Judgment :- 1. This revision has been preferred by the landlord under the following circumstances: He filed H. R. C. No. 3118 of 1979 seeking eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for own occupation for non-residential purposes, as contemplated under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. In the petition it was averred as follows in paragraph 4: "The petitioner further states that he is carrying on a business under the name and style of Thillai Nataraja Industries in a rented house at premises No. 6, Seeyal-amman Koil Street, Chintadripet, Madras-2. The petitioner is not having a building of his own to carry on his own business. The rented building is not convenient to improve his business. Further, the owners of the rented building want the same for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction. The petitioner is not having any other house of his own to carry on the business in the City of Madras except the building under the occupation of the respondent." 3. It should be noted at this stage that the petitioner is a minor represented by his father as guardian. This important fact looms large, as will be seen below. The contention of the tenant inter alia was that the need was not bona fide. During the course of evidence it was brought out the a partnership deed, Exhibit P-12 was entered into on 6th May, 1978, and the petition for eviction itself came to be filed on 27th September, 1979. The case during the course of the evidence was the minor had been admitted into the partnership and the property belonging to the minor is sought for purposes of the partnership business. 4. The Rent Controller was of the view that the bona fide need had been made out and accordingly he ordered eviction. 5. On appeal, the Appellate Authority went into the question as to the definition of member of landlord’s family as contained under section 2 (6-A) of the Act. According to him the requirement by a minor for the purpose of his father’s business as a member of his family cannot fall within the scope of section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. Consequently he vacated the order of eviction and allowed the appeal. Thus, the revision. 6. According to him the requirement by a minor for the purpose of his father’s business as a member of his family cannot fall within the scope of section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. Consequently he vacated the order of eviction and allowed the appeal. Thus, the revision. 6. The learned Advocate-General contends that where the partnership itself runs the business, of which the minor is a partner, certainly after the execution of Exhibit P-12, for purposes of the partnership business the premises could be sought. I put a straight question to the learned Advocate General whether the minor could represent the partnership? Because, it is well-settled, as seen from section 30 of the Partnership Act, that a minor by himself cannot be a partner, He can only be admitted to a partnership. Very fairly he cites before me the decision reported in M. AR.RM. P. M Chidambaram Chettiar and others v. National City Bank of New York1, and invites my attention to the following passage at pages 708 and 709: "The first question is: Does the procedure prescribed by Order 30 in regard to suits against a firm in the firm name apply? In the first place, it is impossible to regard the minors as constituting a partnership firm. In the Partnership Act, 1932, ‘partnership’ is described as the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business (S-4). The next section goes on to say that the relation of partnership arises from contract and not from status. It follows that a minor, who is incapable of contracting, cannot be a partner. Further, it is incomprehensible that four persons, who were all minors, can agree with each other to form a partnership. Then turning to section 30 it enacts that a minor can never be a partner, although ‘he may be admitted to the benefits of the partnership’. Under the section the adult partners, by a contract between themselves, can agree to confer this benefit upon a minor ; in other words, the relation of partnership is the result of contract and where any benefit is reserved to a minor, that arises not from a contract with the minor but between the adult partners. From this the necessary inference is, that there must be at least two adult partners who are capable of contracting before a minor is entitled to the benefits of partnership. From this the necessary inference is, that there must be at least two adult partners who are capable of contracting before a minor is entitled to the benefits of partnership. The language of section 30 is perfectly clear and it expressly enacts that even where some benefit is reserved to a minor, he is not a partner, the only partners composing the firm being the adult members If therefore a suit is brought, under the procedure laid down in Order 30 against a partnership firm where a minor has been admitted to some kind of benefit, to such a suit the minor can in no sense be regarded as a party. Order 21, rule 50, Civil Procedure Code, provides that where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted against any property of the partnership; the reason for making the partnership property liable is not that the minor has been sued but that under the law the partnership property is liable for the debts of the firm. As Lord Horschell, L.C. observed in Lovell v. Beauchamp1 "The adult partner is however entitled to insist that the partnership assets shall be applied in payment of the liabilities of the partnership and that until these are provided for, no part of it shall be received by the infant partner." 7. In English law, there is nothing to prevent an infant becoming a partner, but even there it has been held in the case just cited, that when a suit is brought against a firm under Order 48 (a) corresponding to Order 30 of our Code, the judgment to be passed should be against the firm other than the minor partner; but that cannot affect execution against the partnership property: see also Harris v. Beauchamp Brothers2. For the position, that under the Indian law a decree, against a partnership firm, cannot be regarded as a decree against the minor who has been admitted to some benefit, it is unnecessary to rely upon the decision, already mentioned. of the House of Lords; for section 30, Partnership Act places the matter beyond doubt. We may in this connection also mention that” under the Code, as under the English law, when a decree has been obtained against a firm in the firm name, execution may be levied against the partnership property, notwithstanding the fact that a minor possesses some interest. We may in this connection also mention that” under the Code, as under the English law, when a decree has been obtained against a firm in the firm name, execution may be levied against the partnership property, notwithstanding the fact that a minor possesses some interest. It is unnecessary to pursue this matter, as Mr. Rajah Iyer, the respondent’s learned counsel, urges that the suit should be regarded as in effect having been brought under rule 10, of Order 30. The whole of the order is a reproduction, almost verbatim of the rules comprised in Order 48 (a) of the English Rules. Rule 10 of Order 30 is modelled on Order 48 (a), rule 11, the corresponding English provision. That rule applies, it has been held in England to a single individual who carries on business under an assumed or trading name (The Annual Practice (1936) p. 891; St. Gobain Chauny & Cirey Company v. Hayermant’s Agency3 and Mac Iver v. G. & J. Burns4). Rule 10 of Order 30 stands in marked contrast with rule 1. The latter rule applies to ‘any two or more persons’ whereas rule 10 refers to ‘any person carrying on business’. There is no reason to depart from the view taken in the English cases and we must hold that rule 10 is applicable only to the case of a single individual. In this case, the so-called assumed name is said to be the name of the business owned by the four minors and the rule is, in our opinion, utterly inapplicable. It is further open to doubt whether the rule can apply to a minor at all, when what is alleged is, that the business is carried on his behalf by a guardian. The rule contemplates ‘any person carrying on business’ and as we have said, it is doubtful whether a minor alleged to be trading through his guardian answers this description. 8. The above extract clearly shows that a petition cannot be maintained at the instance of minor who has no legal capacity to represent the partnership. I should say, by and large it is the over-anxiety of the landlord which had brought woe upon him, The reason is, nothing prevented the parties to go on with the pleading as contended, as though the minor was doing the business. I should say, by and large it is the over-anxiety of the landlord which had brought woe upon him, The reason is, nothing prevented the parties to go on with the pleading as contended, as though the minor was doing the business. That was actually what was averred, to which I have made a reference earlier. But suddenly that case was given a go-by and Exhibit P-12 was introduced and evidence was adduced by the father appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the partnership needs the premises. (That being so, the petition for eviction can-not be maintained at the instance of the parnership by a minor. Therefore, on this very simple ground, without going into the other contentions, the civil revisions, petition is dismissed. No costs. 9. The learned Advocate-General states that very soon the revision petitioner is likely to attain majority, in which event he should not be precluded by the dismissal of this civil revision petition. This will be so. As and when he attains majority and if he makes out a case of need of the partnership, then the matter will be decided on merits uninfluenced by the judgment in this civil revision petition. 10. As regards the other question, namely whether a valid renewal of Exhibit P-11 had taken place or not, that is a matter which has to be decided in separate proceedings. Any observation made herein is only for the purpose of rent control proceedings and that cannot be binding in other proceedings if and when they come to be taken. Therefore, to this extent the finding is vacated and the same can be traversed in separate proceedings.