ORDER K.N. Misra J. - This writ petition is directed against the order dated 11-6-74 passed by the Assistant Director Consolidation, Lucknow, Camp Mainpuri (annexure 5) aid order dated 38-1972 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Mainpuri, contained in Annexure 3 by which opposite parties 1 and 2 had ordered mutation to be effected in the name of opposite party 3 on the basis of sale deed dated 5-4-1972 executed by the petitioner Banwari Lal. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that opposite party 3 Gajadhar filed an application for mutation of his name over, plots 747 and 748 situate in village Midhauli, district Mainpuri on the basis of sale deed dated 5-4-1972 executed by the petitioner Banwari Lal. The mutation application was opposed by the petitioner on the allegations that he had not executed the aforesaid sale deed and he was lefrauded by opposite party 3 who obtained fictitious sale deed without making any payment of sale consideration. It was also averred that no permission was obtained for executing the sale deed from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as was required under S. 5. Sub-sec. (1). sub- cl. (c) (ii). U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and as such the sale deed is void aid mutation should not be effected on its basis. Opposite party 3 refuted the allegations made by the petitioner and asserted that on that very date, i.e. 5-4-1972. he had executed it sale de.d for the same amount of sale consideration of Rs. 1.5(X)'- in favour of the petition or and his wife Jai Devi and two sons Ram Kishan and Bahu Ram in reflect of his plot 271/0.89 situate in village Mohanpur, district Mainpuri. It is not denied by the petitioner that he has obtained mutation over the said plot on the basis of the aforesaid sale deed in his name as well as in the names of his wife and sons. 3. The Consolidation Officer, after taking evidence of parties, rejected the mutation application filed by opposite party 3 merely on the ground that requisite permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for effecting the transfer has not been produced and in its absence mutation cannot he ordered. 3. The Consolidation Officer, after taking evidence of parties, rejected the mutation application filed by opposite party 3 merely on the ground that requisite permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for effecting the transfer has not been produced and in its absence mutation cannot he ordered. Aggrieved by the said order opposite party 3 filed an appeal and also produced a certified copy of the permission granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on 3- 3-1972. In the said permission the name of the village where the plots in respect of which permission was granted were situated was mentioned as village Laloopur but the order was subsequently corrected and village Midhauii was noted down in the order. In the copy of the permission that was filed by opposite party 3 the plots in question were mentioned to be situate in village Midhauli. The petitioner also presented a certified copy of the permission before the appellate court wherein the name of the village was mentioned as Laloopur. It appears that in the copy which was issued to the petitioner the error in wrongly mentioning the name of the village Laloopur, which was subsequently corrected, was not noted. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) summoned the record of the said case to resolve the said dispute but the file was reported to be missing hence the village map of village Laloopur was summoned and perused and it was found that there were only 371 plots hence in the permission in question which was in respect of plots 566, 592, 747 and 748, could not relate to village Laloopur and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) found that permission was in fact granted in respect of the aforesaid plots which were situate in village Midhauli. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) after considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, allowed the appeal filed by opposite party 3 vide order dated 12-6-1973. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner filed a revision which was dismissed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation vide order 11th June 1974. These two orders have been challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. 4. I have heard Learned counsel for the petitioner and opposite party 3. I have also gone through the impugned orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2. 5. These two orders have been challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. 4. I have heard Learned counsel for the petitioner and opposite party 3. I have also gone through the impugned orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that since the permission in this case was granted on 3-8-1972 hence on the basis of this post facto permission granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) under S. 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act the sale deed could not be held to be valid because the aforesaid provision requires that prior permission should be obtained for making the transfer of the land. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a case decided by the Board of Revenue reported in Daya Shanker v. Jagan, 1970 Rev Dec 311, where it was held that : "The wordings of sub-cis. (i) and (ii) of cl. (c) of S. 5 are different. In sub-cl. (i) there is limitation on the uses not connected with agriculture etc. but specified agricultural purposes are not prohibited. In sub-clause (ii) any part of holding will include even the entire holding. The permission of the S 0 C therefore was mandatory previous to the execution of a sale deed and even ex post facto sanction does not validate it." 6. There is no dispute so far as the law propounded in the aforesaid authority about ex post facto sanction is concerned. It is true that no sale deed could be executed at that relevant time in respect of part of the holding without obtaining prior permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) under the aforesaid provision but here the facts are otherwise. The permission was in fact granted on 3-3-1972, i.e. prior to the execution of the sale deed on 5-4-1972. In para 6 of the writ petition the petitioner mentioned that the permission was granted on 8-8-1973 but in that very para he mentioned the date of permission to be 3-3-1972. The petitioner has annexed a copy of the permission as Annexure 3 to the writ petition, according to which the permission was granted on 3-8- 1972. In para 6 of the writ petition the petitioner mentioned that the permission was granted on 8-8-1973 but in that very para he mentioned the date of permission to be 3-3-1972. The petitioner has annexed a copy of the permission as Annexure 3 to the writ petition, according to which the permission was granted on 3-8- 1972. In view of these differences in the mentioning of the date of the permission in para 6 of the writ petition I required learned counsel for the petitioner to produce a certified copy which was issued to the petitioner in order to verify the date of grant of permission by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and he produced the same and it has been brought on record. A perusal of the said copy reveals that the permission was granted on 3-3-1972. Thus the argument of the learned counsel, which he had tried to build up on the basis of wrong averments in the writ petition fails. In the present case the permission was granted on 3-3-1972 and the sale deed was executed on 5-4-1972. Hence it cannot be said to be invalid on the ground that post facto permission was granted. The aforesaid case cited by the petitioner does not apply to the present case. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next argued that the permission in the present case was obtained in respect of four plots, viz. No. 566, 591/1, 747 and 748 and it was in respect of half share therein but in fact half share only in two plots. viz. 747 and 748, was transferred through the aforesaid sale deed. He, therefore, argued that the sale deed having not been executed in respect of half share of the aforesaid four plots the sale deed would be invalid. I do not find any substance in this argument. If permission is granted for transferring half share in four plots the bar stood removed for making transfer in respect of those plots. It cannot be said that if out of four plots half share only in two plots was sold the permission would automatically cease and the sale deed on that ground would become void. If permission is granted for transferring half share in four plots the bar stood removed for making transfer in respect of those plots. It cannot be said that if out of four plots half share only in two plots was sold the permission would automatically cease and the sale deed on that ground would become void. When permission to transfer half shre in four plots was granted, the tenure- holder could transfer half share in any of those plots as the legal bar, which stood in the way for making transfer without obtaining prior permission, stood removed by the grant of the permission itself. No doubt it is true that since only half share in two plots was transferred the transfer was only in respect of part of the holding of the petitioner but since permission was granted the legal bar envisaged in S. 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act for making transfer stood lifted by grant of the aforesaid permission and the part of the holding which stood transferred by the sale deed in question would be perfectly valid. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Board of Revenue in Pooran Singh v. Mukhtyara Singh, 1971 U.P. Revenue Cases 116, wherein it has been held that : "S. 5 (c) (ii) of C. H. Act lays down that no tenure-holder except with the permission of the SO(C) previously obtained shall transfer by sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area. In the present case, the vendor has sold the part of the chak when he took the permission of the SO(C) to sell the whole chak. This defeats the purpose of the C. H. Act. The fragmentation should be avoided as defined in S. 168A of ZA and LR Act. No part of the holding can be sold under the CH Act. As such the sale deed cannot he held to he void. 9. This court in Sheo Narain Singh v. Sudama Singh, 1980 Rev Dec 202 : (1981 UPLT NOC 63), has held that : "The expression 'any part of his holding occurring' in sub-clause (ii) is the whole holding of that tenure-holder. As such the sale deed cannot he held to he void. 9. This court in Sheo Narain Singh v. Sudama Singh, 1980 Rev Dec 202 : (1981 UPLT NOC 63), has held that : "The expression 'any part of his holding occurring' in sub-clause (ii) is the whole holding of that tenure-holder. Before execution of the sale deed in question in respect of her entire share in the holding, the respondent No. 3 was not required to obtain prior permission for transfer under S. 5 (c), U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, and the sale deed cannot be held to be void on this ground which is otherwise valid." 10. It may be mentioned that according to the petitioner himself he had only aforesaid four plots in his holding and he had only half share in the said plots. If half share in the entire four plots was to be transferred by him no permission was required of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in accordance with the aforesaid provision which then existed. Permission was only required to be obtained if he wanted to transfer only his share in one or more of those plots. Therefore, the intention in obtaining the permission was implicit. By grant of permission to make transfer of half share in four plots in question, the bar in making transfer by way of sale. gift or exchange of any part of his holding in the consolidation area stood removed and the petitioner, therefore, could validly make transfer of his half share in any part of his holding, i.e. he could transfer his share in any one or more of the aforesaid plots of his holding. The Board of Revenue's decision in Pooran Singh's case (supra), in my opinion, does not lay down correct law. The Board of Revenue failed to notice that no permission was needed at that relevant-time for making transfer of entire holding and it was only for transferring a part of holding that the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was required. If permission has been granted for making transfer of whole, the same would ensure for making transfer of a part thereof unless expressly forbidden to do so under law or by any such condition mentioned in the order itself to the effect that the entire holding can be transferred and not any part thereof. But no such condition exists in the present case. But no such condition exists in the present case. There also exists no such bar in the statute nor the provision contained in S. 5 (c) (ii) of the Act can be interpreted as such. If permission to sell entire holding or entire share in the holding consisting of several plots or chaks in one tenure has been granted. the prohibition in making transfer would stand removed and any one or more of plots or chaks or entire share therein belonging to transferor can be validly transferred. The Board of Revenue in the aforesaid case of Pooran Singh (supra) has wrongly referred to the provision of S. 168A, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which applies to transfers after the close of consolidation operations in the unit and it will not govern transfers made during continuance of consolidation operations in the unit. The decision of the Board of Revenue being based on consideration of the provisions of S. 168A, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is, therefore, altogether erroneous. The transfer of part of land after obtaining permission to transfer whole cannot be said to defeat the purpose of the Act nor it will invalidate the sale so effected. I, therefore, find no substance in the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the sale deed in question was void as no sale consideration was paid to him. It is well settled that the sale deed cannot be treated to be void simply on account of non-payment of sale consideration. Sahdeo Singh v. Kuber Nath, AIR 1950 All 632 , a Division Bench of this Court held that the sale would be complete even though full price was not paid. It has been further observed that (at p. 634) : "Neither the fact that the consideration had not been paid, nor the fact that the endors were not in actual possession, could prevent the transaction from operating as a sale........... Any number of authorities may be cited in support of the proposition that a sale may be complete even though the full price has not been paid. Any number of authorities may be cited in support of the proposition that a sale may be complete even though the full price has not been paid. I would "satisfy myself with quoting only Baijnath Singh v. Paltu, (1908) ILR 30 All 125:((1908) 5 All LJ 96), Sagaji v. Namdev, (1899) ILR 23 Boni 525 : ((1899) 1 Bom L R 5) and Sib Lal v. Bhagwan Das, (1889) ILR 11 All 244: 1889 All W N 96). In Narain Das v. Mt. Dhani, (1916) ILR 38 All 154. Banerjee, J. with whom Walsh J. agreed, stated that the only right of an unpaid vendor is to retain the title deeds and to charge the property with the unpaid price and that he cannot retain possession on the ground that the price has not been paid. The large number of decrees for possession passed in suits brought by vendors against their vendees supports the proposition that ownership can be transferred even without delivery of possession or by an owner who himself is not in possession." 12. Learned counsel in the end argued that opposite parties 1 and 2 in the impugned order have observed that actually there was transfer by exchange between the parties and for coming to that conclusion they have referred to the sale deed executed by opposite party 3 in favour of the petitioners in respect of plot 271 situate in village Mohanpur in that very date, i.e. 5-4-1972. Learned counsel argued that since in the sale deeds in question there was no such mention regarding exchange of the land and the consideration having been passed through the exchange of land hence the finding recorded by opposite parties 1 and 2 stands vitiated in law. I do not find any substance in this contention. 13. It is not denied that opposite party 3 had on the said date, i.e. 5-4-1972, executed a sale deed of his land, plot 271, situate in village Mohanpur, wherein the sale consideration is mentioned as Rs. 1,500/- and on that very date simultaneously the petitioners had executed the sale deed in respect of his half share in plots 747 and 748 situate in village Midhauli for the same amount of sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed, i.e. Rs. 1,500/-. The petitioner has admittedly obtained mutation order in his favour on the aforesaid plot 271 of village Mohanpur. 1,500/-. The petitioner has admittedly obtained mutation order in his favour on the aforesaid plot 271 of village Mohanpur. He is trying to contest and non- suit the opposite party 3 on the aforesaid technical ground which, as already mentioned above, is devoid of merit. The facts and circumstances of the case, as mentioned above, would lead to one conclusion that the parties had decided to transfer their rights in the respective plots situate in two villages apparently for the sake of convenience in cultivating those plots by them. In these circumstances opposite parties 1 and 2 legitimately came to the conclusion that in fact they had effected the transfer by exchange of their respective plots. The sale consideration is the same as mentioned in both the sale deeds. Merely by mentioning the sale consideration in the sale deed the deed in question cannot be branded merely to be a sale deed and not a deed of exchange. It has been held by this Court in Ram Badan Lal v. Kunwar Singh, AIR 1938 All 229, that : "No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when two transactions amount to a sale or to an exchange. If the consideration for a transfer is not paid in cash but is paid by the transfer of ownership of some property it would only be an exchange and not sale. The mere fact that the value of the property transferred has been fixed does not convert the transaction into one of sale. It is not the name of form of the transaction but the nature of the consideration paid for the transfer which determines the nature of the transfer itself." 14. In this view of the matter mere mentioning the sale consideration in the two sale deeds referred to above would not necessarily mean that the transaction was not one of exchange but of sale. Even though the transaction be treated to be that of a sale it would not make any difference so far as the present case is concerned. By sale or exchange the property stands transferred and on its basis opposite party 3 could obtain mutation in his name on the land in question. 1, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2. 15. The writ petition. therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. By sale or exchange the property stands transferred and on its basis opposite party 3 could obtain mutation in his name on the land in question. 1, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2. 15. The writ petition. therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. I, however, make no order as to costs.