ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This is a judgment-debtor's application in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is directed against an order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gyanpur, Varanasi, dated 16-1-80 dismissing the objection of the applicant filed under section 47 of the C P C. 2. The relevant facts are that a preliminary decree for sale based upon a mortgage was passed for recovery of Rs. 14,000/- odd against the applicant. It was followed by a final decree for sale. In pursuance thereof, the mortgaged property was put to auction and was sold on 11-4-1978 for a sum of Rs. 9,700/- in favour of the decree-holder respondent, who had earlier obtained the requisite permission to bid at the auction. 3. An objection was filed thereafter by the judgment-debtor under section 47 of the C P C. Broadly, the judgment-debtor raised the following objections :- 1) The judgment-debtor had paid the decree-holder various sums of money amounting to Rs. 3,500/- towards the debt in regard to which no adjustment was allowed either in the suit or in the preliminary or final decree; 2) The judgment-debtor was a landless agricultural labourer within the meaning of U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977. Consequently, the execution proceedings were liable to be abated under that Act : 3) The property auctioned was valued at least at Rs. 20,000/-. The amount of Rs. 9,700/- for which the property was sold was thus grossly inadequate and the sale was, therefore, liable to be set aside on that ground; 4) The applicant having paid to the decree holder a sum of Rs. 3,500/- as mentioned above, he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the decretal amount. The court should accept the balance and release the property from attachment and sale. 4. Before me, however, counsel for the applicant submitted only the following points for my consideration : 5. The first contention raised in support of the revision was that the view of the court below that the applicant was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata or principles analogous thereto from claiming the benefit of the U. P. D. R. Act 1977 in execution proceedings, he having failed to claim that benefit before the passing of the decree in the suit, was manifestly unsustainable in law. It was urged that S. 4 of the aforesaid Act clearly envisaged or permitted the raising of the objection of the nature mentioned above, even if the same was not taken in the suit itself. It does not seem necessary to express any opinion on this legal submission as I find that the court below also went into the merits of the objection of the appellant based on the U. P. D. R. Act, 1977 and rejected the same on the ground that the applicant was not either a marginal farmer or a small farmer within the meaning of the said Act. This finding of the appellate court is based upon a proper appreciation of the evidence on record and not being vitiated by any jurisdictional error, cannot be interfered with in a revision under section 115 of the C. P. C. 6. I shall next deal with the argument of the learned counsel in support of the plea that on the material on the record, it was clearly established that the applicant was neither a marginal farmer, nor a small farmer, nor even a landless agricultural labourer. I may add that the learned counsel for the applicant rightly made no attempt to submit that the applicant was a landless agricultural labourer, as admittedly the applicant has 1.11.0 Bighas of land. 7. In regard to the claim of the applicant that he was a marginal or a small farmer, the court below has commented that the appellant was not sure himself whether he was a small farmer or a arginal farmer. He had been changing his stand from time to time. In his objection under section 47 C P C, the Applicant claimed that he was a landless agricultural labourer. In the course of arguments before the court below, however, he started with the claim that he was a marginal farmer, but subsequently began asserting that he was a small farmer. For, either of these two things, it was essential for the appellant to prove that his principal source of livelihood was income from agricultural land or manual labour on such land. The finding of the court below, however, is that the principal source of livelihood of the applicant is from a dairy business which he is carrying on jointly with his brother in Bombay. The finding of the court below, however, is that the principal source of livelihood of the applicant is from a dairy business which he is carrying on jointly with his brother in Bombay. Learned counsel for the applicant strongly criticised this finding and submitted that the same was based on no evidence, or was based on a misreading of the evidence on record. 8. The first observation which l wish to make with regard to the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that according to the settled view, in a Revision u, s. 115 of the C.P.C., it is only jurisdictional error which could be corrected u s. 115 C P C. In AIR 1953 SC 23 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that it is not the errors committed by the court below in the judgments against which a revision is preferred, but an error only in the manner of arriving at that judgment which could be corrected under section 115 C P C. Keeping in view the limits of jurisdiction u/ s. 115 C P C therefore this Court could set aside the above finding of the court below only if it comes to the conclusion that the court below has committed some substantial error of jurisdiction or has exercised a jurisdiction which did not vest in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested. 9. Having given the matter a careful consideration, I have no manner of doubt that the decision of the court below that the appellant is neither a small farmer. nor a marginal farmer, is not vitiated by any such error which could he corrected under section 115 C PC. 10. Faced with the above clear legal position, learned counsel contended that the court below was not justified in referring to papers Nos. 65 to 71 as showing that the business which was being carried on in Bombay was a joint business of the appellant and his brother. Learned counsel invited my attention to these papers and submitted that in all those papers, the name of the applicant's brother Jagbir Sheo Kumar Yadav alone was shown. Consequently. the court below was not justified in taking those papers into consideration in support of its conclusion that the business which was being carried on in Bombay was a joint business. Learned counsel invited my attention to these papers and submitted that in all those papers, the name of the applicant's brother Jagbir Sheo Kumar Yadav alone was shown. Consequently. the court below was not justified in taking those papers into consideration in support of its conclusion that the business which was being carried on in Bombay was a joint business. I find no merit in this submission. Firstly, the argument is not one which touches upon the jurisdiction of the court below or which would indicate that the court below has committed some error of jurisdiction. Secondly, I find that the conclusion of the court below is based not only on those papers but also on the testimony of the decree-holder's witnesses. Ram Adhar, Ram Shiroman and Jai Shanker, all of whom deposed that the appellant was doing business in Bombay jointly with his brother and was deriving substantial income therefrom. The court below has believed the statements of the witnesses of the decree holder. The conclusion of the court below being thus based on plenty of other evidence including the admissions made by the appellant himself adverted to by the court below this Court would not be justified in interfering with the finding of the court below, in any view. 11. The next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the finding of the court below as regards the plea of the applicant that he had paid various sums of money amounting to Rs. 3,500/- to the decree-holder, and that the same was liable to be adjusted, is unsustainable. This finding is again based upon a proper appreciation of the evidence on record, and not being vitiated by any error of law, much less of jurisdiction, cannot be interfered with. The court below has accepted some of the payments alleged to have been made by the appellant to the decree-holder and has observed that adjustment shall be allowed while final payment is being made to the decree-holder. Whether a particular payment was made or not on the evidence on record is a question of fact which cannot be investigated in a revision. Also the said question cannot affect the validity of the sale. 12. Whether a particular payment was made or not on the evidence on record is a question of fact which cannot be investigated in a revision. Also the said question cannot affect the validity of the sale. 12. The third and the last submission raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the court below committed an error of jurisdiction in holding that it had no power to accept the balance due upon the decree after making adjustment of Rs. 3.500/- said to have been paid by the appellant to the decree-holder, and on that basis to set aside the sale. 13. Having given the matter a careful thought. I find no substance in the above argument either. I entirely agree with the court below and the learned counsel for the decree-holder-respondent that the stage for accepting the decretal amount and for setting aside the sale was long since over. The legislature has made an express provision in O. 21 R. 89 enabling a person claiming an interest in the property sold, to have the sale set aside by depositing in court the sums of money mentioned in O. 21 R. 89 C P C. The applicant had been duly served with the notice under O. 21 R. 66 C PC. He had, therefore, prior knowledge of the sale. If therefore, the applicant was interested in avoiding the sale, he should have made the deposit contemplated under O. 21 R.89 C P C within the time stipulated therein and avoided the sale even after the auction. Having failed to do that, it is not permissible to the applicant to have the sale set aside on the ground mentioned above. 14. Furthermore, the offer of the appellant to have the sale set aside by making the deposit was conditional and was based upon his insistence that he had already paid a sum of Rs. 3,500/- to the decree-holder opposite party.. The appellant was claiming adjustment of this amount even in regard to his liability under the decree. There was, therefore, no unconditional offer to pay up the entire decretal amount, much less other amounts which are required to be paid under O. 21 R. 89 C P C. The court below hence was not wrong in refusing to set aside the sale on the alleged offer made by the applicant. 15. There was, therefore, no unconditional offer to pay up the entire decretal amount, much less other amounts which are required to be paid under O. 21 R. 89 C P C. The court below hence was not wrong in refusing to set aside the sale on the alleged offer made by the applicant. 15. 1 may dispose of the cases which were cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. He referred to three decisions reported in :- (1) AIR 1972 All 350 (paragraphs 9, 10 and ID: (2) 1968 A W R (H C) 95; (3) AIR 1937 All 407. 16. These cases are of little assistance. What they lay down is that an objection as regards the saleability can be taken by a judgment-debtor in an objection under section 47 of the C P C even if such an objection was not raised under O. 21 R. 89 C P C. The proposition laid down in these cases is with respect, entirely unexceptionable. However, it has no application to the facts of the present case. Such objections as could be raised in execution proceedings have been considered by the court below and decided against the applicant. The other objections were not objections relating to saleability of the property in question. In my opinion, the case which is more apposite to the controversy is the one cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, namely, AIR 1981 S C 693. 17. The decision of the court below is in accord with the above Supreme Court decision. 18. No other point was urged in support of the revision. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.