ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 12th July 1974 passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation in revision arising out of proceedings under S. 9A (2), U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The dispute relates to plots 2088/0.16, 2097/0.27 of khatam. 160B and 2129/0.29 of khata 21 situate in village Datun, district Jaunpur. The names of the petitioners were recorded in the basic year khatauni. Opposite parties 4 to 8 filed objection claiming ?rd share in the land in dispute. Opposite parties 4 to 7 based their claim on the basis of sale deed dated 15th April 1956 said to have been executed by Surya Bans and seven other persons in respect of one third share in the aforesaid plots. Opposite party 8 Sheo Prasad based his claim on the basis of sale deed dated 30th Jan. 1959 executed by Dwarika Singh, Mahadeo and Basdeo in respect of their one third share in the disputed plots. The petitioners contested the case and asserted that they have purchased the entire plots in question from Sarv Din. Ram Deo, Prabhu, Gauri Shanker, Ram Shanker, Janki and Churi through registered sale deed dated 30th April 1951 executed in their favour. By the aforesaid sale deed the petitioners purchased the entire plots in question. Their names were also mutated vide order dated 22nd Oct. 1955 and they alone are recorded as sole Bhumidhars of the land in question. They further asserted to be in exclusive possession and in para 4 of their objection it was specifically pleaded that the other co- sharers were aware of their continuous possession over the land in question ever since they have purchased it and their names are also recorded as such in revenue records. 3. The Consolidation Officer after taking evidence of parties allowed the objection vide order dated 31st July 1972 and held that opposite parties 4 to 8 are co-tenure holders along with the petitioners to the extent of ?rd share in it. He recorded a finding that Sarv Din and others, the vendors of the petitioners, were entitled to ?rd share in the land in question and, therefore, they could not sell the entire plots in favour of the petitioners. He recorded a finding that Sarv Din and others, the vendors of the petitioners, were entitled to ?rd share in the land in question and, therefore, they could not sell the entire plots in favour of the petitioners. Taking this view the Consolidation Officer held the petitioners to be entitled to only ?rd share in the land in dispute. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioners filed an appeal, which was heard and allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dated 14th Oct. 1972. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) found that the vendors of the petitioners were co-sharers to the extent of ?rd share in the land in dispute but he held the petitioners to have acquired rights by adverse possession over the entire plots in question on the basis of their continuous adverse possession ever since the execution of the sale deed in their favour in the year 1951. He also found that their names alone are recorded during this period. Aggrieved by the said order opposite parties 4 to 8 filed a revision which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 12th July 1974 holding that the vendors of the petitioners were entitled to ?rd share in the land in dispute and as such the sale deed executed by them in respect of the entire plots was invalid. The petitioners would only get right to the extent of ?rd share for which alone the sale deed was valid as their vendors were entitled to only ?rd share in the land in question. On the question of acquisition of right by adverse possession over ?rd share the Deputy Director of Consolidation rejected the claim of the petitioners merely on the ground that the plea of adverse possession has not been taken by them and as such their case of adverse possession cannot be considered and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) committed a manifest error of law in granting them rights by adverse possession. Aggrieved by this order the petitioners have filed this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioners about adverse possession merely on technicalities. Aggrieved by this order the petitioners have filed this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioners about adverse possession merely on technicalities. Referring to plea contained in para 4 of his objection learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the plea about adverse possession has been stated therein although not in clear words but it has been asserted that the petitioners are in possession ever since the execution of the sale deed to the knowledge of other co- sharers. Learned counsel further contended that when the parties knew fully well the case of each other the absence of specific plea or issue on the point will not adversely affect their claim and the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in not considering that plea. In reply learned counsel for the opposite parties argued that since no specific plea of adverse possession was taken by the opposite parties their claim with regard to acquisition' of rights by adverse possession over ?rd share in the land in dispute could not be considered and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has thus rightly refused to consider that case. Learned counsel further contended that since it is not disputed that the vendors of the petitioners were entitled to only ?rd share in the land in dispute hence the sale deed could be valid only to the extent of ?rd share and the petitioners have been rightly given ?rd share by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the land in dispute. He further urged that all the three consolidation authorities have recorded a. concurrent finding holding that there had been no private partition amongst the co- sharers of the petitioners and the land in dispute was not partitioned at all. The result of this finding would be that possession of the petitioners cannot be treated to be adverse unless a specific plea with regard to adverse possession and ouster is pleaded and proved. 5. I have considered the aforesaid arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and I am of the opinion that there is no substance in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 6. 5. I have considered the aforesaid arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and I am of the opinion that there is no substance in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 6. It is not disputed that the vendors of the petitioners had held only ?rd share in the land in dispute and, therefore, the sale deed could be valid only to the extent of ?rd share. The transfer of the entire plot will be invalid to the extent of the share of other co-sharers and it would be valid qua the interest of the transferrers and the vendee, i.e. the petitioners. became co-tenant in the land in dispute along with opposite parties 4 to 8 on the basis of the aforesaid deed which could only be valid to the extent of ?rd share and not beyond it. It is well settled that the possession of one co-sharer is possession of all unless a plea of acquisition of right by adverse possession is pleaded. The petitioners in para 4 of their written statement have averred that they are in possession as vendees of the land in question in the knowledge of the opposite parties. They have not specifically pleaded that they have been holding the land in question in adverse possession against the other co-sharers. There is neither any averment or evidence to the effect that the petitioners or their vendors had ousted the other co-sharers and had held the land in question in hostile adverse possession. The plea of private partition, which was set up by the petitioners has been repelled by all three consolidation authorities by concurrent finding on this question of fact. The raising of this plea about private partition amongst the vendors of the petitioners and other co-sharers clearly shows that the vendors of the petitioners had not held the land in question adversely against the other co-sharers. They had held it exclusively, if at all, only on the basis of private partition as claimed by them. The raising of this plea about private partition amongst the vendors of the petitioners and other co-sharers clearly shows that the vendors of the petitioners had not held the land in question adversely against the other co-sharers. They had held it exclusively, if at all, only on the basis of private partition as claimed by them. This plea of private partition amongst the co- sharers of the vendors has not been accepted and as such the possession of the vendors even if it was exclusive on the land in question will not operate to extinguish the right of other co-sharers, it has been held by the Supreme Court in S. M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 S C 1254 (at p. 1256). "The alternative case that the title of the person purchasing benami in Court auction was extinguished by long and uninterrupted adverse possession of real owner is open to the latter to claim if his possession is disturbed. If the possession of the real owner ripens into title under the Limitation Act and he is dispossessed, he can sue to obtain possession, for he does not then rely on the benami nature of the transaction. But the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved. Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. A mere suggestion in the relief clause that, there was an uninterrupted possession for several 12 years or that the plaintiff had acquired an absolute title was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea". 7. This Court in P.S. Lal v. Gaya Din, 1969 All L. J 766 has held that no court can cull out a new case for a party. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in the absence of a plea of adverse possession being raised by the petitioners should not have made out a new case for the petitioners that they have acquired rights by adverse possession in respect of ?rd share in the land in dispute. The Privy Council in Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in the absence of a plea of adverse possession being raised by the petitioners should not have made out a new case for the petitioners that they have acquired rights by adverse possession in respect of ?rd share in the land in dispute. The Privy Council in Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran, AIR 1930 P C 57(1), has held that :- "Where a claim has been never made in the defence presented no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward." 8. Thus the evidence even if led by the petitioners on the question of their exclusive possession over the land in question could not be considered for determining whether they have acquired rights by adverse possession in the absence of a specific plea being raised on that point by them. The Supreme Court in Shambhu Prasad v. Phool Kumari, AIR 1971 SC 1337 , has held that there can be no adverse possession against co-sharer in absence of evidence of open assertion of a hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other. In Sheo Charan v. Tota Ram, 1970 Rev Dec 103 :(1970 All L J 242 at p. 244), M. H. Beg, J., (as he then was) held that co-sharer or co-tenant is not ousted if he is merely kept out of benefits unless such exclusion is in assertion of a denial of his rights brought to his knowledge. 9. No such assertion or denial of rights of the other co-sharers has been pleaded by the petitioners nor any evidence has been led to that effect. In this view of the matter. I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation nor it suffers from any error of fact, law or jurisdiction. 10. No other point is pressed. 11. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. I, however, make no order as to costs.