JUDGMENT: — The point which arises in this revision concerns the interpretation of section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act. 2. The matter arises this way: The petitioner was the consignee of a consignment of timber logs which was carried by the Southern Railway from Punalur to Coimbatore. The logs arrived in Coimbatore, on 13th November, 1973. But there was a delay in the consignee unloading the logs from the wagons. The Railway calculated the delay as 73 hours. On that basis, the Railway demanded from the consignee Rs. 835-20 P. as demurrage and Rs. 102. 30 P. as wharfage, aggregating to Rs. 937-50 P. The consignee paid the amount under protest. She then sent a notice of claim to the Railway administration on 31st July, 1976, claiming a refund of the amount paid, on the score that the delay in unloading must be attributed entirely to the Railway administration in not placing the wagons in a position for unloading. Since there was no compliance with the terms of the notice of claim, the consignee filed a small cause suit for the amount in the Sub Court, Coimbatore. The Railway entered appearance and resisted the suit One of the defences put forward by the Railway was that the suit had not been preceded by a valid notice issued by the consignee under section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act, within the permitted time-limit of six months from the date of delivery of the consignment. The Sub Court went into the merits of the consignee's claim and found that she was bound to pay demurrage charges for a duration of 14½ hours as against 73 hours determined by the Railway. The Sub Court further held that the consignee was liable to pay the entire wharfage amounting to Rs. 102-30. On the issue as to the maintainability of the suit, which arose on the plea of the Railway that the suit notice was not within the time prescribed under section 78-B, the Sub Court found that the notice was issued beyond six months from the date of delivery of the goods. On this ground of want of proper statutory notice within the prescribed time, the Sub Court dismissed the suit. 3. This revision has been filed by the consignee against the dismissal of the suit. On this ground of want of proper statutory notice within the prescribed time, the Sub Court dismissed the suit. 3. This revision has been filed by the consignee against the dismissal of the suit. Learned counsel for the consignee submitted that the Court below was wrong in proceeding on the footing that section 78-B applied to the claim for refund put forward by the consignee against the Railway in this case. 4. The petitioner's contention calls for an examination as to what the scope is of section 78-B, and whether the consignee, in this case, was bound to send a notice under this provision as a pre-requisite for filing the suit. Section 78-B is couched in a negative form. It provides that a person shall not be entitled to a refund of overcharge in respect of goods carried by a railway unless his claim to refund has been preferred in writing within six months from the date of delivery of the goods carried by the railway. The point urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that a claim for refund of excess demurrage or wharfage cannot be brought within the mischief of the expression “refund of an overcharge in respect of goods carried by a railway”. The suggestion is that demurrage and wharfage are terminal charges, and not charges for carriage of the goods. The further contention is that the suit claim in this case did not pertain to rates of charge, so as to come within the meaning of the statutory expression ‘overcharge’. An overcharge, according to learned counsel, has reference only to the rates aspect of the charge and not to the amount of liability itself, as ultimately quantified. The consignee it was urged, did not question the rates as excessive, but questioned the overall liability alone as not chargeable. 5. I do not accept these contentions as tenable on the question of construction and application of section 78-B. This section had ‘been put into the statute book, obviously with a view to avoid litigation, if it could be avoided, between owners of the goods which are carried by the rail roads and the railways which undertake the carriage of such goods. It was apparently expected that the claims of owners for refund or compensation for loss might get settled this side of the law Courts if the railways had a chance of knowing the basis of such claims. No wonder, then, that the Legislature has used fairly wide language in enacting the provision. This is indicated by such words in the section as “in respect of”. Phrases like ‘in respect of, ‘in relation to’, and ‘with respect to’ are words of the widest import, and have been held as such by Courts. Parliamentary draftsmen employ these expressions in constitutional provisions as well as in municipal statutes whenever they intend thereby to cover a fairly wide field. The legislative coverage in enacting section 78-B of the Railways Act on the subject of overcharge must necessarily be held to be wide, because the section speaks of ‘overcharge in respect of goods carried by by the railway. ‘The Railway charges for carriage of goods, and might, on occasion, overcharge the levy for such carriage. The Railway also does incidental things to goods carried, like allowing them to be left or kept in the goods-shed. For these other services also, the Railway charges, and, on occasion, it may overcharge The expression ‘overcharge in respect of goods carried by the railway’ can, therefore, be regarded as comprehending excess charges of all kinds levied by the Railway in relation to the goods carried. The words of the section are not ‘overcharge for the carriage of the goods’, but ‘overcharge in respect of goods carried. ‘The only nexus required under the section is that the goods in respect of which overcharge is alleged must be goods ‘carried by the railway’. That one excludes goods not carried by the railway. But that is all that it excludes. 6. It is clear from this construction of the section that excess wharfage and excess demurrage collected by the Railway must be classed as overcharges ‘in respect of the goods carried by the railway, even though they are not charges levied for actual carriage of goods over the rail-tracks, but only terminal levies. 7. 6. It is clear from this construction of the section that excess wharfage and excess demurrage collected by the Railway must be classed as overcharges ‘in respect of the goods carried by the railway, even though they are not charges levied for actual carriage of goods over the rail-tracks, but only terminal levies. 7. I reject the other contention of the petitioner's learned counsel on the construction of the section, which is to the effect that overcharge only connotes an excess in the application of the rates of charge and it cannot relate to an excessive imposition of liability as a matter of overall quantum. The expressions ‘charge’ as well as ‘overcharge’, in my view, are properly employed only with reference to the actual quantum of liability, and they cannot be applied to relate to the rates of charge. For the rate structure is only a measuring rod for the charge and cannot itself be the charge. The question to be asked under section 78-B is whether the claim against the railway is for an overcharge. The answer will be in the affirmative in two situations. There will be an overcharge if the railway applies a higher rate than is appropriate. There can also be an overcharge, where, even at a rate which itself is not open to objection, there is yet an excessive liability foisted by the railway. It is not proper to restrict the expression ‘overcharge’ only to the former kind of cases where the railway applies a higher rate than which the law allows. 8. In this case there was no dispute between the parties as to the rate of wharfage or the rate of demurrage. The real controversy in the suit, on the merits, was as to the precise amount of demurrage and wharfage. What was involved was thus the application of undisputed rates of demurrage and wharfage to the period during which the railway yard was occupied by the consignee's goods, that is to say, the period in excess of the free time allowed to the consignee within which to clear the goods. In other words, the dispute as to what precisely was the period of delay, on the consignee's part, to clear the goods. In other words, the dispute as to what precisely was the period of delay, on the consignee's part, to clear the goods. The decision of the Court below was that the delay was 14½ hours as against 73 hours asserted by the Railway on the basis of which the demurrage had already been collected from the consignee. This was, therefore, a typical case of an ‘overcharge’ of demurrage, in the sense that the Railway had overcharged the consignee by taking the period of delay as 73 hours, when they ought properly to have charged only on the basis of 14½ hours. Section 78-B, therefore, clearly applies to this case. It follows that the consignee should have complied with the period of time prescribed in the section while sending the Railway a suit notice for claiming the refund. 9. The matter of construction of the section which has arisen in this case, is not res Integra. There are two reported decisions of the Gujarat High Court which had taken a view of section 78-B similar to the one I have arrived at as to the meaning of ‘overcharge’. See Shah Raichand Amulakh v. Union of India1and Union of India v. Mansukhlal2. In the earlier case, section 78-B had come in for elaborate discussion at the hands of Bhagwati, CJ. (as he then was). He expressed the view that ‘overcharge’ would include demurrage and wharfage as well apart from excessive charges for carriage of goods. He observed that the charges for demurrage and wharfage are not entirely unrelated to the business of the railway as a carrier. The learned Judge further observed that ‘overcharge’ is not a term of art, and in its plain natural sense, the expression refers to any charge in excess of that which is due according to law. 10. The result of the above discussion is that there is every justification for the dismissal of the suit by the Court below on the score that the petitioner ought to have sent a notice to the Railway under section 78-B for the suit claim within six months from the date of delivery, and since she sent a notice beyond the time-limit under that section, the suit was incompetent. The civil revision petition is accordingly dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs. R. S. ----- Petition dismissed.