ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 2. It is not necessary to state the facts in any derail because the controversy is a very short one. It seems that the objections under S. 10 (2) of the Act of the petitioner and the objections filed by his brother Pramod borne Singh under the same section were dismissed in default and applications were made by the two brothers separately for the restoration of their cases. It seems that the Prescribed Authority dismissed both these applications and thereafter, the two brother, filed the separate appeals. The appeal of Pramud Kumar Singh was allowed by the appellate court and the order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. However the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed on 11th July, 1977 and the dismissal was in default because no one was present to press the appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application on 31-1-1978 for restoration along with an application for condoning the delay in the filing of the restoration application. The application was obviously made under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application was dismissed by the appeal court by the impugned order dated 3-5-1980. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant writ petition a in support thereof, I have heard Sri B. Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner and in opposition the learned Stand Counsel has made his submissions. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that on the authority of the two pronouncements of this Court reported in Juggilal Kamla Pat v. Ram Janki Gupta, ( AIR 1962 All 407 ), and the other also reported in this very volume, Himanshu Dhar Singh v. Addl. Registrar Co-operative societies U.P., AIR 1962 All 439 ), it should be held that ben the averments made in the affidavit not been controverted by a counter affidavit. then normally such averments should he accepted as true. The learned counsel further placed reliance on Tribhuwan Duttar v. Civil Judge 1979 All WC 26, : 1979 All L J 70), where a learned ;Judge of this Court has discussed the expression `sufficient cause' under S. 5 of the Lim. Act. Lastly, reliance was placed on the pronouncement of this Court in Jamuna Narain Verma v. District Judge, (1979 All W C 437). Act. Lastly, reliance was placed on the pronouncement of this Court in Jamuna Narain Verma v. District Judge, (1979 All W C 437). I have considered this case law but in my view no interference is possible in the instant petition. It should be seen that the Supreme Court in Manindra Land & Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, (AIR 1964 S C 1336) clearly laid down that `sufficiency of cause' under S. S of the Lim. Act, in contrast to S. 3 of the Lim. Act, raises no jurisdictional controversy and it is open to the authorities deciding an application under S. 5 of the Lim. Act as to whether sufficient cause has been made out or not, to decide the same rightly or wrongly. In such a finding no interference is called for in the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It should he seen that in the instant case, the appellate court has given reasons why the petitioner's version was not acceptable and the learned counsel merely stated that Pramod Kumar Singh's inability to appear has been explained in the writ petition itself. Such inability was admittedly not explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application under S. 5 of the Lim. Act. It has seemed to me that the case law, on which reliance has been placed. is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. There is no gainsaying that sufficiency of cause is incapable of being rigidly defined and that will depend upon the facts of each case. The two Allahabad decisions reported in AIR 1962 All (Supra) were made in regular appeals where the evidence was being considered. The learned single Judge, who considered the expression `sufficiency of cause' in 1971) All W C 26 : (1979 All L J 70) did so in the context of the facts of that case. I do not think that it was the intention of the learned Judge to lay down any general standard which would he applicable to the facts of each case. In the last decision it was found that the affidavit was rejected without any reason being given whatsoever. In the instant case, the appellate court has given clear reasons why the version of the petitioner was not being accepted. In the last decision it was found that the affidavit was rejected without any reason being given whatsoever. In the instant case, the appellate court has given clear reasons why the version of the petitioner was not being accepted. As I have said above, the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that irrespective of the fact whether the said finding should be held correct or incorrect on the appraisal of the evidence on record, this Court should not, on its revisional side (which is akin to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution), interfere in such a finding. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to Rafiq v. Munshilal, (AIR 1981 S C 1400) :(1981 All L J 704) and to Mst. Jamna Kuer v. Lal Bahadur, (AIR 1950 F. C. 131). So far as the first case is concerned I have distinguished the same in Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 9357 of 1980 Yogendra Singh v. District Judge which I have decided today. Therein I observed as follows : - "It should he seen that the Supreme Court was dealing with the matter in an appeal. Further. it should be seen that the order dismissing the appeal in default was passed by the High Court and the following observation in this connection may be seen : 'Therefore, the party having done every thing in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to enquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the Advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed.' In the instant case, the appeal was not pending in the High Court, the appeal was before the lower appellate court and it is a normal practice that in the lower appellate court the parties or their Pairokars are generally present. ............., The word `listed' has been used in the aforesaid extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court. In the Courts below there is no question of listing of an appeal. Further, it should be seen that I am not sitting in an appeal. ............., The word `listed' has been used in the aforesaid extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court. In the Courts below there is no question of listing of an appeal. Further, it should be seen that I am not sitting in an appeal. It is an extraordinary jurisdiction which I am exercising under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Manindra Land & Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, (AIR 1964 S C 1336). I think in these matters no interference is called for if the appellate court held that there was not sufficient reason for setting aside the order dismissing the appeal in default. No question of jurisdiction is involved in such matter. Even if a different view was he taken from the one which was taken by the appellate court, I do not have the jurisdiction to interfere." 6. So far as the Federal Court's decision is concerned, it should he seen that the matter was dealt with in the context of the review petition and it was held that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record in respect of certain properties. I do not think that this case has anything to do with a decision rendered by the appellate court while disposing of an application under S. 5 of the Lim. Act holding that the cause shown is not sufficient. 7. This petition is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.