Judgment S.K. Kaul, J. 1. THIS appeal has been filed against an order of acquittal passed in favour of accused-respondent. 2. THE facts of this case are that the appellant owned house No. 20-A Mall Avenue, P. S. Hazratganj, Lucknow. THE complainant also owned a separate apartment at the side of the aforesaid house which is known as Sadhu Kuti which was meant for use and stay of the Christian Sadhus. It is alleged that the appellant had gone to Allahabad in the month of December, 1971 after entrusting his house and the said Kuti in the care of Sri Ashley John and Sardar J. S. Kohli. On his return from Allahabad in the month of April, 1972 he found that the accused-respondent has taken possession over the aforesaid Sadhu Kuti. He was informed by the aforesaid caretakers that the accused respondent had taken forcible possession after getting its lock opened. THE complainant-appellant lodged a report in the police station and also gave a notice to the accused respondent to vacate the aforesaid premises, failing which he filed a complaint before a Magistrate, who took cognizance of the case, and after summoning the accused-respondent, asked him to stand trial under Section 448 IPC. The defence of the accused-respondent was that he was tenant of the aforesaid permises and that he was paying rent to the complainant. The trial court held that the accused respondent had taken forcible possession and as such an offence under Section 448 IPC was made out as a result of which he sentenced the accused respondent to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-. In default of payment of fine he was ordered to undergo two months' R. I. He was also ordered to vacate the premises within 30 days, failing which action was to be taken under Section 456 Cr. P.C. The accused-respondent went up in appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge relying on a ruling reported in 1979 LLJ 18, Ram Swarup v. State held that since a valid notice was not given as required by law, the accused respondent could not be said to have committed criminal trespass as a result of which he allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the trial court. Feeling aggrieved, the complainant has come up to this court by way of appeal. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the complainant has come up to this court by way of appeal. 3. IT was urged before me that the first ingredient of Section 441 of the IPC was attracted inasmuch as after breaking the lock the respondent had taken possession. The second argument was that the notice served upon the accused respondent was valid notice and therefore in any case amended provision of Section 441 was also attracted and as such the order of the trial court was perfectly correct in law. 4. SECTION 441 after amendment by the U. P. State runs thus : "441. Criminal trespass-Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or, having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence. Criminal trespass-Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or, having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence. Or, having entered into or upon such property, whether before or after the coming into force of the Criminal Law (U. P. Amendment) Act, 1961, with the intention of taking unauthorised possession or making unauthorised use of such property fails to withdraw from such property, or its possession or use when called upon to do so by that another person by notice in writing, duly served upon him, by the date specified in the notice, is said to commit 'criminal trespass." The Supreme Court in Smt. Methri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 clearly observed that: "In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry, that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the person entering ; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge, that its natural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry." 5. IT is therefore clear that there should be some proof either in the shape of direct evidence or in the shape of circumstances in respect of intent to commit an offence or to intimidate or insult or annoy a person in possession of the property before such ingredient of Section 441 of the IPC can be said to come into play. The evidence is that the appellant was not present when forcible entry was taken. The evidence is that the appellant was not present when forcible entry was taken. IT may be that possession might have been taken after breaking open the lock but in my view by mere breaking open the lock automatically criminal intent to commit an offence or to cause annoyance cannot be inferred. If the argument on these lines has to be accepted that whenever there is a forcible entry by a trespasser in a property owned by another person, intention to commit an offence or cause annoyance is attracted, the very object of the amendment in Section 441 by the U. P. State becomes redundant. The statute has to be read as a whole and there should be harmonious interpretation so that it may be possible for a court of law to interpret each and every provision and not to hold that one provision is redundant and has no meaning whatsoever. Law contemplates that there have to be circumstances or positive proof for commission of offence or annoyance before such ingredient of Section 441 IPC can be attracted. Two circumstances emerge in this case, namely, that in the absence of the complainant the accused occupied the premises forcibly, and secondly, such a forcible entry was made possible after breaking open the lock. The very fact that subsequently the complainant gave a notice to the accused to vacate the premises suggests that he also did not treat the entry of the accused respondent with the intention of committing an offence or causing annoyance. I, therefore, find myself unable to accept the first argument advanced before me. Coming to the second point there is no dispute that in the first notice given to the accused respondent only three days were given to vacate the premises and in the last notice he was given 15 days' time to vacate the premises after receipt of notice. The question arises whether such a notice can be termed to be a valid notice in the eye of law. I have already quoted above Section 441 IPC which clearly mentions that the notice should mention "the date specified in the notice" by which the trespasser is asked to vacate the premises. Learned counsel argued that the word "date" should be read as "period". He tried to rely upon a dictionary meaning in support of his argument. I have already quoted above Section 441 IPC which clearly mentions that the notice should mention "the date specified in the notice" by which the trespasser is asked to vacate the premises. Learned counsel argued that the word "date" should be read as "period". He tried to rely upon a dictionary meaning in support of his argument. But I am not prepared to accept that the word "date" should be read as "period" as used in Section 441 IPC after amendment. The law is that every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is found guilty. The Indian Penal Code has specifically mentioned what types of crimes are committed and the law requires that the prosecution has to prove the guilt of an accused in relation to a particular time and date. Supposing a person is accused of committing theft on 5-3-1980 but if the proof is given that the theft was committed on 15-3-1980 and there was no charge about the theft being committed on 15th March, even though there may be evidence that the theft was committed by the accused on 15th March, he cannot be convicted of theft having been committed on 5th March. My intention in giving this illustration is that the criminal law is very strict and the statute of the Indian Penal Code has to be construed strictly. In that view of the matter I think that the law laid down by this Court (Supra) as noted above cannot be said to be incorrect nor I think that it requires further elucidation by the Bench inasmuch as I do not disagree with the view expressed above. And I am in respectful agreement with the same since: the two notices which are on record do not fulfill the requirement of the law as laid down in Section 441 IPC. They were rightly held to be invalid and as such the conviction of the accused under Section 448 IPC cannot be sustained. 6. I, therefore, see no force in this appeal and it is hereby rejected. The accused is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled and sureties are discharged. Appeal rejected.