ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The petitioner was issued the notice under S. 10 (2) of the Act and he filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 13-12-1976, a true copy of which is Annexure 1 to the petition. Thereafter, no appeal was filed but an application under S. 13A of the Act was moved seeking two reliefs - one on the ground that certain land had been treated as irrigated without caring to look into records in the shape of Khasra etc, and the second point was that the area of the petitioner's holding underwent a reduction in the consolidation proceedings but the same was not given effect to in the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 13-12-1976. A copy of this application is not on the record. However, an order was passed by the Prescribed Authority on 31-2-1980 allowing in part the said application. Certain area was held to be unirrigated on the basis of the Khasra entries, and in the result the surplus land was reduced. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal in the lower appellate Court but the same was dismissed on the ground that the exercise which the Prescribed Authority was required to do in the proceedings under S. 13A of the Act was not such as could be done under the said provision of law and that the real remedy of the tenure-holder was to have filed the appeal against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 13-12-1976. Since this was not done, therefore, the tenure-holder was not entitled to any relief. However, the appellate Court observed that as the State had not filed any appeal against the Prescribed Authority's order dated 31-3-1980, therefore, no interference could be made in the said order. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant writ petition and in support therefor, I have heard Sri G.S. Srivastava, the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. The learned counsel contended that the appellate Court was wrong in thinking that in the instant case, there was no error apparent on the face of the record, and in this connection, he placed reliance on the following authorities :- 1. Nanha v. Dy. 4. The learned counsel contended that the appellate Court was wrong in thinking that in the instant case, there was no error apparent on the face of the record, and in this connection, he placed reliance on the following authorities :- 1. Nanha v. Dy. Director of Consolidation Kanpur (1975 All W C 1 (F B)) The answer which the Full Bench turned, was as follows : "If it appears that a court of fact has in substance based its findings on no evidence or that its finding is perverse in the sense that no reasonable person could possibly come to that conclusion or that it erroneously ignores the vital plea or material evidence which affects the result, a manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record leading to failure of justice can be said to be established. But if a court or a tribunal bases its finding on a consideration of all relevant evidence, but an appeallate or a revisional court or Tribunal while affirming a finding does not refer to some material or contrary evidence in its order it cannot be said that it has been ignored from consideration so as to entitle the High Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution." 2. Ram Surat v. Shitla Prasad ( AIR 1978 All 270 ) 3. Abdul Rehman & others v. Prescribed Authority (1979 Allahabad Civil Journal (SOC) 10. 4. 1980 All L R (SOC) 16: (1979 UPLT NOC 31) Ram Narain v. 3rd Addl. Distt, Judge. 5. It should be seen that the question as to whether there is error apparent on the face of the record has to be decided with reference to the facts of each case. In the instant case, it should be seen that no copy of the objection, which the tenure-holder made in reply to the notice under S. 10 (2) of the Act, has been filed to enable this Court to see whether and in what manner an objection was raised to the treatment of certain plots as irrigated in the statement which was prepared under S. 10 (1) of the Act. From the order, which was passed by the Prescribed Authority on 13th Dec. 1976, it is not indicated as to in respect of which plot the said objection was taken. From the order, which was passed by the Prescribed Authority on 13th Dec. 1976, it is not indicated as to in respect of which plot the said objection was taken. Certain plots have been discussed in the said order and the discussion is as to whether they should be treated as single crop land. It should be seen that the land in question is situated in Bundelkhand which is covered by S. 4 (11) of the Act. If a party in his objections does not raise the controversy, the Prescribed Authority cannot suo motu be expected to go into the same; in such circumstances, it cannot be contended that the Prescribed Authority had committed an error apparent on the face of the record in passing the said order dated 13-12-1976. Further, it should be seen that that controversy as to whether certain plots should be treated as irrigated or not, is a matter which has to be decided in the regular ceiling proceedings in the manner as laid down under S. 4A of the Act. While Khasras of the relevant year have been made relevant other materials have also been mentioned in the said section and in such circumstances, it as not possible to contend in the proceedings under S. 13A of the Act that an interference should be made with the earlier order, which had been passed under S. 12 of he Act on 13-12-1976. In respect of the above mentioned case-law, which the learned counsel has cited, I would not like to say anything more than what I have already stated above, namely that as to when there is an error apparent on the face of the record, will have to be decided in the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case. It has never been the law that merely because a particular document has not been specifically referred to, therefore, it must be assumed that the same was not considered, and that that fact alone would justify the reopening of the proceedings. As I said it all depends upon the total facts and circumstances of each case. It has never been the law that merely because a particular document has not been specifically referred to, therefore, it must be assumed that the same was not considered, and that that fact alone would justify the reopening of the proceedings. As I said it all depends upon the total facts and circumstances of each case. So far as the Division Bench pronouncement in Abdul Rehman v. Prescribed Authority (Supra) it should be seen that an objection had been filed by certain transferees from the tenure-holder and the Division Bench held that even though such objections could not be treated as objections by the tenure-holder under section 10 (2) of the Act, the same could be treated as the objection under S. 11 (2) of the Act. Presumably the Division Bench was following the Full Bench decision reported in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Civil Judge Bijnor (1969 All L J 556) and thereafter, the Division Bench pronouncement in Dilbagh Singh v. State, (1978 All L J 717). It should be seen that in the instant case, we are not concerned with any one other than the tenure-holder himself. In this connection, I should like to invite attention to Babhutmal Rai Chand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, (AIR 1975 S C 1297), where it was laid down as under (at p. 1302) :- "Here, when we turn to the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High Court has clearly misconceived the scope and extent of its power under Article 227 and overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction under that Article. It has proceeded to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of correcting errors of fact supposed to have been committed by the District Court. That was clearly impermissible to the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The District Court was the final court of fact and there being no appeal provided against the findings of fact reached by the District Court, it was not open to the High Court to question the propriety or reasonableness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence by the Distt. Court. The High Court could not convert itself into a court of appeal and examine the correctness of findings of fact arrived at by the District Court. Court. The High Court could not convert itself into a court of appeal and examine the correctness of findings of fact arrived at by the District Court. The limited power of interference which the High Court, possessed under the Article 227 was to see that the District Court functions within the limits of its authority and so far as that was concerned, there was no complaint against the District Court that it transgressed the limits of its authority. It is true that the High Court claimed to interfere with the findings of the fact reached by the District Court on the ground that the District Court had misread a part of the evidence and ignored another part of it but that was clearly outside the jurisdiction of the High Court to do under Article 227. This is precisely what the High Court did in Nagendra Nath Bora's case, 1958 SCR 1240 (AIR 1958 S. C 398) (Supra) while setting aside the orders of the Appellate Authority under the Excise Act and that was disapproved by this Court in clearest terms. The exercise of the power of interference in that case was sought to be justified by reference both to Articles 226 and 227. So far as the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is concerned, this Court pointed out that a writ or order of certiorari could be issued by the High Court only if there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record and no error of fact, howsoever apparent on the face of the record, could be a ground for interference by the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction. It was observed by this Court, while applying this principle to the facts of appeals before it : In the judgments and orders impugned in these appeals the High Court has exercised its supervisory jurisdiction in respect of errors which cannot be said to be errors of law apparent on the face of the record. If at all they are errors, they are errors in appreciation of documentary evidence of affidavits, errors in drawing inferences or omission to draw inferences. In other words, those are errors which a court sitting as a court of appeal only could have examined and, if necessary, corrected. If at all they are errors, they are errors in appreciation of documentary evidence of affidavits, errors in drawing inferences or omission to draw inferences. In other words, those are errors which a court sitting as a court of appeal only could have examined and, if necessary, corrected. The High Court, in its several judgments and orders has scrutinised, in great detail, the orders passed by the excise authorities under the Act, and has not thought it fit to examine the record or the orders below in any detail, because, in our opinion, it is not the function of the High Court or of this Court to do so. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that the Judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, do not exercise their powers in excess of their statutory jurisdiction but correctly administer the law within the ambit of the statute creating them or entrusting those functions to them. The Act has created its own hierarchy of officers and appellate authorities as indicated above, to administer the Law. So long as those Authorities function within the letter and spirit of the law, the High Court has no concern with the manner in which these powers have been exercised. In the instant cases, the High Court appears to have gone beyond the limits of its powers under Article 226. This Court also held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the orders of the appellate authority in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, since this jurisdiction was limited only to seeing that the District Court functions within the limits of its authority and did not extend to correction of mere errors. What this court said in that case applies with equal force in the present case and we must hold that the High Court acted beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 in interfering with the findings of fact reached by the District Court. Even if the Special Civil Application had been under Article 226 that would have made no difference and the High Court would still have had no jurisdiction to disturb these findings of fact." 6. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed in limine.