Judgment SATYESHWAR ROY, J. 1. This appeal is against the judgment of reversal. The trial Court had decreed the suit and the lower appellate Court set aside the decree on an appeal filed by the respondents. 2. The suit was originally filed by Mirja Majhi against Parikhit Pradhan and two others who were pro forma respondents. Both Mirja Majhi and Parikhit Pradhan died during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court and their heirs, the present appellants and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were substituted in their place. The suit was filed for declaration of title and for confirmation of possession or in the alternative for recovery of possession. The assertions on the basis of which the suit was filed were that the suit land were ancestral lands of the appellants and pro forma respondents Nos. 3 and 4. By a mutual agreement of parties the suit land was allotted in the share of the ancestor of the appellants, Bhunda Dukhiya Manjhi. In the year 1933 Bhunda took a loan of Rs. 127/8/- from Gopal Pradhan grandfather of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and executed registered document on 22-8-1933; offering as security the Schedule A lands in the suit. It was stipulated that the loan will be repaid within the end of the month of Sraban 1343 san (1936) and in the event of failure to repay the loan within the stipulated period Gopal Pradhan would be entitled to get the suit land recorded in raiyati right after paying the State dues in accordance with laws and practice then prevailing in the Seraikella State. Although Bunda Dhukiya Manjhi and the pro forma defendants several times offered to repay the loan together with interest before the due date but Gopal Pradhan refused the same and taking the advantage of illiteracy and simplicity of the plaintiff and the pro forma defendant got the land mutated in the revisional record without going to the Civil Court of Seraikella State in accordance with the laws and practice then prevailing in the Seraikella State. There were several litigations between the parties and in 1958-59 survey Gopal Pradhan got the land recorded in his name. 3. The pro forma respondents filed a written statement supporting the case of the appellants. Parikhit Pradhan filed a written statement alleging inter alia that the value of the suit land was about Rs. There were several litigations between the parties and in 1958-59 survey Gopal Pradhan got the land recorded in his name. 3. The pro forma respondents filed a written statement supporting the case of the appellants. Parikhit Pradhan filed a written statement alleging inter alia that the value of the suit land was about Rs. 9000.00 and therefore beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of Munsif where the suit was filed. It was also alleged that the suit was barred by law of limitation. It was contended that as the mortgagor defaulted in paying the mortgage dues within the time stipulated the name of the mortgagee was recorded according to the practice then prevailing in the Seraikella State. There was no necessity for going to the Civil Court for foreclosure of the mortgage as there was no such practice in the Seraikella State then. 4. On the basis of the pleading several issues were framed by the Additional Munsif who tried the suit. It found that the contesting defendants were coming in possession of the land in suit. It was further found that the contesting defendants were coming in possession of the suit land as mortgagee by virtue of Exhibit-2 and the title of the plaintiffs was not extinguished by lapse of time. In view of Limitation Act, 1963 the trial Court held that the suit was filed within the time prescribed under the Limitation Act. On these findings, the suit was decreed. 5. The lower appellate Court accepted the finding of the trial Court that the contesting respondents were in possession of the land in suit. But it held that the contesting respondents did not come in possession of the suit land on the basis of Exhibit-2 as held by the trial Court, but on the basis of the order of mutation on the failure of the mortgagor to pay the mortgage dues. The lower appellate Court found that the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the C.P.C.) and the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the T.P. Act) were not applicable then to Seraikella State. And in view of the order dated 27-4-1937, Exhibit-1, passed by the Ruler of the Seraikella State, it found that the mortgagee was in possession of the land in suit as raiyat and not as mortgagee. And in view of the order dated 27-4-1937, Exhibit-1, passed by the Ruler of the Seraikella State, it found that the mortgagee was in possession of the land in suit as raiyat and not as mortgagee. It further found that the right of redemption was extinguished as far back as in the year 1936. On these findings the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. 6. This appeal was listed before V. Mishra J. By order dated 21-8-1979 he referred this case to the Division Bench. 7. The question involved in this appeal is whether the T. P. Act and the Limitation Act,1908 were applicable to the Seraikella State in 1933 when Exhibit-2 was executed. It was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents that if the transaction was governed by those Acts then the suit must be decreed. 8. The admitted facts are that Exhibit-2 was executed on 22-8-1933 in which it was stipulated that the mortgagor will repay the loan with interest by the end of Shravan 1343 San corresponding to 1936 and on failure to pay the dues within the stipulated period the mortgagee would be entitled to get his name mutated in the Shirista of Raja of the Seraikella State by paying all the dues of Raja. By order dated 27-4-1937 passed by the Ruler of the Seraikella the name of Gopal Pradhan was mutated in respect of the suit land and he came in possession of the same. Neither in the trial Court nor in the lower appellate Court the parties led any evidence whether the T.P. Act and the Limitation Act applied then in the Seraikella State. However in this Court the counsel appearing on behalf of the parties were heard at length on this point and they were allowed to bring on record the judgments and orders of different authorities of Seraikella State passed in different cases during the relevant period to show whether those Acts applied then to the Seraikella State. 9. Political status of Seraikella State before it acceded to the Dominion of India by virtue of Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler on 16th August 1957 and thereafter has been fully noticed in the case of Most. Bilasi Sardarin V/s. Dun Sardar reported in 1962 BLJR 493. I will, therefore in this case, have no need to give those details. Bilasi Sardarin V/s. Dun Sardar reported in 1962 BLJR 493. I will, therefore in this case, have no need to give those details. Admittedly before the State acceded to the Dominion of India it was a feudatory State and the Ruler in Council was entitled to enact laws for the Seraikella State. According to the Record of Rights Act of Seraikella State no transfer by a raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof by mortgage or lease for any period exceeding 5 years or by sale, gift or any other transaction or agreement shall be valid to any extent except with the sanction of the Ruling Chief. This Act also provided that the deed of transfer must be registered. As appears from the final report of the Survey and Settlement operation in the Seraikella State in the year 1925-26 the Record of Rights Act was Tenancy Act relating to law of landlord and tenant with regard to raiyati holding. 10. With regard to the question whether the Limitation Act, the C.P.C, and the T.P. Act applied then to the Seraikella State during the relevant period, the first document to be noticed is the judgment dated 31-3-1929 in Dewani Suit No.59 of 1928-29 of the Court of Shriman Patayat Sri Sri Biraj Singh Deo the Magistrate of the Seraikella State who disposed of that suit for khas possession. It may be noticed that the parties to that suit were described as plaintiff and defendants. The defendants in that suit had pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. An issue, whether the suit was barred by limitation, was also framed and it was held that the defendants had failed to substantiate that the suit was barred by limitation. The second document is dated 31-10-1930 in Dewani Appeal No. 17 of 1930-31 which arose out of the judgment dated 31-3-1929 in Dewani Suit No. 59 of 1928-29. In that appeal also it was held that the suit was not barred by limitation. And the third document to be noticed is order dated 24-3-1932 in Revenue Suit No.30 of 1931-32. By this order an application filed under Sec.24 of the C.P.C. was allowed and the suit pending in the Court of Munsif was transferred. 11. In that appeal also it was held that the suit was not barred by limitation. And the third document to be noticed is order dated 24-3-1932 in Revenue Suit No.30 of 1931-32. By this order an application filed under Sec.24 of the C.P.C. was allowed and the suit pending in the Court of Munsif was transferred. 11. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in view of the reference of the Limitation Act and the C.P.C. in the judgments and the orders aforesaid the Acts and Code were applicable at the relevant time to the Seraikella State. This contention does not appear to be wholly correct. It appears from the Report on the Administration of the Seraikella State for the year 1944-45, published by the authority of the Ruler of Seraikella that certain Acts including the C.P.C., Limitation Act and the T.P. Act were not applicable as such to the Seraikella State but "the spirit of which has been adopted in the State". Mr. Roy learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents submitted that the spirit of the Act might have been adopted in the Seraikella State in 1944-45, but there is nothing on record to show that, that was the position in 1933 when Exhibit-2 was executed. That is true. No rule of law has been shown by any of the parties that prevailed in 1933 in Seraikella. It is also admitted that by Seraikella and Kharsawan (Laws) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act 23 of 1949) certain Acts, Ordinances and Regulations were extended to and to be in force in those States from 1-1-1950. The Acts so extended include T.P. Act, C.P.C. and Limitation Act. 12. In such a situation how the issue is to be decided? There are a large number of authorities in favour of the proposition that even if T. P. Act was not applicable in certain States (then Provinces) its principles and not technicalities were followed as rules of justice, equity and good conscience. This appears to be consistent view of a number of High Courts. (To notice a few; Mahomed Abdullah V/s. Md. Yasin, AIR 1933 Lah 151; Tarachand V/s. Shersingh AIR 1936 Lah 944; Vasdev V/s. Dheru Mal, AIR 1940 Lah 291; Fazal Karim V/s. Mahammad Karim, AIR 1942 Peshawar 43; Chela Ram V/s. Gopichand, AIR 1942 Peshawar 88). This appears to be consistent view of a number of High Courts. (To notice a few; Mahomed Abdullah V/s. Md. Yasin, AIR 1933 Lah 151; Tarachand V/s. Shersingh AIR 1936 Lah 944; Vasdev V/s. Dheru Mal, AIR 1940 Lah 291; Fazal Karim V/s. Mahammad Karim, AIR 1942 Peshawar 43; Chela Ram V/s. Gopichand, AIR 1942 Peshawar 88). In the case of Gopilal V/s. Abdul Hamid (AIR 1928 All 381) the Allahabad High Court was faced with situation similar to the case in hand. The mortgage was of 1859 and the suit for redemption was filed. Admittedly the T. P. Act, 1882 was not in force then. The main question argued in that case was whether the T.P. Act have any application to the case and if not what should be the nature of the order to be passed by the Court. No rule of law that prevailed in 1859 was shown nor it was shown that rule of law that prevailed in 1859, has any conflict with the present day rule i. e., the provisions of the T.P. Act, 1882. The Allahabad High Court observed as follows (at p. 383):- "In absence of any direct guide as to rule of law that prevailed in 1859 it will be safe to accept the rules prevailing at the present day as a sure guide. No decision of this Court on this point was brought to my notice. If I may say so, with respect, this is a very sound principle and I accept it. Mr. Roy did not contest this legal proposition. 13. But Mr. Roy stated that in this case there was direct guide as to the rule of law prevailing in 1933 and therefore, the rules of the T. P. Act should not be made applicable. He relied on exhibit-2 and the order of mutation dated 27-4-1937 exhibit E/1. From exhibit 2 it appears that the mortgagor undertook to pay the entire amount within the specified time failing which "as per procedures of the Seraikella State after depositing the rents in the State the mortgagee would be entitled to have the land Prajali". By exhibit-E/1 order was passed for mutation of the mortgaged land as per procedure. From exhibit 2 it appears that the mortgagor undertook to pay the entire amount within the specified time failing which "as per procedures of the Seraikella State after depositing the rents in the State the mortgagee would be entitled to have the land Prajali". By exhibit-E/1 order was passed for mutation of the mortgaged land as per procedure. To my mind by reading both the exhibits together it must be held that the mutation was done for the purpose of collection of rents only and not for creating title in favour of the mortgagee. My conclusion is fortified by sec. 5 (3) of the Record of Rights Act the relevant portion of which is as follows:- "In the case of private sale of a raiyati holding or any portion thereof, the other conditions being the same, the right to purchase shall remain with the relatives of the raiyat concerned, then with the raiyats of the village, and then with any raiyat of the State." This section, therefore, prohibits the sale of rayati holding or any portion thereof to a Raiyat other than with the relatives of the raiyat concerned if such relatives were available. Here the admitted facts are that the land in suit was the ancestral land of the appellants and respondents Nos. 3 and 4; therefore, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are relatives of the appellants. It must, therefore, be held that by mutation no title was created in favour of the mortgagee. 14 Further, Exhibit-2 was executed after obtaining sanction from the Ruling Chief as provided in the Record of Rights Act. No sanction for sale of the lands was obtained by the mortgagee from the Ruling Chief in terms of the provisions of Record of Rights Act. Again, Sec. 5 (2) of the Record of Rights Act provides that all transactions must be effected by a registered instrument. From Exhibit-E/1 it appears that the mutation was allowed as per terms of the deed. No evidence has been brought on the record to show that for the purpose of sale of the lands any sanction of the Ruling Chief was obtained or that the transfer was made by a registered document. From Exhibit-E/1 it appears that the mutation was allowed as per terms of the deed. No evidence has been brought on the record to show that for the purpose of sale of the lands any sanction of the Ruling Chief was obtained or that the transfer was made by a registered document. According to the provisions of Record of Rights Act if no sanction of the Ruling Chief was obtained or if the document was not registered no Court in exercise of Civil, Criminal or Revisional Jurisdiction shall recognise such transfer as valid. For the reasons aforesaid it must be held that by the mutation of the name of the mortgagee he did not become the absolute owner of the property. 15. For the reasons aforesaid it must be held that in 1933 in Seraikella no rule of law inconsistent with the principles of T.P. Act, C.P.C. and Limitation Act was prevalent. Following the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Gopilal (AIR 1928 All 381) and of other High Courts I am of the opinion that it is safe to apply the principles of the T.P. Act, C.P.C. and the Limitation Act to this case. 16. Mr. Roy did not contest the legal position that even if the mortgagee is recorded in the record of rights as raiyat he cannot acquire title by adverse possession. It has not been contended that the suit has not been filed within the period of limitation prescribed. It must, therefore, be held that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are the mortgagees and the appellants are entitled to redeem the mortgage. 17. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. According to my findings above, the appellants are entitled to a decree for redemption and not in the terms prayed for by them. It is, therefore, ordered, that the account be taken of what was due to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 at the date when the trial Court passed the decree for principal and interest, if any, on the mortgage and if the appellants pay into Court the amount that may be found due within six months from the date the Court settles the amount due, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 at the date when the trial Court passed the decree for principal and interest, if any, on the mortgage and if the appellants pay into Court the amount that may be found due within six months from the date the Court settles the amount due, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall deliver to the appellants or to such persons they may appoint all documents in their favour or power relating to the mortgaged property and shall re-transfer the property to the appellants at their cost free from mortgage and all incumbrances if any created by respondents Nos. 1 and 2, and shall also put the appellants in possession of the property. If the appellants fail to pay the amount found due within such time as fixed hereinabove or within the extended time, which the trial Court may do in terms of Order 34 Rule 2 of the C. P.C. as the appellants are members of the Scheduled Tribe the amount due may be recovered by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 by praying for appointment of a receiver with regard to the produce of the land, for the purpose of appropriating the produce on terms as the trial Court may decide for liquidating the amount found due and payable by the appellants. If after accounting the trial Court finds that nothing was due from the appellants or that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have been overpaid then the trial Court shall pass a final decree in terms of Order 34 Rule 9 of the Code. The parties shall bear their own costs throughout. UMESH CHANDRA SHARMA, J. 18 I agree.