N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) ). This us an appeal brought to this court under Order 43 Rule (d) of the Civil Procedure Code by the applicant of the Civil Misc. Application no. 58 of 1979 dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (S D.) Jamnagar who thereby refused to set aside the ex-parte decree passed against him by the learned Judge in the Special Civil Suit No. 74 of 1973 of his court. ( 2 ) THE ex-parte decree by recourse to Order 9 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code was passed by the learned trial Judge on 24-10-74 after finding that the summons to this applicant the defendant no. 1 should be deemed to have been served under Order 5 Rule 21 (a) of the Code as the envelope by which the summons was dispatched was returned bearing the postal endorsement refused. The decree-holder filed the execution application by getting the decree transferred to the competent court at Chandigarh in Punjab and it is the say of the applicant the appellant herein that he came to know of the passing of the decree only when the execution process came to be intimated to him. ( 3 ) THE application was stoutly resisted by the decree holder who contended that the defendant no. 1 was rightly deemed to have been duly served with summons. ( 4 ) THE judgment of the learned Judge amply bears out the fact that the summons was sent at the address of this appellant-applicant. The address given by the appellant-applicant in the application and the address of his given in the suit at which the summons was sent by the court are identical. It is not the say of the appellant-applicant that postal communications addressed to him at this address do not reach him ordinarily at this address. All that he stated in the application and in the affidavit filed subsequently in support of the application was that the postman had not accosted him and therefore there was no occasion for him to refuse the acceptance of the letter sent by the court. All that he stated in the application and in the affidavit filed subsequently in support of the application was that the postman had not accosted him and therefore there was no occasion for him to refuse the acceptance of the letter sent by the court. ( 5 ) IT is to be noted that not only the summons was sent by registered post but as a matter of abundant caution a public notice was given in a celebrated paper none other than the Nav Bharat Times published from Delhi and said to be of wide circulation in Chandigarh as per the affidavit of the decree-holder filed-in-rejoinder. The factum of the suit having been instituted was also advertised in the paper. ( 6 ) MR. Ravani for the appellant-applicant invited my pointed attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana A. I. R. 1976 S C. 869 for the purpose of showing that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Meghji Kanji Patel v. Kundanmal Chamanlal Mehtani A. I. R. 1968 Bombay 387 was accorded approval by the Supreme Court. All that the Supreme Court has stated is that where a notice sent by a registered post is returned with endorsement as refused it is not always necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The above observation of the Supreme Court runs counter to the arguments advanced vigorously by Mr. Ravani before me that the postman must be examined. The Supreme Court however made a further observation which was pressed into service by Mr. Ravani. The Supreme Court observes the denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admission or conduct and in this context the Judgment of the Bombay High Court in Meghji Kanjis case (Supra) was adverted to by the Supreme Court. It is therefore safe to conclude that afterall each case is to be decided in its own merits. In the facts before the Bombay High Court in Meghji Kanjis case (Supra) there was flat denial on the part of the party to whom was attributed the service. It is therefore safe to conclude that afterall each case is to be decided in its own merits. In the facts before the Bombay High Court in Meghji Kanjis case (Supra) there was flat denial on the part of the party to whom was attributed the service. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that examination of the postman in the light of the categorical denial by the defendant rebutted the presumption that would be available on a question of fact by recourse to sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. What the Bombay High Court observed in that case cannot be elevated to the position of a proposition of law that whenever a party sought to be served with the notice of summons denies the said service examination of a postman must follow as a matter of course. ( 7 ) THE Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court had an occasion to examine this question in the case of Memon Adambhai Haji Ismail v. Bhaiya Ramdas Badiudas and Others AIR 1975 Gujarat 55 and this court has ruled that on the basis of a mere endorsement of refusal found on the returned registered envelope without being substantiated by any evidence of the postal peon who went to deliver the letter the statutory rebuttable presumption of fact that the addressee had in fact refused to accept the delivery of the letter can be raised under the provisions of sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. So to the extent Mr. Ravanis argument rested on the observation of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Meghji Kanjis case (Supra) the Full Bench judgment is a clinching answer. ( 8 ) WHETHER a summons has been served or could be presumed to have been served or not is essentially a question of fact. A presumption under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act is a matter of a courts discretion. When the learned Judge who was required to deal with this question of fact was pleased to rely on sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act he in the exercise of his powers of appreciation of evidentiary material came to a factual conclusion. A presumption under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act is a matter of a courts discretion. When the learned Judge who was required to deal with this question of fact was pleased to rely on sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act he in the exercise of his powers of appreciation of evidentiary material came to a factual conclusion. The appellate court has no doubt power to re-assess the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion but simply because the appellate court can possibly take the other view it is not a ground for the appellate court to alter the finding of the court below. In the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly the circumstance that the address given by this appellant-applicant in the present application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code is the very address at which summons was issued by the court I see no difficulty in drawing the inference that the envelope containing summons of the court was tendered to this applicant and he had declined to accept the same. What was the address on the envelope is not actually before me but Ma D. M. Shah for the original plaintiff showed me the copy of that cover and also the address of the defendant no. 1 given in the plaint and it is in these circumstances that conclude that the address on the envelope containing the summons of the court was the very address which the applicant has given in his application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code. ( 9 ) I the facts and circumstances of this case I see no merit in this Appeal from Order which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. In view of the dismissal of this Appeal Rom Order mo further order; are required to be passed on the Civil Application which also stands disposed of. Stay vacated. Appeal allowed. .