JUDGMENT P.S. Sahay, J. In this writ application prayer has been made to declare Articles 9(1)(a), 9(4), 9(5) 19, 39, 55, 77 and 78 of the Constitution and Bye-laws of Shri Takht Hari Mandir Jee (herein after referred to as the Temple) of Patna Saheb, Patna City, and bye-laws and proviso to rule 12(5) as amended on 26.3.1961 and rule 42 of the Election rules framed under the orders of the District Judie, Patna, giving him the power to nominate persons and approve the formation of the committee and review the decision of the Prabandhak Committee for its office bearers as unconstitutional, ultra-vires, void and illegal. Prayer has also been made to quash the orders of the District Judge, Patna, respondent no. 1, as contained in Annexures-6, 7, 8 and 9. There was also a prayer to stay the separation of the above Annexures at the time of admission which was, however, not accepted, on 14.5.1980 a petition for amendment of the application was field which was heard by the vacation judge and it was ordered to be put up at the time of the final hearing. Thereafter, it seems, a new committee came into existence and an oral prayer was made that petitioner no.1 will not press this application. Petitioner no.2 wanted to press this application and the application for amendment was also pressed on his behalf by Mr. Basudeo Prasad. Mr. Prabha Shanker Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, contended that it was unnecessary to go into the amendment matter as the right of petitioner no.2 to agitate the question raised in the writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be the respondents. In that view of matter, a consent order was passed on 30.6.1980 that without going into the question of validity of the constitution of the present Prabandhak Committee, the point raised under Article 26 of the Constitution should be gone into at the instance of petitioner no.2, who, apart form being the Central Secretary of petitioner no.1, had independent right to raised that question, being admittedly a Sikh, without prejudice to his right to challenged the legality of the Constitution and other allied matters of the Prabandhak Committee in a separate writ application, Counter affidavits and reply thereof and supplementary affidavit and affidavits in reply have been filed on behalf of the contesting respondents and petitioner No.2. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. Basudeo Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has contended that the Constitution and Bye-laws of the Temple and the Rules relating to election are ultravires of Article 26 of the Constitution of India and the District Judge, Patna, respondent no.1, has no power to interfere with the fundamental right of the Sikhs to manage their own affairs which cannot be controlled by any authority and also by any Central or State legislation, and the rights of the Sikhs, who belong to the minority community, to manage and administer the Temple are absolute. He has, further, contended that even if the District Judge, respondent no. 1, has acted at the instance of the Sikh Community his action will be State action and the Sikhs have got protection under law cannot be interfered with in any manner or by any authority. Mr. Prabha Shanker Mishra, appearing for respondent no. 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12 has contended that before the petitioner invoke the provisions of Article 26 of the Constitution of India, it must be established that the denomination was managing the affairs of the Temple at the time when the Constitution came into force. He has urged that Article 26, Sub-clause (d) protects what was created but does not create anything new. He has, further, submitted that under Article 26, Sub-clause (b), the religious rights are protected which are purely matters of religion distinct form secular matter relating to the administration of property. In other words, according to him there being no interference whatsoever in religious matters either by the Articles or Bye-laws of the Constitution of the Temple or even by the District Judge, Patna, they do not violate either Article 26 (b) or 26 (d) of the Constitution. Mr. Tarakeshwar Dayal, appearing for respondent no.1, has adopted the submission of Mr. Mishra, Article 26 of the Constitution runs as follow :- “Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right (a) To publish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) To maintain its own affairs in matter of religion; (c) To own and acquire moveable and immoveable property; (d) To administer such property in accordance with law.” The prosecution of law enunciated above ha not been challenged by Mr. Basudeo Prasad but he has submitted that the denomination was incharge of the affairs and management of the Temple and there has been interference from time to time by the District Judge and in this connection orders passed by him which are Annexures to this application, have been relied upon. In religious matters also, according to him, there has been undue interference from time to time which is wholly illegal, unjustified and offends the fundamental rights of the community, guaranteed under the Constitution. 4. In order to appreciate the points, which have been raised in this application and the submissions made at the Bar, it will be necessary to give the history of the temple. There is an ancient Sikh religious temple commonly known as Shri Takht Harimandirjee, Patna Saheb, where the tenth guru of the Sikh, Shri Guru Gobind Singh was born and it is considered to be the second throne among the four thrones in the Sikh World. Since persons following other religious also hold the Saint in great veneration a member of non-Sikhs also visit the temple regularly. Formerly, the temple was under the management and control of the East India Company, which worked through the Board of Revenue under Regulation XIX of 1810. Thereafter, on 11th March, 1863 it was transferred to Mahanth Ganda Singh under the provisions of the Religious Endowment Act, xx of 1863 and since then it was being managed by the succeeding Mahanths. Managers or Trustees duly appointed by the District Judge, Patna, from time to time. The Constitution and Bye-laws for managing the affairs of the Temple was framed in 1937 and was approved by the District Judge, Patna on 2.10.1937. The management of Temple was vested in a Committee consisting of five members. The last Sarbarahkar (Manager) Baba Kartar Singh Bedi was removed form the office of mis-managing the affairs of the Temple by the Additional District Judge, Patna, on 14th December, 1954 in Title Suit No.3/8 of 1943-51. In that case it was held that the Supervising Committee should be reconstituted. Thereafter, under the order of the District Judge, Patna, dated 16th May, 1955, notice were issued to the Sikhs residing at different places like Amritsar, Calcutta, Delhi and Patna etc. In that case it was held that the Supervising Committee should be reconstituted. Thereafter, under the order of the District Judge, Patna, dated 16th May, 1955, notice were issued to the Sikhs residing at different places like Amritsar, Calcutta, Delhi and Patna etc. for a meeting to be held in order to have their views regarding the management of the Temple and for the appointment of a new Sarbarahkar (Manager) and they were asked to give their suggestions by 1.7.1955. A large number of Sikhs from various parts of the country assembled and made their suggestions and thereafter a meeting of the Sikh Community was held in the Chambers of the District Judge, Patna and all of them agreed that a new Sarbarahkar (Manager) should be appointed. It was also decided to have fifteen members in the Supervising Committee and the manner of their election was also decided. The District Judge, Patna, by his order dated 12.10.1955, entrusted a Committee for framing Constitution and Bye-laws relating to the management of the temple. After the constitution was framed it was approved by the District Judge and new Committee of fifteen members was constituted and duly approved by the District Judge by his order dated 17.12.1955. This new Committee met on 29.1.1956 and elected their office bearers. Thereafter, elections were held form time to time and Constitution and Bye-laws was approved by the District Judge on 16.5.1957. Rules relating to the election were also framed and approved by the District Judge on 22nd August, 1960. The term of the Prabandhak Committee, of which petitioner no.2 was the Secretary, expired some time in May, 1978, and a fresh election was to be held on 15.11.1979 for which nominations were called for and after the election was over, a fresh Committee duly approved by the District Judge was constituted. From the brief history of the Temple it is clear that the District Judge, Patna, has been exercising control over the management and affairs of the Temple since 1937. From the brief history of the Temple it is clear that the District Judge, Patna, has been exercising control over the management and affairs of the Temple since 1937. This Bench in the case of Sardar Sant Singh vs. the District Judge, Patna, and ors on a consideration of the various provisions of the Articles and Bye-laws held that the District Judge, Patna has been given wide powers in the management and affairs of the Temple and also to decide matters relating to election, and the Prabandhak Committee had been given some powers under the Election Rules. But special powers in this regard vested in the District Judge, Patna. It may be stated that the larger question, which has been raised in this application regarding the absolute right of the Sikhs to manage their own affairs was not the subject matter of controversy in that application and we had to decide the matter within the four corners of the articles and Bye-laws of the Temple. Sri Prasad has drawn our attention to Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810 with special reference to the section 16 of the aforesaid Regulation which mentions the object of the Act, and the power of the Government to appoint Mahanths and public servants who were also appointed to manage the affairs of some religious institutions. Thereafter, the Religious Endowment Act, (Act 20 of 1863) came into force and according to Mr. Prasad the Government wanted to divest the Officers of the power and appoint Trustees under section 4 of the Act, to manage the affairs, relying on some of the provisions of the said Act, he has submitted that the Trustees, who were appointed, were in complete control and managerial rights had been returned to the Trustees, namely, the Sikh Community much before 1950 when the Constitution came into force. In this connection he has relied on certain passages from the law of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments by Sri Varadachari and Tagore Law Lectures by Sri Bijan Kumar Mukherjee at page 312 where it has been stated as follows : “The influence of the Constitution of India on the law relating to religious and charitable trust can be seen also in the difficult question of envolving a practical demarcation between the religious duties of a religious office and its secular responsibilities. Public interest is a ground under the Constitution to justify reasonable restriction in this respect.” Reference has been made to Tinnevelly Siva Devastanam Committee and others vs. Ambalavana Pandara Sannadhi Avergal and another in which a suit was filed for a declaration that the temple in question was under the control and superintendence of the Devasthan Committee and it should be managed by their own Trustees. It was held that simply because the Government had appointed the Trustees who were exercising supreme control over the management and affairs of the Temple was not sufficient to prove that right reling on a decision in Rati Lal vs. State of Bombay which is as follows : “In regards to affairs and matters of religion the right of management given to a religious body is guaranteed fundamental rights which no legislation can take away. On the other hand, as regards administration of property, which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law the State can regulate such administration but it should be remembered that under Article 26 Sub clause (d) it is the religious denomination itself which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with any law which the State may validly impose. A law which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it with any other or secular authority, would amount to violation of the right which is granted by Article 26 Sub-clause (d) of the Constitution.” Mr. Prasad has also relied on the observation made in that decision that religious practice or performance of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as such a part of religion or as faith or belief in particular doctrines and it has been observed that if the tenets of the Jan or the Parsis religion laid down that certain rights and ceremonies had to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner it could not be said that these are secular activities partaking of commercial and economic character simply because of expenditure of money and employment of priest or the use of marketable commodities. Further it has been held that no outside authority had any right to say that these are not essential parts of religion and it was also not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they liked under the guise of administering the Trust Estate. In the case of Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College vs. State of Gujrat, their Lordships, while considering the provisions of Kerala Education Bill in terms of Article 30 of the Constitution, held that the taking over of Schools even if under certain conditions will not amount to the submissions of the those conditions and will not amount to surrender of their rights under the aforesaid Articles. Reliance also has been placed in the case of Lilly Kurian vs. Sr. Lawina and others but that was a case relating to Article 30 of the Constitution of India and is not of much help to us in the instant case. Sri Prabha Shanker Mishra has drawn our attention to the decision of Dargah Committee, Amjer & anr. v. Syed Huain Ali & ors. In that case Khadims of the Dargah had challenged the provisions of Dargah Khawaja Sahib Act, (Art 36 of 1955) that some of the provisions of that Act, were inconsistent with Article 26 and also violated Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Speaking for the Bench Gajendra-gadker, J., as he then was, considering a number of authorities held : “Religious denomination is a collection of Individual classed together under the same name, a religious sect or body having common faith and organisation and designated by a designative name. His hardship further held that Article 26 (c) and (d) do not create rights in any denomination or its section which is never had; they merely safeguard and guarantee the continuance of right which such denomination or its section had. In other words. His hardship further held that Article 26 (c) and (d) do not create rights in any denomination or its section which is never had; they merely safeguard and guarantee the continuance of right which such denomination or its section had. In other words. It the denomination never had the right to manage the properties endowed in favour of a denomination institution as for instance by real on of the terms on which the endowment was created it cannot be beard to say that it gas acquired the said rights as a result of Article 26 (c) and (d) and that the practice and custom prevailing in that behalf which obviously is consistent with the terms of the endowments should be ignored and treated as invalid and the administration and management should now be given to denomination. Such a claim is plainly inconsistent with the provisions of Article 26. If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination or has been validly surrendered by it or has otherwise been effectively and irretrievably lost to it, Article 26 cannot be success fully invoked", and thus the contention of the Khadims that their fundamental rights granted under the constitution had been infringed was rejected.” This decision has been quoted with approval in the cases of Sardarsyendra Taher Saifuddin Sahib v. State of Bombay. Madanchi Ramapa and another vs. Muthaluru Bajjappa, S. Azeez Basha and another vs. Union of India. Seshammal & others v. State of Tamil Nadu. State of Rajasthan & others. V. Sajjanlal Panjawat & others. In A.I.R. 1975 Supreme Court 706 (supra) a contention was raised that the taking over of the Temple was in clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships repelied this argument and held that from the materials it was clear that before the Constitution came into force the management of the Temple had been taken over by the rules of Udaipur State and by virtue of Constitution it ultimately vested in the State which was being managed by the Maharana with the Advisory body and, therefore, the two Jain denominations, namely, swetambers and Digambers, if they had any right in the temple or its management was lost in the preconstitution period. Thus, in my opinion these were litigations relating to the management and affairs of the temple and the Sikh Community empowered the District Judge, Patna, to supervise the management and affairs of the temple and that position continued from 1937 till this date. It is a case of District Judge conferring jurisdiction on himself rather he was persuaded to do so and I am not prepared to accept the argument of Mr. Prasad that the Sikhs could not have authorised the District Judge to supervise the management of the Temple even if they desired to do so. There was neither a surrender of rights by the denomination or any usurpation of rights by the District Judge, respondent no.1. It was more or less a case of mutual understanding and trust for a better administration and the management of the Temple. This sstem worked effectively for a good number of years till this application has been filed in court. In that view of the matter, the case relied upon by Mr. Prasad are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. 5. Now I come to the second leg of the argument that even if the scheme was framed under the provisions of the Religious Endowment Act, and was approved by the District Judge, respondent no.1, it is in direct conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of India and according to Mr. Prasad the latter will prevail under Article 372 of the Constitution which is always subject to Article 278 of the Constitution. It has also been submitted that there has been undue interference in the management and affairs of the Temple by the District Judge even in religious matters. This fact has been stoutly denied by Mishra, who was submitted that not a single instance has been cited and brought to the notice of this court. He has also submitted that there might have been instances of interference so far secular matters are concerned but not in religious matters. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that at least some of the Articles and the Bye-laws should be struck down as unconstitutional as violative of the Articles of the Constitution and in this connection reliance has been placed on South India Corporation (P), Limited Vs. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that at least some of the Articles and the Bye-laws should be struck down as unconstitutional as violative of the Articles of the Constitution and in this connection reliance has been placed on South India Corporation (P), Limited Vs. The Secretary Board of Revenue where it has been held that where there is a conflict between pre-existing law and the provisions of Constitution, latter will prevail. Now I will briefly refer to the Articles and Bye-law which have been referred to by the petitioners. Article 9 relates to the composition and constitution of the Committee and three persons to the nominated by the District Judge; 9 (4) gives power to the District Judge to constitute the Committee even if the election of some of the constituencies are not completed in time. Under Article 9 (5) the District Judge has the power to see whether the election or the nomination has been held in a valid manner or not. The first meeting of the newly elected committee has to be convened under the direction of the District judge under clause 19. Under Article 39, no property of the Temple can be sold or mortgaged except with the permission of the District judge and any amendment or the Constitution will be subject to the approval by the District Judge who has power under Article 55. In case of misfeasance any person could move the District Judge by way of application under Article 77. The Bye-laws are mainly concerned with the election. The Articles and Bye-laws, referred to above, all relate to the administrative matters and in no way concerned with religious matters and Mr. Mishra has also tried to show that the interference. If any, is in administrative matter permissible under the law. He has rightly submitted that in religious matters, there is no interference whatsoever by the District Judge and the Sikh Community has complete freedom in this regard. Our attention has been drawn to the Article 79 which reads a follows and supports his contention. “If any dispute relating to religious matters other than existing Maryada, Ritual and Doctrines of the Gurdwara arises, the Committee shall refer the same to Shri Akal Takht Sahib, Amritsar, whose opinion shall be final. Our attention has been drawn to the Article 79 which reads a follows and supports his contention. “If any dispute relating to religious matters other than existing Maryada, Ritual and Doctrines of the Gurdwara arises, the Committee shall refer the same to Shri Akal Takht Sahib, Amritsar, whose opinion shall be final. This, however, will not Act, a bar to the filing of any regular petition in the court of the District Judge, Patna, in this connection, under the Religious Endowments Act, (Act xx of 1863).” What is religious has been described by B.K. Mukherjee, J. in case of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, madras vs. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamir of Shri-rur Mutt is : "Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Budhism and Jainism which do not believe in Good or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing also but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only law down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress." Article 26 (b) of the constitution gives girth to the Sikhs to manage their own affairs so far religious matters are concerned and under 26 (d) of the Constitution they have to administer their own property in accordance with law. This is a secular matter different from religious matters. Matters relating to religion is a fundamental right whereas a secular right can be regulated by law, Regulations or rules. A similar point arose for consideration in the case of Sardar Sarup Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others. In that case section 148 B of the Punjab Sikh Gurudwaras Act, (Act 8 of 1925) was challenged on the ground that it violated the fundamental rights granted under Article 26 of the Constitution. A similar point arose for consideration in the case of Sardar Sarup Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others. In that case section 148 B of the Punjab Sikh Gurudwaras Act, (Act 8 of 1925) was challenged on the ground that it violated the fundamental rights granted under Article 26 of the Constitution. S.K. Das, J. on a consideration of the various authorities on the subject, held that the distinction between clause (b) and (d) of Article 26 was clear and distinct. The administration of property by religious denomination is on a different footing form the right to manage its own affair in matter of religion. The latter was a fundamental right which no legislation can take away whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislation can validly impose and the contention put forward by the petitioner in that case was rejected. In a full Bench case of the Kerala High Court in Manavendan and others. V. The State of Kerala and others, it was held that the freedom granted under Article 26 (b) of the Constitution relates only to the pure matters of religion as distinguished from secular matters relating to administration of the property belonging to the institution. On the facts of that case it was held by their Lordships that the Act, in question did not effect the matters of religion but did regulate the administration of the property and, thus, it was not violative either under clause (b) or (d) of Article 26 of the Constitution of India, In the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb, hereditary Superintendent Jagannath Temple, P.O. & District Puri v. The State of Orissa the provision of Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 (Orissa Act, 11 of 1954) was challenged on the ground that the petitioner who was the Raja of Puri had the exclusive right to perform religious ceremonies in the Temple and by the provisions of the Act, his rights were being interfered with. Their Lordships, on a consideration of the provisions of the Act, held that by the provisions of the Act, the secular management or the Temple was taken away from the sole control of the petitioner and vested in the committee of which he was to be the Chairman. Their Lordships, on a consideration of the provisions of the Act, held that by the provisions of the Act, the secular management or the Temple was taken away from the sole control of the petitioner and vested in the committee of which he was to be the Chairman. Thus, if the office of one functionary was brought to an end by another functionary such a process could not be said to constitute the acquisition of extinguished office or the vesting of the rights in the person holding that office. In that view of the matter, the application was held to be not maintainable. 6. Thus, on a careful consideration of the various provisions of the Articles and the Bye-laws of the Temple and the authorities, which have been cited before us, I am of the opinion that there is no interference whatsoever so far religious matters are concerned relating to the affairs of the Temple which is clearly distinguishable from secular matters and, thus, Article 26 (b) of the Constitution is not attracted. I have already held that the denomination was not managing the temple exclusively when the Constitution came into force and, thus, they are also not entitled to the protection under article 26 (d) of the constitution. 7. It hat to be seen that the scheme of things adopted by the Temple long long ago has worked effectively for a good number of years and to the statisfaction of all. But it is really unfortunate that after the last election was held petitions after petitions have been filed in this court challenging almost every order of the District Judge whether it related to election, nomination or other allied matters which, in my opinion, is not in the interest of the Temple. A sacred place of worship not only for the Sikh Community but for others also belonging to other communities has now become a not bed of polities. The affairs of the temple should not be allowed to suffer only to satisfy the whims of certain individuals as held by S.K. Das, J. in Sarup Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra) :- "Obviously, these are not matters of religion and we say without meaning any offence to any body that to treat these as matters of religion is tantamount to confusing religion with current polities." Similar is the position in this instant case. It is hoped that all interested in the affairs of the Temple will now bury their differences and see that the good name of the Temple is not tarnished and all of them work for the good of the Temple and carry out the wishes and teachings of the Great Saint Guru Gobind Singh, who has always been held in high esteem by almost all the members of the Community. 8. Before I part with this case it must be stated that this case was heard before summer holidays and a prayer was made on behalf of the parties that the judgment of this case may be deferred till the final hearing of C.W.J.C. No. 1601 of 1980 because the constitutional point was also involved in that application and, therefore, any decision given in this writ application might prejudice the petitioner. In that view of the matter, with the consent of the parties, the judgment of this case was deferred and it is being delivered after the bearing of C.W.J.C. No. 1601 of 1980, the Judgment of which is also being delivered today. 9. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that no ground for interference whatsoever has been made out by the petitioner. This application is, accordingly, dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. K.B.N. Singh, C.J. I agree. Application dismissed.