SHARIFF SHIVA YOGI, GURU GOVIND SHIVA YOGI PANCHAGNIMATH TRUST v. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
1981-02-20
M.RAMA JOIS
body1981
DigiLaw.ai
M. RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is presented by the management of a Private Educational Institution aggrieved by the order of Joint director of Public Instruction, Belgaum, directing ihe reinstatement of a teacher on the establishment of the said Educational institution who had been placed under suspension by an order made by the Management. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are as follows : respondent-2 is a teacher on the establishment of a Secondary School under the management of the petitioner. The management was of the view that there was a case for holding a departmental enquiry against the 2nd respondent, and was also of the opinion that the 2nd respondent should be placed under suspension pending such enquiry. By memo dated 29-5-1980 the management placed the 2nd respondent under suspension and by letter dated 30-5-1980 (An- nexure-H) addressed to the Joint Director, it sought the approval of the Joint director as required under R. 52 (6) of the Grant-in-aid Code. According to the said provision, approval of the Joint director is necessary to an order of suspension suspending any employee of a private management and also for payment of subsistence allowances. By communication dated 5-6-1980, the Joint Director stated as follows :-"pending further and detailed investigations into the charges framed by the management against him by the enquiry committee yet to be constituted for the purpose you are hereby advised to arrange to re instate sri A. K, Advanimath, in service and take back him to duty immediately in your institution. A departmental nominee on the enquiry committee proposed to be constituted would be appointed later, if found necessary, on receipt of a compliance report in the matter. Attention is however invited to the requirements as laid down under Rule no. 11 (xii) as well as to rule 15 in chapter 111 of the revised grant-in-aid code for secondary schools in this behalf. "the same view was reiterated subsequently by the letter dated 26th June 1980 (Annexure-K ). Aggrieved by these directions the petitioner has presented this writ petition.
11 (xii) as well as to rule 15 in chapter 111 of the revised grant-in-aid code for secondary schools in this behalf. "the same view was reiterated subsequently by the letter dated 26th June 1980 (Annexure-K ). Aggrieved by these directions the petitioner has presented this writ petition. ( 3 ) SRI Chandangoudar R. H. , learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that when the management was of the opinion that there were grounds to institute departmental enquiry against its own employee and also formed an opinion that he should be placed under suspension pending enquiry and requested the joint Director to appoint a departmental nominee on the enquiry committee proposed to be constituted and also sought the approval of the Joint Director for the suspension, he should have accorded approval and could not have issued a direction directing the management to reinstate the employee. Alternatively he submitted that if the 2nd respondent was aggrieved by the order of management on any ground his remedy was to prefer an appeal before the Karnataka Educational appellate Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka Private Eucational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Joint Director could not have issued a direction for reinstatement. ( 4 ) SRI K. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contended that the Joint Director had the power to issue an order of reinstatement if he was of the opinion that the suspension was not justified. ( 5 ) SRI Narasimhan, learned Government advocate for the Joint Director submitted that what the Joint Director did by the two communications was, not to accord approval to the order of suspension made by the management and there was no direction for the management to reinstate the teacher. He submitted that as the Joint Director did not accord approval to the order of suspension he stated that the 2nd respondent should be taken back to duty As regards the grievance of the petitioner that the Joint Director had failed to nominate a departmental nominee on the enquiry committee and consequently, caused delay in the holding of the enquiry, the leaned counsel submitted that the Joint director is agreeable to appoint a departmental nominee to enable the management to hold an enquiry.
( 6 ) IN my view, the submission made on behalf of the Joint Director has to be accepted, and the letters addressed by the Joint Director to the management should be construed as only amounting to his not according approval to the order of suspension and not as issuing any further direction to the management to reinstate the 2nd respondent into service pending enqu ry. There can be no doubt that if an order which adversely affects the condit;ons of an employee of a Private educational Institution is made by the management, the remedy open to such an employee is to prefer an appeal to the educational Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act and therefore, the officers of the Education Department cannot exercise the same power which are conferred on the Educational Appellate tribunal by an Act of Legislature. If there is any conflict 'between the provisions of the Act and the provisions under the Grant-in-aid Code, the former prevails. ( 7 ) THERE is another reason for accepting the contention urged for the petitioner. It is well settled that even in the absence of any rule or contract, providing for suspension, every master has inherent power to place his employee under suspension, subject to payment of full salary. See T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik siem ( AIR 1961 SC 276 , 283) Under the Grant-in-Aid Code approval of the Joint Director or any other designated officer of the department to an order of suspension of an employee of a private educational institute is prescribed, obviously because the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension in the first instance, as also full salary, for the period, in the event of exoneration from the charge framed against the concerned employee, to the employee placed under suspension pending enquiry has to be paid by the Government. However, if in spite of the disapproval of the suspension, the management considers that there are good grounds to keep its employee out of employment having regard to the nature of the charges, they are at liberty to do so but subject to payment of salary from their own funds. Therefore, the order issued by the Joint Director, as submitted on his behalf, was only an order disapproving the suspension and did not amount to a direction for reinstatement. In view of the provisions of the Act.
Therefore, the order issued by the Joint Director, as submitted on his behalf, was only an order disapproving the suspension and did not amount to a direction for reinstatement. In view of the provisions of the Act. as far as the suspended employee is concerned, if he is aggrieved by the order of suspension or final order imposing any of the penalties, made by the management whether the same has been approved or not by the officer concerned of the education department, the only remedy available to him under the Act is to approach the Educational Appellate Tribunal in appeal and it is for the Tribunal to decide as to whether the order appealed agninst was or was not justified. ( 8 ) SRI K. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, strenuously contended that the order of the Joint director is not open for judicial scrutiny under Art. 226 of the Constitution as the said order is made under the provisions of the Grant-in-aid Code which have no statutory force and which only amount to an understanding between the management and the State Government. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision of this Court in G. R. Ramaswarny Iyengar v. D. P. I. Mysore ( (1970)1 Mys L J. 232), the relevant portion on which he relied, is contained in paragraphs 6, 7 and 12 of the judgment. I am unable to agree. If the order of the Joint Director is understood as an order issuing a direction for reinstating the teacher, notwithstanding the fact that the management decided to place him under suspension, the order has to be declared as without jurisdiction as the power is conferred only on the educational Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. The decision on which the learned counsel relied was rendered at a time when the Act was not in force. Subsequently, the legislature has enacted the law constituting the Educational appellate Tribunal and conferring exclusive power on the Tribunal to entertain appeals against any order made by a Private Management affecting the conditions of service of an employee of any private management. Therefore, to that extent, all the provisions contained in the Grant-in-aid Code which are admittedly issued by the Government in exercise of its executive powers under art. 162 of the Constitution cannot prevail.
Therefore, to that extent, all the provisions contained in the Grant-in-aid Code which are admittedly issued by the Government in exercise of its executive powers under art. 162 of the Constitution cannot prevail. Therefore, after the petitioner- management placed the 2nd respondent under suspension, if the 2nd respondent was aggrieved by that order he had to avail the remedy only before the Educational appellate Tribunal. Neither at his instance nor suo motu, the Joint director has the power to pass orders which the Educational Appellate Tribunal is competent to pass under the Act. Therefore if the Joint Director were to make an order usurping the power of the educational Appellate Tribunal, such an order could be set aside in a petition under art. 226, as an order made without jurisdiction, However, in this case it is unnecessary to do so as the learned counsel for the Joint Director has clarified that there is no direction issued by the joint Director for reinstatement of the 2nd respondent. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of the Joint director refusing to accord approval to the suspension order also is arbitrary. That is an order made under the provisions of the Grant-in-aid Code. If the management is aggrieved by the disapproval of the suspension itseif, the remedy available for the management is to approach the higher authorities including the Government seeking approval for suspension. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that actually the management had approached the Government and Government has directed the joint Director for according approval to the order of suspension. It is a matter between the Joint Director and the Go- vernment, and I do not express any opinion in the matter. For the reasons aforesaid, I make the following order: (i) The Joint Director (1st respondent) shall appoint a departmental nominee on the enquiry committee within 15 days from the date of the receipt of this order, if the copy of the charges framed against the 2nd respondent has already been furnished to the Joint Director by the Management and if not within 15 days from the date of submission of the articles of charges.
(ii) The 2nd respondent is at liberty to approach the Educational Appellate tribunal against the order of suspension and if the time for appeal is already over he is at liberty to make an application for condonation of delay in prefering the appeal. Sri Narasimhan, learned Government pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance in two weeks. --- *** --- .