JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 19th August 1980 passed by Oza J. allowing Misc. Petition No. 275 of 1978. ( 2. ) THE facts briefly stated are that respondent No. i R. D. Saxena was employed as Upper Division Clerk in the Cost Accounts Section of the appellant at Bhopal. On 27th April 1965 the respondent was transferred to the liaison and Purchase Office at Bombay. The respondent applied on 11th august 1965 to the Labour Court challenging the order of transfer. The respondent was intimated on 23rd August 1965 that he overstayed leave and he must be deemed to have left the service of the appellant Company in accordance with Standing Order 42 (10 ). The respondent then amended the application pending in the Labour Court for challenging the termination of his service. The Labour Court by order dated 11th September 1968 dismissed the application. A revision against this order was dismissed by the Industrial court on 14th July 1970. A writ petition filed by the respondent challenging the aforesaid orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court was dismissed by the High Court on 31st March 1971. Application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also dismissed on 3rd February 1972. The respondent then made another application to the Labour Court on 22nd october 1974 for claiming the following reliefs :- (a) The legality and propriety of the seizure of the entry pass of the applicant may kindly be examined and the action of the seizure may kindly be declared illegal. (b) The non-applicant may kindly be directed to re-employ the applicant on the same terms and conditions on which other persons whose services were previously terminated but who had been re-employed again. (c) Any other relief which is found admissible to the applicant may also kindly be allowed to the applicant. (d) Costs of this petition may kindly also be awarded to the applicant. In answer to this application filed by the respondent, the appellant took a preliminary objection that it was barred by res judicata. This objection was sustained by the Labour Court by its order dated I4th February 1977. A revision against this order was dismissed by the Industrial Court on 25th august 1977. The respondent then filed Misc. In answer to this application filed by the respondent, the appellant took a preliminary objection that it was barred by res judicata. This objection was sustained by the Labour Court by its order dated I4th February 1977. A revision against this order was dismissed by the Industrial Court on 25th august 1977. The respondent then filed Misc. Petition No. 275 of 1978 which has been allowed by Oza J. by the order under appeal. It has been held by oza J. that the respondents application is not barred by res judicata and consequently the application has been sent back to the Labour Court for trial in accordance with law. ( 3. ) THE doctrine of res judicata including constructive res judicata has been applied to industrial adjudications by the Supreme Court in Bombay Gas co. v. Jagannath Pandurang, AIR 1972 SC 2356 . and State of U. P. v. Nawab Hussain, AIR 1977 SC 1680 . The supreme Court in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai, AIR 1976 SC 1455 =1976 SCC (Lab.) 517. has expressed some doubt as to the extension of the doctrine of constructive res judicata to industrial adjudications but the view taken on this point in Jagannath pandurangs case and Nawab Hussains case still stands and we in the High court can only proceed upon the view that constructive res judicata applies to industrial adjudications. ( 4. ) THE argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent is seeking the same relief which he sought in the earlier litigation and that he ought to have raised the new grounds in the earlier litigation itself and, therefore, the present application filed by the respondent is barred by constructive res judicata. The learned counsel has also submitted that the respondent is not an employee as defined in section 2 (13) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 and for this reason also he was not competent to file the application before the Labour Court under section 31 (3) of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the application of the respondent in so far as it seeks reinstatement or setting aside of the termination is certainly barred by res judicata but the respondent has also claimed re-employment and this relief cannot be said to be barred. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the application of the respondent in so far as it seeks reinstatement or setting aside of the termination is certainly barred by res judicata but the respondent has also claimed re-employment and this relief cannot be said to be barred. The learned counsel has further submitted that on a proper construction of the definition, the respondent is an employee under the Industrial Relations Act. ( 5. ) WE have already quoted the reliefs which the respondent has claimed in the application before the Labour Court. Relief (a) is nothing but relief of setting aside the termination which had the effect of seizure of the entry pass of the respondent. This relief is admittedly covered by the previous adjudication and cannot be tried being barred by res judicata. The question then is whether relief (b) is also barred by the principle of res judicata. The facts in support of this relief are stated in para 7 of the application. It is stated therein that some other employees were re-employed by the appellant and granted continuity of service although their employments had been terminated for absence from duty. Reference in this connection has been made in that paragraph to an order of the appellant dated 7th August 1967. The question before us is not whether the respondent will succeed in getting the re-employment as claimed in the application. The question only is whether the relief of re-employment claimed by the respondent is barred by res judicata or not. We have already stated that when the respondent filed his earlier application on 11th August 1965, he merely challenged the order of transfer. He amended the application to challenge the termination when he received the intimation dated 23rd August 1965 that his services stood terminated under Standing order 42 (10 ). The cause of action for claiming re-employment on the ground set out in the present application arose on 7th August 1967 when the persons mentioned in para 7 of the application were re-employed. It may be that the respondent could have amended his former application for claiming re-employment on the ground on which he is now claiming that relief but the respondent was not bound to do so. The respondent in the former application claimed reinstatement and setting aside of the termination of service. It may be that the respondent could have amended his former application for claiming re-employment on the ground on which he is now claiming that relief but the respondent was not bound to do so. The respondent in the former application claimed reinstatement and setting aside of the termination of service. The relief of re-employment on the ground that some other employees who were terminated were re-employed in August 1967 is altogether a different subject matter for which cause of action arose during the pendency of the earlier litigation. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the present application of the respondent to this extent is barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata. It may also be mentioned that the respondent has pleaded in the present application that his termination amounted to retrenchment. He cannot question the termination on the ground that being retrenchment it had contravened the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The validity of the termination is concluded by the decisions rendered in the previous litigation. The respondents real grievance now is that othre similarly situated persons have been re-employed without giving any opportunity to him to seek re-employment. Whether such a grievance even if factually true is legally valid either under general principles or under section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act is a matter on which we express no opinion. All that we say is that the factual and legal aspects of this grievance are not concluded by the previous litigation and have, therefore, to be tried in the present application. These matters could not be and were not decided in the earlier litigation. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the present application filed by the respondent before the Labour Court to the extent mentioned above is not barred by constructive res judicata. ( 6. ) COMING next to the question whether the respondent is an employee, the Explanation to section 2 (13) of the Industrial Relations Act is relevant in this context. The Explanation provides that an employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched from employment or whose employment has been otherwise terminated shall, in respect of matter relating to such dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination, be deemed to be an employee for the purpose of the Act. The Explanation provides that an employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched from employment or whose employment has been otherwise terminated shall, in respect of matter relating to such dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination, be deemed to be an employee for the purpose of the Act. So a retrenched employee is also an employee within the definition in respect of any matter relating to retrenchment. The Explanation seeks to widen the definition of employee and should not be narrowly construed. Matters relating to retrenchment do cover matters bearing upon the validity of retrenchment as is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, but there is no reason to limit the Explanation to these matters only Any matter having a reasonable nexus with retrenchment will fall within the Explanation. Thus a claim of re-employment as of right on the ground that the claimant is a retrenched employee can be a matter relating to retrenchment and such a claimant will fall within the definition of employee. It is also pertinent to note that an "employee" can make an application under section 31 (2) in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule II, Item No. 6 of which is wide enough to cover the topic of re employment. The word "employee" in such a context must necessarily mean an ex-employee. This supports our conclusion that an ex-employee like the respondent who is seeking re-employment on the ground that he is a retrenched employee falls within the definition of employee as contained in section 2 (13 ). In our opinion, the application cannot be thrown out on the ground that the respondent is not an employee. ( 7. ) THE appeal fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.