JUDGMENT K.M. Dayal, J. - The present Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 2. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial court basing its judgment on findings on only some of the issues. An appeal was filed. Before the lower appellate court an argument was raised by the plaintiff-appellant that certain issues had not been decided which were crucial in the case and which ought to have been decided. The lower appellate court after hearing the arguments of the parties on that question, passed an order on 24th February, 1972 remitting issues Nos. 4 to 7 to the trial court for its finding under Order 41 Rule 25 C. P. C. The finding of the trial court was received and thereafter the entire appeal was heard including the arguments of the plaintiff-appellant against the findings recorded by the trial court under Order 41 Rule 25 C. P. C. The appeal was dismissed. 3. The brief facts of the case are that original owner of disputed Sir/Khudkasht land was one Jahana son of Faqira. He died on 8-6-30. Acording to the plaint allegation at the time of death of Jahana the plaintiff was in the womb of her mother Smt. Risali who had been impleaded in the suit as defendant No. 3. The plaintiff was born in 1931 to Smt. Risali. At the time of death of Jahana, Risali was very young. Jahana executed a will on 4-6-30 providing that Smt. Ramdei the mother and Smt. Risali, the wife, defendant No. 3, would get life estate in the assets left by Jahana in equal shares. It was further provided that in case Risali gave birth to a son, the estate of Jahana would vest in him and in case she gave birth to a daughter, the mother and wife were entitled to a life estate over the property and after their death it was to revert to the daughter. She was born in January, 1931 and was daughter of Jahana. It was further alleged in the plaint that afterwards the mother Smt. Ramdei got Smt. Rishali married with Nagina by way of Karao and thereafter Smt. Risali became wife of Nagina, defendant No. 1 and he begot several children from Risali. Consolidation operations took place in the village under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 and Smt. Risali and Ramdei were allotted different chaks. Consolidation operations took place in the village under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 and Smt. Risali and Ramdei were allotted different chaks. Smt. Ramdei in order to deprive the plaintiff completely and to help her own nephews executed a gift deed which was registered on 22nd May, 1965 in favour of Nagina and Birjhan, defendants Nos. 1 and 2. It was claimed that according to the will dated 4-6-30 the plaintiff was entitled to the land left by her father and the gift deed dated 22nd May, 1965 was liable to be cancelled. It was further alleged that Ramdei expired about two and half months before filing of the suit and she had no share or interest left. The relief regarding cancellation of gift deed dated 22nd May, 1965 and for possession over half portion of the disputed land was claimed. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants. The will was denied and it was further alleged that the plaintiff Smt. Bedo was not the daughter of Jahana and Risali but she was daughter of one Jail Singh. It was further contended that the consolidation operations had taken place and chaks of Risali and Ramdei were prepared separately. Gift deed dated 22nd May, 1965 was alleged to have been made validly. It was further alleged that the suit was barred by section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and Jahana did not execute any will in favour of any one on 4th June, 1930. It was also alleged that Risali never was remarried with Nagina nor any children were born to Risali at any time. 5. As many as 16 issues were framed by the trial court. The trial court decided issues Nos. 1 to 3 and 7 to 16. Some of the issues were not pressed by the defendant and some of the issues were decided in the light of decision on other issues. Issues Nos. 4 to 7 were regarding the plaintiff being daughter of Jahana, the marriage of Risali with Nagina by way of Karao, execution of the will dated 4-6-30 by Jahana and competence of Jahana to execute the will. Issues Nos. 4 to 7 were regarding the plaintiff being daughter of Jahana, the marriage of Risali with Nagina by way of Karao, execution of the will dated 4-6-30 by Jahana and competence of Jahana to execute the will. These points were not decided by the trial court holding that the property that was left by Jahana as Sir/Khudkasht vested in State and subsequently Smt. Ramdei and Risali became its absolute owners and after the date of vesting the will of Jahana even if it was valid, could not limit or control the rights of Smt. Risali and Ramdei. The trial court, in its view, held that it was not necessary to decide the issues Nos. 4 to 7 mentioned above. The matter came up in appeal before the lower appellate court. Before the lower appellate court, the plaintiff-appellant's argument seems to have been that issues Nos. 4 to 7 have not been decided and a decision on those issues was necessary. By order dated 24-2-72 the lower appellate court remitted issues Nos. 4 to 7 as the trial court had "omitted to decide some material questions of fact involved in the case". In pursuance of the order of the lower appellate court a finding was returned by the trial court after hearing both the parties on the issues referred to above. In the opinion of the court below it was necessary for decision on merits. 6. After hearing the parties on the questions involved in the appeal including those arising out of issues remitted and findings recorded by the trial court, the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff-appellant has filed the present Second Appeal. 7. Sri G. N. Verma, Advocate for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the lower appellate court on the question of parentage of the plaintiff, the genuineness of the will, remarriage of Risali, which were apparently the questions of fact and ordinarily he would not be entitled to reopen the said questions in the present Second Appeal. His argument, however, was that the case was decided by the trial court mainly on the basis of issue No. 9. It was a decision based on a preliminary issue as contemplated by Order 41 Rule 23 C. P.C., and the court below had no jurisdiction to remit the issues Nos. His argument, however, was that the case was decided by the trial court mainly on the basis of issue No. 9. It was a decision based on a preliminary issue as contemplated by Order 41 Rule 23 C. P.C., and the court below had no jurisdiction to remit the issues Nos. 4 to 7 for decision to the trial court under Order 41 Rule 25 C. P. C. According to him, the operation of Rule 25 of Order 41 was excluded because the decision of the trial court was merely on a preliminary point and the only course open to the lower appellate court was to set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and remand the case to it for fresh decision. The Learned counsel relied upon the word-"try" occurring in Rule 25 of Order 41 and argued that the lower appellate court could remit an issue only if the trial court had omitted to try the same. In the instant case the trial court had recorded the evidence of the parties on issues Nos. 4 to 7 but merely omitted to give the finding and, therefore, the trial court had duly tried the issues. He argued that in such a case the lower appellate court should have reversed the decree of the trial court and remanded the case with a direction to decide the issues Nos. 4 to 7 as well. 8. In support of the contention that trial' did not include finding or decision the learned counsel relied upon a case Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, reported in AIR 1959 S C 837. That was a case under the Representation of People Act. In that case it was observed that after the conclusion of the trial the findings were to be recorded. He also cited the case of Sultan Saleh Bin Omer v. Vijayachand Sirimal (AIR 1966 Andh Pra 295). According to him the trial commenced as soon as the plaint was filed in the court and ended on the last date of hearing i.e. with the argument. Learned Advocate relied upon the following observations in pars 17 of the aforesaid case : "It is in the option of the parties to argue their case after the evidence in the suit is closed and it is for them to decide whether they will exercise their privillage or not. Learned Advocate relied upon the following observations in pars 17 of the aforesaid case : "It is in the option of the parties to argue their case after the evidence in the suit is closed and it is for them to decide whether they will exercise their privillage or not. In other words, once the trial of the suit is taken up and the examination of the witnesses has commenced, the hearing of the suit is said to begin; and, that hearing comes to an end only with delivery of the judgment, or when the suit is posted for judgment where it is reserved. In cases, therefore, where the suit has not been posted for judgment, but is posted for hearing arguments of one side or the other, it should be remembered that the hearing of the suit is not concluded, though the recording of evidence might have been finalised by both the parties. In such cases, either party is not precluded from making a request for examination of additional witnesses, or marking documents, merely on the ground that the trial is closed and the matter is posted for arguments; whether the request should be granted or not, is however, a matter to be decided on the merits, bearing in mind the fact that it is belated." Sri G.N. Verma further relied upon the meaning of word "Trial" in Wharton's Law Lexicon (Fourteenth Edition) Page 1011 :- "Trial" - the hearing of a cause, civil or criminal before a judge who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land. "Trial is to find out by due examination the truth of the point in issue or questions between the parties, whereupon judgment may be given." Sri G.N. Verma relied upon the meaning of word "trial", in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Volume II (Page 2242). According to him in the said dictionary the meaning under 'law' was "the examination and determination of a cause by a judicial tribunal." He cited Dictionary of the English Language Vol. II page 2194, Col. 2. Under the 9th meaning, that is the legal meaning of `trial', the following is mentioned : "(Law). The formal examination of the matter in issue in a cause before a competent tribunal for the purpose of determining such issue, the mode of determining a question of fact in a court of law. II page 2194, Col. 2. Under the 9th meaning, that is the legal meaning of `trial', the following is mentioned : "(Law). The formal examination of the matter in issue in a cause before a competent tribunal for the purpose of determining such issue, the mode of determining a question of fact in a court of law. A trial may be of an issue of law when it is before a Judge alone, or of fact when it is usually before a Judge and Jury. In a general sense trial includes all proceedings from the time when issue is joined, or usually when the parties are called to try their case in court to the time of its final determination; in criminal law the term trial is, however, generally restricted to proceedings subsequent to swearing in the jury " 8A He argued that after the evidence and arguments, there was no trial and the delivery of judgment would not be a part of trial. According to him as the trial court had not given its own finding on issues Nos. 4 to 7, it simply failed to decide the same but did not fail to try the same. 9. Sri Jagdish Swarup appearing for the respondent relied upon the meaning of the word "try" given in the Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, page 1685. According for it "try" means "to examine judicially; to examine and investigate a controversy by the legal method called `trial' for the purpose of determining the issue it involves." Word `trial' has also been relied upon in that dictionary and the meaning of word `trial' is given as under : "Trial - A judicial examination, in accordance with law of the land, of a cause. either civil or criminal, of the issues between the parties whether of law or of fact, before a court that has jurisdiction over it. It includes all proceedings from time when issue is joined, or more usually, when parties are called to try their case in court, to time of its final determination." 10. In view of above citations there appears to be some force in the argument of Sri G.N. Verma that trial may not include the decision. In our case, however, the controversy is slightly different. In view of above citations there appears to be some force in the argument of Sri G.N. Verma that trial may not include the decision. In our case, however, the controversy is slightly different. In this case as it appears the issues had been tried by recording evidence and hearing arguments of the parties by the trial court. While giving the judgment it did not consider it necessary to give a decision on those issues (issues Nos. 4 to 7) as the matter could be concluded by decision of other issues. That did not mean that the trial court omitted to try the issues. Thus the case was apparently covered by Rule 25 of Order 41 C. P. C. Under these circumstances, the order of the lower appellate court remitting the issues for findings could not be said to be beyond the scope of Rule 25 of Order 41. 11. There is yet another aspect of the matter. According to Sri G.N. Verma, the only course open to the lower appellate court was to remand the case to the trial court. The operation of the remand order depends upon the reversal of the decree under appeal. Unless the lower appellate court reversed the decree of the trial court, the occasion for remand did not arise. In the instant case it is clear that the lower appellate court agreed with the findings of the trial court. Assuming that the court below wrongly agreed with the findings of the trial court, still it could not be said that the court below had reversed the decree and therefore should have remanded the case. 12. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the order of the lower appellate court remitting the issues for finding of the trial court was without jurisdiction, cannot be accepted. Learned counsel, however, argued that the issues remitted by the lower appellate court and the findings given by the trial court thereon prejudiced the plaintiff-appellant as the appellant was entitled to have a right of appeal against the findings recorded by the trial court and accepted by the lower appellate court. The argument is misconceived. The findings that were recorded by the trial court were again examined by the lower appellate court as is clear from the decision of the lower appellate court. The argument is misconceived. The findings that were recorded by the trial court were again examined by the lower appellate court as is clear from the decision of the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court after examining the findings agreed with those findings for good reasons and it cannot be said that any prejudice was caused to the appellant. The appellant had full opportunity to challenge the findings on issues Nos. 4 to 7 before the lower appellate court. That was a court of fact and was entitled to test the correctness of the findings recorded on issues Nos. 4 to 7 by the trial court. It also did so. I consequently reject this argument of the learned counsel as well. 13. In the result, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.