ORDER N. D. Ojha, J. - Respondent No. 3 Smt. Munni Devi is the landlord of premises No. 26/45 Birhana Road, Kanpur, of a portion of which the petitioner is the tenant. An application was made by respondent No. 3 in August, 1976, for release of the aforesaid accommodation under section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The case which was set up by respondent No. 2 in this application was that she had three sons, Rajesh Kumar, Rakesh Kumar and Sanjay Kumar, out of whom Rajesh Kumar and Rakesh Kumar had completed their education and that she wanted to settle them in business. The application was contested by the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the three sons of respondent No. 3 and her husband Daulat Ram were carrying on a sweatmeat shop in partnership in the name of Budhson Sweet House, that Rajesh Kumar, the eldest son of respondent No. 3 was also working with his father Daulat Ram in another business of manufacturing exhaust fans and water pumps carried on by him in the name of Universal Corporation, and consequently it was not right for respondent No. 3, to contend that her three sons needed to be settled in business. As seen above it was apparent from the release application itself that Sanjay Kumar, the youngest of the sons of respondent No. 3, was still a student and was not stated to have completed his education in the year 1976 when the application for release was filed. From paragraph 4 of the replication filed by respondent No. 3 in reply to the written statement of the petitioner it was stated that Rajesh Kumar viz. ; the eldest of the sons of respondent No. 3, left his studies in or about 1973, that Rakesh Kumar passed Intermediate examination in 1978 and Sanjay Kumar passed High School examination in the same year. From this paragraph it further appears that even Rakesh Kumar had not completed his studies in the year 1976 when the application for release was made and averment to the contrary in the said application does not appear to be accurate. From this paragraph it further appears that even Rakesh Kumar had not completed his studies in the year 1976 when the application for release was made and averment to the contrary in the said application does not appear to be accurate. The release application, however, came up for decision after about four years and seems to have been decided on the basis of the facts as they existed on the date of its decision. Indeed the petitioner bad filed its written statement in April, 1980 the replication of respondent No. 3 was filed in July, 1980 and issues seen to have been framed by the Prescribed Authority thereafter. Both the parties went to trial knowing each others case as put up at the stage of its decision and produced evidence on that footing. After hearing the parties the Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 2, allowed the application for release on 2nd Decmber, 1980 on the findings that need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 was bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to her in the event of the release application being dismissed than the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner in the event of the said application being allowed. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge which was dismissed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Kanpur. respondent No. 1, 20th May, 1981. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 2, and the Additional District Judge, respondent No. 1, have both committed a manifest error of law in ignoring vital aspects of the case as well as relevant evidence material for the decision of the case. It has also been urged that burden of proof in regard to some crucial points has erroneously been placed by these authorities on the petitioner. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties at some length I am of opinion that the impugned orders for the reasons to be given shortly cannot be sustained. 4. As already pointed out above the main ground on which the application for release had been made by respondent No. 3 was that her sons had completed their education and were to be set up in business. 4. As already pointed out above the main ground on which the application for release had been made by respondent No. 3 was that her sons had completed their education and were to be set up in business. It was not her case that even though her sons were carrying an some business or were in employment, their income was not sufficient and the accommodation in question was needed for carrying on additional business to augment their income. However, in view of the facts stated by the petitioner in its written statement that all the three sons of respondent No. 3 were carrying on business partners with their father in the name of Budhson Sweet House, and that the eldest son of respondent No. 3, viz., Rajesh Kumar, was also working with his further in his business carried on in the name of Universal Corporation as well and from the facts stated in the replication filed by respondent No. 3 and the discussion in the impugned orders it is apparent that the case was really fought out on the ground that even though the sons of respondent No. 3 were not completely unemployed as was asserted in the release application and were carrying on business in partnership in the name of Budhson Sweet House and one of them was also working with his father in the business carried on by him in the name of Universal Corporation, the income which they were receiving was not sufficient and that they still needed the accommodation in question for carrying on the business specified in the release application. When the case was being decided on this basis the question as to what was the income which each of the sons of respondent No. 3 was having and what was the extent of their participation and occupation in the existing business assumed significance. Reference in this behalf may usefully be made to a decision of this Court in Radha Kishan v. The State of U. P. and others, 1981 All. R.C. 80. 5. The other significant matter which had to be considered was the extent of the accommodation already at the disposal of the landlord. Reference in this behalf may usefully be made to a decision of this Court in Radha Kishan v. The State of U. P. and others, 1981 All. R.C. 80. 5. The other significant matter which had to be considered was the extent of the accommodation already at the disposal of the landlord. A finding on the basis of the evidence produed by the parties was necessary to be given on the point as to whether the accommodation at the disposal of the landlord was sufficient for the deeds of her sons as asserted by the petitioner. The cause of the petitioner in brief was that the business of manufacturing exhaust fans and water pumps in the name of Universal Corporation is being carried on in an independent accommodation which lies in a factory area. There is a dispute about the extent of the said accommodation. It has been accepted by the landlord in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court that even on the ground floor of premises No. 26/45 Birhana Road, Kanpur, there is some accommodation which is being used as office of the Universal Corporation by the husband of respondent No. 3, and that two per-rooms on the first floor of this house are being used by the husband of respondent No. 3 for the purpose of storing goads manufactured in the Universal Corporation. There seems o have be.n a dispute about the extent of the accommodation in occupation of respondent No. 3 in premises No. 26/45 aforesaid as also that in which the sweetmeat shop in the name of Budhson Sweet House is being carried on. It has been urged for the petitioner that the area where the accommodation in dispute is situate in Kanpur is essentially a commercial area and shops are being successfully run even on the first floor. It has been asserted, and in my opinion rightly, that the authorities below should have in this background applied their mind to this question as to why at least the two rooms on the first floor of premises No. 26/45 which were beingused as godown could not be used for carrying on business by the sons of respondent No 3. It was pointed out that the factory of the Universal Corporation and its office being admittedly situate at two different places one person was needed to attend the factory and another the office. It was pointed out that the factory of the Universal Corporation and its office being admittedly situate at two different places one person was needed to attend the factory and another the office. It was also pointed out that keeping in view the large scale at which Budhson Sweet House was being run at least two, if not more, persons, were required to attend to this shop. According to counsel for the petitioner each of these assignments was in the very nature of things a wholetime job and it was preposterous to say that the husband of respondent No 3 was alone attending to all the said jobs. It was urged that looked at from this point of view the accommodation at the disposal of respondent No. 3 was sufficient for the needs of her husband and all her three sons. 6. A persual of the order of respondent No. 2 indicates that the said respondent has not applied its mind to the question about the extent of accommodation already at the disposal of respondent No 3 and as to whether it was sufficient for her need, in its proper perspective as pointed out by counsel for the petitioner. Respondent No. 1 on the other hand seems to have completely overlooked this crucial aspect of the matter. In Kanha v. Deputy Director of Consolidations, AIR 1976 Allahabad 91, it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that if it appears that a court of fact has in substance based its finding on no evidence or that is finding is perverse in the sence that no reasonable person could possibly come to that conclusion or that it erroneously ignores a vital plea or material evidence which effects the result, a manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record leading to failure of justice can be said to be established. 7. It may also be pointed out that the case of the petitioner specifically was that whereas Rajesh Kumar was working with his father in the Universal corporation Rakesh Kumar and Sanjay Kumar were sitting on the shop carried on in the name of Budbsen Sweet House. The Additional District Judge has not recorded any finding one way or the other on this point. The Additional District Judge has not recorded any finding one way or the other on this point. The case of the petitioner apparently was that keeping in view the extent of the business carried on by the husband of respondent No. 3 it was clear that her all the three sons were engaged wholetime in the said business and a finding on this aspect of the matter was essential to have been recorded. 8. The submission made by counsel for the petitioner that the impugned orders suffer from a manifest error of law even on the point as to what was the income of the three sons of respondent No. 3 is also well founded. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition it has been stated that the annual turnover of the Universal Corporation was approximately rupees fifteen lacs. Paragraph 20 of the counter-affidavit contains the reply to this paragraph. The aforesaid assertion does not appear to have been specifically denied-nor has any different income of the Universal Corporation been given in the said paragraph. Likewise in paragraph 3 of the writ petition it has been stated that the annual turnover of Budhson Sweet House is about rupees eight lacs. Reply to this paragraph is contained in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit. It has been stated therein that the sale as per assessment of Budhson Sweet House is not more than Rs. 1.5 lacs and total income out of it is below rupees twenty thousand and that "the courts below had examined the accounts and assessment order and came to the conclusion that income of the sons of the landlady is not more than Rs. 400/- per month out of the business." Neither in the judgment of the Prescribed Authority nor of the Additional District Judge there is any reference to any order of assessment or of any account books which may have been produced by respondent No. 3 and taken into consideration by these authorities. On the other hand these authorities seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the three sons of respondent No. 3 were getting Rs. 400/- each as partners from the Budhson Sweet House on the basis of some affidavit filed by the husband of respondent No. 3. On the other hand these authorities seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the three sons of respondent No. 3 were getting Rs. 400/- each as partners from the Budhson Sweet House on the basis of some affidavit filed by the husband of respondent No. 3. The Additional District Judge has turned down the assertion of the petitioner that the three sons of respondent No. 3 were having huge income from the Universal Corporation and the Budhson Sweet House on the ground that the petitioner had failed to produce any concrete evidence and what was stated by him was based on imagination. In this connection it would be seen that the account books both of Universal Corporation and Budhson Sweet House were in the custody of either the husband of respondent No. 3 or of her three sons. These account books constituted the best evidence to indicate as to what was the income which was being derived from these two establishments and what was being paid by the father to each of his three sons. It is settled law that burden to prove his bona fide need is on the landlord. What was the actual income from the two establishments referred to above was exclusively in the knowledge of either the husband of respondent No. 3 or of her sons. In Hiralal v. Badkulal, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 225. while dealing with a suit for recovery of amount due on the basis of adjustment of accounts signed by the defendant correctness of which had been denied by the defendant it was held that the defendant who was in possession of account books kept by him from which the balance could be ascertained should have produced them before the Court and be could not be heard to say, relying upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof, that it was no part of his duty to produce them unless he was called upon to do so. In this view of the matter when in the changed circumstances, pointed out above, the question as to whether the three sons of respondent No. 3 really needed the accommodation in question for additional business because the income which they were already having was insufficient had assumed importance, it was the duty of respondent No. 3 to have produced the account books so that a correct finding could be recorded in this behalf. This, however, was not done. In the very nature of things it was not possible for the petitioner to give any concrete evidence in regard to the actual income which the three sons of respondent No. 3 were having from the aforesaid two establishments. In this connection it may also be pointed out that respondent No. 1 in his impugned order has also stated that Rajesh Kumar, the eldest son of respondent No. 3 "hardly earns a bare Rs. 400/- per month from that Corporation" meaning thereby from Universal Corporation. Counsel for respondent No. 3 has not been able to point out say evidence on the basis of which this finding was given by respondent No. 1. 9. The authorities below have committed a manifest error of law in considering the question of comparative hardship also. The petitioner asserted to have been carrying on business in the premises in dispute since the year 1959, i.e. for about 21 years, when the case was decided by the Prescribed Authority. Rule 16(2)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 reads as follows : "16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement : (2) .................................................................................... (a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that buildings, the less the justification for allowing the application ............... " Respondents 1 and 2 do not appear to have applied their mind to this aspect of the matter. 10. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 2nd December, 1980 and 20th May, 1981 passed by respondents 1 and 2 respectively are quashed and the Prescribed Authority is directed to decide the release application afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Since the Officer acting as Prescribed Authority who passed the impugned order dated 2nd December, 1980, has already expressed his opinion in the matter, the District Judge, Kanpur, will nominate some other officer as the Prescribed Authority to decide the release application. The parties are agreed that they may be permitted to adduce additional evidence and they shall, accordingly, be permitted to do so. The parties are agreed that they may be permitted to adduce additional evidence and they shall, accordingly, be permitted to do so. Since about five years have already elapsed since the release application was filed the Prescribed Authority shall decide it as expeditiously as possible. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.