ORDER K.C. Agrawal, J. - These two petitions raise common questions and hence are being disposed of by a single judgment. 2. An application under Section 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was moved by R.P. Jain, the landlord on 14/17-4-1979, for release of the premises let out to four different tenants who are petitioners of the present writ. The application was although headed under Section 21 of the Act, but the grounds given were both covering Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(1 - A) of U P. Act XIII of 1972. Paras 12 to 16 of the aforesaid application are being reproduced below : "12. That Sri Arvind Kumar Jain, Advocate, the eldest son of the petitioners is practising law at Hapur and he temporarily residing with his uncle for want of a house and chamber. 13. That Sri Ravindra Kumar Jain the second son of the petitioner, also intends to start some business of Hapur. 14. That the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the provisions of Section 21(1-A) of the Act. 15. That in the alternative the case of the petitioner is also covered by the provisions of Section 21(1-A) of the Act. 16. That the need of the petitioner for the said portion of the building is bonafide. He will suffer greater hardship than that suffered by the opposite parties if his present application is not allowed." On 10th May, 1979, the tenants were allowed fifteen days' time for filing written statement. After the expiry of ten days, the case was taken up on 25th May, 1979. On that date again fifteen days' time for filing written statement was given. When the case was taken on 2nd July, 1979, the Prescribed Authority found that the tenants Md not filed the written statement. On this date, the Prescribed Authority granted time upto 2nd of August, 1979 for filing written statement on payment of Rs. 20/- as costs. As the written statement had not been filed on or before 2nd August, 1979, the Prescribed Authority passed the following order : "No written statement was filed. Tenants made application for I month's time for filing written statement." The application was rejected and the Prescribed Authority ordered the case to proceed ex parte and fixed 19th September, 1979 for evidence. As the written statement had not been filed on or before 2nd August, 1979, the Prescribed Authority passed the following order : "No written statement was filed. Tenants made application for I month's time for filing written statement." The application was rejected and the Prescribed Authority ordered the case to proceed ex parte and fixed 19th September, 1979 for evidence. On 19th September, 1979, the file was not made available to the Prescribed Authority on account of the staff of the Civil Courts going on strike. The file was put up before the Prescribed Authority on 17th October, 1979. The order sheet of the aforesaid date reads as under : "Aaj Yah Patrawali Prastut Hokar Prarthi Saboor Dakhil Kar Chuka Hai. Atah Aadesh Hua Ki Ek Pakchhi - Ya Nirnaya Ke Liye 24-10-79 Ko Pesh Ho." 3. On 24-10-79, the application was allowed. The tenants petitioners moved an application for setting aside the ex parte judgment dated 24th October, 1979 on various grounds. The application was contested by the landlord respondent. On 25th March, 1980, the Prescribed Authority rejected the application finding that there was no ground to set aside the ex parte order. 4. The tenants petitioners preferred Misc. Appeal No. 119 of 1979 against the judgment allowing the application of the respondent landlord under Section 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The appeal was dismissed on 23rd April, 1980. 5. By writ No. 5614 of 1980, the petitioners have sought quashing of the orders of the District Judge and that of the Prescribed Authority dated 23-4-80 and 24-10-79 respectively. They have also filed another writ petition no. 3021 of 80 against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 25-3-80 rejecting the application for setting aside the ex parte judgment. Both of these writ petitions, as stated above, involve the common questions. 6. The submission made by the learned counsel, Sri G. N. Verma, appearing for the petitioners, was that the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 24th October, 1979 allowing the application of the landlord having been passed without any notice and without any hearing being offered to the petitioners, the same was invalid. Counsel for the petitioners urged that 19th September, 1979 had been fixed by the Prescribed Authority for the ex parte hearing of the case. On that date, the petitioners had appeared before the court with an application along with the written statement. Counsel for the petitioners urged that 19th September, 1979 had been fixed by the Prescribed Authority for the ex parte hearing of the case. On that date, the petitioners had appeared before the court with an application along with the written statement. But the written statement was not taken on record on account of the staff being on strike. As the hearing of the case was adjourned on 19th September, 1979 on account of the strike, the petitioners were entitled to notice being given to them when the same was placed before the court on 17th October, 1979. Counsel urged that it was the duty of the court to have intimated the petitioners of the date of hearing. 7. Sri R.P. Jain, who appeared in person in this case to oppose the writ petitions, countered the submission of the petitioners' learned counsel on the ground that as the petitioners were in default and an order to proceed with the case ex parte had been passed, they bad no right to make a grievance of the notice not being issued to them. For failure to perform their own duty, they cannot blame the court and get the order set aside under the plea of having been denied the right of an opportunity of hearing. Sri Jain submitted that one who in his own conduct has been to adopt dilatory tactics on the pretext tenable in law is not entitled to the rehearing. 8. After hearing the parties, we are of opinion that the Prescribed Authority committed a gross error in allowing the application on 24th October, 1979. It is true that an order to proceed the case ex parte had been made against the petitioners, on 2nd August, 1979 but, thereafter, the petitioners appeared on 19th September, 1979 along with the written statement which was not accepted on account of the record being not available with the court. It is correct that unless the order to proceed the case ex parte had been set aside, the written statement of the petitioners could not be taken on record. That apart, the order to proceed the case ex parte did not disentitle the petitioners from participating in the proceedings. They were not forbidden to take part in the further proceedings of the application. That apart, the order to proceed the case ex parte did not disentitle the petitioners from participating in the proceedings. They were not forbidden to take part in the further proceedings of the application. It may not be possible for us to imagine the other pleas which could be raised by the petitioners even without the written statement. But the omission on the part of the Prescribed Authority to intimate them of the date fixed for hearing has certainly deprived them of that right. In regard to a right of a person against whom an order under Order 9 Rule 7 has been passed, the Supreme Court held in Arjun Singh v. Mohinder Kumar, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 993. "On the other hand, he might fail in showing good cause. Even in such a case, be is not penalised in the sense of being forbidden to take part in the further proceedings of the suit or whatever might still remain of the trial. Only he cannot claim to be relegated to the position that be occupied at the commencement of the trial. Thus, every contingency which is likely to happen in the trial vis-a-vis. The non-appearance of the defendant at the hearing of a suit has been provided for in Order 9 Rule 7 and Order 9 Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut to the situation that might arise during the course of the trial." 9. Sri R.P. Jain, the landlord, could not submit that the petitioners had no right at all left after the order directing the case to proceed ex parte bad been passed. What he submitted was that it was the bounden duty of the petitioners themselves to keep themselves abreast with the dates fixed by the court and if they failed to do so they thank themselves. The present was not a normal case in which the date had been adjourned from day to day by the court where the persons like the petitioners could be asked to keep themselves aware and abreast with the changes in the dates fixed by the Prescribed Authority. This was an abnormal case. The staff had gone on strike. The strike lasted for a pretty long time. It will be too much to ask a person in such a situation to keep himself acquainted with the dates. This was an abnormal case. The staff had gone on strike. The strike lasted for a pretty long time. It will be too much to ask a person in such a situation to keep himself acquainted with the dates. To do so would be compelling him to do an impossible thing inasmuch as in that event he would be required to visit the court every day. As the law does not require any person to do an impossible thing, the submission of the respondent cannot be accepted. 10. What is worthy of being noticed further in this regard is that the judgment dated 24th October, 1979 allowing the application, the Prescribed Authority itself observed that "the date 19-9-79 was fixed for ex parte evidence but the ministerial staff of this court was on strike, so the file was not available on 19-9-79. It was produced before me on 17.10.79 and to avoid any judice to the parties, 24-10-79 was fixed for ex parte judgment. Even today, the opposite parties did not turn up." 11. From the above it would be seen that the court itself thought that the adjournment of the case was necessary on 17-10-79 to avoid any prejudice which could be caused to the petitioners. But still it took no action which could inform the petitioners of the date fixed for hearing avoided unless the petitioners had been informed of the date for disposal of the application. What is still more strange is that the court did not fix 24th October, 1979 for hearing but for delivery of judgment. When the date for delivery of judgment has been fixed, there was nothing left for the petitioners to do so even if they would have come to know of the same earlier to 24th October, 1979. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 24-10-79 requires to be quashed. 12. We need not go into the controversy about the effect of non application of Order 9 Rules 6 and 7 to the present proceedings suffice. it to say that Rule 22 of the Rules framed under the Act empowers the court to proceed ex parte but that power has also to be exercised in consonance with the principles of law enshrined in the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. it to say that Rule 22 of the Rules framed under the Act empowers the court to proceed ex parte but that power has also to be exercised in consonance with the principles of law enshrined in the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Considerable emphasis was laid by Sri R. P. Jain that Section 21 only requires reasonable opportunity to be given to a tenant in a case of an application under Section 21(l-A). Reasonable opportunity and not unreasonable. In the present case, the Opportunity petitioners was far from being reasonable. There was, therefore, breach of this provision also. Uniformity of procedure toe be adopted therefore, laid down exhaustively. It has to depend on the facts of each case. It is obviously that the legislature lacks both the time and experience necessarily to enact in details Rules for every contingency. Hence, looking into the circumstances of a particular case that the question of reasonableness of the opportunity has to be decided. 14. For what we have said above, we find that the order dated 24th October, 1979 was wrong and illegal. Consequent upon that order being set aside the appellate judgment which was in Misc. Appeal No. 119 of 1979 would also be liable to be quashed on the same ground on which the judgment of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside. The appellate court was also wrong in holding that the petitioners had been given reasonable opportunity of hearing and that the court was not at fault in not issuing notice to them. 15. We also find that the Prescribed Authority committed an error in rejecting the application for setting aside the ex parte order. The grounds have already been given above. For the view that the Prescribed Authority was not justified in deciding the case on 24-10-79, we need not mention the grounds for setting aside the order dated 23-4-80 by which the application of the petitioners had been rejected. 16. In the result, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The aforesaid three orders dated 24-10-1979, 23-4-80 and 25-3-1980 are quashed and the Prescribed Authority is directed to decide the case expeditiously. 17. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.