraph 6 is as follows: The Company submitted that the State Government did not apply its mind to the factual existence or apprehension of an Industrial Dispute and the ORDER :of reference is, therefore, illegal and inoperative. This Labour Court has no jurisdiction to enter on the said purported reference or to adjudicate on the issues referred therein. As I have shown above all the points raised in the written statement in Part-A (Annexure 10) were not pressed before the Labour Court. It, therefore, could not be raised for the first time in this Court. Attention has also been drawn to a paragraph of the case of (8) the Management of Monghyr Factory of I.T.C. Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court Patna, AIR 1978 SC 1428 . In paragraph 11 Untwalia, J. has observed as follows: The relevant words to be extracted from the ORDER :of reference for deciding this point are the following: Whereas the Governor of Bihar is of opinion that an Industrial Dispute exists or is apprehended between the Management of the Imperial Tobacco Company of India Limited.........and their workmen represented by Tobacco Manufacturing Workers' Union.........Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) the Governor of Bihar is pleased to refer the said dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Patna....... The dispute referred was in the following terms: Whether the dismissal of Shri Ram Kishan Pathak is proper and justified? If not, whether he is entitled to reinstatement and/or any other relief? Mr. Pal's contention is that on the facts of the case either an industrial dispute existed or it could be a apprehended. It could not be both. It was necessary for the Governor to be satisfied about the one or the other, namely, whether the dispute 'exists or is apprehended.' The use of both the phrases in the ORDER :of reference demonstrates that there was no application of mind of the authorities concerned before making an ORDER :of reference. The point is not free from difficulty. The High Court repelled it relying upon its two earlier decisions. The point is not free from difficulty. The High Court repelled it relying upon its two earlier decisions. On a close scrutiny, however, on the facts of this case we do not feel persuaded to hold that the reference was bad for the alleged non-application of the mind of the Government. We would, however, like to observe that care should always be taken to avoid a mere copying of the words from the Statute while making an ORDER :of reference. Ordinarily and generally in a large number of cases, a reference is made when the Government finds that an industrial dispute is only apprehended or even there may be some where some disputes exist and some are apprehended. To keep an ORDER :of reference free from the pale of attack on such a ground, the Government will be well advised to specify one or the other in their ORDER :of reference. As observed in some of the cases of this Court, to be alluded to hereinafter, the Government should clarify the position and remove the ambiguity by filing a counter when the reference ORDER :is challenged on this ground. We are unhappy to note that neither the one nor the other was done in this case although the State was made a party respondent in the writ petition. Since in the instant case, the point was abandoned in the Labour Court, there is no need to go it no the question in any details. This decision, however, does not hold the reference to be invalid on this ground. In appropriate cases, however, the Government should undoubtedly follow the observations of the Supreme Court. Obviously, no counter was required to be filed by the State in view of the attitude of the petitioner before the Labour Court. 10. Learned counsel next challenged the finding of the Labour Court that the domestic enquiry was not properly conducted and that the impugned charges against the workmen could not be proved. He has also contended that if it is found that the Labour Court's finding with regard to the defective manner of the domestic enquiry is found to be improper then the whole award has to be set aside on the ground that the Tribunal could not have relied on the evidence led before it by the parties. This vitiates, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the entire proceeding before him. This vitiates, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the entire proceeding before him. In ORDER :to appreciate this point the law as it stood prior to the introduction of Section 11-A of the Act and after its introduction, therefore, has to be examined. (Section 11-A of the Act XLVIII of 1940). The scope of Section 11-A has been the subject-matter of elucidation in the case of (9) the Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. V. The Management and others, AIR 1973 SC 1227 . After discussing all the decisions of the Supreme Court starting from 1952 i.e. 1952 Lab AC 697; AIR 1964 SC 719 ; AIR 1965 SC 1803 ; AIR 1972 SC 136 ; AIR 1972 SC 1031 ; i.e. all prior to the introduction of Section 11-A of the said Act and then discussing the provisions contained in Section 11-A of the Act; the Supreme Court in paragraph 32 of the said JUDGMENT : has held as follows: We will first consider cases where an employer has held a proper and valid domestic enquiry before passing the ORDER :of punishment. Previously, the Tribunal had no power to interfere with its finding of misconduct recorded in the domestic enquiry unless one or other infirmities pointed out by the Court in (10) Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., 1958 SCR 667 : AIR 1958 SC 130 , existed. The conduct of disciplinary proceeding and the punishment to be imposed were all considered to be a managerial function which the Tribunal had no power to interfere unless the finding was perverse or the punishment of victimisation or unfair labour practice. This position "in our view, has now been changed by Section 11-A. The words in the course of adjudication, proceeding (Sic) the Tribunal is satisfied that the ORDER :of discharge or dismissal was not justified." In short, the Labour Court is now clothed with the power to re-appraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied upon by an employer established the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Labour Court that the finding of misconduct is justified or not. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Labour Court that the finding of misconduct is justified or not. The Limitation imposed on the powers of the Tribunal by the decision in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., 1958 SCR 667 : AIR 1958 SC 130 , can no longer be invoked by an employer. The Tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by the employer is correct, but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer, has ceased to be so and now it is the satisfaction of the Labour Court that finally decides the matter. It further held that Section 11-A of the Act did not take away that right of the management to sustain its ORDER :by, adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal, if no enquiry has been held or if the enquiry is held to be defective. It was also held in this decision while, discussing the scope of the proviso, the words 'material on the record' refers to the materials in the following manner:-- 1. the evidence taken by the management at the enquiry and the proceedings of the enquiry, or 2. the above evidence and in addition, any further evidence led before the Tribunal, or 3. evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time in support of the action taken by an employer as well as the evidence adduced by the workmen contra. This decision further held in paragraph 45 of the JUDGMENT : as follows:- The Legislature in Section 11-A has made a departure in certain respects in the law as laid down by this Court. For the first time, power has been given to a Tribunal to satisfy itself whether misconduct is proved. This is particularly so, as already pointed out by us, regarding even findings arrived at by an employer in an enquiry properly held. The Tribunal has also been given power, also for the first time, to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer. This is particularly so, as already pointed out by us, regarding even findings arrived at by an employer in an enquiry properly held. The Tribunal has also been given power, also for the first time, to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer. When such wide powers have been now conferred on Tribunal, the legislature obviously felt that some restrictions have to be imposed what matters could be taken into account. Such restrictions are found in the proviso. The proviso only emphasises that the Tribunal has to satisfy itself one way or other regarding misconduct, the punishment and the relief to be granted to workmen only on the basis of the 'material on record' before it. What those materials comprise of have been mentioned earlier. The Tribunal, for the purposes referred to above, cannot call for further or fresh evidence, as an appellate authority may normally do under a particular statute, when considering the correctness or otherwise of an ORDER :passed by a Subordinate body. The 'matter' in the proviso refers to the ORDER :of discharge or dismissal that is being considered by the Tribunal. The aforesaid decision has also been cited in the case of (11) Shankar Chakravarti V. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and another, AIR 1979 SC 1652 . As I read the above decision, I am inclined to hold that on the basis of materials available before the Labour Court, that court was empowered to differ with the finding arrived at in the domestic enquiry and also in regard to action taken against a workman by the Management on the basis of the enquiry. Even if no domestic enquiry is at all held or in the event of a domestic enquiry being found to be improper on the fresh evidence taken by the Labour Court, Section 11-A empowers the Labour Court or the Tribunal to decide the question according to his own satisfaction. It could do so without going into the question of validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry and if the domestic enquiry itself is impugned, then the authority after allowing the management to lead evidence in support of the domestic enquiry, the court after taking into consideration all the materials on record can come to its own finding on the action taken by the management. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Roy that if it is held that the domestic enquiry is not proper, then the fact that the Tribunal relied on the evidence recorded in that Court vitiate the enquiry. It may be borne in mind that once the domestic enquiry was challenged as being improper and the Management prayed for examining the witness, the court could not refuse the prayer of the management to adduce evidence. Once the management adduces such evidence, it is not open to them to say that the enquiry is vitiated on that ground. In view of Section 11-A even if the validity of the domestic enquiry is not assailed by the workmen, it was still open to the parties on the basis of the material before the Tribunal to challenge the action taken against the workmen. Before the introduction of Section 11-A once it was held that the domestic enquiry has been validly and properly conducted, the Labour Court could not interfere. That is not the situation new and the validity of the domestic enquiry can now be assailed before the Labour Court or the Tribunal. The contention of the petitioner, therefore, as I have stated above, has no substance. 11. The finding of the Labour Court has been challenged as perverse and improper and it has been submitted that it should be set aside. Before I proceed to deal with the submissions I like to cite the case of, (12) Syed Yakoob V.K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 . In Paragraph 7 of the said JUDGMENT :, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:-- The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of a certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals these are cases where ORDER :s are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without, jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals these are cases where ORDER :s are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without, jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where an exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the ORDER :, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding, Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised [vide Hari Vishnu Kamath V. Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233 ; Nagendra Nath V. Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi V. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .] In the case of (13) Central Bank of India Ltd. V. Prakash Chand Jain, AIR 1969 SC 983 , in Paragraphs 4 and 5 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: These decisions make it clear that, when an Industrial Tribunal is asked to give its approval to an ORDER :of dismissal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, it can disregard the findings given by the Enquiry Officer only if the findings are perverse. The test of perversity that is indicated in these cases is that the findings may not be supported by any legal evidence at all. This principle was further affirmed in a different context in State of Andhra Pradesh V.S. Sree Rama Rao, (1964) 3 SCR 25 : AIR 1963 SC 1723 , where this Court, in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, could interfere with the findings recorded by departmental authority in disciplinary proceedings taken against a Government servant. The Court held:- But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole Judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. In this connection, reference was also made to some cases where this Court has held that a finding by a domestic tribunal like an Enquiry Officer can be held to be perverse in those cases also where the finding arrived at by the domestic tribunal is one at which no reasonable person could have arrived on the material before the Tribunal. Thus, there are two cases where the findings of a domestic tribunal like the Enquiry Officer dealing with disciplinary proceedings against a workman can be interfered with, and these two are cases in which the findings are not based on legal evidence or are such as no reasonable person could have arrived at on the basis of the material before the Tribunal. In each of these cases, the findings are treated as perverse. It is in the light of these principles that we have to see whether the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in the present case, was justified in refusing to accord approval to the ORDER :of dismissal which was passed on the basis of the evidence recorded by the Inquiry Officer, Mr. Tipnis. The findings and conclusions of the Labour Court have now to be examined in the light of the above decisions. While holding that the enquiry was not proper by ORDER :dated 7-7-1979, the Labour Court has held that it cannot be ruled out that exhibit 1 is connected document. Its reason is that though the M.W. I had recorded the statements of the witnesses in his own hand, their statements which had formed a part of the inquiry proceedings were in type. The original enquiry proceeding was not produced before the Court. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the inquiry proceeding was signed by the workmen. The case of the workmen is that they were made to sign on a typed paper without the contents being known to them or explained to them. In this situation I hold that this finding of the court cannot be said to be perverse. It is true that the typed copies of the original proceedings can be produced but that must be those copies that are signed by the workmen and with full knowledge about their contents. The second ground relied upon by the Labour Court was regarding the procedure adopted in the domestic enquiry. It appears that firstly Sri C. Kumar and Sri S.K. Chatterjee made their statement regarding the facts of the case before the enquiry officer. The workmen thereafter submitted their written statement in reply to the statements made by the workers and they were thereafter subjected to cross-examination, described as "closely" by the Labour Court. Thereafter, both the workmen were examined and cross examined by Sri S.K. Chatterjee. The workmen thereafter submitted their written statement in reply to the statements made by the workers and they were thereafter subjected to cross-examination, described as "closely" by the Labour Court. Thereafter, both the workmen were examined and cross examined by Sri S.K. Chatterjee. Much stress had been laid on the word 'closely'. The learned counsel for the petitioner took us closely through the cross examination to show that the workmen were not closely cross-examined. In my view this is nothing short of hair splitting. After the cross-examination of the workmen, six witnesses were examined on behalf of the management. This procedure is clearly, against the rule of natural justice and the Labour Court was justified in relying on this reason to hold that the enquiry was improper. The Labour Court has relied upon the fact that one R.K. Brown's services were utilised to explain the enquiry proceeding to the workmen in Hindi. Sri R.K. Brown has not appeared before the Labour Tribunal to say that he was competent to explain the proceeding in Hindi, nor any endorsement has been made by him on the proceeding, to the effect that, he had explained the proceeding which was recorded in English. The Labour Court, therefore, was quite justified on these grounds, in holding that the enquiry, was not properly held. This enquiry, however, was really not necessary in view of Section 11-A of the Act. The court below could examine the whole matter and come to an independent finding regarding the dismissal of the workmen on the basis of the evidence. Prior to the introduction of Section 11-A of the Act, the court could not interfere with a proper domestic enquiry. The Labour Court has held that the management has failed to prove the allegation of misconduct against the concerned workmen and consequently has set aside the dismissal and has directed their reinstatement with full back wages etc. His reasons, shortly stated were that the Management has failed to prove the charges that the workmen had left the place of work without taking permission from their officers on 29-4-1974. The evidence of M.W. 2, J.D. Sarkar has not been accepted because in his report Exhibit B/4, dated 29-4-1974, Sri J.D. Sarkar had not mentioned the names of the concerned workmen, Sri Indradeo Prasad and Sri Kamta Prasad Singh. The evidence of M.W. 2, J.D. Sarkar has not been accepted because in his report Exhibit B/4, dated 29-4-1974, Sri J.D. Sarkar had not mentioned the names of the concerned workmen, Sri Indradeo Prasad and Sri Kamta Prasad Singh. He has further held that from the evidence of M.W. 1, it, appears that M.W. was not an eye witness. The Labour Court has further held that since M.W. 6 has admitted that he furnished injury certificate to Sri B.R. Das on 30-4-1974, on being asked to do so by the General Manager, the injury certificate appears to have been obtained from the doctor as an afterthought. While considering exhibit 3, the deposition of Sri M. V.R. Sharma, before the Magistrate in criminal proceeding the court has stated that Sri B.R. Das did not mention the names of the concerned workmen to the witnesses. Lastly, he states that the statements of Sri Aukufer does not establish the complicity of the concerned workmen in the incident alleged by Sri Das. While assailing these findings the learned counsel for the petitioner placed before us the entire evidence and desired that we should examine them as if we were hearing an appeal. On his insistent we went through the entire material placed by him. I am satisfied that the finding of the Labour Court is completely justified on the basis of the material before him and it cannot be styled as being perverse. It may be that two views were possible but that would not justify any interference with his findings. It was lastly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the court should not have ORDER :ed reinstatement and should have offered only compensation to the workmen. Several decisions of the Supreme Court have been cited to show that compensation could be given instead of reinstatement. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner compensation is the normal rule, reinstatement should be ORDER :ed only under exceptional circumstances. It is not necessary to discuss in detail the Supreme Court decision since the ratio of these decisions clearly means that an ORDER :of reinstatement or compensation will depend on the facts of each case. On the basis of these decisions one thing seems apparent that reinstatement should be denied to workmen only if there is exceptional circumstances such as the effect of reinstatement to industrial peace etc. On the basis of these decisions one thing seems apparent that reinstatement should be denied to workmen only if there is exceptional circumstances such as the effect of reinstatement to industrial peace etc. No evidence has been led in the court below and no averment has been made in this proceeding to show that the reinstatement of these petitioners will cause disruption of industrial peace or any law and ORDER :problem. The two workmen are the office bearer of the Union and it is not stated any where that they by their conduct will disrupt industrial peace and cause disruption in the smooth running of the industry. Merely making a demand for withdrawal of suspension ORDER :cannot justify such an interference. In any view, therefore, there is no reason to alter Labour Court's decision of reinstatement of the workmen directing the payment to them of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. In the result, there is no merit in this application and is accordingly dismissed with costs.