JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - A post-graduate College known as Janta Vadic College, Baraut (hereinafter referred to as the College) and an intermediate college are run by Jat Siksha Sabha, Baraut, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Society). This Society has its bye law. A true copy of these bye-law has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. In a meeting of the general body of the Society held on 20-8 1978 the petitioner was elected as President of the Society for a period of three years. One Ravindra Kumar, brother's son of the petitioner, was appointed as a lecturer in the Botany Department on 3-12 1979. Respondent no. 2 in his capacity as Vice-President of the Managing Committee of the two institutions referred to above and respondent no. 4 in his capacity as a member of the Society instituted suit no. 553 of 1980 in the court of the Civil Judge, Meerut, for a mandatory injunction restraining the petitioner from functioning as president of aforesaid Society. It was asserted by respondents 3 and 4 in their suit that on the appointment of the Ravindra Kumar as a lecturer in the Botany Department the petitioner automatically ceased to be the president of the Society in view of bye-law no. 14 (d) of the bye laws of the said Society The said bye-law provides that no relative of an employee in any of the educational institution run by the Society shall be entitled to be a member of the Society. It also provides that if any relative of a member was appointed in any of the educational institutions referred to above such member shall cease to be a member of the Society. Respondents 3 and 4 further stated that notwithstanding two letters being addressed to the petitioner on 28-1-1980 and 21-2-1980 by respondent no. 3 requiring him to vacate the office of the president in view of bye-law 14 (d) the petitioner paid no heed. In the said suit an application was also made by respondents 3 and 4 for a temporary injunction, restraining the petitioner from functioning as president of the Society. The application was opposed by the petitioner but was allowed by the 1st Civil Judge, Meerut, respondent no. 2. In the said suit an application was also made by respondents 3 and 4 for a temporary injunction, restraining the petitioner from functioning as president of the Society. The application was opposed by the petitioner but was allowed by the 1st Civil Judge, Meerut, respondent no. 2. The petitioner preferred an appeal against that order which was dismissed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Meerut, respondent no 1. Aggrieved he has instituted this writ petition with a prayer to quash these two orders. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that bye-law no 14 (d) relied on by the respondents was not applicable inasmuch as it stood superseded by Section 39 of the U P. State Universities Act, .973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Reliance for this submission was placed on bye.law no 35 (a) which inter alia provides that in the event of any inconsistency between the bye-law and-the Act, statutes or the ordinances of the University the bye-laws to the extent of such inconsistency will be deemed to have been amended so as to make them consistent with the Act, statutes and ordinances of the University. 3. Having hear counsel for the parties I find it difficult to accept the submission made by counsel for the petitioner. It has not been disputed by counsel for the petitioner that Ravindra Kumar is a relative of the petitioner within the meaning of bye-law 14 (d) as also within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 39 of the Act. Considerable emphasise has, however, been placed on the proviso to Section 39. In order to appreciate the submission made by counsel for the parties in respect of the proviso it would be useful to extract Section 39 of the Act at this place. It reads : - "39. Considerable emphasise has, however, been placed on the proviso to Section 39. In order to appreciate the submission made by counsel for the parties in respect of the proviso it would be useful to extract Section 39 of the Act at this place. It reads : - "39. Disqualification for membership of management - A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being a member of the management of an affiliated or associated college (other than a college maintained exclusively by the State Government or by local authority), if he or his relative accepts any remuneration for any work in or for such college or any contract for the supply of goods to or for the execution of any work for the execution of such college : Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the acceptance of any remuneration by a teacher as such or for any duties performed in connection with an examination conducted by the college or for any duties as Superintendent or Warden of a training unifliifr of a hall or hostel of the college or as proctor or tutor or for any duties, of a sihailar nature in relation to the college. Explanation - The term- "relative" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Explanation to Section 20." The submission made by counsel for the petitioner is that since Ravindra Kumar was a teacher in the College and was getting remuneration from the College as a teacher the case was covered by the proviso to Section 39 and the disqualification laid down in Section 39 Was not applicable to the petitioner. On this very basis it was also urged that bye-law 14 (d) which made no distinction bet-tween a teacher and the other employees was inconsistent with Section 39 and-will be deemed to have been amended so as to bring it in conformed with Section 39. On a conspectus of the relevant provisions in the Act and First Statutes of the Meerut University to which the College is affiliated it is clear that the said proviso is not inconsistent with be leave 14(d) Statute 13.05 of the Fir Statutes provides for the constitutions the management of affiliated colleges. On a conspectus of the relevant provisions in the Act and First Statutes of the Meerut University to which the College is affiliated it is clear that the said proviso is not inconsistent with be leave 14(d) Statute 13.05 of the Fir Statutes provides for the constitutions the management of affiliated colleges. According to clause (d) of the said Statute 25 per cent of the members of the management ate to be teachers including the principal and according to clause (c the teachers (excluding the principal) are to be members for a period of one year by rotation in order of seniority. The proviso to Section 39, in my opinion, any safeguards the interest of such teachers who may be members of the management in accordance with clauses (b) and (c) of Statute 13 05. The proviso was cent to ensure that what was given to the teachers by one hand viz by clauses (b) and (c) of Statute 13 05 may not be taken away by the other, viz by Section 39 of the Act Had the proviso not been there the teachers who become members of the management under Statute 3.05 would have become disqualified to continue as members by virtue of Section 39 on the ground that they were accepting remuneration for work done in the College. The proviso accordingly applies only to such a teachers who was also a member for the time being of the management of the college under Statute 13.05. It does not apply to a teacher who is a relative oi a member of the management. 4. The matter may be looked into from another aspect. In view of Sec 39 member of the management shall become disqualified to continue as a member if any of his relatives gets employed in the college in any capacity and accepts remuneration for the work done in lieu of sub employment. The relative may be employed not necessarily as a teacher but in any other capacity, i e. a class III or class IV employee. The proviso to Section 39 will not cover the case of any of the employees Who is relative of a member other than an employee who is a teacher. The relative may be employed not necessarily as a teacher but in any other capacity, i e. a class III or class IV employee. The proviso to Section 39 will not cover the case of any of the employees Who is relative of a member other than an employee who is a teacher. There seems to be no satisfactory or cogent reason to take a distinction between an employee who is the relative of a member and is employed as a teacher and a relative of such a member who is employed in any other capacity. The principle continued behind Section 39 is that no such person shall be entitled to be chosen as a member or to continue as a member of the management if he or his relative accepts remuneration for any work done in or for such college. Reference is not being made to the latter part of Section 39 which deals with a person accepting remuneration tor any contract inasmuch as that clause is not relevant for the purpose of the instant case. The submission made by counsel for the petitioner. if accepted will thus lead to an anomalous result. A member of the management will become disqualified to continue as member if a relative of such member is employed in the college as a class III or class IV employee and accepts remuneration for the work done by him in connection with bis employment but no such disqualification shall accrue if the relative of the member happens to be employed as a teacher. The proviso in nay opinion is not ment to distinguish a relative of a member whit is a teacher from another relative who even though is employed in the college and is accepting remuneration for the work done as such employee but not a teacher. The proviso as pointed out above applies only to such a member who also happens to be a teacher and has been ne a member by virtue of Statute 13.05 5. Counsel for the petitioner in this connection invited my attention to clause (d) of Statute 13.05 which provides that subject to the provisions of clause (c) no two members of the management shall be related to each other within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 20. Counsel for the petitioner in this connection invited my attention to clause (d) of Statute 13.05 which provides that subject to the provisions of clause (c) no two members of the management shall be related to each other within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 20. It was urged that clause (d) clearly contemplated that if out of the two members of the committee of management one happens to be a teacher the bar created by clause (d) would not be attracted. Consequently according to counsel it was clear from clause (d) that on a relative of a member being appointed as a teacher the member did not become disqualified from continuing as such. In any opinion it is not the true interpretation of clause (b) Clause (e) in respect of which the exception has been made in clause of as already pointed out above contemplates teacher members referred to in clause (d) who are to be on the management for a period of on# year by rotation, in order of seniority. Clause d) on the other hand contemplates that 25 per cent of the members of the management are to be the teachers. It may be that at one point of time two teachers who are related to each other within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 20 may in order of seniority become members of the managing committee simultaneously. Clause (d) would apply to these two members of the managing committee and neither of them will be dis entitled to become member of the committee of management simply because they are related to each other within the meaning of the Explanation to Section. 20. 6. Clause (3) of Statute 11.05 provides that a member of the Selection Committee for appointment of teachers in the University shall withdraw from a meeting of the committee or of the Executive Council as the case may be if the question of appointment of any of the relatives (as defined in the Explanation to Section 20 of the Act of such member is being or is likely to be considered in such meeting. By virtue of Statute 11 15 the provisions of Statute 11.15 mutatis mutandis applies in cases of appointments of tea hers of affiliated college as they apply to the teachem of the University. By virtue of Statute 11 15 the provisions of Statute 11.15 mutatis mutandis applies in cases of appointments of tea hers of affiliated college as they apply to the teachem of the University. Section 31 (41 (cl of the Act provides for the constitution of the Selection Committee for the appointment of the principal of an affiliated or an associated college. It indicates that the head of the management or a member of the management nominated by him shall be the chairman of the committee. Th-re shall also be one member of the management nominated by the management. Likewise clause (d) of Section 31 (4) provides for the constitution of a Selection Committee for the appointment of other teachers of an affiliated or associated college The head of the management or a member of the management nominated by him is to be the Chairman of such committee also When clause (3) of Statute 11.05 read with Statute 11.15 provides that a member of the S-lection Committee shall withdraw from a meeting of the committee if the question of appointment of any of the relatives of such member is being or is nicely to be considered in such a meeting it only ensures impartiality in the master of selection so that no member whose relative was being or was likely to be considered in the meeting of the Selection Committee may be in a position to confer any benefit either directly or otherwise on his relative If this is the intention of Cl. (3) of Statute 11 05 which in my opinion undoubtedly is, it is all the more necessary that after the relative of a member has been selected and subsequently appointed as a teacher such member should not continue on the management so that he may not be in a position offer undue benefit in his relative. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that after a relative of a member had been appointed as a teacher there was no scope for any undue benefit being conferred by such member on his relative. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that after a relative of a member had been appointed as a teacher there was no scope for any undue benefit being conferred by such member on his relative. In this connection be dinned my attention to Section 34 (2) of the Act which provides that no teacher of the University or of an applied or associated college shall at any time held more than ode returnative office specified in the said section Od this basis it was submitted that the only possible benefit which a the their' could confer on his relative was to permit him to hold more than one remunerative office and since this could not be done in view of Section 3-t (2) it was not possible for a member to confer any undue benefit on his relative who was appointed as a teacher. This submission in may opinion cannot be accepted for obvious reasons. Even within limited scope of Section 34 (2) it is possible to confer benefit by a member on his relative to the detriment of another teacher. For instance, if there are two remunerative offices, one carrying larger remuneration and the other a nominal remuneration the member may against be instrumental in getting assigned the remunerative office which carries larger remuneration to his relative. Further he can ensure that his relative may continuously occupy one remunerative office or the other at the cost of other teacher. Moreover assigning remunerative offices is not the only possible benefit which can be conferred on a teacher. I here may be other way of conferring undue benefit by a member of the management on a teacher who is his relative. For instance, Section 31 (2) read with sub-section (1) of the said section contemplates, inter alia, that appointment of every teacher of an affiliated or an associated college not being appointment under sub section (3), shall on the first instance be on probation for one year which tray be extended for a period not exceeding one year. For instance, Section 31 (2) read with sub-section (1) of the said section contemplates, inter alia, that appointment of every teacher of an affiliated or an associated college not being appointment under sub section (3), shall on the first instance be on probation for one year which tray be extended for a period not exceeding one year. As is well know the period of probation is provided to give an opportunity to the management of a college to watch the work and conduct of the teacher so appointed during the period of probation and to terminate his appointment in case his work and conduct is not found satisfactory A member whose relative is a teacher can confer or may be instrumental in conferment of undue benefit on such relative by confirming him in place of terminating his appointment even if his work and conduct is not satisfactory. He can also extend or assist in getting extended the period of probation for another year in case the teacher happens to be his relative whereas the same thing may not be done in the case of another teacher. The reference to Section 31 (3) of the Act is only illustrative. A member of a committee of management may find various other means to confer undue benefit on a teacher who happens to be his relative. It is obviously in this vide of the matter that it was provided in Section 39 of the Act as well as in bye-law 14 (d) of the society that if any relative of a member was employed in the College and was accepting remuneration in lieu of such employment the member shall cease to continue as such. What is contained in Section 39 and bye-law 14 (d) is based on sound public policy. Since I have found that there is no inconsistency in bye-law 14 (d) and Section 39 of the Act it seems obvious that consequent upon Ravindra Kumar, who is a relative of the petitioner within meaning of bye-law 14 (d) as also Section 39 of the Act, being appointed as lecturer in the Botany Department of the College the petitioner stood disqualified for existing or continuing as a member of the Managing Committee of the College. The word be" means "to live, to exist a member" after the words "chosen, as and for" in Section 39 of the Act would also mean and include "existing or "continuing." 7. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioner- that in view of clause (d) of the proviso inserted in sub-rule 12) of Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure by the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 (U. P. Act 57 of 1976) respondents 1 and 2 did not have jurisdiction to pass the impugned order inasmuch as the injunction granted by the impugned order affects the internal management or affairs of educational institution or society within the meaning of the said clause. 8. A similar submission was made on behalf of the petitioner before respondents 1 and 2 also and was repelled. I have gone through the reasons given by respondents 1 and 2 for repelling the aforesaid submission and in my opinion those reasons do hot suffer from any such error which may justify interference under Article 22 6 of the Constitution There is an additional reason why I am of opinion the said clause (d) is not attracted to the instant case To me it appears that the bar created by clause (d) dis entitles a court from issuing an injunction which has the effect of interfering with the management or the functioning of an educational institution or society. It does not bar the issue of an injunction which in place of interfering with the internal management or affairs of an educational institution or society has the effect of really assisting the internal management or affairs of such an institution or society. Suppose a person threaten to interfere with the internal management of an educational institution or society asserting that he is entitled to manage the affairs of such institution or society but in reality is a pretender or rank usurper. An injunction can certainly be issued at the instance of the appropriate person, restraining such pretender or rank user per to do so. If such an injunction is issued it will on the face of it in place of interfering have the effect of assisting the internal management or affairs of an education institution or society. An injunction can certainly be issued at the instance of the appropriate person, restraining such pretender or rank user per to do so. If such an injunction is issued it will on the face of it in place of interfering have the effect of assisting the internal management or affairs of an education institution or society. In my opinion on principle there is no difference between a person who is a pretender or rank usurper from the very inception and a person who becomes a pretender or rank user per by suffering a disqualification to hold the office in question. The only difference between a pretender or rank use per on the one hand and a person who is entitled to carry on the internal management or look after the affairs of an educational institution or society on the other is that there is a legal sanction behind the latter whereas the former has no such legal sanction to hold the office in question. Legal sanction in the context will include authority conferred either by some statutory provision or by the bye-laws of a society or may be even by contract or agreement validly entered into. In the instant case no injunction has been sought against the whole committee of management on the ground that one of its members has become disqualified to to hold office. The injunction has been sought only against that person who has ceased to be a member because he has incurred a disqualification and even on whose ceasing to hold office the management of the college can smoothly go on in view of those bye-laws of the society which provide for such a contingency and on which reliance has been placed in the impugned orders. For the reasons given above. I am of opinion that clause (d) of the proviso to sub-rule (2). Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure as inserted by (U. P. Act 57 of 1976 will-not be attracted to the facts of the instant case 9. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on a decision of this Court in (Sri Nath Educational Society Sirsa, Allahabad v. The Additional Munsif, Allahabad, (1980 UPLBEC 67). On its own facts the said case is clearly distinguishable. Reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on a decision of this Court in (Sri Nath Educational Society Sirsa, Allahabad v. The Additional Munsif, Allahabad, (1980 UPLBEC 67). On its own facts the said case is clearly distinguishable. That was not a case where an injunction was sought against a particular member on the ground that he had by operation of law ceased to be a member Further, even in that case it seems to have been accepted that clause (d) of the proviso to Order XXXIX, Rule 2 (2), C.P.C. may not be attracted if injunction was sought against a pretender or rank usurper. 10. Counsel for the petitioner relying on the same decision then urged that no injunction could be granted by the Civil Court in view of clause (d) of the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 2(CP.C. as inserted by U.P. Act 57 of 1976 Having given my anxious consideration. I am of opinion that on the facts of the instant case the impugned orders do not deserve to be quashed on the basis of this submission neither It is settled law that a writ of certiorari does not issue as a matter of course. In {East India Commercial Co. v. Collector of Customs), (AIR 1962 SC 1993) it was held : "This raise the question whether an administrative Tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State initiate proceeding in direct violation of tic law so declared. Under Article 215 every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such court including the power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and Tribunal throughout the territories in relation to which in exercises jurisdiction. It would be anon anons to suggest that a Tribunal Were which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. If a Tribunal can do so all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superiors tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conductive, to their smooth working; otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for Jaw would irretrievably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction." 11. Not that the petitioner has himself raised before this Court under Article 22 6 of the Constitution the question about the interpretation of Section 39 of the Act and the said question has been decided in the manner stated above it would be a futile exercise to quash the impugned orders and require respondents 3 and 4 to approach the Vice Chancellor under Statute 13.05 and thereafter the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act if the decision of Vice-Chancellor goes against them, for it would not he possible either for the Vice-Chancellor or the Chancellor to take a view portray to that taken by this Court in regard to the interpretation of Section 39 of the Act. The matter can be looked into from yet another aspect. Suppose even after laying down the true import of Section 39 of the Act the impugned orders are quashed because of clause (h) of the proviso to Or XXXIX Rule 2(2) C o.C. and the Vice-Chancellor and the Chancellor on a reference made to them interpret Section 39 of the Act in conformity with the interpretation of this Court which they are bound to do, and the petitioner still insists to continue as president of the Society, respondents 3 and 4 may again have to file suit for injunction and apply for temporary injunction. It will all result in unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings which has to be discouraged not only as a matter of policy but also in the interest of the parties. 12. Lastly it was urged that the suit itself was not maintainable. No such plea appears it have so far been raised before the Court to which the suit is pending. Even in the writ petitioner there is no prayer for quashing the proceedings in the suit. As such the petitioners do not deserve to be permitted to raise this plea at this stage. 13. No other point has been pressed. 14. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.