ORDER N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the tenant of an accommodation of which respondent No. 3 Shri Shambhu Saran Singh is the landlord. The respondent No. 3 filed an application for the release of the aforesaid accommodation in his favour on 25th Sept. 1974 on the allegations that he was employed as an upper division clerk in the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies at Delhi; that in connection with his employment, he was in the occupation of a Government quarter and that he retired from the aforesaid service on 7th Feb. 1972. It was further stated that consequent upon his retirement, he was required to vacate the Government quarter. Since his own house was not available for occupation, he was continuing in the Government quarter and was paying penal rent at the rate of Rs. 182/- P.M. when his pension was Rs. 150/- P.M. only. It was further stated in the said application that there was a risk of his being dispossessed from this Government quarter at any time. It appears that the respondent No. 3 had to vacate the Government quarter aforesaid on 28th April, 1975. By the time the release application came up for decision before the Prescribed Authority, a sub-section being sub-section (1A) was inserted in S. 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This sub-section reads as follows :- "(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in S. 2, the Prescribed Authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment : Provided that an application under this sub-section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation." The prescribed authority was of the view that on the facts of the instant case sub-section (1- A) aforesaid was squarely applicable and allowed the release application on 28th Feb. 1979. 1979. An appeal was preferred by the petitioner against that order before the District Judge which was dismissed by the III Addl. District Judge, respondent No. 1 on 3rd Apr. 1980. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by the counsel for the petitioner that sub-section (1-A) of S. 21 of the Act, which was inserted by U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976, was not retrospective and applies only in those cases where the landlord had retired and had to vacate a public building after the commencement of the Act. According to the counsel, since in the instant case, the respondent No. 3 had retired on 7th Feb. 1972, i.e. before the commencement not only of U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976 but also of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, he could not be given the benefit of that sub-section. On a plain reading of sub-section (1A) of S. 21, however, I find no substance in this submission. An application under sub-section (1A) can be made by a landlord who was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes "which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment". It is apparent that the cessation of employment and eviction from the building are to be accomplished facts for entitling the landlord to make an application under the said sub section. If a landlord was to make an application under the said sub-section on 5th July, 1976, namely the date of the commencement of the U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976 it would have been necessary for him to state that he was in occupation of a public building prior to the making of the application and that he had to vacate the said building on account of the cessation of his employment. Even a plain reading of sub section (IA) indicates that it is applicable to even those cases where the landlord has already vacated the public building prior to the commencement of the Act. The circumstance that the application in the instant case had been made on 25th Sept 1974, i.e. before sub-section (lA) was inserted, is also, in my opinion of no significance. The circumstance that the application in the instant case had been made on 25th Sept 1974, i.e. before sub-section (lA) was inserted, is also, in my opinion of no significance. It is settled law that the benefit of an enactment which came into force during the pendency of proceedings can always be given to a person for whose benefit the said amendment has been made unless there is prohibition either expressly or by necessary implication contained in the enactment itself. Nothing has been brought to my notice which may indicate that the legislature did not intend to give benefit of sub-section (lA) to those landlords who had already filed applications for release prior to the commencement of the Act, and the said applications were pending on the date when the amended provision came into force. 3. The other submission which was made by the counsel for the petitioner in this connection was that since the respondent No. 3 had already vacated the Government quarter, which was a public building within the meaning of sub-section (1A) on 28th April, 1975 and was actually occupying some other accommodation, he was not entitled to get the benefit of sub-section (1A). I find no substance in this submission either. As seen above, sub-section (IA) applies to those cases alone where the landlord had to vacate a public building on account of the cessation of his employment'. If he has been forced to vacate the public building on account of cessation of his employment, the landlord, of course, will have to occupy some other accommodation till his own building is vacated by the tenant. If that circumstance is material then a landlord can be given benefit of section 21 (1A) perhaps only in those cases where he may be living just on the road side for want of any other shelter. This obviously was not meant by section 21(1A). The position may be different if the landlord owns several buildings and he has occupied one of his own buildings other than the building for which the application under section 21(1A) has been made. It is, however, not the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3, after having vacated the public building, is in occupation of any other building of his own. 4. It is, however, not the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3, after having vacated the public building, is in occupation of any other building of his own. 4. It was then urged that after the commencement of U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976, the respondent No. 3 did not formally amend his application for release claiming the benefit of sub-section (1A) of S. 21 and consequently, the authorities below erred in granting him the benefit of sub-section (lA). I am unable to find any substance in this submission. In the instant case, the facts that the respondent No. 3 was in the Government employment and has retired and that consequent upon his retirement, he was required to vacate the Government quarter occupied by him and for want of an alternative accommodation was continuing in the said quarter and that he had every risk of being evicted from the same at any time, had all been stated in the release application. The fact that he had to actually vacate the Government quarter on 28th April, 1975 before the commencement of U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976 has not been disputed. In this view of the matter it was a question of applying the law on the facts already pleaded and established. The requirement of formally amending the application is one of procedure and the mere fact that no formal amendment was carried out in the release application claiming the benefit of sub-section (IA) will have no consequence. On the facts of the instant case absolutely no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner or account of no formal amendment being made in the release application. In State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, AIR 1976 SC 1177 , it was held (at p. 1179) that : "We must always remember that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. It has been wisely observed that procedural prescriptions are the hand-maid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. Where the non-compliance, the procedural, will thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing of justice to parties, the rule is mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominant desideratum. Where the non-compliance, the procedural, will thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing of justice to parties, the rule is mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominant desideratum. After all, Courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end-product on technicalities". 5. Counsel for the petitioner then urged that sub-section (1A) was discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Nothing, however, has been pointed out as to how the said sub-section is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Reasonable classification is not prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution. All such Government servants who were in the occupation of public buildings in connection with their employments and who had to vacate the public buildings as a consequence of cessation of their employments constituted a class by themselves and sub-section (1A) has been made applicable to all the Government servants falling in this category. It makes no distinction between one Government servant and the other, so far as the conferment of benefit of sub-section (I A) is concerned. Therefore, it cannot be said that this sub-section is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. It was next contended that the petitioner should have been ordered to be evicted from only a part of the building and the order requiring him to be evicted from the entire building was not sustainable. A perusal of Section 21(1) of the Act will indicate that the said sub-section has been made applicable "to a building under tenancy or any specified part thereof'. In sub-section (1A) however, the word `building' alone was used and the words 'or any specified part thereof are conspicuous by their absence therein. This clearly indicates that the purpose of sub-section (1-A) was different than the purpose of sub-section (1) of S. 21. Whereas, while dealing with a case covered by sub-section (1) of S. 21 of the Act, it was open to the prescribed authority to direct eviction of a tenant either from the whole of the building or from any specified part thereof, an order under sub-section (1A) was envisaged against the whole of the building. The impugned orders cannot, therefore, be quashed on this ground either. 7. The impugned orders cannot, therefore, be quashed on this ground either. 7. Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner was not taken into consideration by the authorities below and consequently their orders are vitiated in law. 8. In this connection, it would be seen that prior to the commencement of U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976, a Full Bench of this Court in C. K. Shah v. District Judge, 1976 All L J 226 : ( AIR 1976 All 328 ) had held on 9th Jan. 1976 that the use of the words 'bona fide required' in S. 21(1) do not justify the consideration of the need of or hardship to the tenant. In order to get over with what was held in that case, a proviso was added to sub section (1) of S. 21 by U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976, namely, the same Act by which sub section (IA) was inserted. The said proviso reads as under :- "The prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application". Even though, as seen above, sub-section (IA) was also inserted by U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976, the aforesaid proviso was not made applicable to the cases covered by sub-section (1A). It was, in these circumstances, not necessary for either the prescribed authority or the Additional District Judge to consider the question of hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner. The view which I take finds support from a decision of this Court in J. C. Gupta v. District Judge, Dehradun, 1978 All L J 1306. 9. Lastly, it was urged that the petitioner was also running a clinic in a portion of the accommodation in question and since that portion was being used for commercial purposes and not for residential purposes, the application for release of respondent No. 3 could not have been allowed in respect of the porti on. To me it appears that there is no substance in this submission either. To me it appears that there is no substance in this submission either. The scheme underlying some of the amendments introduced in the Act by U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976 indicates that no distinction was made in regard to the nature of the user of the building in so far as the applicability of sub section (1A) is concerned. Apart from inserting sub-section (1A) in the Act, U. P. Act XXVIII of 1976, inter alia. substituted sub-section (2) of S. 2 and the relevant portion of sub-section (2) reads as under :- "Except as provided in sub-section (5) of S. 12, sub-section (1A) of S. 21, sub-section (2) of S. 24, Sections 24A, 24B, 24C or sub section (3) of S. 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed." Sub-section (1A) of S, 21 has thus been made applicable even to those buildings to which the Act is not otherwise applicable. Likewise section 24B has been made applicable even to those buildings to which the Act was not otherwise applicable. S. 24B was also inserted in the Act by U. P. Act XXVIII of 19th and seems to be in pari materia with sub-section (1A) of S. 21. It would he seen that even though the words `residential building' were used in section 24B, the word 'building' alone was used in sub-section (lA). `Building' according to he definition of said term in S. 3(1) of the Act, inter alia, means a residential or non-residential roofed structure. As such it is apparent that sub- section (1A) does not place any restriction on the power of the prescribed authority in passing an order of release in respect of a building even if a portion of it is for the time being used by the tenant for commercial purposes. Further, in Smt. Lilawati v. Add District Judge, Muzaffarnagar 1976 All LR 564, it was held that establishing a chamber in a part of the building does not amount to converting a residential accommodation into a non-residential accommodation. In Ram Swarup v. Ram Niwas, 1968 All L J 289, it was held that even if an advocate, doctor or businessman used a room of a residential building for his trade, profession or business, the user of that building continued to be for residential purposes. In Ram Swarup v. Ram Niwas, 1968 All L J 289, it was held that even if an advocate, doctor or businessman used a room of a residential building for his trade, profession or business, the user of that building continued to be for residential purposes. It appears from the judgment of the prescribed authority that the petitioner started using a room and verandah of the accommodation in question as clinic and the prescribed authority has held that notwithstanding the said user, the building still retained the character of a building meant for residential purposes. 10. No other point has been pressed. 11. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. The petitioner is granted one month's time to vacate the accommodation in question.