JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - This writ petition has been filed on behalf of a candidate who was not selected in the combined U. P. State Services Examination, 1979. Disgruntled candidates are often prone to approach the scheme of such competitive examinations in a spirit of carping criticism. It is remarkable that when appearing at such examinations they are not alive to any of what they later deplore as the abominable features of the system. If their efforts are crowned with success, then they are quite satisfied and the entire system appears to be above reproach. On the other hand, if success eludes them and they are found deficient in merit, then all sorts of imaginary short-comings in the scheme of such examinations and the manner and mode of conducting them suddenly dawn upon them. This is vividly illustrated by the nature of criticism hurled by the present petitioner at the combined State Services Examination of 1979. The learned counsel for the petitioner with great vehemence pressed upon us virtually to review the entire scheme and structure of the combined examination held by the U. P. Public Service Commission and held that the norms prescribed for the examination were illegal, inconsistent and not indicative of the real merit of the examinees. It was urged that the whole system needed to be radically altered and that too through the instrumentality of this Court. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is beyond the jurisdiction of courts to devise the scheme and form for holding such examinations or lay down the norms and standards which the Public Service Commission or other bodies must observe in conducting such examinations. The fixation of place, the allocation of marks to various subjects, enumeration of the factors which ought to be taken into consideration in the matter of selection are best left to the bodies or authorities entrusted with the duty of holding such examinations. Therefore, the area of interference by the courts in such matters is strictly limited. It is only where some constitutional or other cardinal legal right of a candidate is infringed or where apparent irrationality or illegality is ingrained in the system which adversely affects the candidature of the examinees that the Courts can interfere and issue suitable directions. 2. Therefore, the area of interference by the courts in such matters is strictly limited. It is only where some constitutional or other cardinal legal right of a candidate is infringed or where apparent irrationality or illegality is ingrained in the system which adversely affects the candidature of the examinees that the Courts can interfere and issue suitable directions. 2. In the instant case the petitioner's arguments were mostly of a rambling nature and in our opinion instead of drawing attention to any legal infirmity in the system there was nothing more than a sweeping indictment of the entire mode of examination. It is difficult to endorse the criticism that the system is absolutely rotten and fraught with all the potentialities and arbitrariness of an unjust selection. We are unable to accept the wide proposition that every viva voce or oral test is inherently arbitrary and is invariably abused. With respect we may advert in this connection to the observations of the Supreme Court which are to the effect that the system is not intrinsically bad and that its efficacy and utility really depend upon the personnel who are called upon to execute the scheme and put it into practice. Therefore, to advance arguments which are not buttressed by facts but are merely speculative and flow from the realm of imagination that there may be a very remote possibility of such system being abused, is to indulge in sophistry of which the Court can take no notice. The Supreme Court in the case of R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, (AIR 1964 S C 1823) observed (at p. 1831) :- "In the field of education, there are divergent views as regards the mode of testing the capacity and calibre of students in the matter of admissions to colleges. Orthodox educationists stand by the marks obtained by a student in the annual examination. The modern trend of opinion insists upon other additional tests such as interview, performance in extra-curricular activities, personality test, psychiatric tests etc. Obviously we are not in a position to judge which method is preferable or which test is the correct one. If there can be manipulation or dishonesty in allotting marks at interviews, there can equally be manipulation in the matter of awarding marks in the written examinations. Obviously we are not in a position to judge which method is preferable or which test is the correct one. If there can be manipulation or dishonesty in allotting marks at interviews, there can equally be manipulation in the matter of awarding marks in the written examinations. In the ultimate analysis, whatever method is adopted, its success depends on the moral standards of the members constituting the selection committee and their sense of objectivity and devotion to duty. This criticism is more a reflection on the examiners than on the system itself. The scheme of selection, however, perfect it may be on paper, may he abused in practice. That it is capable of abuse is not a ground for quashing it. So long as the order lays down relevant objective critria and entrusts the business of selection to qualified persons, this Court cannot obviously have any say in the matter." (emphasis added) 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 S C 487 and submitted on its basis that the system of allotting high percentage of marks in interview was deprecated by that court. We have carefully gone through the facts of that case and it appears to us that what actually weighed with their Lordships was that a chart has been placed before them in which it was found as a matter of fact that the marks obtained in the written test by the examinees were in inverse proportion to the marks obtained by them in the viva voce test. If such an abnormal situation or freaks comes to the notice of this court it would certainly not throw out the petition under Article 226 but in ordinary cases the High Court would not interfere with the results of the competitive examinations by suggesting or substituting its own norms and standards, nor would the Court assume the role of an appellate authority to re-assess the merits of the examinees. In the present case merely because 200 marks in the U. P. P. S. C. examination were allocated to interview, whereas 700 marks were assigned to the written test, it does not lead to the conclusion that the overall selection was arbitrary. In the present case merely because 200 marks in the U. P. P. S. C. examination were allocated to interview, whereas 700 marks were assigned to the written test, it does not lead to the conclusion that the overall selection was arbitrary. In the case of Ajay Hasin (supra) the Supreme Court held that allocation of 33?% of the total marks to the oral interview was not proper. In the instant case only 22.22% marks were assigned to viva voce. Hence, Ajay Hasia's case does not support the petitioner's contention. 4. It is noteworthy that even in Ajar Hasia's case the Supreme Court took a very realistic view of the matter and observed that "in the absence of any better test for measuring personal characteristics and traits, the oral interview test must at the present stage, be regarded as not irrational or irrelevant." The Court merely sounded a note of warning that the "oral interview test as presently held should not be relied upon as an exclusive test." In the case in hand the result of the oral test was not regarded as the sole criterion for the selection of candidates. On the other hand, the criterion was the aggregate of the marks obtained both in the written test and viva voce test. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that R. 50 relating to Personality Test was patently nebulous and such woolly phrases occurring therein as "intelligent, personality, character, physique and general suitability for the service" were devoid of objective content. It was suggested that the relevant factors should have been more particularised. In other words the point was raised that the criteria embodied in the Personality Test as framed in R. 50 were in the nature of "airy nothings" and they could serve no purpose unless they were given "a local habitation and a name." This criticism is purely academic and untrammelled by considerations of reality. In order to make a law effective and all embracing the element of vagueness cannot be totally eschewed; some important terms and key words have to be made advisedly broad and in a sense vague so that they may be able to cover the infinitude of nuances which may arise in different sets of facts which no amount of human ingenuity can exhaustively catalogue. It has always to be left ultimately to experts and seasoned examiners appointed for making the selection to perceive that substratum of excellence or merit or spectrum of qualities which would satisfy the broad factors or ingredients enumerated under the general heading of Personality Test. The discerning faculty of such exerts alone can discover the presence or absence of these virtues in a candidate. This necessarily involves a streak of subjectiveness. What actually constitutes such essential merit or eligibility in a particular candidate is a matter which defies analysis and makes a completely objective statement of the minutiae of such qualities impossible. In matters of Personality Test there is always in the last analysis an indefinable "something" which the trained eye can never miss but which mere paper definition, however artistic, can never invest an examiner with true insight. 6. Before parting with the case we may also notice the last argument pressed upon us on behalf of the petitioner. It was stated in Paragraph 26 of the writ petition that it had come to the knowledge of the petitioner that two sons of Sri Ram Hit Ram, member of the U. P. Public Service Commission were also selected in the same combined U. P. State Service Examination of the year 1978 and his another son had been declared successful in the examination of the year 1979. It was, however, unequivocally conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Sri Ram Hit Ram, the aforesaid member of the Public Service Commission was not included in any of the panels which interviewed his sons. We hold that the mere fact that the father of some of the examinees also belongs to the fraternity of members of the Commission for selecting other candidates cannot vitiate the selection of the candidates who happen to be his sons. To attribute partiality or bias to members of such an independent and august body as the Public Service Commission merely because a relation of one such member was also a candidate at the examination, though he was interviewed not by that member but by a different examiner is to betray petulant prejudice. On the other hand, the presumption is that a candidate must have succeeded by dint of his own merit. On the other hand, the presumption is that a candidate must have succeeded by dint of his own merit. If such facile allegations of partisanship are taken at their face value it would disrupt the entire pattern of competitive examinations in this State which has stood the test of time. Thus, there is not a single point canvassed on behalf of the petitioner which has any substance. On the other hand, the entire writ petition gives the unsavoury impression that merely because the petitioner's bid at the examination proved abortive, he is anxious to tear the whole system into shreds. 7. In the end the learned counsel for the petitioner endeavoured to reinforce his submission by means of an analogy and contended that the maximum marks assigned to viva voce test in another Provincial service of the same standard and prospects, namely, the U. P. Provincial Judicial Service were only 100. Hence, according to him allocation of 200 marks to viva voce test in the case of combined competitive examination for U. P. executive and other allied services was arbitrary and discriminatory. The creation of different services and holding examinations for the purpose of recruitment to those services and prescribing standards of examination and subjects for purposes of selection is entirely the function of the Government. It is wholly beyond the province of the judiciary to attempt to undertake the discharge of these functions and prescribe subjects and standards of merit by determining the number of marks to be allocated to each subject or mode of examination. The basic structure as well as the hierarchy of services has got to be created by the Government and the jurisdiction of the courts is attracted only when the working of such pattern results in the infringement of the specific legal or constitutional rights of those who offer themselves as candidates for appointment to such posts. The learned counsel went on to argue that the technique of viva voce was extremely unsatisfactory because some candidates were interviewed for a long time, whereas others were disposed of very quickly and the nature of questions put to them by the examiners in the interview was vitally different from each other. This again is a matter of details in the actual working and application of the general norms and judicial supervision or control over such things is neither feasible nor proper. This again is a matter of details in the actual working and application of the general norms and judicial supervision or control over such things is neither feasible nor proper. The suggestion that the law courts should attempt to control the practical working of such competitive examination in such minute details is wholly fatuous. If the general norms prescribed are on the whole sound and relevant, their detailed application must of necessity be left to the authorities concerned with the practical functioning of such examining bodies. Even the definition of norms can do nothing beyond indicating the bare essence or crucial content of the guideline or the requirement of the examination. They cannot be reduced to a rigid formula or rule of thumb which may without the intrusion of any subjective element, be mechanically followed. Hence, to cavil at the general guide-lines in the Rules relating to the Personality Test is merely in the nature of an academic animadversion: it does not stem from a practical analysis of the scheme of selection which may merit attention nor does it point to any serious or tangible short comings which may be mitigated by adopting a different mode of examination. 8. We find this writ petition under Article 226 devoid of merits and dismiss it in limine. 9. After we had dictated the judgment the learned counsel for the petitioner asked for grant of a certificate that the case was a fit one for filing an appeal before the Supreme Court. We have already quoted the two Supreme Court decisions covering the points. In these circumstances no question of law of general importance meriting consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is involved in this case. The certificate asked for is refused.