JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - This is defendant's second appeal. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that his dismissal from service by Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Central Workshops, Kanpur, by his order, dated 20 February 1969, was illegal and void as it was contrary to the principles of natural justice. Consequential relief was also sought in respect of pay, etc. The suit was filed on 8 June 1968. By the time it came up for hearing the Uttar Pradesh Government Roadways which functioned as a State Road Transport undertaking was constituted as a corporation by notification issued by the State Government on 31 May 1972. Consequently, the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation was also impleaded as a party. It raised an objection that plaintiff was a workman within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the remedy of the plaintiff was to agitate industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. The trial Court accepted the contention and held that civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Against his order plaintiff went up in appeal. The appeal was allowed. It was held that S. 24 which permitted an individual also to raise industrial dispute was added in the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Dispute Act in 1965 only. It was also held by it that the case of the plaintiff was not covered in the expression industry, it could not be said to be an industrial dispute and the civil Court had jurisdiction to try it. On these findings he allowed the appeal and directed the trial Court to decide the suit afresh. After remand the trial Court dismissed the suit on merits. The appellate Court set aside the order. In appeal it was not disputed that the plaintiff was a Government employee and the provisions of the Article 311 of Constitution of India applied to him. He found that the plaintiff was asked to submit his explanation to the charges framed against him on the same day. He further found that as the explanation of plaintiff was not found satisfactory he was suspended on 22 January 1969, and he was ultimately dismissed on 22 February 1969. Show-cause notice was given to the plaintiff on 27 January 1969, and the order was also passed on the same day. He further found that as the explanation of plaintiff was not found satisfactory he was suspended on 22 January 1969, and he was ultimately dismissed on 22 February 1969. Show-cause notice was given to the plaintiff on 27 January 1969, and the order was also passed on the same day. On these facts he was of the opinion that respondent was guilty of committing breach of principle of natural justice. He accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by the trial Court and decreed the plaintiff's suit. Against this order Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation has filed this appeal. 2. It has been argued by the learned counsel for appellant that as the plaintiff had a remedy of approaching the Industrial Court the suit was not maintainable and the Courts below committed an error of law in taking cognizance of the suit. Reliance has been placed by him on a number of decisions, Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, 1976 (I) L.L.N. 1 , is one of them. On the facts stated above it is not necessary to consider whether the civil Court had jurisdiction and whether the case of plaintiff was covered under principles (2) or (3) laid down by the Supreme Court in this decision, as pointed above it was not disputed by the defendant that plaintiff was a Government employee to whom Article 311 of the Constitution of India applied. In view of this concession it is not open to learned counsel to urge that plaintiff was a workman whose remedy was to approach Labour Courts, Even the twise reliance placed by learned counsel on the Standing Orders of Uttar Pradesh Government Roadways Central Workshops, Kanpur, and its branch at Kalpi Road of 1963 are of no help. It has been seen above that Uttar Pradesh Government Roadways was constituted a corporation in 1972 only. Till then the plaintiff could not be treated to be an employee of the corporation. From the standing order issued in 1965 also the plaintiff cannot be treated to be a workman as Cl. It has been seen above that Uttar Pradesh Government Roadways was constituted a corporation in 1972 only. Till then the plaintiff could not be treated to be an employee of the corporation. From the standing order issued in 1965 also the plaintiff cannot be treated to be a workman as Cl. 2 of the standing orders read as under: "These standing orders shall apply to all the workmen excluding those who are governed by the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or any other rules that may be notified by the State Government in this behalf in the official gazette." It is clear that these orders themselves create an exception in favour of employees who are governed by Fundamental Rules or any rules framed by the State Government in this behalf. Once it was admitted that plaintiff was a Government employee the Fundamental Rules applied to him. Therefore, these standing orders could not be applicable prior to 1972 and he could not be treated to be an employee of the corporation. Only when he could be considered to be a workman the remedy would have been under the Industrial Disputes Act. Reliance is placed in this connexion on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1591 of 1977, connected with Writ Petition No. 3971 of 1978, decided on 9 October 1979. In this case it appears the petitioners were appointed prior to taking over of Uttar Pradesh Government Roadways by Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation but as their services were transferred to the corporation from that date they were treated employees of the corporation. The Bench, therefore, held that after, 1972 they were workmen and could not claim themselves to be Government employees. This decision cannot apply as in this case the plaintiff was a Government employee and his services were terminated much before the notification was issued and when cause of action accrued there was no question of his going to Industrial or Labour Court. 3. Reliance is also placed on Kiran v. Singh Chaman, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340; Chandra Bhusan v. Brij Nandan Singh, A.I.R. 1978 All. 459; and Mahabir Singh v. Narain Tewari, A.I.R. 1981 All. 3. Reliance is also placed on Kiran v. Singh Chaman, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340; Chandra Bhusan v. Brij Nandan Singh, A.I.R. 1978 All. 459; and Mahabir Singh v. Narain Tewari, A.I.R. 1981 All. 498, in support of the submissions that even if the point of jurisdiction was not raised before lower appellate Court or even if the defendant had acquiesced to the jurisdiction he was not estopped from agitating it in the higher Court. The principle is well settled that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court but that principle does not apply in this case. The applicability of jurisdiction depends on the basic question whether the plaintiff was a workman or not ? It was open to the defendant to claim that plaintiff was a workman but he chose to admit that he was a Government employee. This was an admission on a question of facts. The appellant cannot resile from it. 4. On merit it is not disputed' that the plaintiff was denied opportunity of hearing or showing cause which can be considered adequate in the eye of law. The argument of the learned counsel that no prejudice has been caused cannot be accepted. In a case where an employee was asked to submit his explanation on the same day the prejudice is writ large. 5. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.