JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition directed against an order of eviction under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act, 1972 as modified in appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The order relates to a residential accommodation in the city of Lucknow. Originally the petitioner's father was tenant in the premises of respondent-landlord. The father of the petitioner owned two houses, one in Ashok Marg, Lucknow and another at Allahabad. Earlier proceedings initiated by the respondent for the eviction of the petitioner's father were unsuccessful, the last such proceedings being in April, 1972. Subsequently, the father of the petitioner died and the present application was filed in April, 1977. The Prescribed Authority ordered release of part of the accommodation. Against that order both parties filed appeals and the learned Additional District Judge has allowed the appeal of the landlord and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and has, thus, released the entire house in favour of the respondent. It appears from the appellate order that it was conceded before the learned Additional District Judge by the parties counsel that the nature of the accommodation was such that it could be released either as a whole or not at all that it could not be released in part. The petitioner has controverted this assertion about concession of parties counsel as recorded in the appellate judgment. No affidavit of the petitioner's counsel who argued. The appeal was, however, given and in the circumstances there would be no justification for disbelieving the recital in the judgment of the Additional District Judge. 2. The case of the petitioner in the written statement filed before the Prescribed Authority was that the respondent had been living in a portion of his Bhojnalaya situated near Darulsafa, Lucknow. Admittedly that Bhojhalaya was demolished by the Government during the pendency of the appeal and this fact was brought to the notice of the appellate Court. The petitioner's contention, however, was that after demolition of that Bhohnalaya the respondent had shifted to a certain house in Maha Nagar where he was living in his own right. Admittedly that Bhojhalaya was demolished by the Government during the pendency of the appeal and this fact was brought to the notice of the appellate Court. The petitioner's contention, however, was that after demolition of that Bhohnalaya the respondent had shifted to a certain house in Maha Nagar where he was living in his own right. It was not disputed before the appellate Court that the house in Maha Nagar stood in the name of one G.S. Verma who was described by the petitioner as respondent's brother but who was, according to the respondents counsel, his first cousin. The contention of the petitioner that the house has been purchased by the respondent Benami in the name of Sri G.s. Verma, was however, not supported by any evidence whatsoever and could not, therefore, be entertained. 3. The other contention of the petitioner was that the respondent could live in a part of his other Bhojnalaya situated in Hazraiganj. The finding of the appellate Court is that the said Bhojnalaya was owned by a firm of which respondent was a partner. Moreover, it could not be expected that the landlord will be required to live in a room in a Bhojnalaya instead of shifting to a residential house belonging to himself. Likewise the fact that the landlord has made some temporary arrangement in his brother's or cousion's house after demolition of the Darulsafa Bhojnalya, cannot imply that the landlord should not shift to his own house. He could not live in the Maha Nagar house as of right but could continue to live there only by way of sufferance of his brother or cousion. 4. The learned Additional District Judge has referred to the circumstances of the petitioner and has taken a view that it will not be difficult for him to secure alternative accommodation on rent even if the house of the later father in Ashok Marg be not taken into account. It appears that petitioner's father had made a testamentary disposition of the house in Ashok Marg in favour of the petitioner's other brothers, while the petitioner was given a house in Allahabad. 5. The judgment of the appellate Court is based on an appraisal of evidence. The findings of fact on personal need and on comparison of hardships do not suffer from any manifest error. 5. The judgment of the appellate Court is based on an appraisal of evidence. The findings of fact on personal need and on comparison of hardships do not suffer from any manifest error. In view of the concession recorded by the appellate Court it cannot be said that the respondent's need would be satisfied by release of part of the accommodation. It is true that the nephew and nephew's wife and children would not be members of the respondent's "family" as defined in the Act but the respondent being a bachelor there is nothing unusual about his taking other close relatives to live with himself for his company and comfort. Their living with him is part of his own personal need. 6. The entire controversy is, thus concluded by findings of fact which do not call for interference. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, stated that the petitioner's daughter is going to be married in a few months and that the petitioner may be granted sufficient time for vacating the premises. 8. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed without any order as to costs. As prayed by the petitioner he is granted nine month's time to vacate the premises on condition that the petitioner files in Court an undertaking on affidavit within two weeks to the effect that he will vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession to the respondent No. 3 on the expiry of the time granted and that during this period he will not transfer possession to any one and that he will pay rent of damages for use and occupation regularly to the respondent during this period. In case either the undertaking is not furnished within two weeks or any of these conditions is breached the petitioner shall be liable to be evicted forthwith in execution of the order of the Additional District Judge.