JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the tenant of an accommodation of which one Fateh Singh predecessor-in-interest of respondents 3 to 7 was the landlord. A suit was instituted by Fateh Singh for ejectment of the petitioner, after terminating his tenancy by giving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner had sub-let the accommodation to respondent No. 8, and that he was in arrears of rent since 1st September, 1969 and did not pay the same inspite of service of notice of demand dated 9th July, 1970. The suit was contested by the petitioner. It was, inter alia, asserted by him that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the petitioner and Fateh Singh and consequently no question of his being a defaulter in payment of rent arose. The Judge Small Causes, before whom the suit had been instituted, decreed the suit on the finding that the petitioner was defaulter in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), that it had also been established that he had sub-let the accommodation in question to respondent No. 8 and that he was also liable to be evicted in view of Section 20(2)(f) of the Act inasmuch as he had renounced his character as tenant and denied the title of the landlord. No defect in the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was found. This order was challenged by the petitioner before the District Judge in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act which was dismissed by the IVth Additional District Judge, respondent No. 1. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. This order was challenged by the petitioner before the District Judge in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act which was dismissed by the IVth Additional District Judge, respondent No. 1. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. In so far as the findings recorded by the Judge Small Causes and accepted by respondent No. 1 that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent; that he had sub-let the accommodation in question to respondent No. 8 and that he was liable to be evicted also on the ground that he had renounced his character as tenant and denied the title of the landlord are concerned, these are findings of fact based on an appraisal of the evidence on record and do not suffer from either any manifest error of law or error of jurisdiction. 3. What was, however, urged by counsel for the petitioner is that the accommodation in question was khokha and did not fall within the definition of the term 'building' under the Act. On this basis it was submitted that the suit was not cognizable by the Court of Judge Small Causes and consequently the decree passed by him was without jurisdiction. 4. Having heard counsel for the parties on this point, I am of the opinion that the view taken by respondent No. 1 in this behalf that khokha in question as a buildings in correct and as such is does not call for interference under Article 226 of the constitution. It is not disputed that the khokha is a wooden roofed structure. On the finding recorded by the trial Court, it is this structure which was let out by the landlord to the petitioner. The term building has been defined in Section 3(i) of the Act. According to the said definition "building"means a residential roofed or non-residential roofed structure. Simply because this roof structure is made of wood will make no difference. On the finding recorded by the trial Court, it is this structure which was let out by the landlord to the petitioner. The term building has been defined in Section 3(i) of the Act. According to the said definition "building"means a residential roofed or non-residential roofed structure. Simply because this roof structure is made of wood will make no difference. In Ram Dularey v. D.D. Jain, 1965 ALJ 772, while dealing with the definition of term of accommodation under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, it was held that any building which provides shelter for those who live in it, or carry on business in it or work in it or provides shelter for goods and articles, is an accommodation. It was further held that even as structure like a Jhopari or hut with attached roof for shelter would fall within the definition of the term accommodation. It was also pointed out in that case that the policy underlying the Act of 1947 was to protect every tenant, rich or poor who is living in a rented building giving him shelter. A poor tenant cannot be deprived of this protection merely because he can only afford a flimsy structure like a jhopry with a attached roof for shelter. The policy underlying the U.P. Act XIII of 1972, in my opinion, is not different than the policy of Act of 1947 in this behalf. 5. No other point has been pressed. 6. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs. The petitioner is granted one month time to vacate the accommodation in suit.