C. Munuswamy v. Sri Sarada College Educational Trust, represented by its Correspondent, Yathiswari. Sarada College, Salem
1981-12-22
S.SWAMIKKANNU
body1981
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The interesting point that confronts this Court in this civil revision petition is whether the burden of proof lies on the person who seeks the benefits under the agrarian Act which contained itself agrarian reforms or on the person who raised a contention that the petitioner who seeks the benefits is not entitled to the said benefits of the agrarian enactments that had emanated from the floor of the State Legislature as a reform giving certain benefits to the indebted agriculturist and agricultural labourer and small farmer in the State. In this regard, it is relevant to note that Act XXXI of 1976 (Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1976), contained a provision under section 12 regarding the burden of proof which was omitted by Tamil Nadu Act V of 1980. Therefore, it has become obligatory on the part of this Court now to observe about the burden of proof in a case where the respondent C. Munuswami claims benefit under Tamil Nadu Act XXXI of 1976 in his counter that he had filed with reference to R. E. P. No. 485 of 1979 in O. S. No. 115 of 1975, and subsequently filing another counter claiming benefits under the Tamil Nadu Act XIII of 1980. The lower Court while passing an order on 28th November. 1980 in this matter, viz., R. E. P. No. 485 of 1979 in O. S. No. 115 of 1975. On the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem, had observed that the respondent in R. E. P. No. 485 of 1979. viz, C. Munuswami cannot seek the benefit under either of these two enactments, and therefore, he has elected to claim the benefits only under Tamil Nadu Act XIII or 1980 by leading some evidence on this aspect and as such the entire evidence available on record so an as the appellant is concerned in this petition has to be looked into in that angle viz. whether C. Munuswami, the respondent in R. E. P. No. 485 of 1979 is entitled to the benefits under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act XIII of 1980 or not. 2.
whether C. Munuswami, the respondent in R. E. P. No. 485 of 1979 is entitled to the benefits under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act XIII of 1980 or not. 2. The petitioner Sri Sarada College Educational Trust represented by its Correspondent Yathiswari, Sarada College had let in evidence through its Correspondent’s Personal Assistant, P. W. 1 B. Viswanathan, stating that the respondent, Munuswami, herein has been working as a building contractor and as a matter of fact he had been getting only an annual income of more than what is contemplated as the minimum under the provisions of the Act XIII of 1980 and as such the respondent Munuswami is not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act XIII of 1980. He had been vehemently cross-examined on behalf of the respondent Munuswami. R. W. 2, Ramaswami was examined and as a matter of fact the respondent Munuswami himself has got into the box as R W. 1 and stated that he is getting an income which is less than the limit prescribed under provisions of Act X(II of 1980 viz., below Rs. 4,800 and as such he is entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the enactment. 3. It is relevant in this connection to note ‘debtor’ has been defined under Act XIII of 1980, under section 3 (d) as any person from whom any debt is due and whose annual household income exceeded, Rs. 4,000. There is no documentary evidence at all adduced in this case and the entire case rests on oral evidence available on record as mentioned above. 4. The point for consideration in this civil revision petition is by coming to the conculsion that the respondent Munuswami is not entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu Act XIII of 1930 whether the lower Court had committed any illegality or irregularity or exercised the jurisdiction which is not vested or exceeded its jurisdiction. 5. When the entire case is looked from the above angle, it is seen that P. W. 1, B. Viswanathan. Personal Assistant of the Correspondent of Sarada College, has deposed that he is the personal assistant of the petitioner who has filed this petition under Order 21, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, for proclaiming and selling the property in question.
5. When the entire case is looked from the above angle, it is seen that P. W. 1, B. Viswanathan. Personal Assistant of the Correspondent of Sarada College, has deposed that he is the personal assistant of the petitioner who has filed this petition under Order 21, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, for proclaiming and selling the property in question. In fact the order under revision has declared that the petitioner College is entitled to proclaim and sell the property in question. The petition under Order 21, rules 64 and 66 of the Civil Procedure Code, was filed by the petitioner with the allegation that the house in question exclusively belongs to the respondent revision-petitioner herein. The decree amount was Rs. 13,556.56 and interest on Rs. 13,144.93 at 9 per cent, from 27th February, 1975 to 10th August, 1979 had worked itself out to the tone of Rs. 1,500 totalling in all Rs. 17,056.56 and the cost was Rs. 1443.20. So the proceedings were taken by the decree-holder against the property of the judgment-debtor. 6. It is specifically stated by P. W. 1 Viswanathan personal assistant of the Correspondent of Sarada College Educational Trust that the house in question has been let out to a tenant so far as the upstairs portion is concerned and towards rent of the said portion of the house belonging to the judgment-debtor, a sum of Rs. 150 was being received by the respondent per month. According to P. W. 1 the house is worth Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 40,000. Nothing material has been elitcd in the cross-examination of P. W. 1 which will entitle the judgment-debtor revision-petitioner herein to uphold his contention that he is entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Act XIII of 1980. The self-interested testimony emanating from the revision petitioner herein as R. W. 1 cannot be given much weight as well as the evidence of R. W. 2 also in that his evidence discloses that he is interested in R. W. 1. Therefore, in coming to the conclusion that the revision petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Act XIII of 1980, this Court holds that the lower Court had not committed any error — much less illegality or irregularity or error regarding jurisdiction. 7.
Therefore, in coming to the conclusion that the revision petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Act XIII of 1980, this Court holds that the lower Court had not committed any error — much less illegality or irregularity or error regarding jurisdiction. 7. It is also relevant in this connection to refer in this judgment with reference to the case law on the subject by both the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sundaralingam, and Mr. Jagadeesan, learned counsel for the respondent have been of a much enlightening bearing and it is but necessary that these decisions should also form part of this Order. Mr. Sundaralingam referred to the decision in Messrs. Muthukumara Pillai Son v. T.N.V. Nilakantha Chettiar1, wherein it was held that the burden of proof under section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act is on the plaintiff that he has to prove that the defendents are assessed to income-tax and thereby deprive them of the benefits comtemplated under the said enactment. Mr. Sundaralingam also refers to the decision in Arumuga Nadar v. Kumara Pillai, represented by A. Rajagopal, Advocate2, for the proposition that so far as section 3 (2) of the Act IV of 1978 is concerned the aspect regarding the agricultural, agrarian or otherwise and the burden of proving the said aspect, is on the debtor. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Jagadeesan, the learned counsel for the respondent refers to the aspect that section 12 dealing with burden of proof in the Tamil Nadu Act had been deleted by the provision of Act V of 1980 which will enable us to understand that the burden of proof depends on each and every case as the facts of legal evidence exhibit themselves in a proceeding. He also refers to the decision in Chidambara Chettiar firm v. State of Tamil Nadu1, for the observation which runs as follows:- "In conclusion Mr. Venugopal pleaded that some of the terms of the enactment are most unreasonable and ruinous of the entire profession of money-lending and pawn-broking. Our attention was drawn particularly to section 4 (3) which requires a creditor to redeem the property from the possession of the transferee and produce it for being handed over to the debtor. After redemption the creditor is bound to return it to the debtor.
Our attention was drawn particularly to section 4 (3) which requires a creditor to redeem the property from the possession of the transferee and produce it for being handed over to the debtor. After redemption the creditor is bound to return it to the debtor. He also referred to section 12, which provides that the burden of proving that the debtor is not entitled to the protection of the Act lies on the creditor. It was submitted that the burden of proving that a person is entitled to some exemption from the operation of the Act is on the person who pleads exemption. It is virtually impossible for the creditor to prove that the debtor does not come within the exemption as the facts will be within the knowledge of the debtor and will not be available to the creditor. Those two provisions may make the position of the creditor difficult and from the point of view of money-lenders and pawn-brokers unreasonable. But that would not make the legislation invalid. If the petitioners want relief from the harsh provisions they will have to approach the Legislature and not the Court. Taking the interest of the community as a whole, there can be no doubt that the impugned legislation is a beneficial one." He submitted that in view of the above observations by the Court the provision under section 12 of the Act XXXI of 1970 was deleted by Tamil Nadu Act V of 1980. Mr.
Taking the interest of the community as a whole, there can be no doubt that the impugned legislation is a beneficial one." He submitted that in view of the above observations by the Court the provision under section 12 of the Act XXXI of 1970 was deleted by Tamil Nadu Act V of 1980. Mr. Jagadeesan also refers to the decision in Jagannatha Chettiar v. Padma Financial Corporation2, for the proposition that the person claiming protection under the Act need not prove that he is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Indebted Persons (Temporary Relief; Act, 1976 and that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that he was not entitled to the protection but yet by referring to this decision he would be dislodged to contend that each and every case has to be found with proper perspective in relation to the burden of proof and it cannot be as if that the burden of proof is only on a particular side whether it is on the side of the plaintiff or the defendant or the petitioner or the respondent or the claimant or the objector or the person who is being represented by the Government or by the quasi-Government organisation and he would further submit that the entire discretion of shifting the evidence as to the actual appreciation regarding the point at issue lies on the Court and it is the Court which has to come to a conclusion regarding the conferring of the benefits under the provisions of the special enactment and especially the omission of section 12 in the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1976 by the Tamil Nadu Act V of 1980 on the basis of the observations of the Court itself would reveal that the legal approach is one which has to be guided by the judicial discretion and not by the letter of the law as it is so far as the burden of proof is concerned. I am unable to reject the above said contention raised on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Jagadeesan as wholly unsustainable.
I am unable to reject the above said contention raised on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Jagadeesan as wholly unsustainable. The observation that has been made with respect to the burden of proof is applicable to this case in which there is no specific provision provided in the very enactment itself relating to burden of proof, because it is only the letter and spirit of the provisions of an enactment regarding the burden of proof that has to be given effect, but in the absence of the same it is only the discretion and of course, that discretion must be pure and simple a judicial discretion and nothing else. On a careful consideration of the respective contentions it is sufficient at this stage to state that this Court need not interfere with the order under revision and as such it becomes one which is not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court and as such the civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed but under the circumstances there is no order as to costs.