JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ to :- (i) quash the orders dated 1-11-1977 (Annexure-O) and 2-7-1979 (Annexure-Y) passed by the management of the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Bombay, respondent No. 2; (ii) direct the respondents to categorise the petitioner as Superintendent and place him in the Superintendent category according to the provisions of the Scheme dated 27th May 1974 and grant him all the benefits of the said Scheme and pay the increased wages from 1-1-1973 with all arrears. ( 2. ) THE petitioner joined services on 1st December 1961 as Office Assistant in the Orissa Co-operative Assurance Society Ltd. (hereinafter the Orissa insurance Company) doing the business of general insurance. The management of general insurance was taken over by an Ordinance issued by the president on 1-5-1971. The petitioner at that time was serving in the Indore divisional Office of the Orissa Insurance Company and was drawing a salary of Rs. 280 plus various allowances, total Rs. 447. ( 3. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner he was promoted by the Orissa Insurance company as Office Supritendent vide order dated 1-1-1970 (Annexure-B of the petition ). After the nationalisation of the general insurance business under the provisions of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act 57 of 1972 the Orissa Insurance Company was merged with the General Insurance Corporation of India, respondent No. 1. With effect from 1-1-1974 the business of the Orissa Insurance Company was taken over by the New india Assurance Company, respondent No. 2 and the petitioner was assigned new work under the new management.- On 27th May 1974 the Government of India by a notification framed under the Scheme called General Insurance (Nationalisation and revision of pay scales and other conditions of services of supervisory, Clerical and Sub- ordinate Staff) Scheme, 1974 (referred to as scheme hereafter;. The Scheme came into force w. e. f. 1-1-1973. This Scheme provided for categorisation of employees of different companies taken over by the Central Government and which were continuing their busness. The Scheme came into force w. e. f. 1-1-1973. This Scheme provided for categorisation of employees of different companies taken over by the Central Government and which were continuing their busness. Paragraph 5 of the Scheme with which we are concerned is at Annexure-C of the petition and may be re-produced :- " (5) Categorisation of employees : (1) The employees shall be categorised into the appropriate categories on the basis of their substantive positions and nature of work on the 1st day of January, 1973 as specified in sub-paragraph (2) to (4 ). (2) (a) Superintendents: Subject to sub-paragraph (4) the following shall be eligible to be considered as Superintendents, namely; (i) all those designated as Superintendents, Section Heads, Assistant Superintendents, Staff Assistants, Head Clerks or Supervisors and working in a supervisory capacity; (ii) all those designated as Junior Officers in United India Fire and general Insurance Co. ltd. Unit "union Cooperative"; (iii) all those employees with specific skills or qualifications specially recruited in a position equivalent to one of those mentioned in subclause (i) or sub-clause (ii ). " ( 4. ) THE petitioners grievance is that in view of the provisions of the scheme referred to above the petitioner who had been promoted in the parent company i. e. Orissa Insurance Company to the post of Office Superintendent by order dated 1-1-1970 was entitled to be categorised as Superintendent under clause (5) of the Scheme. However, he was not so categorised by the respon-dents and was categorised as Senior Assistant (Annexure-E of the petition ). The petitioner represented against his categorisation but the same Was rejected by order dated 7-11-1975. The petitioner filed an appeal as provided under the Scheme but the same was also dismissed on 1-11-1977 (Annexure-O ). The. petitioner continued to make representations from time to time thereafter but the same were rejected. The last letter rs dated 2nd July 1979 (Annexure-Y ). Petitioner, therefore, filed this petition against the respondents for appropriate categorisation under the provisions of the Scheme. ( 5. ) RESPONDENTS 2, 3 and 4 filed a common return. Preliminary objections about jurisdiction and delay in filing the petition were taken by these respondents. The last letter rs dated 2nd July 1979 (Annexure-Y ). Petitioner, therefore, filed this petition against the respondents for appropriate categorisation under the provisions of the Scheme. ( 5. ) RESPONDENTS 2, 3 and 4 filed a common return. Preliminary objections about jurisdiction and delay in filing the petition were taken by these respondents. On merits the respondents submitted that categorisation of the petitioner as Senior Assistant was made in accordance with clause (5) of the said Scheme which provided that* the employees of the merging companies will be categorised on the basis of their substantive position and nature of work as on 1st January 1973. According to the respondents the petitioner on 1-1-1973 was in the pay scale of Senior Assistant and, therefore, was categorised as such under the Scheme. On these grounds the respondents denied petitioners claim to be categorised as Office Superintendent. ( 6. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents at the outset raised the question of delay. We, therefore, consider it proper to dispose of this objection before embarking, if necessary, on the merits of the petitioners claim. ( 7. ) AS mentioned in the narration of facts earlier, the petitioner represented against his categorisation as Senior Assistant. This representation was rejected by the management on 7-11-1975. An appeal as provided under the Scheme was filed by the petitioner before the Appeals Committee on 15-1-1977 and that too was dismissed on 1-11-1977 (Annexure-O ). There was no right of appeal thereafter and so far as the respondents were concerned the chapter was closed. The petitioner continued to make representations but the same were rejected on the ground that after the decision of the Appeals committee dismissing petitioners appeal, the matter could not be re-opened. In Jagdish Narain Maltiar v. The State of Bihar and others (A I R 1973 S C 1343) it was held by the supreme Court that where a Government servant on being informed that his services were terminated spent about three years in sending memorials to the government, a remedy not appointed by law, the High Court may reject his writ petition filed thereafter against his dismissal on ground of delay. It was not disputed that various representations made after the dismissal of the appeal were not in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme or any other rules made by the respondents in that behalf. It was not disputed that various representations made after the dismissal of the appeal were not in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme or any other rules made by the respondents in that behalf. They were in the nature of memorials not appointed by law and, therefore, could not be taken into consideration for condoning the delay which is patent in the present case. After the decision of the appeal on 1-11 1977, the petitioner spent nearly three years in making representations and finally filed this writ petition on 18-4-1980. There was no explanation which could persuade this Court to condone such delay. In Ashok Kumar Mishra and- others v. Collector, Raipur and others (AIR 1980 S C 112.)the Supreme Court considered the effect of delay in filing a writ petition. It was observed that: - "it is well-settled that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary and if the high Court finds that there is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, it may reject the petition if it finds that the issue of writ will lead to public inconvenience and interference with rights of others. " In Amrit Lai Berry v. Collector of Central Excise (A I R 1975 S C 538) the Supreme Court dismissed the petition made under Article 32 of the Constitution on the ground of inordinate delay. It was observed by their Lordships that merely by filing repeated or delayed representations, the petitioner cannot get over the obstacles which delay in approaching the Court creates because equitable rights of others had arisen. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Shri Mathur referred to certain observations of the Supreme Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. President Industrial court Bombay and others (AIR 1967 S C 1450) wherein the Court reproduced the dictum in Lindsay petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd and others ( (1874) 5 P C 221 at 239.) and observed in the case of the petitioner in the cited case there was no acquiescence or laches on his part. In paragraph 6 of the report their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to various dates in order to show that in fact there was no delay in filing the writ petition. The facts in the cited case, therefore, are not in point. ( 9. In paragraph 6 of the report their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to various dates in order to show that in fact there was no delay in filing the writ petition. The facts in the cited case, therefore, are not in point. ( 9. ) IT is clear that the petitioner in the present case was informed on 21st September 1974 vide Annexure-E by the Manager, New India Assurance company Ltd. that he was categorised as Senior Assistant. An appeal as provided for in the Scheme was preferred by the petitioner and was dismissed by letter dated 1-11-1977 (Annexure-O ). Obviously in the meantime employees who have been categorised as Office Superintendents must be working in that capacity. The result of allowing the present petition will obviously affect those employees who have already been absorbed as Office Superintendents. In these circumstances we are of the view that the petition must fail on the ground of laches because there was no explanation for this abnormal delay in filing this petition and also because in this interval interests of other persons may also involve. We, therefore, refrain from making any comment on the merits of the case. ( 10. ) THE petition is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs. The amount of security deposit will be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.