JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra. J. - This second appeal is by the defendants in a suit for injunction filed by plaintiff-respondent No. 1. The injunction sought was that the defendants be restrained from realising from the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 2106-29 by arrest of the plaintiff or otherwise. The trial court had dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court decreed it. 2. The plaintiffs case was that he had been served with a false notice demanding a sum of Rs. 2106-29 towards charges for electricity (consumed) by him in the bill which related to premises No. 101-B Chak Daudnagar, Naini, Allahabad with which he had nothing to do. He never took any electric connection nor was he supplied any electricity. 3. The suit was contested and the principal plea which was taken by the present appellants was that on the request of the plaintiff, an electric connection was given to him in the premises in question. Later, the plaintiff made a request for disconnection. The amount that was being claimed from him related to the consumption of electricity before the date of disconnection. Since the plaintiff had not paid it in spite of demand, it had become necessary to seek its recovery through coercive process. The plaintiff was not entitled to the relief asked for by him. 4. The trial court believed the case of the defendants that the plaintiff had made a request for connection in premises No. 101-B Chak Daudnagar and that he had actually been given that connection and after that electricity had been consumed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, was consequently, liable to pay the amount due from him and was, as such, not entitled to any injunction restraining the defendants from effecting the recovery thereof. The trial court arrived at the conclusions aforesaid on its view of the evidence led by the parties. It recorded a finding that several material facts had been concealed by the plaintiff in the plaint and that the plaintiff was not a truthful person. 5. The plaintiff assailed the decree of the trial court in an appeal. That appeal was heard by the Second Additional District Judge Allahabad. The learned Judge re- appraised the evidence on record and felt that even though the plaintiff had not been truthful in certain respects. 5. The plaintiff assailed the decree of the trial court in an appeal. That appeal was heard by the Second Additional District Judge Allahabad. The learned Judge re- appraised the evidence on record and felt that even though the plaintiff had not been truthful in certain respects. the defendants, had failed to establish that any electric connection was actually provided in the premises in dispute on the request of the plaintiff or that the plaintiff had consumed any electricity. The lower appellate court was of opinion that the defendants could have produced evidence to establish the extent of energy consumed by the plaintiff and, thus, the fact that he was liable for the amount sought to be recovered from him could have been established affirmatively. Since the defendants had failed to do so, they were not entitled to make any recovery from the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of injunction. The lower appellate court therefore, set aside the trial court' decree and restrained the defendants from realising the amount from the plaintiff. It is this decree which has been assailed by the defendants in the present second appeal. 6. The first submission which has been made by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the lower appellate court was not justified in its view that the plaintiff was not given any electric connection in the premises in question and that no electricity was consumed by him. It has been urged that from the circumstances on record, as noticed by the lower appellate court as well in its judgment under appeal, the only reasonable conclusion was that the defendants had given an electric connection to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had consumed electricity in the premises. 7. The lower appellate court has taken into account the statement made by the two witnesses produced by the defendants in support of their plea that electric connection was given to the plaintiff in the premises in question. It has taken note of the fact that the testimony of these two witnesses only went to the extent of establishing that some steps towards giving of electrical connection in the premises in question were taken by the defendants on the request of the plaintiff. It has taken note of the fact that the testimony of these two witnesses only went to the extent of establishing that some steps towards giving of electrical connection in the premises in question were taken by the defendants on the request of the plaintiff. It then proceeded to notice the statement made by the two witnesses of the defendants wherein they gave out that they did not know whether actually an electric connection was given in the premises in pursuance of the steps taken by the defendants at the request of the plaintiff in that regard. The finding that no electric connection was given is,prima facie, based upon this ignorance on the part of the two witnesses of the defendants. 8. The next and the principal submission of the learned counsel fur the appellants is that on the facts found by the courts below, the present was not an appropriate case in which the discretionary relief of injunction should have been granted to the plaintiff. It has been urged that the conduct of the plaintiff himself was (not?) such which entitled him to the grant of the discretionary relief of an injunction. It was argued that if the plaintiff could established in appropriate proceedings that he was not liable for payment of the amount which was sought to be recovered from him, he would be entitled to seek the refund of the amount if realised by the defendants. 9. The grant of relief of injunction is' undoubtedly one of discretion. It is an equitable relief and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 itself contemplates that the grant of the relief of injunction is in the discretion of the court. In fact, this proposition is so well settled that the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent fairly did not contest it. 10. The case with which the plaintiff came to court was a simple one. He alleged that he had no concern with premises No. 101-B Chak Daudnagar and that he never took any electric connection. Further, no electricity was supplied to hire and fictitious bills had been raised by the defendants who were trying to realise the amount thereof arbitrarily from the plaintiff, inter alia, by his arrest. The defendants had no right to realise the amount from him. Further, no electricity was supplied to hire and fictitious bills had been raised by the defendants who were trying to realise the amount thereof arbitrarily from the plaintiff, inter alia, by his arrest. The defendants had no right to realise the amount from him. The defendants, however, pleaded that the case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint was not true and that he had not only made an application for electric connection in the premises but had also made certain deposits with the defendants towards the taking of that connection in the premises in suit. The plaintiff, according to the case of the defendants, actually consumed electricity and was, thus, liable for the amount demanded from him. Since he had failed to pay the amount, recourse to its recovery through coercive process had to be taken as the defendants were entitled in law to do so. 11. The trial court, as noticed earlier, observed, on consideration of the evidence led before it, that the allegation that he had no concern with House No. 101-B Chak Daudnagar, was incorrect. Further that the plaintiff had not told the truth when he alleged that he never took any electric connection from the defendants. In fact, he had not only applied for such a connection but had also deposited some amounts towards it. These findings were expressly affirmed by the lower appellate court which re-appraised the evidence on record. In fact, the lower appellate court observed as follows: "I find that the appellant had not said the whole truth and at places he had differed from his original version............ To begin with the case of the appellant was that he had nothing to do with house No. 101-B Chak Daudnagar, Naini, but when the evidence was led it transpired that he had something to do with it ............... The evidence adduced by the appellant goes to indicate that he did intend to take an electric connection and for that matter a sum of Rs. 700/- had been advanced to one Mr. Saxena. It has, however, not been proved from the evidence of the appellant irespondent to be correct) that the electric connection was supplied to the appellant or that he had consumed the electricity. The respondents produced two witnesses in their defence. 700/- had been advanced to one Mr. Saxena. It has, however, not been proved from the evidence of the appellant irespondent to be correct) that the electric connection was supplied to the appellant or that he had consumed the electricity. The respondents produced two witnesses in their defence. Both of them proved certain circumstances which go to indicate that some steps necessary for supplying an electric connection are taken. They have proved that an estimate was prepared and some wiring had been done, but both these witnesses say that they did not know if ultimately the electric connection was given or not........." 12. The lower appellate court was of opinion that the fact that the plaintiff had not said the whole truth and at places he had differed from his original version had little effect on the decision of the case itself and that what was to be seen was whether the amount which was being realised from the appellant was due from him or not. The observation of the lower appellate court indicates that it was oblivious to the fact that the conduct of a party in a case wherein the relief sought is on grounds of equity has material bearing upon the ultimate decision about the grant or otherwise of that relief. It is trite that one who seeks equity must come with clean hands. On the findings about the conduct of the plaintiff recorded by the two courts below concurrently it is obvious that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands. He had suppressed material facts and had not stated the whole truth. 13. The lower appellate court appears to have felt that the circumstances that the defendants had failed to establish that the plaintiff was liable to pay the amount, which was being demanded from him, was enough to grant relief to the plaintiff. This approach, however, is clearly contrary to the settled view that the grant of the equitable and discretionary relief of an injunction cannot be claimed by a party as a matter of course. Before a party can claim to be entitled to an equitable relief, it has also to prove to the satisfaction of the court that his own conduct was above reproach. 14. Before a party can claim to be entitled to an equitable relief, it has also to prove to the satisfaction of the court that his own conduct was above reproach. 14. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that the lower appellate court having decided to grant the relief of injunction to the plaintiff in its discretion that grant was not amenable to challenge in second appeal and that, in any case, the exercise of discretion in favour of the plaintiff was not liable to be interfered with by this court in appeal. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ram Krishna Govind Morey, (AIR 1976 S C 830) wherein it was observed (in para. 2 of the Report) as follows : "The plaintiffs case did not depend on what the defendant might say in the written statement and if what he proposed to introduce in the plaint by way of amendment was relevant to his case, there is no apparent reason why this was left out when the plaint was filed. Prima facie, therefore, the order of the trial court rejecting the plaintiff's application for amendment of the plaint was not arbitrary. Whether the trial court should not have exercised its discretion differently, is not a question of law justifying interference by the High Court in second appeal. The learned Judge of the High Court also failed to consider the fact that a revisional application from the order refusing amendment had earlier been dismissed by the High Court. For these reasons, we hold that the High Court had no jurisdiction is second appeal to interfere with the order passed by the trial court in its discretion which was affirmed by the lower appellate court........." Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the decision of T.S. Misra. J. in Sohan v. Abdul Hameed Khan, ( AIR 1976 All 159 ) in which the learned Judge observed (in para. J. in Sohan v. Abdul Hameed Khan, ( AIR 1976 All 159 ) in which the learned Judge observed (in para. 4 of the Report) that "the principle is that where the discretion has been exercised-by the courts below in a sound and reasonable way, the High Court, would not interfere in second appeal." The learned Judge was dealing with a case where the lower appellate court had refused to condone the delay in filing of the appeal on its view that there was no sufficient cause for the appellant for not preferring the appeal within the time prescribed. It is noticeable that the observation aforesaid was followed by the observation that " .......... If the court below does not exercise its discretion at all or exercises its discretion capriciously and arbitrarily or without proper legal material to support its decision, this court would interfere with that order in second appeal.............. 15. The principle undoubtedly is that normally an appellate court would not interfere with an order passed by the court below in its discretion except where it has not been guided by the correct legal principle or the discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary or perverse manner. Not much authority is needed for this proposition which is a settled view of law. It is however, a matter of enquiry in each case as to whether the court below has passed an order in exercise of its discretion or not and whether that order, has inter alia, been passed with due regard to the correct legal principle for exercise of discretion by it. In the present case, as noticed earlier, the lower appellate court appears to have felt that the conduct of the plaintiff in not stating the whole truth and at places differing from his original version was of no consequence. This is what it observed when it started examining the case on merits. The observation made by the learned Judge clearly betrays an erroneous approach in law to the question of the grant or otherwise of the discretionary relief of injunction which is equitable in character. The lower appellate court clearly felt compelled to grant the relief when it observed that what was to be seen was whether the amount which was being realised from the plaintiff was due from him or not and upon the finding recorded by it that it was not so due. The lower appellate court clearly felt compelled to grant the relief when it observed that what was to be seen was whether the amount which was being realised from the plaintiff was due from him or not and upon the finding recorded by it that it was not so due. In taking the view that it has, the lower appellate court has not kept before itself the guiding principle in the matter of grant of relief of injunction, namely, that the conduct of the applicant seeking relief should be clean and above reproach. That the conduct of the plaintiff-respondent was not such is clear from the findings recorded by the courts below themselves. In the circumstances, the lower appellate court was not justified in granting the relief of injunction in the case. 16. The basic question which had to be determined in the instant case was whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against the realisation from him of the amount said to be due from him by recourse to coercive process. The mere fact that the plaintiff is being held not entitled to the grant of the equitable relief of injunction does not mean that the defendants are entitled to realise the amount claimed by them from the plaintiff. In case realisation by recourse to coercive process is actually made of the amount from the plaintiff-respondent, it would always be open to him to seek its refund in appropriate proceedings in case he is able to establish that he is not liable for the pavement of the amount. In fact Sri Sudhir Chandra, appearing for the defendants appellants, has very clearly stated that the appellant-Board will proceed to make the realisation only in case it is found, on due enquiry afresh, that the plaintiff owes the amount to the Board. I have no doubt that the appellant Board will be fair to the plaintiff in this regard and that it would scrutinise the plaintiff's case again in the light of the representation that the plaintiff may make to it. 17. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed. In view, however, of the circumstances of the instant case, I direct that the parties shall hear their own costs throughout.