Judgment :- 1. The matters arise under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Disposal of Surplus Lands) Rules, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. The lands of one Vaiyapuri Pillai were the subject matter of proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act 58 of 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act. After the lands were declared as surplus under the Act, the concerned Authorised Officer, the third respondent in these writ petitions issued and published a notice in July-August, 1972 for the assignment of surplus land under R. 4 of the Rules and in Form B prescribed by the Rules. There was no response from any one to this call. Hence Form B notice was issued and published a second time in September-October, 1972. Form B notice specifically provides that the applications for assignment shall be made within 30 days from the date of publication of the said notice. Respondents 4 and 5 in W.P. Nos. 1286 and 1287 of 1979, respondents 4 and 5 in W.P. Nos. 2406 of 1979 and respondents 4 to 6 in W.P. Nos. 2327 and 2407 of 1979 submitted their applications for assignment beyond the period of 30 days prescribed by Form B notice. These respondents will be hereinafter referred to as the assignee-respondents. The records show that the applications by the assignee-respondents were received only in February-March, 1973. Form D Notice listing out applications for assignment and fixing a date for enquiry was issued and published in March-April, 1973. At or about this time, the owner of the land Vaiyapuri agitated the matter further under the Act by way of revision and the proceedings under the Act and the Rules were obviously stayed and the stay continued till April, 1976. The third respondent passed orders of assignments in favour of the assignee-respondents in April, 1976. The petitioner in W.P. Nos. 1286 and 1287 of 1979 pleading want of knowledge of the proceedings relating to assignments under the rules, made applications for assignment in April, 1976 after orders of assignment were passed as aforesaid. On similar basis, the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2327 and 2407 of 1979 made their applications for assignment in December, 1976. As against the orders of assignment in favour of the assignee-respondents, the petitioners agitated the matter by way of appeals before the District Revenue Officer concerned, the second respondent in these Writ Petitions. On similar basis, the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2327 and 2407 of 1979 made their applications for assignment in December, 1976. As against the orders of assignment in favour of the assignee-respondents, the petitioners agitated the matter by way of appeals before the District Revenue Officer concerned, the second respondent in these Writ Petitions. They could not succeed in appeals and therefore, the petitioners preferred revisions to the Land Commissioner, the first respondent in these writ petitions and the first respondent has also not countenanced the case of the petitioners. The orders of respondents 1 to 3 are being impugned in the present writ petitions. 2. The main contention urged by the petitioners before the second respondent and which is being repeated before me is that the assignments in favour of the assignee-respondents could not be sustained because the very applications for assignments were presented beyond the time prescribed and if the assignments in favour of the assignee-respondents were to be ignored on this basis, the question of assignment of the surplus land has got to be considered afresh, affording an opportunity to all concerned including the petitioners in this behalf. Now there is no dispute that the applications by the assignee-respondents were in fact presented beyond the time prescribed. In Vadivel Servai & others v. The Land Commissioner and others, 1 a Bench of this Court to which I was a party, held that the statutory rules compel the Authorised Officer, to fix a last date for receipt of applications for assignment of surplus lands and the applications filed beyond the time prescribed are liable to rejected on that ground. The same ratio has been reiterated by another Division Bench of this Court in The Land Commissioner, and another v. Udayakumar. 2 It is true the said two Bench Judgments dealt with Form B prescribed under R. 4 of the Rules and the scope of R. 8 of the rules. It has been found that the very Form B enjoins upon the Authorised Officer to fix a date within which applications called for, are to be received. R. 8 (1) refers to the preparation of the list of the applications received as soon as may be after the expiry of the time allowed for the presentation of the applications for the assignment of surplus land. 3. R. 8 (1) refers to the preparation of the list of the applications received as soon as may be after the expiry of the time allowed for the presentation of the applications for the assignment of surplus land. 3. The two judgments of the Division Benches considered the rules prior to an amendment introduced to R. 7 of the rules in February, 1974. On 11th February, 1977 by G.O.Ms. 601, Revenue, an amendment has been introduced to R. 7 of the rules stating that every such application shall be made within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notice under R. 4 in the village or town where the land is situated. This amendment has merely reiterated the position which was already evident in the rules and as countenanced by the two Bench Judgments of this Court. The proviso to R. 7 could also be of no avail to the assignee-respondents because the discretion is there only to allow further time not exceeding fifteen days, and admittedly the applications of the assignee-respondents were even beyond this fifteen days’ time. If the assignments in favour of the assignee-respondents could not be countenanced and allowed to stand on the first principle that they were applicants beyond time, then the land must be deemed to be still available for the purpose of being dealt with afresh for assignment under the rules. The ratio of the two judgments of the Division Benches of this Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case with reference to the assignments in favour of the assignee-respondents. This is sufficient for interference in writ jurisdiction. 4. But, Mr. D. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the assignee-respondents in W.P. Nos. 1286 and 1287 of 1979 would submit that the petitioners themselves did not present any application for assignment within the time prescribed and hence they have no locus standi to question the assignments in favour of the assignee-respondents. For this proposition, learned counsel relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Jit Singh v. State of Punjab 1. I am afraid that the proposition countenanced by the Supreme Court in that decision could have no application to the facts of the present case. For this proposition, learned counsel relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Jit Singh v. State of Punjab 1. I am afraid that the proposition countenanced by the Supreme Court in that decision could have no application to the facts of the present case. There it was found the petitioners themselves were not qualified for promotion and had no legal right for promotion before the respondents and hence the petitioners were not entitled to succeed in their claims in the writ petition. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the ingredients of eligibility of assignment of the surplus land. We are concerned with the very presentation of the applications for assignments. The statutory rules and the form prescribed spell out a mandate that the applications received beyond the time prescribed will not have countenance and the applicant who comes beyond the prescribed time has no audience for considering his claim for assignment. On a proper interpretation of the rules, it has to be laid down that the assigning authority will have no jurisdiction to entertain such applications. If assignments have been made countenancing applications which were preferred out of time, they cannot have any sanctity in law and cannot be upheld and have to be ignored. The result is, the land must be deemed to be available for the purpose of being considered for assignment afresh. The petitioners can definitely give vent to their grievance in this behalf and covet assignments afresh and the mere fact that the applications for assignments by the petitioners were also received out of time, in the instant case, after orders of assignment had been passed will not alter the legal position that the assigning authority has no jurisdiction and competency to countenance out of time applications of the assignee-respondents and such orders of assignments should fall to the ground. In view of the above legal position, these writ petitions are allowed and the orders of the respondents 1 to 3 are quashed and it is open to the authority or authorities concerned, to initiate proceedings afresh for assignment and deal with the question of assignment of surplus land in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.