JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 against the order dated 25-10-1975 passed by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Indore, awarding compensation in favour of the claimant-respondents Nos. I, 2 and 3. ( 2. ) THE facts giving rise to the present appeal are as under:-The claimant-respondents Nos. I, 2 and 3 submitted an application under section 22 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on 23-2-1973 for award of compensation before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Indore, on the allegations that Bhura was husband of Smt. Fatmabai-claimant No. I and father of Saleem and raisa-claimants No. 2 and 3. Bhura was a workman employed as operator of Driller-Tractor No. RJQ 5735 by Jamnalal. On 14-11-1972, Bhura received personal injury by accident ar sing out and in the course of his employment. The injury so sustained by him resulted in death of Bhura on the spot. The cause of this injury was that Bhura was travelling from Bhilwara to burhanpur with the said Driller-Tractor as an operator as directed by jamnalal. At that time, Bhura was incharge of the Driller-Tractor which was loaded on a truck bearing registration No. RSL 4263 belonging to one smt. Gurcharan Kaur of Bhilwara. While so proceeding, the truck overturned on the road and while nearing Mhow in the District of Indore, M. P. and as a result thereof Bhura died on the spot. It was further averred that the applicants are dependents of the deceased workman Bhura who was employed on monthly wages of Rs. 350 and his age at the time of death Was over the age of 15 years. Notice of the accident was served on 22-1-1973. On these facts, a compensation in an amount of Rs. 9,000 was claimed under section 4 read with Schedule 4 of the Act. The New India Assurance company-appellant herein was impleaded, being insurer of the said tractor and the truck. ( 3. ) THE claim was resisted by Jamnalal inter alia on the grounds that bhura was not employed by him as operator on his tractor; that Bhura before his death some times used to come as a casual worker and was paid rs. 5 per day whenever he worked with him. ( 3. ) THE claim was resisted by Jamnalal inter alia on the grounds that bhura was not employed by him as operator on his tractor; that Bhura before his death some times used to come as a casual worker and was paid rs. 5 per day whenever he worked with him. Accordingly, Bhura was neither a workman nor an employee; that the tractor was to be sent to his camp at Nanded beyond Burhanpur, Bhura was directed to reach Burhanpur by Railway and not asked to go by the said tractor, and that the claimants are not entitled to award of any compensation. ( 4. ) THE Insurance Company appellant herein opposed the claim inter alia on the grounds that Bhura did not fall within the definition of workman given in the Act; that Bhura was not in employment of Jamnalal the opposite party and was not going with the tractor as his employee either; and that the insurance Company cannot be made liable under the terms of the Insurance policy. ( 5. ) AFTER recording evidence of the parties, the learned Commissioner has awarded compensation in an amount of Rs. 9,000 besides interest and costs as specified in paragraphs No. 19 to 23 of the impugned order. ( 6. ) AGGRIEVED by the said order, the Insurance Company has preferred this appeal. ( 7. ) IN this appeal, it was contended by Shri N. C. Behl, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company that Bhura was not a workman as defined by Section 2 (h) of the Act; (2) that the learned Commissioner has wrongly decided the case on the hypothesis that the Driller-Tractor was on the road whereas in the application for claim, it has been stated that it was loaded on the truck and has also erred in treating item No. 2 of the Schedule 2 of the Act to apply to the case: (3) that since it has not been shown by the claimants that, Bhura was operating the tractor at the time when he met with the accident, no liability can be fastened on the appellant-Company having regard to the terms of the Insurance Policy Ex. P/l and having regard to the provisions of the Act read with those of sections 94-95 of the Motor Vehicles act and (4) that in absence of proof that Bhura was directed by Jamnalal to go with the tractor to be transported on the truck, therefore, the owner of the truck could not be made liable in the matter and for the same reason no liability can be imposed on the appellant-Company. Shri V. K. Dubey, learned counsel for the legal representatives of Jamnalal (since deceased)respondents No. 5 to 8 adopted the aforesaid arguments. Shri J. Hartiwal, learned counsel for the claimant-respondents No. I, 2 and 3 argued in support of the impugned order and submitted that none of the contentions put-forth for the appellant have efficacy of affecting the ultimate award of compensation; that even if the Commissioner be taken to have wrongly stated in the impugned order the fact that the tractor was on road and that Bhura fell within the category of person specified at Item No. 2 of Schedule 2 of the Act and even if it be taken that the tractor was loaded on the truck and that Bhura fell within the person specified at Item No. 1 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the award deserves to be maintained, as Bhura had met with an accident arising out of and during course of his employment with Jamnalal. ( 8. ) HAVING heard, the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. ( 9. ) IT is true that the learned Commissioner for Workmens Compensation has made a mis-statement of fact in the impugned order, inasmuch as he has treated the case set out in the application submitted by the claimants to be that the tractor was on road whereas in para 1 of their application, the claimants have specifically stated that Bhura "was incharge of the tractor-driller which was loaded on a truck bearing No. RSL 4263 belonging to one smt. Gurcharan Kaur of Bhilwara". However, this statement cannot be regarded to have vitiating effect on the impugned order, inasmuch as the fact that the tractor-driller was loaded on the truck at the time when Bhura met with the accident has no adverse legal consequence as will be clear from the discussion made hereinafter. Gurcharan Kaur of Bhilwara". However, this statement cannot be regarded to have vitiating effect on the impugned order, inasmuch as the fact that the tractor-driller was loaded on the truck at the time when Bhura met with the accident has no adverse legal consequence as will be clear from the discussion made hereinafter. It is also true that the learned Commissioner has treated Bhura to be a person falling within Item No. 2 of Schedule II of- the Act. It is not the case of the claimants that Bhura was employed in any premises wherein or within the precincts whereof a manufacturing process as defined in Clause (k) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 was being carried on or in any kind of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with any manufacturing process or with article made, whether or not employment in any such work is within such premises or precincts any steam, water or other mechanical power or electrical power is used. Thus, the learned Commissioner appears not to have acted rightly when he treated Bhura to be a person falling within Item No. 2 of Schedule II of the Act. However, the learned commissioner has recorded a finding to the effect that Bhura was employed as a driver of tractor by Jamnalal at a monthly salary of Rs. 350. He has also recorded a finding to the effect that Bhura was directed by Jamnalal to accompany the tractor-driller which was to be loaded on the said truck and carried to Burhanpur. There is evidence on record to sustain these findings. Fatmabai as (AW-1) and Sohanlal Bhatt (AW-2) stated that Bhura was employed with Jamnalal as driver on his driller-tractor at a monthly wage of rs. 350 and that Bhura was asked by Jamnalal to accompany the tractor driller which was to be carried on the said truck. The finding on the point is not assailable in view of the fact that it is a finding of fact which is not amenable to a challenge in an appeal under section 30 of the Act. By virtue of first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 30 of the Act, no appeal shall lie against an order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. ( 10. By virtue of first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 30 of the Act, no appeal shall lie against an order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. ( 10. ) NOW, in view of the aforesaid finding, the further question which arises for consideration is whether Bhura falls within the definition of Workman given in section 2 (l) (n) of the Act or not. Section 2 (l) (n) of the Act reads as under:- "2. Definitions. (1) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- (n) "workman" means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employers trade or business) who is- (i) a railway servant as defined in section 3 of the Indian Railways act, 1890 (9 of 1890), nor permanently employed in any administrative district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or (ii) employed (***) on monthly wages not exceeding One Thousand Rupees in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of (the armed forces of the Union) (***); and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them. " Now, Schedule II of the Act provides list of persons who, subject to the provisions of section 2 (1) (n), are included in the definition of workmen. Item no. I of the said Schedule reads as under:- "the following persons are workmen within the meaning of section 2 (l) (n) and subject to the provisions of that section any person who is- (i) employed, otherwise than in a clerical capacity or on a railway, in connection with the operation or maintenance of a lift or a vehicle propelled by steam or other mechanical power or by electricity or in connection with the loading or unloading of any such vehicle;" In this case, in view of the aforesaid finding that Bhura was employed as a driver at monthly wages of Rs. 350 by Jamnalal, it has to be regarded that his employment was not of a casual nature as contended by Jamnalal. What has to be considered now is whether, he fell within the category of persons specified in item No. 1 of the aforesaid Schedule. In Item No. 1 the expression "employed in connection with the operation" is significant. Mr. Behl, learned counsel for the appellant-company wanted this Court to construe the aforesaid expression to exclude case of mere accompaniment of the driller tractor by Bhura. Mr. Behl further contended that on the case set out by the claimants the tractor was not in operation. Therefore, Bhura cannot be regarded to be a workman within the contemplation of the Act. Reliance was placed on the meaning of the word operation given in Websters New world Dictionary and ratio of Pollachi Transport Ltd. Coimbatore v. Arumuga kounder (A I R 1938 Mad. 485.), Maltibai and others v. The Divisional Controller Belgaum and another (A I R 1968 Mys. 208. ). What has been observed in the case of Pollachi Transport Ltd. (supra) is as under:- "the second contention is that having regard to the definition in section 2 (n) (i) of the Act taken in conjunction with Schedule 2, clause (i), the respondent is not a workman because he could not be said to be a person connected with the operation or maintenance, of a mechanically propelled vehicle. We are not inclined to agree with this connection either. The word operation in clause (i) of Schedule 2 means the working of the vehicle. So far as the duties of a conductor in this case are concerned, there is evidence that his duties are not only to issue tickets, to collect fares, sign time sheets at police stations but also, as admitted by D W 1 to look over the convenience of the passengers, their luggage and generally do all that is prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Rules. Apart from any question of evidence, the duty of a conductor is not merely to sit in the car and issue tickets but he has to see the safety of the passengers getting in and getting out, to the starting of the car and the stopping of the car at the convenient places and co-operate with the driver in the proper running of the car throughout the journey. In our opinion, he is therefore, as much concerned with the operation of the mechanically propelled vehicle as the driver is within the meaning of that clause. The question whether the conductor of an omnibus is a workman within the meaning of the (Act was recently considered by a Bench of the Calcutta high Court and they have taken the same view as we have taken (See 42 CWN 123 ). As observed in that case, the presence of a conductor is not only desirable but is really necessary and is indeed obligatory for the purpose of the proper working of a bus. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the respondent is a workman within the meaning of the Act. " From the aforesaid excerpt, it is clear that the aforesaid expression is very wide in its connotation and cannot be construed to indicate only a person who is actually operating i. e. working of the vehicle. The emphasis appears to be on the factum of employment and employment has to be in connection with the operation or maintenance of a given vehicle. This is clear from the aforesaid observations. Accordingly, the ratio of the aforesaid case of Pollachi transport Ltd. (Supra) runs counter to the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant-company. What has been observed in the case of Maltibai (supra) is as under:- "the words in connection in clause (i) of Schedule II of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 are quite wide as to include employees not merely operating the vehicle but also in connection with it otherwise. Similarly in regard to loading or unloading a vehicle, if the exclusion of the persons employed in a clerical capacity is to be omitted from clause (i), it would mean that even persons who are employed in a clerical capacity would be workmen within the meaning of clause (i ). So the term in connection with the operation of the vehicle is not confined to the actual mechanical operation of the vehicle but extends to other activities connected with the operation or maintenance of the vehicle propelled by mechanical power would be a workman. " The aforesaid observations correctly construed, run against the contention put forth by Shri Behl. So the term in connection with the operation of the vehicle is not confined to the actual mechanical operation of the vehicle but extends to other activities connected with the operation or maintenance of the vehicle propelled by mechanical power would be a workman. " The aforesaid observations correctly construed, run against the contention put forth by Shri Behl. The expression employed "in connection with the operation" of the vehicle cannot be construed to be confined to the actual mechanical operation of the vehicle, but extends to other activities connected with it. Accordingly, reliance on the ratio of Maltibais case (supra) is of no avail to the appellant. In the instant case, Bhoora having been employed to operate the tractor has to be treated as a person employed in connection with operation of the said vehicle, although at the relevant time the said vehicle was not in operation and was merely loaded on the truck. In order to resist the aforesaid conclusion, reliance was placed by Shri Behl on the dictionary meaning of the word operation as given in Websters New World Dictionary second Indian Reprint 1976 at page 525- "i. the act, process, or method of operating. 2. the condition of being in action or at work. 3. a procedure that is part of a series in some work. 4. any strategic military movement; and also, (p1) a center where this is monitored or supervised. 5. any specific plan, project, etc. (Operation Clean up) 6. any surgical procedure to remedy a physical ailment or defeat. 7. Math, any process, as addition, involving a change in quantity. " The aforesaid dictionary meaning at 1 or 2 above, cannot be employed to construe the word operation occurring in the aforesaid expression. The Courts are not to go by dictatorship of dictionaries but are to construe words in the light of the context in which they have been used in a particular statute. " The aforesaid dictionary meaning at 1 or 2 above, cannot be employed to construe the word operation occurring in the aforesaid expression. The Courts are not to go by dictatorship of dictionaries but are to construe words in the light of the context in which they have been used in a particular statute. The principles governing the situation have been laid down in Subhash Chandra and others v. State of U. P. and others (1980 (2) S C C 324), wherein it has been held that:- "so, dictionary versus dictionary leaves the matter at large, apart from the plain function of the Court to gather the meaning, not under the dictatorship of dictionaries but guided by the statutory purpose without being deflected by logomachic exercises, the mischief to be countered and the public interest to be advanced. " Accordingly, the word operation cannot be construed with the aid of the meaning given by the aforesaid dictionary. It does not appear to be a postulate of law that the person employed in order to fall within Item No. 1 of schedule II should be actually operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it has to be concluded that Bhura was a workman at the relevant time within the meaning, of section 2 (I) (n) read with Item No. I of Schedule II of the Act. ( 11. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, it has to be held that the learned Commissioner was right in his ultimate conclusion that Bhura was workman within the contemplation of the Act and as such, his heirs claimants-respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 are entitled to award of compensation. The conclusion so reached by the learned Commissioner is maintained though on different reasons stated by me above. ( 12. ) THIS brings me to the further contention advanced by Shri Behl, namely, that by virtue of the provisions placed in sections 94-95 of the Motor vehicles Act read with section 3 of the Workmens Compensation Act and in view of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy (Ex. P/l) the appellant-company cannot be treated to be liable in the matter. P/l) the appellant-company cannot be treated to be liable in the matter. In this case, it has been held that Bhura was a workman in employment of Jamnalal and that the accident occurred while he was going on the truck with the tractor as directed by his employer Jamnalal at the time when the accident took place, jamnalal was liable to compensate the claimants and as such, being insurers the appellant company is also liable in the matter. Although the primary liability is that of the employer yet, the Insurance Company is also liable to discharge the claim as if it was a judgment-debtor. This is what has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Northern India Insurance Co. Branch indore v. Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Indore ( 1973 MPLJ 548 = 1973 ACJ 428 ). Nothing is shown in the Insurance Policy on the basis of which, it may be regarded that the appellant-Company is not liable in the matter. ( 13. ) AT this stage, it was contended by Shri Behl that the case should be sent back to the Commisioner for deciding the case de novo as the impugned order proceeds on erroneous assumptions of fact and law referred to above. I am afraid, remand merely for the purpose of writing a satisfactory judgment cannot be ordered. ( 14. ) AS a sequal of the discussion aforesaid, it is clear that the appeal is not shown to involve any substantial question of law warranting interference in the impugned order. All challenges to the impugned order have no force as discussed above. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Having regard to the nature of the controversy, I deem it fit to direct the parties to bear their own costs as incurred in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.