JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal has been preferred by the defendants against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Nagaur dated December 2, 1971 reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, Nagaur and arises out of a suit for ejectment of the defendants from a shop situated in the town of Nagaur on the ground of reasonable and bona fide personal necessity of the plaintiffs for the suit shop. The trial court held that the plaintiff was unable to establish his reasonable and bona fide necessity for the shop in dispute, while the first appellate court reversing the finding arrived at by the trial court held that the personal necessity of the plaintiff-landlord was proved and passed a decree for ejectment. 2. During the pendency of the second appeal in this court an additional issue in respect of comparative hardship was framed by this Court by its order dated April 25, 1979, and the same was remitted to the first appellate court for trial. The Civil Judge, Nagaur has sent the record back to this Court along with the evidence of both the parties recorded by him in respect of the additional issue regarding comparative hardship and has also sent his finding dated September 26, 1980 in respect of the said additional issue. According to the finding arrived at by the first appellate court greater hardship would be caused in the present case by passing a decree for ejectment than by refusing to pass it. After the receipt of the finding of the first appellate court regarding the additional issue, the appeal has now been listed for hearing. 3. The plaintiffs, case in respect of their bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises was that Manak Chand plaintiff carried on cloth business in the shop in dispute for about 16 years but then he had gone out and now that he was not keeping good health he wanted to return and reside at Nagaur and that his son Pannalal would do 'sarrafa' and cloth business, for which the shop in dispute was required. The defendants resisted the plaintiffs' claim in respect of the alleged requirement for the suit shop and asserted that the plaintiff Pannalal was already carrying on 'kirana' business in a rented shop in Mohan Market and further that there is a shop belonging to the plaintiffs available for use by them under the house of Ratanlal in 'Danti Bazar'. Thus according to the defendants the alleged requirement of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit shop was neither reasonable nor bona fide, but the intention of the plaintiffs was merely to raise the rent. The original plaintiff Manakchand expired during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were brought on the record. After a trial, as mentioned earlier, the trial court dismissed the suit while the first appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. 4. So far as the question of reasonable and bona fide personal necessity of the plaintiff for the suit premises is concerned, the case of the plaintiffs is that Manakchand plaintiff had carried on cloth business in the shop in dispute for about 16 years. Thereafter he went away to Calcutta but afterwards as his health deteriorated he desired to come back to Nagaur and the shop in dispute was required by him for the use and occupation of his son Pannalal, who was to carry on cloth and 'sarrafa' business in the said shop. It is admitted by both the parties that after waiting for some time, Pannalal son of Manakchand plaintiff took a shop on rent which is situated in Mohan Market and in which he started his 'kirana' business. Thus according to the plaintiffs, their business was carried on in a rented shop in Mohan Market, which according to them was not suitable for carrying on business in cloth and as such the plaintiffs required the suit shop for starting their cloth business. The first appellate court has found that plaintiff required the shop for carrying on their cloth business, as they wanted to close the 'kirana' business which was run in a rented shop in Mohan Market. The finding of the first appellate court in this respect is not seriously challenged before me. The first appellate court has found that plaintiff required the shop for carrying on their cloth business, as they wanted to close the 'kirana' business which was run in a rented shop in Mohan Market. The finding of the first appellate court in this respect is not seriously challenged before me. However, after the amendment of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), and the introduction of sub- section (2) of Section 14 in the Act an additional issue about comparative hardship was framed by this Court and was remitted to the first appellate court for trial. The learned Civil Judge, Nagaur by his order dated September 26, 1980, while deciding the additional issue remitted to him, has held that the defendant would suffer greater hardship if a decree for ejectment is passed against him than the plaintiff would suffer, if the court refused to pass a decree for ejectment. 5. Learned counsel for the parties strenuously advanced their arguments in respect of the question of comparative hardship. The first appellate court has given two reasons for its conclusion. In the first place it has been held that the plaintiffs are in possession of a shop below the house occupied by Ratanlal in Danti Bazar, which is used as a 'Bethak' by them, but the said shop could be utilised by the plaintiffs for their cloth business. The other reason which prevailed with the first appellate court was that the plaintiff Pannalal was already carrying on his 'kirana' business at present in a rented shop situated in Mohan Market, and the very same shop could be utilised for starting cloth business, if the plaintiffs intended to close their 'kirana' business and start a new cloth business. 6. Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that although there is a 'Bethak' under the house of Ratanlal, but the same is not a shop and it is a room meant for sitting purposes, which could not be utilised by the plaintiffs as a shop. His further submission is that in Danti Bazar there were no other cloth shops and the said Bazar was not fit for starting a cloth business. As regards the other shop in Mohan Market on which the 'kirana' business was carried on by Pannalal plaintiff, learned counsel Mr. His further submission is that in Danti Bazar there were no other cloth shops and the said Bazar was not fit for starting a cloth business. As regards the other shop in Mohan Market on which the 'kirana' business was carried on by Pannalal plaintiff, learned counsel Mr. Bhandari argued that it was much smaller in size than the disputed shop and that Sadar Bazar where the disputed shop is situated, is the main cloth market and there could be no impediment in the plaintiffs' starting their cloth business in the best locality where the plaintiffs' own a shop, which is in the occupation of the defendant at present. On the other hand, Mr. Hastimal, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant argued that there were two rooms available with the plaintiff in Danti Bazar, one is under his own residential house and the other under the house in occupation of Ratanlal and which is utilised as a 'Bethak', but the same could very well be used as a shop. He also urged that the shop situated in Mohan Market, which was already on rent with the plaintiffs, was not smaller than the disputed shop and that the first appellate court was right in holding that the cloth business could be carried on by the plaintiff's on that shop. 7. When the plaintiff filed the suit for ejectment of the defendant on the basis of bona fide and reasonable personal necessity of the suit shop for starting cloth and 'sarrafa' business, defendant Chanchal Mal in his written statement had taken the plea that the plaintiff had no bona fide requirement for the suit shop as the plaintiffs had a shop available with them, opposite the shop of Sohan Singh Dhanraj which was lying vacant. It was also mentioned in the written statement that there was another shop of the plaintiffs situated in Dhan Mandi, and the plaintiffs allowed the tenant in that shop to continue after getting the rent enhanced some time ago. The original plaintiff Manakchand, when he was examined as a witness in the suit on September 12, 1966 admitted in his cross-examination that under the house of Ratanlal Dhiraj Kumar he had a "shop" which was used as a sitting room, but he stated that in Danti Bazar there was not a single cloth shop. The original plaintiff Manakchand, when he was examined as a witness in the suit on September 12, 1966 admitted in his cross-examination that under the house of Ratanlal Dhiraj Kumar he had a "shop" which was used as a sitting room, but he stated that in Danti Bazar there was not a single cloth shop. When plaintiff Pannalal was examined, after the additional issue was framed regarding comparative hardship, he admitted that there are two adjoining houses, one was the residential house of the plaintiffs and the other was the residential house of their uncle, Ratanlal. On the ground floor of the residential house of the plaintiffs there was a room with two doors which was used for storing articles. This room has been described by him in his statement some times as 'Ghar' then as 'Makan', then as a 'kamra'. The plaintiff Pannalal further admitted in his cross-examination that in the ground-floor of the house occupied by Ratanlal there is the plaintiffs' 'Bethak' which has also two doors opening towards the market. P.W. 2 Jeevraj has described the room under the residential house of the plaintiff's as a 'Tahkhana' and has further stated that under Ratanlal's house the plaintiffs have a 'Bethak' which was not a shop, but he admitted that the said 'Bethak' could be used for carrying on business. Chanchal Mal has again reiterated his earlier stand and has stated that there is one shop below the house Ratanlal which has got two doors opening towards the main market in which the cloth of sarrafa' business could be carried on. According to him there is another shop below the residential house of the plaintiffs which has also two doors. Mangalchand, who has been examined as a witness on behalf of the defendant, has stated that he carried on cloth businesss on the shop of the plaintiffs situated in Danti Bazar below the house of Ratanlal, under the name of'Hulash Mal Mangalchand for about 11/4 or 11/2 years and there after he went away to Calcutta. The statement of witness Mangal Chand has been severely criticised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents on the ground that he disclaimed any relationship with the defendant, but Kishoremal son of defendant Chanchalmal has admitted that Mangal Chand was the husband of Chanchalmal's sister's daughter and was thus closely related to the defendant. The statement of witness Mangal Chand has been severely criticised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents on the ground that he disclaimed any relationship with the defendant, but Kishoremal son of defendant Chanchalmal has admitted that Mangal Chand was the husband of Chanchalmal's sister's daughter and was thus closely related to the defendant. Even if the statement cut of Mangal Chard is ignored on the ground of his close relationship with the defendant and if the statement of Manak Chand recorded earlier in the suit and the statements of Pannalal and Jeevraj, recorded after the additional issue was remitted are accepted then also it is apparent that the plaintiffs are the owners of an apartment situated on the ground floor of the residential house of Ratanlal, which is being utilised by them at present as a sitting room, but it has got two doors opening on the main market of Dhanti Bazar and the same could very well be utilised as a shop by them. Manak Chand original plaintiff described the said apartment as a 'shop'. Thus the first appellate court was right in holding that there is another shop available with the plaintiffs below the house of Ratanlal. However, the aspect that the said shop was not suitable for carrying on cloth business as there were no other cloth shops in Danti Bazar has not been properly considered by the first appellate court. 8. As regards the Dhan Mandi shop, there is not much dispute as the same is in possession of a tenant and it might be that as the plaintiffs instead of getting it vacated got the rent thereof enhanced. 9. However, so far as the finding arrived at by the first appellate court that the shop, situated in Mohan Market, in which the plaintiff Pannalal is carrying on his 'kirana' business could be utilised by him for carrying on his cloth business, in case he desired to close his 'kirana' business and start a new cloth business, cannot be assailed. It is in evidence that there are many cloth shops in Mohan Market and this fact has been admitted by Pannalal himself in the witness-box and has not been refuted on behalf of the plaintiffs. It is in evidence that there are many cloth shops in Mohan Market and this fact has been admitted by Pannalal himself in the witness-box and has not been refuted on behalf of the plaintiffs. Although the plaintiff has stated that the rented shop is smaller in size than the shop in dispute, but the defendant Chanchalmal has asserted that the shop on rent with the plaintiffs in Mohan Market is bigger in size than the shop in dispute. Both parties have not furnished the dimensions of the two shops and as such even if there is some slight difference in the dimensions of the two shops, yet it cannot be held that the shop which is already on rent with the plaintiffs and is situated in Mohan Market is unsuitable for the plaintiffs in carrying on their cloth business in that shop, if they desired to do so. The plaintiffs had filed the suit in the year 1965 and thereafter they took the shop in Mohan Market on rent. It cannot be under-stood as to why they did not start their cloth business on that shop, but instead thereof 'kirana' business on the newly rented shop, which according to plaintiff Panna Lal, he does not want to continue. The Mohan Market shop in on rent with the plaintiffs for Rs. 35/- per month, while the defendant is paying Rs. 50/- per month as rent to the plaintiffs for the dispured shop. In my view, the lower appellate court is right in holding that the Mohan Market shop could very well be utilised by the plaintiffs for carrying on their cloth business, if they at all intend to start such a new business, as it is in evidence that cloth on in Mohan Market. 10. Now if a decree for eviction is passed, in these circumstances, the result would be that the defendant would be left without a shop and would have to close down his cloth business. But in case the court refuses to pass a decree for eviction, the plaintiffs can still start their new cloth business on the rented shop in Mohan Market, as they do not want to continue the 'kirana' business any longer. But in case the court refuses to pass a decree for eviction, the plaintiffs can still start their new cloth business on the rented shop in Mohan Market, as they do not want to continue the 'kirana' business any longer. According to the plaintiffs themselves, the 'kirana' business was started by them merely as a stop gap arrangement, while they really wanted to do cloth business fail to find any impediment in the plaintiff's starting their cloth business in the Mohan Market shop, which is on rent with the plaintiffs. Thus comparative hardship is certainly in favour of the defendant, as he would be left without business premises at all, if the decree for eviction is passed, while the plaintiffs can carry on their cloth business, though on the rented shop, but without any difficulty I, therefore, partly uphold the finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge, Nagaur on September 26, 1980 in respect of the issue of comparative hardship. 11. In view of the finding that greater hardship would be caused to the defendant by passing the decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it, this court has no alternative but to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit, in accordance with the provisions of section 14(2) of the Act. The mandate of law is that a decree for eviction cannot be passed if the tenant is to suffer greater hardship by passing the decree than the plaintiff landlords would suffer by refusing to pass such a decree. It would be in consonance with the mandate of the provisions of section 14(2) of the Act that this Court should decline to pass a decree for eviction in the present case. 12. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the first appellate court dated December 2, 1972 is set aside and the decree passed by the trial court dated August 31, 1970 is restored and the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs in all the courts.Appeal allowed. *******