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1981 DIGILAW 68 (RAJ)

Babulal v. State

1981-02-16

S.N.DEEDWANIA

body1981
JUDGMENT 1. - Babulal has preferred this revision against the judgment dated 1-4-1976 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirohi, whereby his appeal was dismissed and the conviction under section 4(2) of the Rajasthan Prohibition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was maintained. 2. Briefly stated the facts as alleged by the prosecution are these: On 9-1-1972 police Sirohi raided a house alleged to be in possession of the Petitioner and recovered from therein nine bags each containing twenty bottles of plain liquor, six bags each containing 25 bottles of plain liquor, and one bag containing gulab liquor. These bags were seized and sealed and samples from these bottles were chemically examined. A challan was put up in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sirohi against the petitioner. On the same day another room in this house was searched and some more bottles of liquor was seized and sealed. Another challan was also presented against the petitioner. However, it appears that both the offences were tried in one trial. The prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses. The defence of the accused was that he had not concerned with this house. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor and gone through the record of the case, it is not disputed before me that on search liquor was recovered from the house. The only point pressed before me is that the prosecution miserably failed to prove that this house was in possession of the petitioner. None of the prosecution witness has deposed to prove the possession of the petitioner over the house. On the other hand the learned Public Prosecutor argued that the possession of petitioner over this house is proved by the admission of the petitioner himself at the time of the release of certain properties. The petitioner made an application in the court that he was in possession of the house. I have considered the argument carefully. The learned appellate court has also mainly relied upon this admission contained in Ex. P. 10. Before dealing with this admission, it may be stated that the prosecution examined PW 1 Devi Chand, the owner of the house to prove the possession of the petitioner over it. PW 1 Devi Chand however, specifically stated that he rented this house to Maganji Kangtani. He did not rent out any house to Babulal. P. 10. Before dealing with this admission, it may be stated that the prosecution examined PW 1 Devi Chand, the owner of the house to prove the possession of the petitioner over it. PW 1 Devi Chand however, specifically stated that he rented this house to Maganji Kangtani. He did not rent out any house to Babulal. He further stated that he took the rent once in a year from the cereal shop of Babulal. However, this is his inference only because he further states that as the shop was situated in the building owned by Babulal, therefore, he inferred that the shop was of Babulal Thus it is obviously not possible to come to a finding on the basis of the statement of this witness that the house was rented out to Babulal or was in his possession. P.W. 4 Om Prakash also deposed that the house was on rent with Babulal and also in his possession. However, in the cross examination he stated that for the first time he saw this house. The witness also tried to say that at the time he raided this house Babulal ran away. However, the witness cannot be believed on this point as in the first information report made by him, he omitted to state this fact. 4. Thus the only evidence on the basis of which the petitioner could possibly be convicted is Ex. P. 10. It appears from the proceedings in the trial court that the arguments were heard and the case was fixed for pronouncement of judgment on 15-9-1975. It does not appear from the proceedings in the trial court how this Ex. P. 10 was introduced in evidence. It is stated in the proceedings of 15-9-1975 that it is necessary to further question the petitioner under section 342 Cr. P.C. (old) regarding his application dated 21-12-1972. This application is Ex. P. 10. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the first instance that Ex. P. 10 was formally not proved. The prosecution cannot take the advantage of the admission of the petitioner to come to a finding that he signed this application. However, this is besides the point because the two defence witnesses who were examined after further quarry regarding Ex. P. 10 was formally not proved. The prosecution cannot take the advantage of the admission of the petitioner to come to a finding that he signed this application. However, this is besides the point because the two defence witnesses who were examined after further quarry regarding Ex. P. 10 was made by the court DW.2 Om Prakash, the son of the petitioner admitted that this application was signed by his father Babulal. The petitioner in his statement under section 342 Cr. P C. (old) stated that his son asked him to sign an application which he signed without reading it. He signed the application because his son told him that his counsel had instructed him that the gwar can only be released if the application is made on his behalf as the case was pending against him. To the same effect is the statement of Babulal. Normally an admission has to be considered as a whole and more so, where it is sought to be made the basis of conviction. The rule is that if a party makes a qualified statement, it cannot be used against him apart from the qualification. Thus the rule is that an admission which is qualified in terms must be ordinarily accepted as a whole or not at all. Babulal has nowhere admitted that he consciously signed Ex. P. 10 not it is possible to come to this conclusion from the statement of DW 2 Om Prakssh. If the prosecution relied on the admission it must be accepted as a whole. No doubt, in Ex. P. 10 no such exculpatory explanation is contained that the house was not in the possession of the petitioner or he did not consciously sign it. However, it must not be lost sight of that Ex. P. 10 was not formally proved and it is not possible to know that in what circumstances Ex. P. 10 was signed by the petitioner. Even from the statement of PW 1 Devi Chand, it is clear that the house was not rented out to Babulal. No doubt, it is stated in Ex P. 10 that the house had been in possession of the petitioner. However, I am of the view that in the absence of any evidence that Babulal consciously signed this application Ex. Even from the statement of PW 1 Devi Chand, it is clear that the house was not rented out to Babulal. No doubt, it is stated in Ex P. 10 that the house had been in possession of the petitioner. However, I am of the view that in the absence of any evidence that Babulal consciously signed this application Ex. P. 10 or did not make a wrong averment in the same, it is not possible to ignore the explanation given by his son regarding Ex P. 10. The possibility cannot be ruled out that a wrong admission was made by the petitioner in Ex. 10. though the house was not in his actual and conscious possession. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was rightly convicted and it has certainly entailed a miscarriage of justice. The explanation furnished by the petitioner has to be given due weight in the absence of any "evidence to the contrary. The appellant court stated that the plea of the petitioner in his statement under sec. 142 Cr. PC. (old) was that the contents of the application were correct. I have already referred the statement of the petitioner in this regard. It may again be said that he stated that he did not move an application in the nature of Ex, P. 10 but put his signatures on it without reading it on the request of his son Om Prakash and one Mangilal. The petitioner specifically asserted that the gwar did not belong to him and he was not in the possession of the house. The learned appellate court, therefore, wrongly misread this statement of the petitioner. There are no reasons to support that the explanation given by the petitioner and his son is most unnatural or an afterthought. It appears that in the anxiety to take the possession of the house and the gwar a wrong admission was made in Ex. P. 10 and probably Babu Lal did not consciously sign it. The prosecution therefore could not prove its case against the petitioner by any cogent evidence. 5. The petitioner is, therefore, acquitted of the offence under section 4(2) of the Act and the sentence awarded therein is set aside. He is on bail and need not surrender to his bail bonds.Revision allowed. *******