JUDGMENT B.K. Misra, Member - This is a revision preferred by Suresh s/o Rameshwar Dayal, against the orders passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Bareilly Division, and Sub-Divisional Officer, Moradabad, rejecting his application for mutation of plot Nos. 36-Aa, 36-Ba and plot No. 190. The learned counsel for the revisionist said that no revision is being pressed in respect of plot No. 190. 2. The facts as narrated by the learned counsel for the revisionist are that on July 3, 1972 the opposite party in the instant revision executed a registered sale-deed in favour of Suresh, minor at that time, for Rs. 5,000/- transferring plot Nos. 36-Aa, 36-Ba and plot No. 190. The revisionist moved an application for mutation on October 151, 1977. The application was rejected by the Naib Tahsildar in respect of plot No. 190 and allowed in respect of plot Nos. 36-Aa and 36-Ba. The opposite party to the revision as vendor had objected to the mutation on ground that an earlier application for mutation had been rejected on April 20, 1974. The learned S.D.O. sitting in appeal over the Naib Tahsidar's order dated April 13, 1973 rejected the mutation application in to, holding that in view of the previous application having been rejected, a fresh application would not lie. He relied upon the views expressed in Kailash Nath Awasthi v. Ram Pal, 1977 R.D. 149. The learned Additional Commissioner also rejected the revision filed by the revisionist on the same ground. 3. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued that the two courts below have erred in holding that a second mutation application would not lie. He cited Kubra Begum v. Salig Ram, 1940 R.D. 254 as well as A.N. Singh v. Smt. Deoki Devi, 1978 R.D. 270 in support of his arguments. It was held in Kubra Begum v. Salig Ram, 1940 R.D. 254 that when a first application is dismissed on the ground that there has been no delivery of possession then in view of the provisions of Section 34(2) and (3) of L.R. Act such dismissal is no bar to the making of a second application after possession has been secured. The principle enunciated in 1941 R.D. 1086 is that a fresh mutation application would be filed where the previous application was dismissed, provided the Second application is based on a different cause of action. The principle enunciated in 1941 R.D. 1086 is that a fresh mutation application would be filed where the previous application was dismissed, provided the Second application is based on a different cause of action. In the case of A.N. Singh v. Smt. Deoki Devi, 1978 R.D. 270 the view taken was that since the earlier application had been filed by ore Pan Singh and the trial court had taken the view that Pan Singh had no legal locus-standi to move the mutation application the second mutation application was maintainable. 4. The cases so cited by the learned counsel only refer to certain circumstances in which the second mutation application may lie. These circumstances provide a fresh cause of action. The learned counsel first of all tried to show that circumstances existed to justify the second mutation application, and secondly, apparently seeking support of the ruling in 1978 R.D. he wanted to establish that it had not been proved that the previous application was moved by the revisionist. 5. The sale-deed which has been brought on the record was before the learned Naib Tahsildar when he rejected the mutation application on April 13, 1978. The application for mutation was moved by Rameshwer Dayal. The recital in the sale-deed shows that transfer was in respect of Suresh, the revisionist before this Court, who was a minor and was the son if Rameshwar Dayal. In the instant proceedings, the learned counsel for the revisionist said that the opposite party adduced no evidence but produced only a certified copy of the original application and the Naib Tahsildar's order. If he had any doubt about that applications could have challenged it and summoned the original file and led such evidence as were available with him to prove that the application was not moved by any body who could legally proceed in the matter on behalf of Suresh. Therefore, this argument does not help the revisionist. 6. As regards the question of plot No. 36, which has been referred to in the application moved earlier it had at no stage been urged in the present proceeding that its identity was different from the land in respect of which mutation was now being sought. Therefore, this argument does not help the revisionist. 6. As regards the question of plot No. 36, which has been referred to in the application moved earlier it had at no stage been urged in the present proceeding that its identity was different from the land in respect of which mutation was now being sought. The matter relates to the same village and there could not be different plots bearing the same number so that when the earlier application mentioning plot No. 36 was moved in spite of the facts that the sale-deed referred to plot Nos. 36Aa and 30Ba, the applicant who had the sale-deed with him would not be said to have committed a clerical error. It was a deliberate act and the mutation application was made in respect of the same area as would be apparent by the fact that if the area of plots 36-Aa and 63-Ba is added, we get the total area of 1.11 acres which is mentioned in the previous mutation application as the area of plot No. 36. Therefore, it cannot be said that a fresh cause of action has accrued to the revisionist. Secondly, it has also to be considered that the order of the Naib Tahsildar dated April 20, 1974 had not been challenged in any competent court and that decision has become final. The argument of the learned counsel that if the sale-deed is hit by the provision of 168-A U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, penal consequence should have ensued, has no relevance in the present proceedings. Another point raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the opposite party having transferred the land by a transaction which is hit by Section 168, his rights extinguished and there cannot be a vacuum in the records, and therefore, the rightful owner's name should be entered. It is difficult to draw any inference because who is the rightful owner is. Since this court is not deciding a declaratory suit, the entries which stand in the record will continue to stand till they are corrected. As such, whether or not this transaction is hit by Section 168-A is different subject matter on which no order can be passed in the present revision. But the claim of the revisionist to be allowed to move the second mutation application cannot be upheld. 7. The revision is dismissed accordingly.