JUDGMENT - D.B. DESHPANDE, J.:---These are three different appeals preferred by three different defendants against the three judgments and decrees passed against them by the City Civil Court of Bombay in three different short cause suits on its file and they relate to three different rooms of the same premises know as Virji Peraj Bhatia Sanitorium situated at Jayantilal Vaishnav Road, Ghatkopar, Bombay 77 and they arise out of the following facts. 2. Short Cause Suit No. 7293 of 1974 is filed by the trustees against Sunderdas Karsondas Ved who has filed First Appeal No. 148 of 1980. Short Cause Suit No. 7294 of 1973 is filed by the Trustees against Jamkurbai Gopaldas Sawli, who has filed First Appeal No. 149 of 1980 and Short Cause Suit No. 7292 of 1973 is filed by the Trustees against Bhanji Haridas Joshi, who has filed First Appeal No. 150 of 1980 and with the consent of the parties evidence was recorded in the trial Court only in the last mentioned Suit No. 7292 of 1974 and on the basis of evidence of recorded in this suit all the three suits are decided by the trial Court. 3. Bhanji was occupying Room No. 16 whereas Smt. Jankurbai was occupying Room No. 8 and Sunderdas was occupying Room No. 13. Admittedly all these there persons were occupying these three rooms right from the year 1953. The plaintiffs alleged that these three different persons were inducted in these rooms as licencees with the leave and licence of the then trustees of the aforesaid sanitorium only for a period of two months from the date of their agreements. They alleged further that some time in the year 1955 there were disputes amongst the trustees regarding the management of the Trust property and therefore proceedings were taken in the Court after the sanction of the Charity Commissioner for that purpose. These proceedings went on, according to them till 1972 and in the meanwhile a Court Receiver was also appointed for the property. 4. The plaintiff therefore alleged that in view of these litigations the trustees were not able to administer the trust property and that is how all these three defendants continued to remain in occupation of the rooms in their possession. 4. The plaintiff therefore alleged that in view of these litigations the trustees were not able to administer the trust property and that is how all these three defendants continued to remain in occupation of the rooms in their possession. Some time in the year 1973 the Court Receiver handed over possession of the properties to the new Trustees and thereafter the Trustees revoked the licences of the three defendants and asked the defendants to vacate and hand over possession of the rooms to the Trustees. Inspite of the revocation of the licence the defendants did not vacate the rooms and did not hand over vacant possession of the rooms as demanded by the notice and hence the trustees filed three different suits against these three defendants for possession of the rooms and for mesne profits etc., as detailed in the plaint. 5. The three defendants by filing three practically identical written statements in these three suits resisted the plaintiffs claim on several grounds. In the decision of these appeals I do not intend to deal with all the grounds on which the suits were resisted the plaintiffs claim on several the grounds on which the suits were resisted in the trial Court by these there defendants. In these three appeals before me the suits are resisted only on two grounds. The first ground is that each of these defendants was not a licence of the room but was a tenant of the room and the second contention is that in view of the revocation of the licence and in view of section 15-A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, the licences having continued on 1-2-1973 it must be deemed that the licensees have attained the status of a tenant, and hence it will be sufficient to say that the defendants resisted the plaintiffs suit in the trial Court mainly on these two grounds and, therefore, the other grounds need not be stated here as they are not raised before me. 6. As already stated the oral evidence was led in Suit No. 7292 of 1974 and the documents also were produced. After considering the entire evidence the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay rejected all the contentions raised by the defendants. 6. As already stated the oral evidence was led in Suit No. 7292 of 1974 and the documents also were produced. After considering the entire evidence the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay rejected all the contentions raised by the defendants. He held that the defendants were not the tenants and that they were not deemed tenants also in view of section 15-A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates (Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act). The trial Court, therefore, held that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the room sand consequently the trial Court passed a decree in favour of plaintiff in all the three suits in terms of prayers (a) and (b) in the plaint, and further orders regarding the enquiry into the future mesne profits etc., were also passed. Once common judgment was written in this Suit No. 7292 of 1972. However, the trial Court granted to the defendants 6 months time to deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved by this decision these three defendants have preferred these three different appeals and that is why they are heard together and are disposed of by a common judgment. 7. The first question that arises for my consideration in these three appeals is whether the defendants were inducted in the rooms as tenants as contended by the defendants or whether the defendants were inducted as licensees as contended by the plaintiffs. Now the plaintiffs have come to the Court saying that the defendants are their licensees and hence normally the burden would lie upon the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants are their licensees. By way of rebuttal the defendants can prove that they are tenants. 8. In order to prove that the defendants are licensees the plaintiffs have examined Karsandas plaintiffs No. 1 who is one of the trustees. He stated that he had given Room No. 16 to Bhanji as a licensee under the provisions of the Trust, and he produced the agreement dated 1-8-1953 which is signed by the defendant. Similar rooms are given to the other defendants and exactly identical agreements are signed by those two defendants also. Now these agreements are annexed to the plaint as Exhibit "A". Similar rooms are given to the other defendants and exactly identical agreements are signed by those two defendants also. Now these agreements are annexed to the plaint as Exhibit "A". The original agreement is in Gujarathi, and the translation thereof is filed at pages 43 to 46 in the paper book of First Appeal No. 150 of 1980. Mr. F.P. Kapadia appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent laid great stress on this agreement and he contended that this agreement proves in clear terms that the defendants were inducted in the three different rooms as licensees. Hence it will be worthwhile to refer to this agreement. 9. The agreement is addressed to the Trustees of a Sanitorium known as Virji Peraj Bhatia Sanitorium. It is further mentioned that the Sanitorium is at Ghatkopar and it is further mentioned that the room is taken as a licensee for the change of climate according to the provisions of the trust deed and on the following terms. There are about 24 terms which governs the contract between the parties and most of these terms are vital in determining the nature of the transaction between the parties. As already stated it starts with the word "Licence". It is now an undisputed that the mere nomenclature does not really show the nature of the transaction between the parties but the terms of the document and the intention of the parties have to be ascertained. 10. Now let us turn to Clause 1 of the said agreement. It says that the room will be used only for two months and that is at the compensation of Rs. 20/- per months. It is further mentioned in Clause 2 that the room given to the defendant for use would be under the control and in possession of and supervision of the trustees and the defendant agreed that no exclusive possession of the room was being given to the defendant. It is further stipulated in the same clause that whenever the trustees though proper the trustees would be entitled to remove the defendant from the said room and give him another room in exchange and the defendant thereby agreed and accepted the rights of the trustees to do so. It is further stipulated in the same clause that whenever the trustees though proper the trustees would be entitled to remove the defendant from the said room and give him another room in exchange and the defendant thereby agreed and accepted the rights of the trustees to do so. The Third Clause states that the defendant would vacate the room after the expiry of two months and if he did not vacate, the trustees would have a right to throw out his belongings front he said room and the defendant agreed and accepted the rights of the trustees to do so. The defendant further undertook not to come in the way of the trustees doing so. The Fourth Clause is also important. It shows that the defendant shall not lock up the said room given to the defendant and go out of Bombay. One of the conditions in the 5th clause is that the defendant would not pound anything in the said room. Clause No. 6 authorises the trustees to enter the room at any time and inspect it. Clause Seven also authorises the trustees to keep their cupboards, chairs or any other belongings as they liked and to make use of them and the defendant undertook to give all the facilities to the trustees for that purpose. This clause further authorised the trustees to hold meetings in the respective defendants rooms. Clause No. 8 forbids the defendants from sleeping in the passage. Clause No. 10 stated that boys and girls and children would not commit any nuisance or cause any damage to any property of the compound. Clause No. 11 forbids the defendant from keeping the dogs etc. Clause No. 12 forbids the defendant from allowing anyone else to use the said room and if the defendant did so the trustees were entitled to get the defendants vacated. Clause 14 enjoins upon the defendant to agree to remove any person in occupation of the room suffering from mental trouble or infectious disease. Clause 15 forbids the defendant from washing clothes or cleaning utensils and clause 16 and 17 give some more details of washing of clothes etc., Clause No. 18 stated that the defendant agreed that no accommodation is being given in the Sanitorium to the terms of the trust, to the members other than those of Bhatia Caste and Pushkharana Brahim caste. Clause 19 is also important. Clause 19 is also important. It states that if any visitors come to the said room it would be at the discretion of the trustees to permit them or not and if Trustees did not want them the defendant should stop them coming to the respective rooms. Under Clause 20 permission was given to the Trustees to increase the compensation amount for occupation of the said room even. Clause 21 stated that the trustees were giving the defendant one lock and key of the said room and keeping the other lock and key of the said room with the trustees and if the trustees wanted to make use of that room they should do so with the other lock with them and the defendant would not put any other lock on the said room. Last clause states that the defendant has signed after reading all the terms and conditions. These are all the material and conditions under which the respective defendants were inducted in the rooms in their possession. 11. Mere long possession would not change the nature or character of possession of the defendant. It is apparent that due to the inter se dispute amongst the trustees no action could be taken against the defendants. In view of these terms and conditions Mr. Kapadia urged that they disclose nothing else but a licence and according to him these terms and conditions are clearly against the theory of a lease. Whereas Mr. Sampat, appearing for the appellants urged that possession of the room was given in 1953 as per the agreement. According to him all the terms and conditions in the agreement regarding the control of the trustees etc., are a colourable pretext and a camouflage. He urged that there was no evidence about the implementation of the terms of the agreement and he led streets on the fact that there was an exclusive user by the defendant and there was a payment of a fixed sum all the while. He further urged that the receiver could obtain possession and hence in view of all these submissions according to him a tenancy was created and, therefore, the defendants are tenants. 12. In this respect Mr. Kapadia placed reliance upon some rulings. The first one is (Ramjibhai Virpal Shah v. Gordhandas Mangala Bhagat)1, 56 Bom.L.R. 365. He further urged that the receiver could obtain possession and hence in view of all these submissions according to him a tenancy was created and, therefore, the defendants are tenants. 12. In this respect Mr. Kapadia placed reliance upon some rulings. The first one is (Ramjibhai Virpal Shah v. Gordhandas Mangala Bhagat)1, 56 Bom.L.R. 365. Upon which the trial Court also had placed reliance and has reproduced the material portion from the ruling. The lower Court has considered the effect of this ruling and I need not repeat the same. I may only state that I am in agreement with the observation. Mr. Kapadia placed reliance on three other unreported rulings of this Court (1) (A.N. Chattely v. Motibai Charity Trust)2, in Special Civil Application No. 2587 of 1973 decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 10th March, 1978. Mr. Sampat was right when he invited my attention to the fact that the claim in which the writ petition was allowed squarely fell within the ambit of section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act and hence whatever observations are made in this ruling are in consideration of the provisions of section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act and they would not apply to the facts of the present case. The second ruling is in (Narayandas Pranjivan Ashar v. Lalji Dharmsey and others)3, in Special Civil Application No. 1021 of 1977 also decided by another learned Single Judge of this Court of December 13, 1977. That case also arose out of a Trust property known as "Seth Khatau Morarji Trust". That was also used for Bhatia community members to which the Settler of the turns himself belonged. Similar terms and conditions were prevailing in the matter of grant of properties, in that case by the trustees to the other persons and, over and, above, the word "rent" was used therein. Even then this Court held that it was a case of licence and not a lease as contended by the defendant therein. There also the possession was for a long time. The last ruling is (Rustom Burjori Aga v. Sir Cowasji Jahangir Bart and others)4, Appeal No. 555 of 1958 from original decree also decided by another learned Single Judge of this Court on 23rd March, 1961. That was also an appeal against the decision of the City Civil Court at Bombay. There also the possession was for a long time. The last ruling is (Rustom Burjori Aga v. Sir Cowasji Jahangir Bart and others)4, Appeal No. 555 of 1958 from original decree also decided by another learned Single Judge of this Court on 23rd March, 1961. That was also an appeal against the decision of the City Civil Court at Bombay. That was also a trust property as in the instant case and the dispute was whether the person inducted was a tenant or licensee. The person inducted claimed that he was a tenant and that not a licensee. That was also a trust for the benefit of the Bombay Pari Community. In this ruling settlor was authorised to nominate two persons to whom the trustees were to let out the property and, although a resolution was passed by the trustees that the property should be let out to the defendant, at the time when the actual person was inducted a document of the similar nature of the one in the present case was sent to the defendant therein for signature and the defendant signed that agreement before occupying the premises. It was held by this Court in view of the circumstances prevailing that it must be held that it was a case of licence rather than lease and this ruling, therefore, supports the contention raised by Mr. Kapadia. 13. With this background let us turn to the actual evidence on record. I have already referred some evidence of Karsandas P.W. 1. He stated in clear words that there were disputes between the trustees and there could not be any settlement. He applied to the Charity Commissioner in 1957 and that dispute lasted up to 1962 or 1963. A civil suit was filed in 1964 and it was decided in December, 1972 and the Court Receiver handed over possession to the Trustees in March 1963. This explains the delay in taking action against the defendant. He admitted that there was no fresh agreement after the notice dated 12-4-1954 by which the licence was revoked. Then a reference was made to the construction of 5 shops by the Trust. But I do not think that it has got any bearing on the decision of this case. It may be that the shops which have been constructed newly might have been let out for commercial purpose. Then a reference was made to the construction of 5 shops by the Trust. But I do not think that it has got any bearing on the decision of this case. It may be that the shops which have been constructed newly might have been let out for commercial purpose. The only other evidence on record is of defendant in Suit No. 7292 of 1974 and I shall turn to it. According to him he obtained the permission for residence permanently. It is against the written agreement executed and signed by them. He admitted that the signed agreement Exhibit "A" to which have made a detailed reference earlier. He further stated that plaintiff told him that he was to stay there permanently and that he would not be evicted. However, no such contention is raised in the written statement. He admitted that the suit property is the Trust property. He admitted that there was no talk after the notice dated 12-4-1954. He admitted that he can read and write English and he admitted further that the receipt Ex. "C" goes to show that the property is used as "Sanitorium". He admitted that the receipts were issued for compensation and not for rent. According to him he objected to the use of word "compensation" but even then the receipts were issued only by using the word "compensation". In fact he should have started immediate action thereof if at all his version is true. He admitted that he signed the agreement Ex. "A" after reading it and he admitted that he is aware of Clause 21. According to him he signed the agreement because he was informed that it was only a routine agreement and that he need not worry. He denied that when the room was given to him lock and key were also given to him. He admitted that he did not record anywhere that he was told that it was only a routine agreement and that it was no consequence. He admitted that he has nothing besides his bare word to show that it was mere routine agreement. He admitted that at present he is residing in Kurla and that his sons reside in the said room since 1976. He admitted that he was not rescind since 1964 in the said room and his son came to reside there in 1976. He admitted that at present he is residing in Kurla and that his sons reside in the said room since 1976. He admitted that he was not rescind since 1964 in the said room and his son came to reside there in 1976. According to him he obtained water connection and in the last line of his cross-examination he admitted that he does not pay for the water connection also. 14. It will therefore, be seen that he signed the agreement Exhibit "A" after fully reading it and after knowing the contents and in the same manner it can be gathered that the other defendants also did so. The agreement shows that there are several restrictive covenants which are inconsistent with the case of tenancy and which are consistent with the case of licence. The trust deed clearly goes to show that the rooms should be given in the first instance only for a period of 2 months and thereafter there should be renewal only twice for a similar period always. It means that it clearly provide that any person getting in should not be allowed to stay for more than six months. Hence there is no force in the contention that the writing which was taken from the defendant was not implemented or was not to be acted upon. It cannot be said that even the terms are merely colourable or a camouflage. The intention is quite clear and it shows that the room should be given to persons of Bhatia community and that of Pushkarana Brahmins community alone. In view of these facts I am satisfied that it is case of licence only land it is not the case of tenancy and I, therefore reject the contention of the appellants in this case. 15. The only other contention is about the theory of deemed tenancy. According to Mr. Sampat the licence having been revoked by notice and the possession of defendants having been continued on 1-2-1973 when the amended Bombay Rent Act, came into force introducing section 15-A of the Rent Act gave protection to the licence who were in possession on that day. In this respect Shri Sampat invited my attention to the definition of the word licence in the Rent Act. Mr. In this respect Shri Sampat invited my attention to the definition of the word licence in the Rent Act. Mr. Kapadia appearing for the plaintiff urged that the building in the instant case is a Sanitorium and according to him Sanitorium are excluded from the operation of the amended Act. Mr. Sampat urged that mere use of the word Sanitorium would not clench the issue and the mere use of the word Sanitorium does not come in the way of the defendants if the other conditions of the tenancy are proved. At this respect it is clear from the agreement that the agreement relates to the room in the Sanitorium. The defendants have signed this agreement after knowing fully well the contents thereof and not once but twice it is mentioned that this is a Sanitorium. The defendant in his cross-examination admitted that he knew that the property was a Trust property and that he knew further that the suit property was a Sanitorium used for residence only. In view of this clear position the defendants now cannot contended that it is not a sanitorium and they accepted the rooms on the basis that it is a sanitorium and they are bound by this. I have also pointed out from the oral evidence of defendant that the knew that it was a sanitorium and it was not disputed before me that the Sanitoriums are excluded from the amended section 15-A introduced in the Bombay Rent Act. Hence the issue of deemed tenancy also does not stand to reason and this contention also deserves to be rejected. 16. The result is that all the three appeals deserves to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed with costs. 17. All the appellants are given six months time from today to hand over the possession on the conditions that they will not induct any one else in the premises. Appeal dismissed. -----