JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a Second Appeal by the Union of India on behalf of the North Eastern Railway Administration. The Plaintiff-respondent was appointed as a Hamal on Rs. 30/- per month as salary in the Scale of Rs. 30-1/2-35 plus usual D.A., and joined his post on the 2nd Jan., 1956. The appointment was purely temporary and liable to termination on thirty days notice by the Railway Administration. By a notice dated 31st May, 1966, that is more than ten years after, the plaintiffs said appointment, his services were terminated on the ground that they were no longer required, with fourteen days' notice. The order of the termination of the plaintiffs services was issued in pursuance of a direction of the Chief Personnel Officer of the Railway Administration to the Assistant Personnel Officer, North Eastern Railway, Sonepur, where the plaintiff seems to have been working at that time. The said direction is contained in a letter dated 2nd Jan, 1966, which appears to have been a reply to a letter dated 4th Sept., 1965, from the Assistant Personnel Officer, Sonepur, whereby he forwarded certain remarks of the Police on an inquiry memo dated 7th Oct., 1961, sent by the District Traffic Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, Sonepur to the District Magistrate, Saran (Chupra). The remarks of the Police at the back of this memorandum (Ex. A-11) are that there was nothing against the plaintiff in the police records, but his reputation in the locality was bad and that he was concerned with many- unreported cases of theft of Railway property that is coal, iron and steel etc., in league with certain criminals. 2. It is obvious that this adverse report against the plaintiff, which concerned not his antecedents before he became a Railway Servant, but his conduct as a Railway Servant was the cause of the action taken by the Railway Administration in terminating the plaintiffs service. 3. The trial Court having decreed the suit, two points were raised before the lower appellate Court. (1) that the plaintiff's services were temporary, and (2) that the order terminating his services did not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 4. 3. The trial Court having decreed the suit, two points were raised before the lower appellate Court. (1) that the plaintiff's services were temporary, and (2) that the order terminating his services did not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 4. The trial Court had, on the basis of the material placed before it, found that the plaintiff had to be deemed to have become a permanent servant of the Railway Administration and that his services could not be terminated without complying with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constn. The lower appellate Court agreed with this finding and did not give any finding on the second question raised before it, as to whether the notice terminating the plaintiffs services was bad for not complying with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constn. even if he was a temporary employee. 5. The learned counsel for the Railway Administration urged before me that the finding of the two Courts below that the plaintiff was a permanent employee of the Railway Administration was based on no confidence. It is true that, according to the reasons given by the lower appellate Court for arriving at the finding that the plaintiff was a permanent employee, it was impelled by two circumstances : (1) the fact that the plaintiff had been allowed to contribute to the provident fund; and (2) that, according to the circular issued by the Railway Administration, he should have been confirmed in his post after completion of two or, at any rate, three years' service without requiring verification of his antecedents. The fact remains that from the records produced by the Railway Administration, and I have no reason to think that they have suppressed any part of the record, the plaintiff does not appear to have been confirmed in service. Mai he that according to the instructions issued by the Railway Administration the immediate superiors of the plaintiff or the officer's concerned should have taken steps to confirm the plaintiff in his employment, and, if they had followed those instructions. the plaintiff would have been confirmed in his employment; but this could not mean that the plaintiff had become a confirmed employee, simply because the concerned authorities did not take any steps to confirm him in his employment. the plaintiff would have been confirmed in his employment; but this could not mean that the plaintiff had become a confirmed employee, simply because the concerned authorities did not take any steps to confirm him in his employment. It is no explanation that the plaintiff being a poor fourth class employee of the Railway Administration, he was no supposed to keep papers regarding the confirmation of his service. I would, therefore, hold, in disagreement with the finding of the lower appellate Court, that there is nothing on the record to show that the plaintiff ever became a confirmed employee of the Railway Administration. May be, on the basis of the circular issued, he was entitled to he confirmed, but the fact remains that he did not take the necessary steps in the direction. 6. This, however, is not the end of the matter, for, as observed above, it is apparent from the documents filed by the Railway Administration itself that his services were terminated on the basis of the police report. It may be that the Railway Administration is entitled in law to have suppressed that police report and to have passed an order terminating the plaintiffs services after giving him fourteen days notice in terms of the appointment letter given to him without giving any reason and without casting any stigma on the plaintiff. But the law in this regard cannot he applied in a mechanical fashion. The object of Article 311 of the Constn, is to maintain the morale of the public services, and at the same time to see to it that the public interest does not suffer by not taking proper action against erring employee. It is obvious that the police report was the basis of the action taken against the plaintiff. Having looked into that report, it is obvious that the report related to the plaintiffs conduct as a Railway servant. Now, if that was the basis of the action taken against the plaintiff, it was in the public interest to have formulated a specific charge against him and to have taken action to punish him in accordance with the service rules. Now, if that was the basis of the action taken against the plaintiff, it was in the public interest to have formulated a specific charge against him and to have taken action to punish him in accordance with the service rules. This kind of a termination of service, by service of notice, withholding the real reason, and on the ground of service being no longer required, which reason is, on the face of it, false, defeats the object and purpose of Article 311 of the Constn. It only shows that the Railway Administration shirked its responsibility of taking action against the plaintiff and punishing him in accordance with the service rules, and at the same time deprived him of the opportunity of showing' cause to which he was entitled under the rules. 7. I would, therefore. dismiss the appeal and maintain the decree declaring that the order terminating the plaintiffs services was illegal and unconstitutional for violating Article 311 of the Constn., but I wish to make it clear that this would not prevent the Railway Administration from proceeding to punish the plaintiff in accordance with the service rules if they so want to do. Since the plaintiff ties unrepresented in this Court, there will he no order as to costs.