ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment and order dated 28-7-1980 passed by the Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad in second appeals Nos. 23 and 24 of 1978-79, Anirudh Rai and another v. Pitambar Rai and others, dismissing the appeals and confirming the judgment and decree dated 10th November 1978 passed by the Additional Commissioner Gorakhpur Division, in first appeals Nos. 515/1056/A and 516/1057/A of 1973 filed by the petitioners Anirudh Rai and others by which the Additional. Commissioner had dismissed the aforesaid appeals and had confirmed the judgment and decree dated 31st October, 1973 passed by the Assistant Collector, Ist Class, Azamgarh, in two suits Nos. 423 and 424 filed by Pitamber Rai opposite party No. 4 under section 229B/ 176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The trial court declared opposite party No. 4, Pitamber Rai to be co bhuniidhar to the extent of ?th and th share respectively in the suit lands involved in suits Nos. 424 and 423. The petitioners have challenged in this writ petition the aforesaid judgments and decree passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this writ petition are that Pitamber Rai, opposite party No. 4 filed two suits under section 229-Br 176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Suit No. 423 of 1972 was in respect of land of Khata No. 77 of village Madhasiya Tappa Kota. Pargana Nizamahad, district Azamgarh, whereas suit No. 424 of 1972 was in respect of land of Khata No. 78 of the said village. Plaintiff opposite party No. 4 Pitamber Rai claimed that the land of Khata No. 77 was Sir of one Jaddu Rai who had gifted it in the year 1924 to Bajrangi Rai opposite party No. 6 and Kalap Nath Singh, the father of opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5. The plaintiff Pitamber Rai claimed that after the death of his father Kalap Nath Rai, his half share devolved upon him and his brother Madan Rai and thus he claimed one-fourth share in the Khata in dispute. 4 and 5. The plaintiff Pitamber Rai claimed that after the death of his father Kalap Nath Rai, his half share devolved upon him and his brother Madan Rai and thus he claimed one-fourth share in the Khata in dispute. He further asserted that the defendant Anirudh Rai and Yadu Nath Rai hold no right, title or interest in the land in dispute and they had fraudulently and fictitiously got their names recorded as co-bhumidhars during consolidation operations of which he had no notice or knowledge. The plaintiff further asserted that the defendants Anirudh Rai and Yadu Nath Rai held no share in the land in question and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer in their favour was null and void being vitiated by fraud. Anirudh Rai is petitioner No. 1 in the present writ petition and Yadu Nath Rai is now dead and his son Sheo Kant Rai is petitioner No. 2 in the writ petition. In the other suit No. 424 of 1972 which was in respect of Khata No. 78 the plaintiff Pitamber Rai claimed ?th share with the allegations that the land of the said holding was sir land of Maya Rai who had gifted it to Kalap Nath Rai, Bajrangi Rai and Smt. Surti, wife of the donor Maya Rai, who is arrayed as opposite party No. 7 in the writ petition. The plaintiff further pleaded that upon the death of the father, Kalap Nath Rai, his one-third share had devolved upon him and his brother Madan Rai and that he has got ?th share in the holding in dispute. He also contended that the names of Anirudh Rai and Yadu Nath Rai were fictitiously and fraudulently got recorded as co-bhumidhar during consolidation operations as aforesaid. The orders passed by the Consolidation Officer recording their names as co-bhumidhars was illegal, void and without jurisdiction and the defendant Anirudh Rai and Yadu Nath Rai hold no right, title or interest in the land in suit. The aforesaid its were contested by the petitioners with the allegations that Kalap Nath Rai had received the property through the aforesaid gift deeds of the years 1922 and 1924 in a representative capacity and they being brothers of Kalap Nath Rai and members of point family have got one-third each in the share of Kalap Nath Rai which he had received in a representative capacity. `They further pleaded that their names were rightly recorded during consolidation operations by the Consolidation Officer vide Order dated 23-6-1960 passed under S. 12 of the un antended U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as the unamended Act, and that the present suit is barred under See. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding, Act hereinafter referred to as the Act. They further pleaded that the allegations with regard to obtaining the aforesaid order fraudulently and fictitiously is altogether baseless and wrong. They further pleaded that since the plain till' had accepted them as co-bhumidhars in the land in suit and had also tiled a compromise in the aforesaid case, although the ,one was not got verified, he is estoppel by the principle of acquire absence and estoppel from challenging the right, title and share of the answering defendants. It will he relevant to mention here that no plea regarding non-maintainability of the suits in the Revenue Court was specifically pleaded nor it was raised even at the line of the framing of the issues. 3. The trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiff was the co-bhumidhar of the suit land along with defendants 2nd set? 2. Was the order dated 23-6-60 under See. lion 12 of the U. P. C. H. Act farzi and a result of fraud'? Is it binding on the plaintiff? 3. What is the share of the parties in the suit land? 4. Whether the defendants 1st and 2nd set are co-bhumidhars along with the plaintiffs of the land in suit'? If so, what is their share? 5. Whether the suit is barred by Section 49 of the U. P. C. H. Act? 6. Whether the suit is barred by principles of estoppel? 7. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 4. Opposite party No. 3 after taking into consideration the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit holding the plaintiff to be co-bhumidhar along with defendants 2nd set and that his share in the land involved in Suits Nos. 423 and 424 is th and ?th respectively. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 4. Opposite party No. 3 after taking into consideration the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit holding the plaintiff to be co-bhumidhar along with defendants 2nd set and that his share in the land involved in Suits Nos. 423 and 424 is th and ?th respectively. He also recorded a finding that the order dated 23-6-1960 passed under Section 12 of the unamended Act was fraudulently and fictitiously obtained by the defendants Anirudh Rai and Yadu Nath Rai and that the order was also without jurisdiction inasmuch as the Consolidation Officer could not himself decide the question of title regarding cobhumidhari rights in the land in suit in proceedings under S. 12 of the unamended Act. He thus found that the aforesaid order dated 23-6-1960 was fraudulent, void and without jurisdiction and not binding on the plaintiff and the contesting defendants can, not get any right, title or share in the land in suit on its basis. It was further held that the suit is not barred under Section 49 of the Act nor it is barred by the principle of estoppel as no compromise was filed by the plaintiff in the aforesaid case before the Consolidation Officer and some one impersonated for him in signing the alleged compromise which was also not got verified. The trial Court, after considering the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, held that it is clear beyond doubt that the plaintiff, who was opposite party in the case under Section 12 of the unamended Act, was clearly and designedly kept away from the knowledge of the proceedings. It was further held that the alleged compromise did not hear the signatures of Pitamber Rai and no consent decree could be obtained as attestation was lacking. It further held that the defendants succeeded in securing an ex parte decree on a farzi service report of the summons issued to Pitamber Rai. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, it found that the order of 23-6-1960 was obtained by fraud and is consequently an absolute nullity. It further held that the defendants succeeded in securing an ex parte decree on a farzi service report of the summons issued to Pitamber Rai. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, it found that the order of 23-6-1960 was obtained by fraud and is consequently an absolute nullity. It also held that since the proceedings under S. 12 of the unamended Act were initiated by an application dated 30th July, 1958, i. e. prior to enforcement of Amendment Act No XXXVIII of 1958, the provisions of S. 12 of the unamended Act, applied and the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to decide the case and pass orders holding the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to be co-bhumidhars in the land in dispute. 5. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioners tiled appeals which were dismissed by opposite party No. 2 vide judgment and decree dated 10th Nov., 1978. A perusal of the order passed by opposite party No. 2 would indicate that the learned counsel for the appellants (petitioners) had stated during the course of arguments that he had nothing to say against the finding of the trial Court to the effect that the order of the Consolidation Officer was fraudulently obtained. Apparently, therefore, the petitioners had not challenged the said finding of the trial Court and the only point which was canvassed before the first appellate Court was that the suit of the plaintiff was barred under S. 49 of the Act and the aforesaid order passed by the Consolidation Officer could not be ignored unless it was got set aside. Both these arguments were repelled by the first appellate Court and the appeals were dismissed. The petitioners thereupon filed second appeals before the Board of Revenue which were also dismissed vide Order dated 28th July, 1980 and the findings, recorded by the Courts below were upheld. The aforesaid orders passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 have been challenged in this writ petition. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and opposite party No. 4 and have perused the impugned orders as well as the averments contained in the writ petition and the counter-affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the finding recorded by opposite parties Nos. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and opposite party No. 4 and have perused the impugned orders as well as the averments contained in the writ petition and the counter-affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the finding recorded by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 holding the aforesaid order dated 23-6-1960 to have been fraudulently obtained by the petitioners is not sustainable as the same has been based on mere conjectures and surmises. This argument is untenable. A concurrent finding of fact has been recorded by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 holding that the order dated 23-6-1960 was fraudulently obtained by the petitioners. The finding recorded by the trial Court, already referred to above, is based on appraisal of both oral and documentary evidence on record and nothing could be pointed out on behalf of the petitioners to indicate that it is wrong or perverse in any manner whatsoever. I have perused very carefully the orders passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 and I do not find any infirmity in the concurrent finding recorded by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 on the aforesaid question. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners next argued that the suit of the plaintiff was barred under Section 49 of the Act. He further argued that so long as the aforesaid order dated 23-6-1960 stands and is not set aside by competent Civil Court the plaintiff's suit for declaration would not be maintainable. Placing reliance upon a decision of this Court in State of U. P. v. Madho Kumar Swarup, 1976 All LR 627, wherein it was held that a collusive decree even for defeating the provisions of law would not be a nullity, it would at best be a voidable decree and so long as it is not avoided by due process of law, it will remain binding on the parties to the suit, the learned counsel argued that the order dated 23-6-1960 cannot be said to be a nullity and it will be binding between the parties unless avoided by due process of law. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, conceded that in the aforesaid case the decree was branded to be a collusive decree and not a fraudulent decree. The aforesaid case therefore, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, conceded that in the aforesaid case the decree was branded to be a collusive decree and not a fraudulent decree. The aforesaid case therefore, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Fraud vitiates the most solemn transaction and if a plaintiff suppresses a vital fact and manipulates false service report on the basis of which the Court is induced to pass ex parte decree, it would amount to fraud in relation to the proceedings of the Court. The fraud must also be intrinsic to the proceedings of the Court, that is, it must be in the conduct of the suit by keeping the defendant out of Court by a deliberate employment of the machinery of the Court in such a way that the defendant is prevented from placing his case before the Court. When a false report of service is obtained by the plaintiff and thereby be obtains an ex parte decree it would amount to playing fraud on Court. Where an ex parte decree has been obtained by fraud by forging signatures of a party summoned, the decree is a nullity and cannot be allowed to stand. It has been held by this Court in Sri Jaisi Ram v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1969 Rev Dec 61, that it is a well established proposition that fraud vitia the most solemn proceedings of Courts o law and if the Court passing a decree has been deceived into accepting a compromise the decree would not be said to exist in eyes of law. It was further held that this no bar imposed by any of the provision of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act against proof of fraud which may invalid a any action taken by a Court in a suit un Section 209, U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act which rights in land are claimed. In view of the matter in the present suit whether plaintiff claims to be co-bhumidhar also with the second set of defendant in the land in suit he can show that the order passed by the consolidation authorities in aforesaid proceedings under Section 12 of unamended Act was no order in the eye of law as it stood vitiated by fraud and opposite party No. 3 was competent to consider that question and record a finding on it on merits. No separate suit was, therefore, required to be filed for seeking cancellation of the order dated 23rd June, 1960 passed by the Consolidation Officer. 9. There is yet another ground to hold that the order dated 23-6-1960 passed by the Consolidation Officer did not require cancellation by a separate suit as it was an order without jurisdiction. Undoubtedly the present proceedings under Section 12 of the unamended Act was filed on 30th July, 1958, i.e. prior to the passing of U. P. Act No. XXXVIII of 1958 which came into force on 27th Nov., 1958. Since the objection was filed on 30th July, 1958 under Section 12 of the unamended Act and the same was pending on the date of enforcement of U. P. Act No. XXXVIII of 1958 the same was to be heard and decided under the provisions of the unamended Act as if the said amending Act had not come into force as was provided in S. 49, sub-clause (ii) of the said amending Act, which reads as follows : "Notwithstanding the amendment of the principal Act by this Act all proceedings, commenced prior to, and pending on the date on which this Act comes into force- (i) ....................... (ii) under S. 8 and the subsequent section of the principal Act shall, subject to the provisions of S. 50 of this Act, be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act, as if this Act had not come into force." 10. In view of the provisions the said objection which was filed under Section 12 of the unamended Act and was pending on the date of enforcement of the said amending Act No. XXXVIII of 1958 was to be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of Section 12 of the unamended Act. The Consolidation Officer in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 12, sub-clause (4) of the unamended Act should have referred the case to the competent Civil Court for determination of the question of title by the arbitrator because the objection filed by Anirudh Rai and Yadu Nath Rai involved a question of title as they had claimed to be co-bhumidhars along with the recorded persons. The names of the objectors were not recorded as co-bhumidhars on the land in question. The names of the objectors were not recorded as co-bhumidhars on the land in question. Hence the objection filed by them involved a determination of the question of title and the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to decide that question himself. It was incumbent on him to refer that question to the Civil Court under S. 12, sub-clause (4) of the unamended Act which reads as follows :- "Where the objection filed under subsection (1) involves a question of title and such question has not already been determined by a competent Court the Consolidation Officer shall refer the question for determination to the Arbitrator." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that since in this case the plaintiff Pitamber Rai had not contested the case hence there was no necessity of referring the matter to the Civil Judge under the provisions of Section 12, sub-clause (4). of the unamended Act. This argument is unsustainable. The aforesaid provision envisages that where an objection filed under sub-section (1) of S. 12 involves a question of title the Consolidation Officer has to refer the same for decision to the competent Civil Court in case the said question was not already determined by any competent Court. Admittedly prior to the filing of the objection by the petitioners under S. 12, sub-section (1), of the unamended Act the question of title, i.e. the claim of co-bhumidhari rights, which the petitioners had set up, was not already determined by any competent Court. The petitioners were not recorded as co-bhumidhars on the land in question and they had claimed co-bhumidhari rights in it and as such the objection undoubtedly involved a question of title and had to be referred to the arbitrator for determination under S. 12, sub-section (4), of the unamended Act and the Consolidation Officer had, therefore, no jurisdiction to pass any order in favour of the petitioners even in ex parte proceedings. Thus apart from the fact that the ex parte proceedings were fraudulently obtained by the petitioners the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to pass orders on merits in favour of the petitioners. His order was, therefore, null and void. Thus apart from the fact that the ex parte proceedings were fraudulently obtained by the petitioners the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to pass orders on merits in favour of the petitioners. His order was, therefore, null and void. It has been held in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 that a decree passed by the Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and it can be ignored whenever it is sought to be enforced even in execution proceedings or in any suit or collateral proceedings and no amount of consent would confer jurisdiction on Court which lacks inherent jurisdiction. 12. Thus we find that the order dated 23-6-1960 passed by the Consolidation Officer was without jurisdiction and was fraudulently obtained and as such it was a nullity and opposite party No. 3 had jurisdiction to entertain the suit irrespective of the aforesaid order and there was no necessity for filing a separate suit in Civil Court for setting aside the said order. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners next argued that the suit was barred under Section 49 of the Act. He contended that the plaintiff opposite party No. 4 instead of filing the present suit could have approached the Consolidation Officer of the appellate or revisional authority against the said order seeking its vacation on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained or that it was not sustainable on merits. Having not approached the consolidation authorities the present suit of the plaintiff-opposite party No. 4 was barred under Section 49 of the Act. This argument is unsustainable. Admittedly the suit has been filed after the de-notification of the village under S. 52 of the Act. There is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioners were aware about the fraudulent order prior to de-notification of village and as such there was no occasion for the plaintiff-opposite party No. 4 to have approached the Consolidation Officer seeking his redress against the aforesaid impugned order which was fraudulently obtained and was without jurisdiction. After de-notification of the village the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit for declaration and partition vests in the Assistant Collector under S. 229-B/176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The jurisdiction of the consolidation Courts ceased from the date of de-notification and they could not entertain any suit or application in respect of the proceedings done during consolidation operation. The jurisdiction of the consolidation Courts ceased from the date of de-notification and they could not entertain any suit or application in respect of the proceedings done during consolidation operation. The orders passed during consolidation operations, if they are valid and not without jurisdiction, would be binding between the parties and no suit will be entertainable by the Revenue or Civil Court challenging those orders. Such suits Shall be barred under the provisions of Section 49 of the Act and would also be barred by the principle of res judicata but if any order has been passed during consolidation operations by the consolidation authorities which is per se without jurisdiction and had been obtained fraudulently the same would be a nullity and void and would not be binding on the parties and the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court would not be excluded under the provisions of Section 49 of the Act and the entries made during consolidation operations based on such fraudulent and without jurisdiction orders would be open to challenge in regular title suits and could be shown to be wrong on merits. 14. Section 27 of the Act, after its amendment by U. P. Act No. 12 of 1965 provides that all entries in the record of right prepared in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. This amendment has been made applicable with retrospective effect. Thus the entries made in consequence of the impugned order of the Consolidation Officer could be shown to be erroneous and fraudulently obtained and without jurisdiction. They are liable to be disapproved and ignored on a finding recorded in the case that the proceedings were without jurisdiction and the order was fraudulently obtained. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, therefore, unsustainable and the suit tiled by the plaintiff-opposite party No. 4 was not barred under Section 49 of the Act. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners next argued that the suit of the plaintiff was not cognizable by the Revenue Court. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, therefore, unsustainable and the suit tiled by the plaintiff-opposite party No. 4 was not barred under Section 49 of the Act. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners next argued that the suit of the plaintiff was not cognizable by the Revenue Court. Although this plea was not taken in the written statement nor any issue was pressed on that point in the trial Court nor it was pressed in the first appellate Court but the said question was raised on behalf , of the petitioners before the Board of Revenue which, after considering it on merits, held that the suit was maintainable in the Revenue Court and I do not find any infirmity in the said finding. Admittedly the plaintiff's suit is one for declaration and partition filed under S. 229-B/176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and it relates to agricultural holding. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically barred under the provisions of S. 331 (I) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which provides that: "(1) Except as provided by or under this Act no Court other than a Court mentioned in column 4 of Sch. II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof, or a suit, application or proceeding based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application : Provided that where a declaration has been made under S. 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Sch. II in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chap. VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation :- if the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be grant of by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the Revenue Court would have granted." 16. VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation :- if the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be grant of by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the Revenue Court would have granted." 16. The aforesaid provisions clearly indicate that the present suit in which the plaintiff-opposite party No. 4 sought declaration that he is co-bhumidhar along with the second set of defendants alone was maintainable under S. 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. He had also claimed th and ?th share in be aforesaid holding in dispute and had claimed partition and separation of his share which was maintainable under the provisions of S. 176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Such suits could not be entertained by the Civil Court in view of the aforesaid provisions contained in S. 331 (1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain such suits. The Explanation appended to the said section clearly provides that if the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the Revenue Court, it would he ins material that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the Revenue Court may have granted. In the present suit the plaintiff opposite party No. 4 had asserted that the entry in the names of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (petitioners) was per se wrong and illegal and the same is based on an order which was fraudulently obtained and void being also without jurisdiction. This question could incidentally be gone into by the Revenue Court in the present suit. The decree being void could be ignored and the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to determine that question. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath v. H.N. Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 . that if a document is void the consolidation authorities had jurisdiction to go into the question but if the document is voidable it had no jurisdiction to consider that question unless the document is avoided by the party concerned from a competent Court. that if a document is void the consolidation authorities had jurisdiction to go into the question but if the document is voidable it had no jurisdiction to consider that question unless the document is avoided by the party concerned from a competent Court. Similarly after de-notification of the village when the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration vested in the Revenue Court it had jurisdiction to determine the question whether the order passed by the Consolidation Officer was void and ineffective on the ground urged by the plaintiff. 17. There is yet another reason to repeal the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel. It is well settled that a decree or order which is void and a nullity is not binding on parties and is liable to be ignored and the same need not be set aside by the Court passing it or through a separate suit in Civil Court seeking its cancellation. Even at the risk of repetition it may be observed that in view of what has been stated above the order dated 23-6-1960 passed by the Consolidation Officer was void and a nullity, being without jurisdiction hence there was no necessity of filing an application for its setting aside before the Consolidation Officer nor there was any necessity for filing appeal or revision against it before the appellate or revisional consolidation authorities for its avoidance, even if, though not conceding, it be taken that such an application, appeal or revision could be filed before them in spite of de-notification made, tinder Section 52 of the Act. It has been held by this Court in Jai Singh v. Hanumant Singh, 1979 All LJ 645, that where the dispute regarding entries in revenue papers is raised the jurisdiction of Civil Court will be barred under S. 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The jurisdiction depends on the cause of action of the suit mentioned in the plaint hence the averments in the plaint with regard to the cause of action has to be strictly scrutinised to determine whether the suit is solely cognizable by Revenue Court or otherwise. It was further observed that (at p. 646) : "In the present case, the real cause of complaint of the plaintiff was the state of aljairs in the revenue records in spite of the existence of the compromise. It was further observed that (at p. 646) : "In the present case, the real cause of complaint of the plaintiff was the state of aljairs in the revenue records in spite of the existence of the compromise. The plaintiff dated that the compromise was entered in the Civil Court and it was not given effect to in the revenue papers. Taking advantage of this position, the defendant got his name entered as a shikmi. This complaint was hence primarily in relation to the entries in the revenue papers. The plaintiff himself alleged that because of the entry of the defendant's name as shikmi he was trying to interfere with the plaintiff's possession. This was obviously the alleged consequence of the state of affairs in the revenue papers. It is well settled that the Civil Court cannot direct correction of the revenue papers. This is a function that is done by Revenue Courts. (See Parsottam v. Narottam, 1970 All LJ 505). In view of this decision it is clear that the basic cause of action was such that relief on that could effectively be granted only by the Revenue Court. The suit was hence not maintainable in the Civil Court. It is barred by S. 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act." 18. The present suit was, therefore, maintainable in the Revenue Court. I thus find that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merit. 19. Learned counsel further argued that even on merits the petitioners have got a share in the property. He contended that Kalap Nath Rai had received the land in question in the representative capacity through gift deeds executed by Maya Rai in the year 1972 and Jatidu Rai in the year 1924. He further contended that the Courts below have wrongly held that there could not be acquisition of property in the representative capacity by way of gift. He further, referred to an affidavit of Jaddu Rai, the donor, which was filed in the case before the trial Court wherein he had mentioned that the gift made to Kalap Nath Rai was in representative capacity, hence it is established that the father of opposite party No. 4 Kalap Nath Rai had received the property in a representative capacity through the aforesaid gift. I do not find any substance in this argument. 20. I do not find any substance in this argument. 20. A gift is a transfer without consideration. The gift must be accepted by the donee or by some one on his behalf. The donee must be an ascertained person. Gift to un-ascertained persons would be invalid. After making gift the donor is divested with all his interest in the property and a condition cannot afterwards be attached nor he can later on indicate that by making gift of the property to a specified person he had meant to gift it to others as well, and such evidence would be inadmissible under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. An unqualified gift will not be cut down by subsequent words nor it would operate to create title in favour of others, who were not donees. The donee gets absolute ownership in the property. A gift cannot be benami and donee, who accepts the gift for and on his own behalf, acquires absolute ownership in the property and he cannot be said to be holding it as benamidar for others. The donee cannot be said to be holding the property in the representative capacity for and on behalf of other members of the joint family. It is well settled that even in joint family a member of the joint family and even a karta can acquire and hold separate property in his name. An ancestral property or a property acquired with the aid or assistance of joint family funds will alone be treated as a joint family property and not those other properties which a member of joint family acquires for himself from his own separate funds and the joint family funds are not utilised in acquiring it. Since gift is a transfer without consideration, hence it cannot be said that in acquiring property through gift any joint family funds were utilized. The property thus acquired through gift by a member of joint family cannot be branded to be joint family property nor the donee, although he may be a karta of the joint family, can be said to hold the property in a representative capacity for and on behalf of all other numbers of joint family. The property received through gift would be held by him as his separate property and other members of the family will have no interest or share in it. The property received through gift would be held by him as his separate property and other members of the family will have no interest or share in it. In the present case, therefore, Kalap Nath Rai donee cannot be said to have held the property in a representative capacity. His name along with other donees was recorded and continued in papers ever since execution of the gift deeds and upon his death the name of his son, the opposite party No. 4, was mutated. The petitioners never raised any claim of the property prior to consolidation operations and they somehow got their name surreptitiously and fraudulently recorded by means of the aforesaid order dated 23-6-1960 which, as already mentioned above, was void and a nullity. There is also nothing on record to indicate that Kalap Nath Rai was head and Karta of the family nor the petitioners have been able to establish their possession over the land in dispute. Thus I find that the petitioners have not been able to establish their alleged claim of cobhumidhari rights in the land in suit and there is no force in the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel of the petitioners. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to an affidavit of the donor Juddu Rai filed in, the case before the trial Court wherein he had mentioned that the property was given by him to Kalap Nath Rai and his brothers and that Kalap Nath Rai held it in a representative capacity. It was thus argued that the petitioners on the basis of the evidence are entitled to one-third share each with the plaintiff-opposite party No. 4 in the land in suit. It is not disputed that Juddu Rai is alive. But he was not examined in the case as a witness and thus could not be subjected to cross-examination. It is also admitted that no order was passed by the Court as required under O. XIX, R. 1, C.P.C. permitting defendants-petitioners to prove any particular fact or facts by affidavit nor any order was passed by Court ordering affidavit in question to be read in evidence, hence the aforesaid affidavit cannot be read in evidence. It is also admitted that no order was passed by the Court as required under O. XIX, R. 1, C.P.C. permitting defendants-petitioners to prove any particular fact or facts by affidavit nor any order was passed by Court ordering affidavit in question to be read in evidence, hence the aforesaid affidavit cannot be read in evidence. It has been held by this Court in Kedar Pandey v. Ram Din, 1964 Rev Dec 237: (1964 All LJ 722 at p. 724) that : "The affidavit could not constitute evidence in spite of the fact that there was no counter-affidavit by the defendant." 22. In another earlier case, Kunwar lnderjit Singh v. Gir Raj Singh, AIR 1936 All 671 , the Division Bench of this Court held that a mere affidavit is not evidence, and the person making this affidavit is to be subjected to cross-examination if it is to be used likewise. Apart from it the donor Jaddu Rai having gifted the property to Kalap Nath Rai had divested himself of all rights in the property and those vested absolutely in donee Kalap Nath Rai along with other specified donees in the gift deed, which was duly registered. He cannot now enlarge the scope of gift by saying that he had made gift of property to Kalap Nath Rai and his brothers and that Kalap Nath Rai had held it in a representative capacity. The testimony of Jaddu Rai in the aforesaid affidavit, although the same cannot be read in evidence for reasons already stated above, will not be admissible in evidence in view of the provisions contained in Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. It is well settled that no oral evidence of intention is admissible for the purposes of constructing deeds or ascertaining the intention of parties. See Bal Kishan Das v. W. F. Lagge, (1900) ILR 22 All 149 (PC). It is also well settled that the evidence as to the acts and conducts of the parties is also inadmissible because such conduct can only lead to the inference that there was a contemporaneous oral agreement or settlement between the parties, which cannot be proved. See Achutaramaraju v. Subbaraju, (1901) ILR 25 Mad 7 and Dattoo v. Ramchandra, (1906) ILR 30 Bom 119. See Achutaramaraju v. Subbaraju, (1901) ILR 25 Mad 7 and Dattoo v. Ramchandra, (1906) ILR 30 Bom 119. It has also been held by the Calcutta High Court in Madhab Charan Das v. Rajani Mohan Das, (1921) 64 Ind Cas 583, that it is not open to tender evidence of acts and conduct of the parties with a view to show that a document is not really which it purports to be. In Vissanji Y. Shapurji Burjorji, (1912) ILR 36 Bom 387 (PC), it was held that evidence of what took place after execution of a document was not admissible on the question of its construction. In G. Valia Raja v. T. Vareed, AIR 1961 Ker 293 , it was held that where the terms of a document are plain and un ambiguous no evidence of subsequent conduct of the parties as to how they understood them, or treated their relationship, is admissible. The Supreme Court also took the same view in Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta, AIR 1959 SC 1362 , wherein it was held that we are concerned with the expressed intention of parties and when the words are clear and unambiguous there is no scope for drawing upon hypothetical construction or supposed intentions of the parties. 23. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the evidence afforded by the aforesaid affidavit of Sri Jaddu Rai is not admissible in evidence and on its basis it cannot be urged that Kalap Nath Rai, the donee had received the property in question in a representative capacity and that the petitioners are cobhumidhars and entitled to share in it. The petitioners' claim thus fails also on merits and they cannot be held to be co-bhumidhars in the land in suit along with opposite parties No. 4 to 5. I, therefore, see no substance in the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 24. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Board of Revenue had not recorded any finding on the question whether the order dated 23-6-1960 passed by the Consolidation Officer was without jurisdiction or not and as such the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue be quashed and the case be remanded to it requiring the Board of Revenue to consider and record a finding on the aforesaid question. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that remand should be avoided in a case of protracted litigation. See Sant Narain Mathur v. Rama Krishna Mission, AIR 1974 SC 2241 and Bechan Pandey v. Dulhin Janki Devi, AIR 1976 SC 866 . In the latter decision the Supreme Court observed that to remand the suit to the trial Court would necessarily have the effect of keeping alive the strife between the parties and prolonging this long drawn litigation by another round of legal battle in the trial Court and thereafter in appeal and it is time that final curtain is drawn and this long meandering course of litigation between the parties is put to an end and the Court should be loath to entertain a plea which would have the effect of condemning succeeding generation of families to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. 25. Hence in this view of the matter I think no useful purpose will be served nor it appears appropriate in exercise of powers in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to remand the case specially when there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer appears to be per se without jurisdiction as already observed above. 26. No other point was pressed before me. 27. In view of what has been said above I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. I, however make no order as to costs.