JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal and V.K. Khanna, JJ. - The petitioner Kamal Singh Yadav, was a student of LL.B III year of the Allahabad University on 14-2-1981, one Omprakash Rai lodged a report with the Proctor of the Allahabad University against certain students alleging that Kamlesh Tewari, S.P. Goswami, Indra Pal Singh and Kamal Singh Yadav formed a group and demolished the foundation stone laid by the Rajyapal and when they were attempting to demolish the foundation stone paid by the Prime Minister Smt. India Gandhi, he intervened and attempted to stop them from demolishing the foundation. Thereupon Kamiesh Tewari caught hold Ora Prakash Rai from behind and attempted to throttle him. Kamiesh Tewari asio bit his nose. Om Prakash Rai gave a list of twelve students who had fromed the procession and had reached the spot with the intention of demolishing the foundation laid by the Rajyapal and the Prime Minister. The said report was considered by the Proctor on 16-21981. Being of the opinion that a prima facie case existed for enquiry, the Proctor requested the Vice-Chancellor for appointment of an enquiry committee. On 26-2-1981 the Vice-Chancellor appointed a Committee consisting of four teachers namely, Dr. Hari Shankar Singh, Dr. Ram Nagina Singh (Chairman), Iswar Chandra Shukla and Dr. Prabhu Narain Misra The Vice-Chancellor noted that the Enquiry Committed could call the concerned students for submitting the report on the question referred to it for enquiry. 2. The Committee thereafter, called the petitioner on 14-3-1981 and gave him nine questions dealing with the charges mentioned by Om Prakash Rai in bis complaint dated 14-2-1981. The petitioner submitted his reply to each one of the charges in writing and denied his presence on the 13th Feb. 1981. The Committee also took the statements of a number of students. After considering the entire material, the Committee submitted a report to the Vice Chancellor on 19 6-1981 finding that the petitioner Kamal Singh Yadav was guilty of biting Om Prakash Rai and also of demolishing the foundation laid by the Rhajyapal. 3. 1981. The Committee also took the statements of a number of students. After considering the entire material, the Committee submitted a report to the Vice Chancellor on 19 6-1981 finding that the petitioner Kamal Singh Yadav was guilty of biting Om Prakash Rai and also of demolishing the foundation laid by the Rhajyapal. 3. The Vice Chancellor considered the report given by the Enquiry Committee and found that In the interest of maintenance of discipline, it was necessary that Kamal Singh Yadav, the petitioner, was restricted from the University of Allahabad for a period of two years for his involvement in the incident of 13-2-1981 in the Department of Ancient History, Culture and, Archaeology, the Vice-Chancellor further ordered his rustication for two years and banned his entry into the University Campuses for the period of his rustication. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of the Vice-Chancellor, the petitioner presented a representation to the Chancellor. The Chancellor rejected the representation holding that the grounds taken against the order of the Vice-Chancellor w. re untenable. In the opinion of the Chancellor the petitioner had been given full opportunity to give his explanation and that because of the seriousness of the act, the punishment could not be considered as excessive. 5. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed this writ petition. It may be stated here that the petition had bee r filed before the order of the Chancellor was communicated to the petitioner. During the course of argument, the petitioner was supplied a copy of the Chancellor's order, and then the counsel challenged the said order as well. 6. Three submissions had been advanced by the petitioner's learned counsel The first was that the procedure adopted by the Vice-Chancellor was against the principles of natural justice and, as such the order rusticating the petitioner for two years was invalid The second argument was that neither were the witnesses relied upon by the Enquiry Committee examined in the presence of the petitioner nor the petitioner had been given the opportunity to cross-examine them, hence the procedure adopted rendered the entire proceeding invalid, resulting in invalidating the order. The third argument was that on merits no case against the petitioner had been made out and, as such the order was wrong. The third argument was that on merits no case against the petitioner had been made out and, as such the order was wrong. In that connection, counsel also urged that he had been illegally discriminated by being picked out for rustication for two years, whereas Indra Pal Singh, against whom similar allegations had been made, was let off, 7. The first two arguments are inter-linked and, therefore, can be taken up together. In this case, the exigency of the matter required immediate hearing. Therefore, instead of inviting the counter-affidavit, we called upon the Chief Standing Counsel to produce before us the entire record of the University to enable us to consider the points urged by the petitioner's learned counsel. 8. The principles of natural justice are not inflexible and cannot be imprisoned in straight jacket of a rigid formula. They differ in deficient circumstances. In Board Mining Examination v. Ramji, (AIR 1977 SC 905], the Supreme Court held ; "Natural justice is no untruly harsh, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure all. If fairness is shown by the duties maker to the men proceeded against, the form, features, and the fundamentals of such essentials processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice , without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be ex aerating. 9. As observed above, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the requirement of natural justice which has got to be compulsorily followed. What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a given case depends on a variety of circumstances, such as individual's right alleged to be infringed and the public interest sought to be protected. In that connection ; the person who is taking action against the delinquent also is a relevant factor. However the proceedings have got to be fair. Fairness itself is a flexible and relative term. 10. In Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All E.R. 109 at page 118], Tulker, L.J., observed : "There are in my view no words which are of universal application to every kind of enquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. However the proceedings have got to be fair. Fairness itself is a flexible and relative term. 10. In Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All E.R. 109 at page 118], Tulker, L.J., observed : "There are in my view no words which are of universal application to every kind of enquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirement of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, 1 do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case." 11. In Mohindtr Singh v. Cheif Election Commissioner [AIR 1978 S.C. 1851], the Supreme Court also had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter The Supreme Court observed : "No doctrinaire approach is desirable, but the Court must be anxious to salvage the cardinal rule to the extent permissible in a given case. After all, it is not obligatory that counsel should be allowed to appear nor is it compulsory that oral evidence should be adduced. In deed, it is not even imperative that written statement should be called for. Disclosure of the prominent circumstances and asking for an immediate explanation orally or otherwise may, in many cases, be sufficient compliance it is even conceivable that argent meeting with the concerned parties summoned at an hour's notice or in a crises even a telephone call, may suffice." 12. The view taken in the above cases would show that the procedure adopted in an enquiry can be fair with ut the rules of evidence or forms of trial being adopted. Incoming to that conclusion, the Supreme Court had referred to its earlier decision given in the case of Bihar - School Examination Board v. Subhash Chandra Sinha, MR 1970 S C. 1259]. In that case, Hidayat-ullah, C.J., speaking tor the court repelled the plea of natural justice when the whole examination was cancelled by the concerned University authorities. The Court examined the ground for cancellation of examinations and satisfied itself ;hat there was evidence that students generally had outside assistance in answering questions. 13. In that case, Hidayat-ullah, C.J., speaking tor the court repelled the plea of natural justice when the whole examination was cancelled by the concerned University authorities. The Court examined the ground for cancellation of examinations and satisfied itself ;hat there was evidence that students generally had outside assistance in answering questions. 13. In Hari Nath Misra v. Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi [ AIR 1973 S.C 1260 ], a complaint had been lodged by the inmates of the Girls Hostel against certain male students of that College about the indecent behaviour during odd hours of night. In such a case, the Supreme Court laid down that natural justice did not require that statements of girl students should have been recorded in the presence of male students concerned or that the latter should be furnished with the report of the Enquiry Committee. 14. For what we have said above, we find that procedural rights which a person can claim in proceedings against him, cannot be defined precisely which must invariably be complied with. The reason being, the procedural right is not a term of legal art defining fixed and certain/rights applicable to all forms of adjudications. 15. Section 12 (1) (d) of the U. P. State Universities Act bestows responsibility on the Vice Chancellor for the maintenance of discipline in the University. Statute 20.18 requires that the Vice-Chancellor may consult the Dean of Students Welfare before taking any action against a student on disciplinary ground. Statute 20.26 provides that the Proctor shall assist the Vice-Chancellor in the exercise of his disciplinary authority in respect of students in the University All of these provisions have been complied with. After the report was submitted by the Enquiry Committee, the Proctor and the Dean of the Faculty of Students Welfare gave their assent to the report as made by the Committee. This report was accepted by the Vice-Chancellor. We have already mentioned above that the Enquiry Committee disclosed the charges against the petitioner and gave him an opportunity to submit his reply which was given in writing. The Enquiry Committee, thereafter, asked questions in writing from some of the students who had knowledge of the incident. The entire matter was thereafter considered the Enquiry Committee and a report was submitted. This report found the petitioner guilty of indiscipline. The Enquiry Committee, thereafter, asked questions in writing from some of the students who had knowledge of the incident. The entire matter was thereafter considered the Enquiry Committee and a report was submitted. This report found the petitioner guilty of indiscipline. The Vice Chancellor also applied his mind to the report and held that the charges against the petitioner had been made out. In these circumstances, the procedure observed was more than fair and the petitioner's grievance of having not been permitted to cross-examine the students who deposed against him, has no substance. 16. The object of cross-examination is mainly to elicit information concerning facts in issue or relevant to the issue. Since it is not possible to say that without giving an opportunity of cross-examination the facts cannot be elicited, it has not been said that the absence of cross-examination would invariably in all cases vitiate the administrative hearing. Flick in his book on Natural Justice. Principles and Practical Application, 1979 Edition, at page 55, has dealt with this question in the following words : "The effect of these cases is that natural justice does not require the opportunity for cross-examination in all cases. Whenever disputed facts are in issue natural justice does require an opportunity to controvert those facts; but cross-examination is only one of the means by which adverse testimony can be tested. Natural justice only requires cross-examination when no other equally effective means for control ting factual material has been made available to an aggrieved party." 17. D. Smith also considered this aspect of the matter in his book on "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" Fourth Edition, at page 195. He discussed at pages 195 and 196 is as follows : "Again, there are administrative contexts where contested issues are determined by an anonymous and unidentified adjudicator on the basis of written submissions or where the hearing has been conducted by a person other than the officer who makes the decision, or where facilities for legal representation and cross-examination have been lacking, but where the procedure has nevertheless been held to conform to the requirements of natural justice. It is often possible to comply with the audialteram partem rule in administrative law without incurring any risk of being mistaken for a participant in proceedings before a court of justice." 18. It is often possible to comply with the audialteram partem rule in administrative law without incurring any risk of being mistaken for a participant in proceedings before a court of justice." 18. The proceedings against the petitioner in the present case were disciplinary in nature In such proceedings, it is for the Disciplinary Officer to envisage the procedure which may help him in arriving at the correct conclusions. It is something for the officer charged with the duty of maintaining the discipline to evolve and follow and not something for the court to lay down. 19. Sri R.R. Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, gave to us a long list of cases in support of his submission that cross-examination was a condition, without compliance of which the entire proceeding was vitiated. It is not necessary to mention all of those cases as, to our mind, no one of them throws light on the controversy arising for decision before us. 20. The petitioner's counsel relied on a Full Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in Pramia Devi v. Secretary, Board of Secondary Education [AIR 1972 Orissa 224). Specific reference was made to paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment We have carefully read this decision and the aforesaid paragraph We are unable to find anything which could support his argument. Instead. in paragraph 17, while summing up the conclusions, the Full Bench observed that there is no obligation on the prosecutor to examine in the proceeding oral evidence or suo moto to give opportunity for cross-examination. This case does not at all support the petitioner's argument. The other case relied upon is reported in Town Area Committee v. Jagdish Prasad AIR 1978 S.C. 1417 ]. This was a case of an employee of the Town Area Committee. For such an employee, the Supreme Court held that he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him. This case does not help us in deciding the controversy in the present case. The case of a Government servant or that of a servant of a local body cannot be kept at par with a student against whom disciplinary action is taken for his misbehaviour or misconduct. 21. In Sheshmani Nath Tripathi v. Deputy Inspector of Police [AIR 1974 All 540] a Full Bench of this Court held that the principle of natural justice is not an uncompromising virtue. 21. In Sheshmani Nath Tripathi v. Deputy Inspector of Police [AIR 1974 All 540] a Full Bench of this Court held that the principle of natural justice is not an uncompromising virtue. In some adjudicatory areas and in some cases it may be observed with all its attributes whereas in some others partially. This decision supports the view taken by us. 22. Judged in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases, we cannot pay that the rules of natural justice have been violated or that the minimum requirements of the same had not been complied with 23. Counsel s argument that the petitioner had been discriminated in the matter of punishment is not correct. It is not correct and Indra Pal Singh, who was also a member of the procession taken on 13-2 1981, had although been found guilty of the charges, but had still been let off. From the report it appears that against Indra Pal Singh the charges had not been established, and, as such, the question of Jag out the petitioner for punishing him does not arise. 24. Counsel also urged on the basis of the decision given in Menka Gandhi v. Union of India [AIR 1978, S.C. 597] that the procedure adopted by the University since was not fair, reasonable and just, the punishment is hit by Article 21 of the Constitution. According to the law laid down in the aforesaid case, the procedure which is not reasonable, fair or just would fall foul of Article 21 of the Constitution. But, in the circumstances of the present case, it is not correct to say that the procedure was not reasonable. We have already given our reasons for holding that depriving the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses who stated against him, was not against the concept of natural justice. In the circumstances, it cannot be said to be unreasonable. Unreasonableness's test is the same as fairness. We have found above that the procedure adopted was fair. Since it was fair, it could not be considered as unreasonable. As it was not unfair, the argument of the petitioner's counsel of Article 21 of the Constitution falls to the ground. 25. Counsel's submission that the punishment awarded was excessive cannot be gone into in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Ours is a limited jurisdiction of supervisory character. As it was not unfair, the argument of the petitioner's counsel of Article 21 of the Constitution falls to the ground. 25. Counsel's submission that the punishment awarded was excessive cannot be gone into in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Ours is a limited jurisdiction of supervisory character. We do not sit in appeal in matters like the present. We cannot confer upon ourselves the power of finding as to whether in the circumstances the punishment was just and proper. This was tor the Disciplinary Authority to decide. The appeal for clemency made to us is a futile effort, as the power, if any, rests with the Vice-Chancellor and not with us. 26. For the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The interim order passed by this Court on 7th August, 1981, is vacated This petition has been decided under the proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XXI of the Rules of the Court. 27. The oral prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused, as in our opinion the present writ petition does not raise any substantial question of law needing to be decided by the Supreme Court. 28. Let a copy of the judgment be supplied to the learned counsel for the petitioner today on payment of usual charges.