ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings in Small Cause Court Suit No. 99 of 1974 filed by the petitioner Pyarey Lal Sharma against opposite party No. 3, Satya Prakash Gupta. The suit was filed for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. The allegations in the plaint were that opposite party No. 3 was a tenant at the rate of Rs. 65/- per mensem. He did not pay rent from 1st January 1974 to 30th April, 1974 amounting to Rs. 260/- and the water tax since October 1973 to April 1974 amounting to Rs. 45/50. The water tax of the portion occupied by opposite party No. 3 is Rs. 6.50 per month, which, according to the petitioner, the opposite party No. 3 was liable to pay as part of the rent. When this amount became due the petitioner sent a notice of demand to the opposite party No. 3 on 20th April, 1974 asking him to pay Rs. 260/- towards rent and Rs. 45.50 towards water tax. Since this amount was not paid according to the petitioner opposite party No. 3 became a defaulter. Thereafter the present suit was filed on 21st Oct., 1974. In the suit, however, an amount of Rs. 704.94 was claimed towards arrears of rent and water tax. The suit was contested by opposite party No. 3 on the ground that he was not a defaulter as he had deposited rent in the court under S. 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for the period 1st January, 1974 to 31st March, 1974 amounting to Rs. 195/-. It was further averred that rent for 1st April, 1974 to 30th June, 1974 was also deposited in the State Bank on 2nd June, 1974 and rent from 1st July, 1974 to 30th Sep., 1974 was also deposited in the State Bank by Challan No. 61 and thus according to opposite party No. 3 rent had already been deposited for 1st Jan., 1974 to 30th Sep., 1974. it is further averred that he bad paid Rs. 71.50 to the Municipal Board vide receipt No. 67/277 for which he sought adjustment. 2. it is further averred that he bad paid Rs. 71.50 to the Municipal Board vide receipt No. 67/277 for which he sought adjustment. 2. The Judge Small Cause Court came to the conclusion that water tax was a part of the rent and as such opposite party No. 3 was a defaulter in the eye of law. It was further held that opposite party No. 3 was not entitled to the benefit of Section 20, sub-clause (4), of the Act and as such the suit was decreed, on 1st April, 1978. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 1st April, 1978 a revision was filed by opposite party No. 3 under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. This revision came up for hearing before the VIIth Additional District Judge, Etah, who by his judgment dated 25th Oct., 1978 allowed the revision, set aside the decree for ejectment and gave the benefit of S. 20, sub-clause (4) of the Act to opposite party No. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 25th Oct 1978 the landlord has filed the present petition in this Court. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the revisional court acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in giving benefit of Section 20, sub-clause (4), of the Act to opposite party No. 3. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the VIIth Additional District Judge, Etah, had no jurisdiction to decide a revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 3, however, not only refuted the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner but has also further contended that in any case the judgment is supportable in law because opposite party No. 3 could not have been deemed to be a defaulter in the eye of law and as such no decree for ejectment could have been passed against opposite party No. 3. 4. The present suit was instituted on 21st Oct., 1974. Summons fixing 3rd Jan., 1975 were issued. On 3rd Jan., 1975 opposite party No. 3 appeared and deposited Rs. 592/50. He also moved an application for time to file the written statement and deposit the balance of the amount. This application was allowed and the court fixed 14th March, 1975 for further orders. Summons fixing 3rd Jan., 1975 were issued. On 3rd Jan., 1975 opposite party No. 3 appeared and deposited Rs. 592/50. He also moved an application for time to file the written statement and deposit the balance of the amount. This application was allowed and the court fixed 14th March, 1975 for further orders. On 14th March, 1975 the case was again adjourned on the request of opposite party No. 3 and time was granted up to 30th May, 1975. In the meantime the tenant deposited Rs. 334/50 on 17th April, 1975 but thereafter it appears that the matter lingered on and ultimately the written statement was filed on 15th July, 1916. It is admitted on record that if the deposit of Rs. 334/50 is taken into consideration the deposit is much more than what was required to be deposited under S. 20, sub-cl. (4) of the Act. The argument, however, of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the written statement was filed on 15th July, 1976 the first date of hearing should be taken as 15th July, 1976 and the amount up to 15th July, 1976 should have been deposited and, therefore, the deposit made on 17th April, 1975 should fall short of the deposit and as such opposite party No. 3 could not get the benefit of Section 20, sub clause (4) of the Act. 5. It is no doubt true that in case the date of first hearing is taken as 15th July, 1976 the amount of deposit made up to 15th April, 1975 would be short of the amount. In Basu Dev Sahai v. Brij Mohan Lal, 1979 All WC 153 : (1979 All LJ 484), the question referred to the Division Bench was as to what was the effect of a deposit made prior to the date of hearing. The Bench after analysing the various provisions of the Act came to the following conclusion : "This means that if he (tenant) deposits or tenders the entire amount contemplated by S. 20 (4) of the Act before the first hearing of the suit takes place he can, when his eviction is sought on the ground that he was in arrears of rent for more than four months and that he had failed to pay the same within one month of service of notice of demand upon him, be relieved of his liability for eviction. It may be that first hearing of the suit may not take place on the first date fixed for its hearing. There is clear distinction between the requirement that a deposit should be made on the first date for hearing fixed in the case and that it should be made, at the first hearing of the suit. So long as the tenant deposits the requisite amount before the first hearing in the suit takes place, it can be said that he has deposited the same at the first hearing and he would be entitled to claim the relief contemplated by S. 20 (4) of the Act." 6. In view of the Division Bench authority of this Court since even if the date of first hearing is taken to be as 15th July, 1976 the amount as contemplated under Section 20, sub-clause (4), of the Act having been deposited on 17th April, 1975, before the date of hearing fixed in the case, namely, 15th July, 1976, such deposit would entitle the tenant to the benefit of Section 20, sub-clause (4) of the Act. The principle laid down in the case of Basu Dev Sahai (supra) fully applies to the present case. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied on Gulab Singh v. 1st Addl. D.J., Bareilly, 1980 All Ren C 517: (1980 All LJ 633). In this case it was held that S. 20 (4) of the Act permits deduction of such rent which may have been deposited under S. 30 (1) and not which had been deposited under S. 30 (2) of the Act. This case does not apply to the facts of this case at all. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the first date of hearing has to be the date of issues and as such the deposit made earlier is invalid. Even it this argument of the learned counsel is accepted even then the deposit having been made before the date of the first hearing, the opposite party No. 3 would be entitled to the benefit of Section 20, sub-clause (4) of the Act, the said date of hearing, though it may be later, will give no benefit to the landlord. 9. 9. In the circumstances so far as the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned I am of the opinion that the view taken by the revisional Court that the tenant is entitled to the benefit of S. 20, sub-clause (4) of the Act is in accordance with law. 10. In Ram Narain v. K.L. Vishwakarma, 1965 All LJ 989, a Division Bench of this Court took the view that in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act the Addl. District Judge has jurisdiction to decide the revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. I am bound by the said decision. This view has been subsequently reiterated in the case of Basant Lal & Sons v. Surya Kant, AIR 1967 All 294 . Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has relied on certain observations made in the case of Chunni Lal v. Shanker Lal, Civil Revision No. 171 of 1976, D/d. 15th Feb., 1979, reported in 1979 AIR Summary of Cases 161. This observation was made in respect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Small Cause Court. The question that the Addl. District Judge did not have jurisdiction to decide a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was not considered in this case. The question had already been decided finally by this Court in the reference to the Division Bench which I have already mentioned above. In the circumstances the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not well founded. 11. In regard to the submission made by the learned counsel for opposite party No, 3 that the petitioner is not a defaulter it is not necessary to go into the details of the submission because I have held that opposite party No. 3 is entitled to the benefit of S. 20, sub-clause (4), of the Act and as such the decree passed by the revisional Court has to be upheld. 12. In the circumstances there is no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.