ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - These two petitions are connected and they are directed against the common order passed by the Prescribed Authority and thereafter by the appellate Court. They arise out of the proceedings under the U.P. position of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these:- One Krishna Kumar, who is the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 5851 of 1980 was treated as the tenure-holder and the notice under S. 10 (2) of the Act was issued to him. Objections were filed by the said tenure-holder and also by the transferees, who had purchased lands from him. These objections were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 4-6-1979, a certified copy whereof is annexure 1 to the writ petition of Shri Krishna Kumar and whose true copy is annexure 1 to the other connected writ petition. Thereafter separate appeals were filed by the said tenure-holder and by his transferees and all these appeals were treated as connected and were disposed of by one common judgment, whose true copy is annexure No. 2 to the two writ petitions. The certified copy of the appellate judgment is also on the record. Now the petitioners in the two petitions have come up to this court in these petitions and in support thereof I have heard Shri K.M. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Misc. writ petition No. 4498 of 1980 and Shri Ashok Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5851 of 1980. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has also made his submissions. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners emphasised that the appellate Court should have dealt with the objections filed by separate objectors in a -separate and systematic manner and that this was not done and the appellate Court has almost created a jumble. It may be that this criticism may have some point in it but merely on the ground that the order should have been more neat and lucid, dealing separately with each objection, it would not be proper to set aside the same within the limited ambit of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It may be that this criticism may have some point in it but merely on the ground that the order should have been more neat and lucid, dealing separately with each objection, it would not be proper to set aside the same within the limited ambit of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. What has to be seen is whether ends of justice will be satisfied only by setting aside such an order on the ground that there has been miscarriage of justice by the manner in which the controversies were decided by the authorities below. The only point which has been pressed before me is that the sale deeds in question which were executed by the tenure-holder Krishna Kumar after 24-1-1971 were wrongly ignored by the Prescribed Authority and thereafter by the appellate Court and the benefit of cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of S. 5 was wrongly denied to the petitioners. In other words, it is claimed that the transfer deeds even though executed after 24th January, 1971 should have been held to have been executed in good faith and for adequate consideration and should have been accepted. Learned Counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on a recent Supreme Court decision in Brijendra Singh v. State of U.P., (AIR 1981 S C 636) : (1980 All L J 1105). I have gone through the facts of the said case but in my view, the same is distinguishable in view of the facts involved in the said case. In paragraph 20 of the said decision it was laid down as follows : "In the instant case, the two sales in question have not only been found to be genuine and for adequate consideration but it has been further accepted that the sales were made by the tenure-holder to meet an ordinary need of every house holder i.e. for raising funds for constructing a residential house in New Delhi. The sales have been held by the Appellate Authority to be not in `good faith' merely on the ground that the construction of a residential house in New Delhi by the tenure-holder could not in the opinion of the Authority, be said to be an `impending (impelling) necessity. This approach and finding is manifestly erroneous." 4. It seems to me that in the instant case the appellate Court was under no legal misconception. This approach and finding is manifestly erroneous." 4. It seems to me that in the instant case the appellate Court was under no legal misconception. It was observed by the appellate Court as follows : "No doubt the law does not require that the circumstances which constrain an owner of agricultural land to sell the land would be recited in the sale dead itself. Of course, the presence or absence of such recital in the sale deed may be relevant to determine whether the sale was bona fide or not within the meaning of the Act. However, the absence of such a recital is not decisive of the matter. This view has been held in 1978 Rev. Dec. 285 Lal Krishna Kumar Pal v. Civil Judge. The sale deeds also do not contain any recital that the aforesaid sale deeds were executed in pursuance of the agreement for sale." 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to the following extract occurring in the, judgment of the appellate Court : - "It may also be mentioned here that the sale deeds do not appear to have been executed in good faith as there is not evidence on record to show as to what was the compelling circumstances and necessity under which the sale had to be executed." 6. In my view this sentence should not be read in isolation from the rest of the judgment pronounced by the appellate Court. It should be seen that many aspects were considered by the appellate Court to show that there were many gaps in the position taken by the tenure-holder and by his transferees. An agreement of sale is said to have been executed before the sale deeds were executed. The Court has pointed out that the alleged original agreement for sale was not placed on record. It has further been pointed out that there is no reference to the alleged agreement for sale in the impugned sale deeds. So far as the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioners of Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 4498 of 1980 is concerned, it has been pointed out that the witnesses who appeared in the witness-box in respect of the said sale deed, made one statement about the date when possession was obtained whereas there is a different recital in the sale deed itself. Writ Petn. No. 4498 of 1980 is concerned, it has been pointed out that the witnesses who appeared in the witness-box in respect of the said sale deed, made one statement about the date when possession was obtained whereas there is a different recital in the sale deed itself. It seems to me that taking into consideration the language used in S. 5 (6) and in its proviso, it is not possible to interfere the finding recorded by the authorities. Therefore, both these petitions are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. However, I should like to make it clear that hereafter it will be open to the tenure holder to give his fresh choice in regard to the land which is sought to be declared as surplus under S. 12A of the Act and such choice, as far as possible be accepted as laid down in the said provision, of law provided the tenure-holder has not lost his rights in such land in the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act.