JUDGMENT : Aggarwal, J. 1. The Appellant, a hand-cart puller, was knocked down or hit from the back side by a police break-down van jeep on 11th March, 1968, at about 5.30 a. m. while he was pushing the hand-cart laden with vegetables alongwith another handcart puller from the rear side and pulled from the front by a third person on its journey from Byculla Vegetable Market towards J. J. Hospital soon after crossing the Byculla Bridge. The Appellant became unconscious immediately and was removed to the J. J. Hospital. He received medical treatment thrice at the J. J. Hospital and once at the Civil Hospital, Lucknow. The medical examination conducted by Dr. B. R. Nayan on 21st February, 1972 showed that the Appellant had suffered 75% permanent disability. Prior to the Appellant knowing the percentage of his disability, he had filed an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Bombay on 13th April, 1968, claiming a sum of Rs. 20,000/-from the State of Maharashtra. 2. The State of Maharashtra by its written statement admitted that the breakdown van jeep was being driven by its driver Shinde while on duty. The other occupant of the van was More a car cleaner. The accident took place at about 5. a.m. on 11.3.1968 when driver Shinde was driving the said vehicle along Sir J. J. Road in the direction of north to south, that is from Byculla Bridge side to J. J. Hospital side, at a moderate speed. When the break-down van was almost opposite the Berkley House, a hand-cart heavily loaded with vegetables was proceeding in the same direction in the centre of the road and the said hand-cart was being pulled in front by one Rambehari Bacha and was being pushed from the rear left side by the Appellant and on the rear right side by one Maruty. As the said driver Shinde started to overtake the said hand-cart at a moderate speed, the said handcart suddenly turned to the right, with the result that the right middle portion of the said hand-cart came in the line of the said break-down van and it dashed against the middle portion of the hand-cart and due to the impact, the hand-cart was pushed ahead, i.e. it turned to its right side and there was a crack in the middle of the right side wooden bar of the hand-cart above the right wheel, and the front left mudguard and the front left spring portion of the break-down van were damaged. The driver Shinde had applied brakes immediately on seeing the hand-cart suddenly turning to the right, but in spite of due diligence and care on his part, the break-down van could not be halted before the impact and it stopped immediately on the spot. As a result of the said impact, the Appellant and Rambehari Bacha sustained injuries. The cleaner More dashed against the windscreen and sustained an abrasion on his right cheek on account of applying the brakes with full force. The injured were taken to the J. J. Hospital where Rambehari and More were treated and allowed to go and the Appellant was admitted. On receipt of information, the police visited the place of impact, traced a witness and drew up a panchanama of the scene of the incident. After due investigation, the police classified the incident as an accident and no case was registered against the driver Shinde. 3. In support of his case, the Appellant examined himself and an eye-witness Shankar Tukaram Sevale and Dr. B. R. Nay an. On behalf of the State of Maharashtra, neither driver Shinde nor cleaner More were examined, but the investigating officer Police Inspector Pathan gave evidence. The Tribunal, on consideration of the evidence, held that the Appellant had failed to prove negligence. As regards compensation, the Tribunal worked out a sum of Rs. 5,000/-on account of financial loss and Rs. 6,000/-on account of pain and sufferings and loss of amenities in life. As, however, the Appellant failed to prove that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver, the Tribunal dismissed the application with no order as to costs. 4. As regards compensation, the Tribunal worked out a sum of Rs. 5,000/-on account of financial loss and Rs. 6,000/-on account of pain and sufferings and loss of amenities in life. As, however, the Appellant failed to prove that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver, the Tribunal dismissed the application with no order as to costs. 4. Shri Kurien, learned advocate appearing for the Appellant, submitted that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the accident had not occurred on account of the negligence of the driver Shinde, and that the amount worked out by the Tribunal is very much on the lower side. The Tribunal totally disregarded the question of interest which it ought to have considered u/s 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 5. The Appellant on his brief evidence has testified that on the day of the accident he was pushing the hand-cart loaded with vegetables and that it was proceeding from Byculla Market to Bhuleshwar via J. J. Hospital. He was behind the hand-cart on the left side, while Maruti was on his right hand side. Both of them were pushing the hand-cart pulled from the front by Rambehari. The hand-cart was about 5 to 6 feet away from the edge of the foot-path. While the hand cart was in front of Berkley House, the police van came from behind and knocked him down. The cross-examination on this point was comparatively more brief than the examination-in-chief. The Appellant admitted that there was ample space on his right hand side as well as on his left hand side for the jeep to pass, but he could not give the length of the open road on either side He could not say in which direction the hand-cart was pushed after the impact. The Appellant first admitted that the hand-cart was damaged but later did not stick to that statement and stated that he had not seen the hand-cart after the accident. There was heavy traffic on the road. He denied that the police van was passing on his right hand side. He further denied that the hand-cart was suddenly turned to the right side. Now there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the Appellant about the manner in which the hand-cart was being driven and that he was on the left rear side and that he was pushing the hand-cart. He further denied that the hand-cart was suddenly turned to the right side. Now there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the Appellant about the manner in which the hand-cart was being driven and that he was on the left rear side and that he was pushing the hand-cart. These facts even otherwise do not appear to be in dispute from the written-statement. It is also common ground that the police van was going in the same direction as the hand-cart and, therefore, the version of the Appellant that the police van came from behind is not open to doubt. In a situation like this, the Appellant was not in a position to testify about the manner in which the police van was driven. He was pushing the hand-cart laden with vegetables and, therefore, it is not improbable that he would not observe the happenings on the right side or the left side, much less those taking place on his back side. In these circumstances, his story about being hit by the police van deserves acceptance. The suggestions made to him in cross examination do not indicate that he was in any manner responsible for the accident or that he contributed to the same in any degree. 6. Shri Hombalkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the Respondent State, criticized the evidence of the Appellant on the ground that he has nowhere stated as to whether the police van came in speed or the driver blew the horn or not. This criticism has no relevance. As discussed above, the Appellant could not have been in a position to state about the speed as the vehicle came from his back side. Regarding the blowing of the horn, it was not suggested to the Appellant whether a horn was sounded to warn the cartmen. The other ground of attack was that there were two other persons-one pulling and the other pushing the hand-cart, but none of them has been examined. I do not think that for this reason the evidence of the Appellant can be thrown over-board. In the first place, the Appellant was not asked anything about the whereabouts of those two persons. Secondly, the Appellant has examined Shankar who is supposed to have seen the incident. Therefore, the non-examination of the persons suggested by Shri Hombalkar would not render the evidence of the Appellant suspect. In the first place, the Appellant was not asked anything about the whereabouts of those two persons. Secondly, the Appellant has examined Shankar who is supposed to have seen the incident. Therefore, the non-examination of the persons suggested by Shri Hombalkar would not render the evidence of the Appellant suspect. The other criticism was that the panchanama shows that only a crack on the handle of the hand cart had occurred and thus there was no serious damage to the hand-cart. This circumstance has no significance in the appreciation of the evidence of the Appellant. There is no material to show that the cause of the accident or the nature of the injuries suffered by the Appellant had any relation with the damage to the hand-cart. On the contrary, the panchanama referred to by Shri Hombalkar shows that there was no particular damage to the handcart and that the hand-cart had not come in contact with the police van. The panchanama further shows that the hand-cart was laden with vegetables like cabbage, brinjals, flowers, Watanas, Chavali. Senga, Gawar, Karla, Dudhi, etc., with this load, it is not unlikely that with the impact of the police van, the puller of the hand-cart Rambehari might have lost control of the cart and the handle of the cart came in contact with the ground and thus the crack occurred as recorded in the panchanama. In this connection, it may be noted that the police vehicle was a break-down van jeep and such a vehicle would be heavier than an ordinary jeep. The force of impact from such a vehicle is likely to be more. 7. Witness Shankar examined on behalf of the Appellant was standing in the window of his house when he saw the handcart on the road and the police van coming from Byculla side and the Appellant being hit from behind when the police van tried to overtake the hand-cart from the left hand side. He came to the scene of occurrence and some time thereafter the police arrived on the spot and recorded his statement there and then. He pointed out the place of accident to the police. In cross-examination he disclosed his place of work. According to him, there was not much traffic on the road. There was ample room for the van to pass from both the sides of the hand-cart. He pointed out the place of accident to the police. In cross-examination he disclosed his place of work. According to him, there was not much traffic on the road. There was ample room for the van to pass from both the sides of the hand-cart. The van stopped at a distance of 30 feet after the impact. He denied that the police van had tried to overtake the hand-cart from the right hand side. The van was at a speed of about 20 to 25 miles an hour. Two contradictions between his statement before the Court and his statement before the police were brought out, firstly, that he had stated before the police that the jeep driver stopped the jeep immediately after the impact and, secondly, that he had told the police that the jeep was going at a moderate speed. This witness cannot be said to be a chance witness or one interested in the Appellant. His version that he was standing in the window of his house and that he had seen the accident was not challenged. His statement was recorded by the police on the spot and that lends assurance to his evidence. The first contradiction between his statement to the Court that the police van stopped at a distance of 30 feet after the impact his statement to the police that it stopped immediately after the impact, is not of much importance and so also other contradiction that the police van was being driven at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour as stated before the Court and that it was being driven at a moderate speed as stated before the police. Both these contradictions relate to his opinion as to distance and speed. 1 do not think that the witness intended to make any improvement in his version in order to oblige the Appellant. This witness sufficiently corroborates the evidence of the Appellant. 8. On behalf of the State, the investigating officer Police Inspector Pathan was examined and he produced the panchanama, Ex. F. In cross-examination, he stated that he had not recorded the condition of the police jeep in the panchanama as it was not at the place of the accident. This witness sufficiently corroborates the evidence of the Appellant. 8. On behalf of the State, the investigating officer Police Inspector Pathan was examined and he produced the panchanama, Ex. F. In cross-examination, he stated that he had not recorded the condition of the police jeep in the panchanama as it was not at the place of the accident. In answer to a question from the Court, he stated that he had not noted down the damage to the jeep in the panchanama but in his station diary and that the damage was to the front left mudguard and the left spring plate near the front left wheel was dented and slightly damaged. In further cross-examination, he stated that the police van was examined at the police station, but it was not his practice to make a panchanama of damage to a vehicle involved in the accident not found at the site. The police vehicle came to the police station at about 7.30 a. m. when he personally saw the damage to the jeep. The spring plate was just behind by the side of the wheels. He denied the suggestion that the damage was to the right front mudguard and for that reason he had not made a panchanama. Whatever could be the worth of his evidence about the damage to the police vehicle, I find that the evidence on this point is unsatisfactory and makes me hesitant to accept it without corroboration from some contemporaneous record. Although the witness stated that he had noted down the damage in the station diary, there is nothing to show that he answered the question put to him by the Court after refreshing his memory from the station diary. He might have noticed some damage to the police jeep, but it is difficult to depend upon his memory after the lapse of nearly four years. Furthermore, the vehicle had arrived at the police station after about two hours after the accident. There is nothing to show that the alleged damage to the vehicle could be connected to the present accident. The evidence of this witness does not in any manner affect the case of the Appellant, much less demolish the same, or establish the case of the State. 9. There is nothing to show that the alleged damage to the vehicle could be connected to the present accident. The evidence of this witness does not in any manner affect the case of the Appellant, much less demolish the same, or establish the case of the State. 9. The above discussion establishes that the accident had taken place in the manner suggested by the Appellant and that the driver of the police van who was driving behind the hand-cart was alone responsible for the accident and no blame could be fixed on the Appellant and the two other persons pushing and pulling the hand-cart. The view taken by the Tribunal is that the particulars of negligence alleged by the Appellant were (i) high and excessive speed, (ii) failure to keep a proper look out for traffic and pedestrians, passing on the road (iii) failure to blow horn or warn traffic, and (iv) failure to apply brakes in time, and none of them is established by the Appellant. The other reason given by the Tribunal is that the correct inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the accident was caused by the negligence of the Appellant himself. The third reason is that it is a rule of road that the driver of a vehicle before he changes his direction must slow down or stop and give intended signal clearly and failure to do so is evidence of negligence. Now it is not the Appellant's case as understood by the Tribunal that "while he was taking a turn to his right, in fact he denied that he had taken turn to his right. he has given the signal". Out of the four particulars of negligence, the third particular of failure to blow horn could have been known to the Appellant as he is found to be with his back towards the police van. The other three particulars would be matter of inference on the facts of the present case. The evidence of witness Shankar shows that the police van had tried to overtake the handcart from the left hand side and while doing so, it had hit the Appellant. This means that the police van had tried to overtake the hand-cart from the wrong side. This by itself is in breach of driving regulations. The evidence of witness Shankar shows that the police van had tried to overtake the handcart from the left hand side and while doing so, it had hit the Appellant. This means that the police van had tried to overtake the hand-cart from the wrong side. This by itself is in breach of driving regulations. The Tenth Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, shows that the driver of a motor vehicle shall pass to the right of all traffic proceeding in the same direction as himself. Assuming that the driver of the police van thought that there was sufficient space to overtake from the left side, as the evidence of the Appellant and his witness Shankar shows, he ought to have taken more care as he must have known that the puller of hand-cart did not expect the traffic to overtake him from the left. This shows that the driver of the police van had not kept a proper look out and not taken into account the position of the hand-cart proceeding in the same direction. I think that out of the four circumstances, it can safely be said that the second and the third circumstances have been reasonably established. To my mind, even the principle of res ipsa loquitur would have application to the facts and circumstances of the present case as it was not possible for the Appellant to know what precisely led to the accident. All the material and relevant facts relating to the circumstances of the accident were within the knowledge of the driver Shinde who was at the steering wheel of the police van. The Tribunal ought to have considered the applicability of this maxim. The Tribunal should have seen that the Appellant and his witness Shankar had in any case laid a reasonable basis of negligence on the part of the driver of the police van, with that the burden had shifted on to the shoulders of the driver or the owner of the vehicle. They not having discharged that burden, the evidence of the Appellant ought to have been accepted and issue No. 1 regarding the negligent driving of the police van should have been answered in affirmative. They not having discharged that burden, the evidence of the Appellant ought to have been accepted and issue No. 1 regarding the negligent driving of the police van should have been answered in affirmative. Adverse inference u/s 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act that evidence which could be produced and is not produced, if produced, would be unfavorable to the person who withholds it could have been fairly invoked as there is no evidence to show that driver Shinde was not in the service of the Government or that in spite of due diligence he was not available to give evidence. It is, therefore, reasonable to presume that the case pleaded in the written-statement could not have been established and that driver Shinde was not willing to testify to the truth of the alleged facts which were made the basis of the defence to contest the claim of the Appellant. These types of defences which are not attempted to be proved at the trial, delay the disposal of claims for personal injuries which are otherwise required to be decided expeditiously and for which august purpose the Tribunal has been constituted. 10. The second reason given by the Tribunal is not warranted by the material on record. There is no discussion on this point. The Tribunal has merely stated the reason and allowed the matter to rest at that. The third reason is that it is a rule of road that the driver of a vehicle before he changes his direction must slow down or stop and give intended signal clearly and failure to do so is evidence of negligence. There is no firm evidence to show that the puller of the hand-cart had changed his direction which required him to give a signal before changing his direction. A mere suggestion was made to the Appellant which he had refuted. No such suggestion was made to witness Shankar. Thus the Tribunal was in serious error in drawing an inference of negligence against the Appellant himself. In these circumstances, the question of expecting any signal from the puller of the hand-cart is ruled out. For all these reasons, the Tribunal was not right in discarding the evidence of the Appellant and his witness Shankar. 11. Coming to the injuries suffered by Appellant, the Appellants evidence is based on Exts. In these circumstances, the question of expecting any signal from the puller of the hand-cart is ruled out. For all these reasons, the Tribunal was not right in discarding the evidence of the Appellant and his witness Shankar. 11. Coming to the injuries suffered by Appellant, the Appellants evidence is based on Exts. A, B, C and his hospitalization three times in J.J. Hospital, Bombay, and once in Civil Hospital, Lucknow, extending to a period of about 18 months. The nature of the injuries suffered were (1) fracture of right radius and ulna and (2) fracture of right femur shaft-femoral part. These are the two principal injuries and Dr. Nayan has testified that the total permanent disability is to the extent of 15% for the right forearm and 60% for the right lower limb. The Appellant cannot lift heavy articles and cannot walk much as his right leg is stiff. He cannot sit or squat or bend his leg. He can walk only with the help of a stick. In 1972, he was about 35 years of age. His earning capacity has been seriously affected as, according to him, at the time of giving evidence he was earning about a rupee a day by selling bidis as against his normal earning of Rs. 8 to Rs. 10/- per day. For pain and sufferings, inconvenience and loss of amenities in life, the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 6,000/-. According to Shri Hombalkar, this amount is reasonable. Shri Kurien referred to some judgments where varying amounts have been awarded on this count. In Bhaskarbhai v. Ramanlal AIR 1968 Guj. 158 the amount of Rs. 6,000/- was raised to Rs. 22,500/- as in that case the injury involved two vital limbs. In Ranjitsingh v. Meenaxiben 13 G.L.R. 662 the amount for pain and suffering in our country was considered to be Rs. 10,000/-. In Babu Mansa Vs. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Others, in a case of permanent partial disability to the extent of 20 per cent, a sum of Rs. 15,000/- was awarded under this head. Shri Kurien also referred to a judgment, to which I was a party while sitting with Justice Deshpande (as he then was), in Master Arjun Fatchand v. Balshil Gulati 1979 A.C.J. 92 (Bom.) in which a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was fixed. 15,000/- was awarded under this head. Shri Kurien also referred to a judgment, to which I was a party while sitting with Justice Deshpande (as he then was), in Master Arjun Fatchand v. Balshil Gulati 1979 A.C.J. 92 (Bom.) in which a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was fixed. Now, in all these cases, the nature of the injuries suffered, the pain and suffering through which the injured had undergone, the loss of amenities in life were considered. In the present case the permanent disability is at a very high percentage of 75%. As a result of this, various activities of the Appellant such as lifting heavy articles, being not able to walk much, not in a position to sit and requiring a stick to walk, have entirely changed the life picture of the Appellant who was a coolie, a labourer earning his livelihood by pushing a hand-cart. For him the future is very dark. His pain and suffering extending over a period of about 18 months in various hospitals is not of a short duration. Considering all these, I feel that a sum of Rs. 6,000/- is inadequate. Merely because the injured in the present case is from a very low bracket of income, the considerations about pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of amenities in life, etc. would not be different than that in the case of persons in higher brackets of income. I think that the minimum that I should give him is Rs. 10,000/-. 12. As regards the pecuniary loss, the evidence shows that the Appellant's income has dwindled from Rs. 8 or Rs. 10 per day to about a rupee a day. Even assuming that the Appellant is earning more than a rupee a day, nevertheless it can safely be held that his earning capacity has been affected to the extent of Rs. 5/- per day as against his daily wages of Rs. 8 to Rs. 10/- per day. In fixing the amount of Rs. 5/- per day, I am taking into consideration the fact that on some days he may not have found work and would have remained idle. At the rate of Rs. 5/- per day, we get Rs. 150/- per month and Rs. 1,800/- per annum. The Appellant was about 32 years old at the time of the accident. 5/- per day, I am taking into consideration the fact that on some days he may not have found work and would have remained idle. At the rate of Rs. 5/- per day, we get Rs. 150/- per month and Rs. 1,800/- per annum. The Appellant was about 32 years old at the time of the accident. There is no valid reason not to apply the multiple of 15 to the present case. That would award him Rs. 27,000/-. 12A. Now, u/s 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, where any Court or Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation, such Court or Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. This provision is aimed at providing simple interest, though it leaves open to the court or Tribunal the rate at which the interest should be given or the date from which it should be made effective. I do not propose to make any distinction between non-pecuniary loss and pecuniary loss for the purpose of interest. In the present case, as the claim is restricted to Rs. 20,000/-, therefore the Appellant will get only Rs. 10,000/- for pecuniary loss instead of Rs. 27,000/-. It could be argued that the pecuniary loss takes care of the interest factor in applying the rule of multiple as done above. In this view of the matter, I grant interest at a conservative and modest rate at 6 per cent per annum from the date of making the claim. 13. To sum up, there shall be an award in favour of the Appellant for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- under the head of non-pecuniary loss and a sum of Rs. 27,000/- for pecuniary loss with interest on both counts at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the application, i.e. 13.4.1968, till realisation. However, as the Appellant has claimed a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in all, the effective award shall be for Rs. 20,000/- only, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 13.4.1968 till payment. 14. However, as the Appellant has claimed a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in all, the effective award shall be for Rs. 20,000/- only, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 13.4.1968 till payment. 14. As regards costs, Shri Kurien submitted that the costs of application should be quantified on the same scale as laid down by the Division Bench in Abdulkadar Ebrahim v. Kashinath Moreshwar Chandani 1968 A.C.J. 78 (Bom.). The relevant observations are: Under the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no direct provision which enables the Tribunal to award costs. But the whole procedure is left to be governed by the Rules framed by the Government under the Act and one of the Rules say that the Tribunal shall exercise the same powers as a civil Court. Under the circumstances, therefore, it would be proper and reasonable to allow costs as they are taxed in suits in the City Civil Court, so far as Bombay City is concerned. We will accordingly direct that costs should be taxed as in the City Civil Court in the trial Court and in this Court as in a regular appeal on the appellate side. Shri Kurien made a general submission that notwithstanding the above law laid down by this Court, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for Greater Bombay does not award costs as taxed in the Bombay City Civil Court and this causes a great financial loss to the applicants and indirectly amounts to reducing the amount of the award. Shri Hombalkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader, on making inquiries from the Tribunal, informed me that the Tribunal had not been awarding costs as taxed in the Bombay City Civil Court as very few matters are decided by the Tribunal by judgment. On no ground, much less a ground that few matters are being decided by judgment, the Tribunal cannot excuse itself from following the above judgment. In fact, it is normally in case of a matter being decided by a judgment that the question of costs comes up for determination. It is needless to point out that it is the duty of the Tribunal to follow the judgment of this Court and to hand out justice as pronounced by this Court. In fact, it is normally in case of a matter being decided by a judgment that the question of costs comes up for determination. It is needless to point out that it is the duty of the Tribunal to follow the judgment of this Court and to hand out justice as pronounced by this Court. I am confident that any lapse in this behalf on the part of the Tribunal is very likely on account of the attention of the Tribunal not being drawn to the above judgment when the question of costs arises. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dismissing the application is set aside. The application is allowed. There shall be an award in favour of the Appellant for a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in all with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 13.4.1968 till payment. The Respondent to pay to the Appellant the costs of the hearing of the application by the Tribunal at the scale of the Bombay City Civil Court as per the terms of the said judgment in addition to the costs of the present appeal. The Respondent to pay the amount of Court fees.