ORDER R.M. Sahai, J. - By these petitions, one by the tenure-holders and other by transferee, the order of Additional District Judge passed in appeals arising out of proceedings under U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act have been challenged. The petitioner in response to notice issued under Section 10 (2) of the Act had claimed that he having transferred land by three sale deeds dated 19th February 72, in favour of Rajendra Singh, Parminder Singh and Smt. Barjinder Kaur petitioners in connected petition for adequate consideration and the transfer having been made in good faith the area of this land could not be included for determining the land held by him on prescribed date. The Prescribed Authority did not accept this contention as the sale deed was executed on 19th February, 1972, that is, after the prescribed date. The appellate authority also rejected the contention as the petitioner had not disclosed the necessity for transfer in the deed itself although it found that sale deed was executed by irrevocable instrument and was for adequate consideration. The reason given by petitioner in these proceedings for selling the land was held to be afterthought. 2. Admittedly the transfer was made after 24th January, 1971 therefore it fell in legislative mandate enacted in principal clause of sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act. The narrow controversy however that survived was whether it was saved by proviso (b) to the sub-section (6) of Section 5 which provides:- "nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family." The rigour imposed by legislature to circumvent (sic) contemplated amendment in reducing ceiling area was mitigated by the proviso obviously because the amendment in 1973 nullified transactions entered prior to it. How has this been achieved is glimpsed by use of well known legal expressions in the proviso. What is left in the principal clause is a transfer which can be described as fraudulent, sham or effected with attempt to defeat the provisions of ceiling Act. The line in the nature of two transactions one covered by the principal clause and other by proviso may be thin but it is well marked. What is left in the principal clause is a transfer which can be described as fraudulent, sham or effected with attempt to defeat the provisions of ceiling Act. The line in the nature of two transactions one covered by the principal clause and other by proviso may be thin but it is well marked. The word 'good faith' has not been defined. But its meaning both in legal and literal sense appears to be same. A transfer made bona fide is a transfer made in good faith. An Act which is genuine, honest and fair carries with it the impress of good faith. Even negligent act done honestly can be considered to have been done in good faith. While considering a transfer therefore the authorities have to concentrate and give effect to legislative intention by examining facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a transfer is covered in the proviso or not. It is the finding of absence of good faith, of course, only when it is claimed by tenure-holder as Explanation II places the burden on him, that gives jurisdiction to prescribed authority to ignore a transfer which is not void or illegal. 3. In this case the appellate authority found that transfer was by irrevocable instrument to an outsider for consideration. He did not find it to be benami or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family. He has not referred to any evidence or circumstance except the omission to mention the necessity in the sale deed itself. It has been repeatedly held by this court that such omission by itself does not establish lack of good faith. The appellate authority was conscious of this fact but it held that, recital in the sale deed showing the circumstances or the compelling necessities under which the land was sold shows the bona fides of the vendor. True, but it is not conclusive. In absence of any other evidence or circumstance this by itself could not result in a finding that sale deed was executed without good faith. 4. The learned State Counsel argued that finding whether a transfer was in good faith is a finding on question of fact and this court cannot interfere with it in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned State Counsel argued that finding whether a transfer was in good faith is a finding on question of fact and this court cannot interfere with it in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The argument proceeds on a misconception both on scope of Article 226 and the nature of finding. It has been seen above that the finding that sale deed was executed without good faith is based on no evidence. The circumstance on which reliance was placed was not sufficient. It is well nigh settled that a finding based on no evidence is not a finding of fact and can be set aside in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Apart from it good faith in the proviso is a legal conclusion to be drawn from the evidence and finding on it. An inference in law if erroneous cannot be considered to be a finding of fact. 5. In the circumstances petition No. 7449 of 1979 succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by Additional District Judge is quashed only to the extent indicated above. He shall redetermine the surplus area. This order shall govern Petition No. 7446 of 1979 as well. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs.