JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal and V.K. Khanna, JJ. - Though this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought the relief of Mandamus directing respondents 2 and 3 to take necessary steps for holding the selection for the post of Headmaster as advertised by the Committee of Management of the Janta Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Murra, district Farrukhabad, on 18-1-1981. The petitioner claims that he was been officiating as Headmaster Since July, 1980. On the publication of the advertisement for the above post of Headmaster, only three persons applied. The District Inspector of Schools awarded quality marks to the candidates, including the petitioner. The petitioner claims that out of sixty-three applicants, the petitioners name found place in the list selected for interview. A date for interview had also been fixed, but subsequently, an account of Radiogram issued by the State of U.P., the selection was postponed. On 10th July, 1981, an Ordinance was promulgated, which is known as the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Ordinance. 1981 (U.P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1981), to establish a Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards for the selection of teachers in institutions recognised under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. As a result of the promulgation of the Ordinance, the petitioner could not be either interviewed or selected. 2. Challenging the validity of the Ordinance, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised the following points : 1. Section 14 of the Ordinance directing for the appointment etc. be made only on the recommendation of the' Commissioner the Board, is ultra vires the Constitution. 2. Since there was no specific prohibition imposed on the power of the Committee of Management to select and appoint the members and teachers so long as the Commission and the Board had not been constituted, the inaction of the District of Schools in not taking steps for appointment in accordance with the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, is in contravention of the law. 3. The provisions of the Ordinance being not universally applicable to all the institutions including minority it has discriminated the institution similarly situated, and, as such, the Act is ultra vires, and 4. The U.P. Intermediate Education Act having not been repealed, expressly or impliedly the selections are still required to be made in accordance with the procedure made by it. 5. The U.P. Intermediate Education Act having not been repealed, expressly or impliedly the selections are still required to be made in accordance with the procedure made by it. 5. Section 2 of the Ordinance defines the Expressions inter alia', 'institution, and teacher. The institution means an Intermediate College or a Higher Secondary School, or a High School recognised under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, whereas the expression teacher means a person employed for imparting education in an institution and includes a principal or a Headmaster- Section 3 envisages the establishment c f the Commissioner, the composition, of which has been provided for in Section 4. Section 9 lays down the powers and duties of the Commission. From a reading of the aforesaid sections, it appears that the Commission is entitled to make the selections for appointment of the categories of teachers, the details of which have been mentioned in the Schedule given in the Ordinance, whereas Section 12 contemplates the establishment of Regional Selection Boards for selecting teachers other than those covered by the Schedule. Section 16 provides for an embargo laying down that after the promulgation of the Ordinance, every appointment of a teacher specified in the schedule, other than a teacher specified in it, shall be made by the Management on the recommendation of the Commission and the Board, as the case may be. Sub section (2) of Section 16, on which argument had been advanced before us by the learned counsel, reads as under. "Every appointment of a teacher, in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1), shall be void." 3. Having heard the petitioners learned counsel and the State counsel we are of opinion that the writ petition has no merit. The Ordinance has a laudable object for establishing a Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Boards, for selection of teachers in the institutions. This has been done to find out the best of those who are entitled to be appointment as teachers. The obvious purpose is the benefit of the students. The Slate in a democratic set up is vitally interested in securing a healthy system of education for its coming generation of citizens, and, as such the Ordinance had been issued to. achieve that purpose, 4. The obvious purpose is the benefit of the students. The Slate in a democratic set up is vitally interested in securing a healthy system of education for its coming generation of citizens, and, as such the Ordinance had been issued to. achieve that purpose, 4. Entry No. 25 of List PI amended by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, under which the impugned Ordinance has been promulgated, reads as under : - "Education including technical education medical education and Universities subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65, 66 of List I, vocation and technical training of labour." The impugned Ordinance is in regard to the aforesaid field of education, which was within the competence of the State Legislature. Nothing was pointed out before us to show that the provisions of the earlier law made by the parliament or an existing with respect to that matter covers the field on which the impugned Ordinance has been promulgated. Therefore, there was no question of obtaining the assent of the president under Article 254 of the Constitution. 5. In support of the first argument, counsels submission was that to make appointment of teachers according to the Scheme envisaged in the Ordinance, is providing for restrictions and control upon the members of the educational institutions. Counsel Contended that the Committee of Management has a right to recruit teachers in the manner laid down in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. The State Legislate e could not have provided for recruitment exclusively by the Commission to the exclusion of the Management. It is wrong to suggest t; at the Management has totally excluded from participating in the appointment of teachers. Sub-section (I) of Sect ort 10 lays down that for the purpose of making appointment of a teacher specified in the Schedule, the Management shall notify the vacancy to the Commission in such manner and through such officer or authority as may be prescribed. After the Commission selects a person, it is the Management which shall have power under sub-section (4) of Seem a 11 to issue appointment letters to the candidates whose name has been intimated under subjection of Section 11. 6. Reading these provisions together, and other relevant in that connection, it would be found hat the Ordinance has not totally excluded the Management. 6. Reading these provisions together, and other relevant in that connection, it would be found hat the Ordinance has not totally excluded the Management. It may be that It the matter of selection, the Management may not have the same voice when had before the promulgation of me Ordinance, but that by itself does not invalidate the Ordinance. Even before passing of the Ordinance the Scheme provided for recruitment required approval of the District Inspector Schools If the selection made was not approved, the Management could not appoint the person selected by it. The difference in the procedure now made u aim d at for avoiding favouritism and for finding out the best suited persons for the job. The composition of the Commission indicates that appointment is to be made to bring the matter of appointment above party politics Amongst others, the Commission shall be comprised of a member Of the judicial service as well as a professor of a University. 7. In Katra Education Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307 , the validity of certain provisions made in U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 for disapproval of the selections made by the Committee of Management had been challenged on the ground of depriving the Management of its right. The Supreme Court repelled the argument. The principles of that case would apply to the present case as well. 8. The second submission also has no merit. Sub-section (2) of Section 16 clearly provides that every appointment of a teacher in contravention of the provisions of subsection (1) shall be void. Sub-section (1) in its turn lays down that no appointment shall be made is any manner other than in accordance with the Ordinance. The necessary and inescapable result is that after the promulgation of the Ordinance, no appointment can be made which may contravene its provisions. Supposing that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the expression appointment only embraces within itself the fact of issuing the appointment letter, is correct, Che same cannot in any, way help the petitioner. When the letter of appointment cannot be issued, there is no point in laying down chat the procedure for selection of teachers in accordance with U.P. Intermediate Education Act must be permitted to go on. When the letter of appointment cannot be issued, there is no point in laying down chat the procedure for selection of teachers in accordance with U.P. Intermediate Education Act must be permitted to go on. As a matter of fact, the Scheme appointment laid down in the Ordinance in altogether different than the one envisaged by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act The larger should be deemed to be invalid to the extent it is contrary to the provisions of the Ordinance. Hence even if the expression appointment may be given the measuring which the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted us to interpret, that would not help the petitioner in getting the ultimate success. 9. Counsel pointed out to us the provisions of another State Act where the provisions is differently worded which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, plates absolute restriction-in the matter of holding the selection. With the help of the Act, counsel argued that had the intention been to provided f.r the similar thing, the Ordinance, would have contained that a provision in it. This argument does not advance the petitioners case. Reading the provisions of the Ordinance, we are of opinion that since no appointment can be made against the provisions of the Act, there is no scope for submission that the selection could still be directed to proceed with according to the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. The expression void used in sub section (2) of Section 16 is very material. In the strict sense the wordvoid means nullity, and, as such the appointment would have to be ignored treating as honest. Hence this submission does not carry the petitioner to any fruitful result. 10. There may not be any clear provision in the Act repealing the U.P. Intermediate Education Act in regard to the appointment in its entirety but sufficient indications m the Ordinance which it ad to the inescapable conclusion that the selection after the promulgation of the Ordinance has to be made in accordance with the Scheme laid down by it and not according to the Intermediate Education Act. 11. The next submission made by the learned counsel was that was the Ordinance does not apply to minority institutions, therefore, the provisions are invalid, does -not appeal t' us to be correct. Article 30 of the Constitution confirms special right on the minority community. 11. The next submission made by the learned counsel was that was the Ordinance does not apply to minority institutions, therefore, the provisions are invalid, does -not appeal t' us to be correct. Article 30 of the Constitution confirms special right on the minority community. It is intended to be a right for the protection of minorities in the matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own choice. Since the minority community has special rights and privileges, the petitioner cannot challenges the validity of this Ordinance on the ground that it has has been applied to the minority community. 12. Counsels next submission was that as the Commission had not been constituted under Section 16, the prohibition imposed by sub section (2) of Section 16 did not apply. He urged that during this period of integrum no prohibition could be imposed by an administrative order by the State Government to make appointments in the Colleges and Schools governed by tho U.P. Intermediate Education. Counsel urged that the petitioner and fundamental right of being considered on the appointment to be made and on account of the complete prohibition imposed, the petitioner could not be appointed. 13. For the first submission that in the absence of the constitution of the Commission and the laying down of the guide lines on which the Commission had to act Section 16 could not be applied, counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Narendra Kumar and others v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430 . Reference was made to paragraphs 26 and 27 of the aforesaid decision. After having gone through thi9 decision, we are of opinion that is case is no authority for the argument which was made by the learned counsel before us. In that case, the controversy was as to whether clause (4) of Non-Ferrous Metal Control Order, 1958 could be applied. After having referred to clause (4) of the said Order, the Supreme Court h Id that without the enunciation of the principal, the said clause of the Order was ineffective. In the instant case, Section it does not depend for its operation on fulfilment of any condition precedent or making of a provision. Hence, this ruling will not appeal to our case. In the instant case, Section it does not depend for its operation on fulfilment of any condition precedent or making of a provision. Hence, this ruling will not appeal to our case. As pointed out earlier, the language of sub-section (2) of Section 16 is clear and leaves no room for doubt that the appointment to be made against the provisions of the Ordinance would be viod. 14. The Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State brought to our notice a notification dated July 31, 1981, which came into force with effect from that date. By this notification, the State Government laid down that since the establishment of the Commission and the selection Boards was likely to take some time and even after the establishment of the said Commission and Selection Boards, it was not possible to make the selection of teachers for the first few months and the failure or delay in filling up the vacant was likely to create difficulties, the Governor promulgated the Ordinance providing for the removal of difficulties. This, has been demised as the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981. This Order contains seven sections as also an Appendix. It provides for a whole some scheme for making of appointments during this period of integrum-By making this provision, the State Government has conferred upon the committee of Management the power to make appointments in the vacancies which have arisen in the past and in future till the commission i9 constituted or Boards are established. The nature of appointment of the teachers would, of course, he ad hoc. But, in the circumstances of the present case, the scheme cannot be held to be illegal or invalid. The management would be entitled to make appointments according to the procedure provided in the Ordinance. The petitioner may have a chance to reply for appointment under a.id in accordance with this Ordinance. Hence, his grievance that ms fundamental right of profession and vocation is being denied to him, cannot be accepted. 15. Another aspect of Section 16, which was emphasised by Sr. B.D. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner was that the said section could operate only with regard to vacancies and appointments to be made in future and could not apply to appointments which bad been made earlier or in respect of which proceeding had already been started. This submission has no merit. B.D. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner was that the said section could operate only with regard to vacancies and appointments to be made in future and could not apply to appointments which bad been made earlier or in respect of which proceeding had already been started. This submission has no merit. It is no doubt a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. In the present case, the legislature has simply amended the procedure in accordance with which the appointment of teachers and heads have to be made. The rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to a statute merely became a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing"(See (1) State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ram Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 158 (2) M/s New India Sugar Works v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 998 and (3) Trimbak Damodar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Pattia, AIR 1966 SC 1758 ). In the case, the Supreme Court observed: "In this connection it is relevant to distinguish between an existing right and a vested right. Where a statute operates in future, it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweet: of its operation all existing rights are included." 16. We are, therefore, not impressed by the submission made by the learned counsel. If that were not so, every statue will be presumed to apply only to persons or things coming into existence after its operation and the principles submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, if applied to would result in virtual nullification of the Ordinance. 17. The writ petition is dismissed summarily.