JUDGMENT - Tulpule R.D., J.-This second appeal raised a short question as to what is meant by the expression “manufacturing purpose” occurring in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and whether that purpose spoken of in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act must be at the commencement of the lease and with reference to the lessee or otherwise. 2. The circumstances in which this question has arisen is the commence­ ment of a suit by the landlord respondent before me in the Court of the Civil Judge, (Junior Division) Akola against the appellant-defendant for possession of premises plot No. 10/2, admeasuring 3700 sq. feet in area. The premises originally belonged to one Nagarkar who had leased them to the defendant. The suit was filed by the plaintiff who was transferee from Nagarkar and who got this property in exchange under a deed from Nagarkar. The rent agreed according to the plaintiff was monthly rent of Rs. 58.33 and that that tenancy commenced on the first of every month, according to the Gregorian Calendar, The tenancy of the defendant was terminated by a notice to quit issued to the defendant on 18th March 1969 requiring him to vacate and deliver possession by the end of April 1969. Tenant-appellant-defendant replied to the notice and claimed that the notice in question which was only a 15 days' notice or a notice of a duration of less than six months was not a legal and valid notice. That the property had been leased to him by Nagarkar in the year 1952 for a manufacturing purpose, and, therefore, the notice was bad and invalid. 3. Overruling the contentions taken by the defendant similarly in his written statement the learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), who tried the suit decreed it in favour of the plaintiff awarding a decree for possession as also for arrears of rent and other charges in a sum of Rs. 1300. The appeal taken up by the defendant-tenant to the Court of the District Judge, Akola also failed so far as the relief for possession was concerned. The learned District Judge, however, modified the decree for money and reduced it to a sum of Rs. 496. 4. 1300. The appeal taken up by the defendant-tenant to the Court of the District Judge, Akola also failed so far as the relief for possession was concerned. The learned District Judge, however, modified the decree for money and reduced it to a sum of Rs. 496. 4. Both before the trial Court as well as the appellate Court the principal question which was raised was whether the lease in favour of the defendant was a lease for a manufacturing purpose. An incidental and ancillary question which was also raised was, whether in the circumstances and in the absence of a written instrument of lease registered and in writing as contemplated under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, this defence was open to the defendant at all. It was in that context that the question as to whether the notice in suit was legal or valid was considered and answered by both the Courts. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that it was not proved by the defendant-tenant that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. In that view, no further question arose before him. The appellate Court on the other hand came to the conclusion that the lease was for a composite purpose, namely, for the purpose of residence and for the purpose of workshop which the defendant was carrying on there. In that view, the appellate Court also came to the conclusion that the notice was legal and valid. It is this con­ current finding recorded by the Courts below which is challenged in this second appeal. (After disposing of the contention regarding production of additional documents in appeal in paras. 5 to 7, the judgment proceeds:) 8. Mr. Udhoji further urged that the defendant had taken the premises for the purposes of carrying on his activity. That though he was also residing in the premises, what was taken by him. was an open plot of land, upon which a tin-shed was constructed by him and in a part of tin-shed he was also resid­ing. That the tin-shed was used by him for the purposes of manufacturing with the help of machinery fixed by him therein. The dominant purpose, therefore, it was Mr. Udhoji's submission, in taking these premises of 3700 sq. feet on lease was for manufacture and not for purposes of residence. That the tin-shed was used by him for the purposes of manufacturing with the help of machinery fixed by him therein. The dominant purpose, therefore, it was Mr. Udhoji's submission, in taking these premises of 3700 sq. feet on lease was for manufacture and not for purposes of residence. Merely because a small part of the premises taken on lease was used for the purpose of residence, that would not convert the lease into a lease for a composite purpose, and not a lease for manufacturing purpose. He submitted that in all such cases, it is the dominant intention of the parties for which the premises are taken and utilised or employed, that must be determinative of the purpose. That purpose in the present case was obviously according to him, a manufac-luring activity and, therefore, notwithstanding the use of a part of the premises for residence, the purpose of the lease ought to have been held to be manu­facture. Mr. Udhoji complained that the appellate Court was erroneously influenced by the decision in (Devji Shivji v. Shanti Swaroop)1 and wrongly held that in order to attract section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the pur­pose must be an exclusive purpose and cannot be allowed to be a composite purpose, where one of the purposes and the dominant purpose is manufactur­ing purpose. 9. In support of his contention that the activity which the defendant. was carrying on in the premises was manufacturing activity, Mr. Udhoji relied upon a number of decisions and the connotation of the word 'manu- facture'. He also relied upon the evidence given by the defendant and the plaintiff's witness Nagesh P. W. 4. He submitted that that evidence has gone unchallenged and if the evidence establishes that what the defendant was carrying in the premises in question was a manufacturing activity, then it must be held that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act applies. It is in this context Mr. Udhoji also drew my attention to Exh. 54, the receipt upon which considerable reliance was placed. He pointed out that the learned appellate Judge was in error in disregarding Exh. 54 for a paltry oversight and errors in noting the dates properly and doubting therefrom the receipt as well as its effect. 10. It is in this context Mr. Udhoji also drew my attention to Exh. 54, the receipt upon which considerable reliance was placed. He pointed out that the learned appellate Judge was in error in disregarding Exh. 54 for a paltry oversight and errors in noting the dates properly and doubting therefrom the receipt as well as its effect. 10. Some argument in this case was advanced as to whether this conten­tion in the absence of a written instrument creating the lease and registered by virtue of section 107 could be raised at all. It was pointed out, Mr. Udhoji urged, that there is apparently no conflict between section 106 and the first paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. He contended, and I think rightly, that section 106 raises a fiction and creates and indicates a deeming provision in respect of leases which do not fall within the ambit of section 107 paragraph 1. Section 107 makes it imperative that where a lease is intended to be created or brought into existence in respect of an immoveable property “from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving the yearly rent”, such a lease can only be made by means of a registered instrument and has, therefore, to be in writing. Where, therefore, a lease is intended to be created for an immovable property for a period from year to year or for the preceding one year or where the annual rent is reserved, then it can be only made by a registered instrument in writing. The lease can, however, be entered into and granted even in cases where no writing is effected. It follows that where no such writing is effected, there is no question of registration. Nevertheless such a lease may be for a particular purpose, namely, for the purpose of agriculture and for manufacturing. The question is whether in such a case, where a lease is not created by an instrument in writing to such a lease section 106 would be applicable and whether the deem­ing provision in section 106 for such leases that they “shall be deemed to be leases from year to year terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by six months' notice” is possible to be applied. 11. This question was however directly raised before the High Court of Assam before Mr. 11. This question was however directly raised before the High Court of Assam before Mr. Justice Goswami of the Assam High Court (now Judge of the Supreme Court) in (Kali Kumar Sen v. Haridas Roy)2. I shall have occasion to refer to this case once again while dealing with the question as to what is the meaning of the word “manufacturing purpose”. A contention based upon section 107 was directly raised and it was sought to be urged that there was a conflict between sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therein it was observed : “Section 106 lays down a rule of construction. Even if an oral lease of immoveable property for manufacturing purpose is established and nothing to the contrary is proved, the rule of construction provided for in section 106 will be applicable,” The learned Judge further observed that “there is no conflict between sec­tion 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act” and that where there is no written contract, the provisions of section 106 will operate and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act will not be a bar to the raising of such a con­tention . 12. With this we may now go to the consideration of the evidence adduced. Exhibit 54 is a receipt obtained by the defendant and that is when the lease in this case first started namely in April 1952. That is only a receipt for receipt of rent which is described as annual rent at the rate of Rs. 215/- per annum. The learned appellate Court felt that the receipt was suspicious because it mentioned the period as 1-4-1952 to 30-4-1953 and not 31-3-1953, which it should have been, it would otherwise be for a period of 13 months and there “was apparent conflict felt by him in that the receipt in the amount of rent stated as annual rent and the period for which it was received. I do not think that much can be made out of this apparent error and slip in the mention of the period as upto 30th April 1953. What was clearly intended was that the rent paid was for a period of 12 months. The receipt will, there­fore, go to show that the rent reserved was yearly rent, thus coming within the ambit of section 107. What was clearly intended was that the rent paid was for a period of 12 months. The receipt will, there­fore, go to show that the rent reserved was yearly rent, thus coming within the ambit of section 107. It has, therefore, to be held that the lease was an yearly lease. That would not, however, solve the problem and advance the purpose of the defendant unless it is also held, inasmuch as there is no writing, that the lease was also for a manufacturing purpose. The fiction or presump­tion under section. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requiring the termina­tion notice of a period of 6 months would be attracted only where- the lease-was a lease for manufacturing purpose deemed to be year to year. In other cases the lease is “deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of either the lessor or lessee by 15 days notice. Exh. 54, therefore,, only partly assists the case of the appellant. 13. Mr. Udhoji then relied upon the evidence given by the defendant and plaintiff's witness Nagesh (P.W.4). Witness Nagesh stated ire his cross- examination that for the last 15-36 years from the time he gave evidence, namely, from about 1956 or 1957, the defendant has been residing in the tin- shed in the suit plot and he has also his workshop for lathe machine for fabrication jobs like welding etc. The defendant in his evidence stated that he obtained the suit plot on an annual rent of Rs. 215 for his 'residence and workshop as well'. 14. He stated further that in his workshop “parts of machines are prepared besides the work of casting”. It is common ground, however, that the plaintiff does not produce or manufacture any article as such or anything in this workshop for himself which he sells to others. It was not disputed that the work which the defendant does on the premises in question is the work which he undertakes on account of others and against orders received by him. The orders involve different kinds and types of work such as casting, fabrica­ tion, welding, the use of the lathe, a versatile multipurpose machine which can, be used for the purpose of grinding, turning, forming and polishing as well as shaping. The orders involve different kinds and types of work such as casting, fabrica­ tion, welding, the use of the lathe, a versatile multipurpose machine which can, be used for the purpose of grinding, turning, forming and polishing as well as shaping. The fact, however, remains that what the defendant does in his workshop is not carrying on any activity or manufacture of any article or articles of any product as such, whether it be of casting or fabrication after welding for himself which he sells to others, but that he carries out and executes orders of parts or machinery placed with him in accordance with the specifica­ tions and directions by the contracting parties. The question is whether this activity on the part of the defendant is a manufacturing activity. 15. There is one more incidental question which has to be considered and dealt with at this stage and in this connection. As there is no written docum not the question as to what was the purpose of the lease and whether out of the two purposes spoken of by the defendant, namely, residence and workshop, which one was dominant and principal, will turn upon the evidence upon which the question as to purpose of the lease has to be considered. Further whether the purpose of the lease must be found and established to be at the time when the lease is entered into or can be at the time when the question conies up or any time subsequent to the grant of the lease is also a question to be decided on evidence. It may be assumed in the present case that the dominant purpose of the defendant in occupying these premises on lease was for the purposes of his workshop and not for the purposes of his residence.” 16. It may therefore be, though the lease was for a composite purpose for the sake of application of section 106, assumed and the case proceeded on the footing that the dominant purpose of the lease was the purpose of the workshop of the defendant. Mr. Udhoji in this context rightly distinguished the decision upon “which reliance was placed in the Courts below reported in Devji Shivji v. Santi Swaroop (Supra). Mr. Udhoji in this context rightly distinguished the decision upon “which reliance was placed in the Courts below reported in Devji Shivji v. Santi Swaroop (Supra). That was a case where the premises consisting of a house which later on was sub-divided into two portions was taken by the defendant for various purposes, mainly for residential purpose of the defendant himself, for the purpose of setting up of a printing press and for ordinary business purpose. Mr. Udhoji pointed out that in the Calcutta case the main purpose or the purposes for which the premises were taken were residence, for setting up of a printing press and for ordinary business purpose. This was, therefore, a composite user of the premises which were apparently large and used for three different kinds of activities and purposes. There, there was no question, nor any finding as to which of the three purposes was a dominant purpose and, therefore, he submitted that it was not right to rely upon that decision. Mr. Udhoji is right in contending that that decision does not either lay down a test or give us any clue as to whether it is the dominant intention which must be found and what was the dominant intention in that case, and where a lease is for a composite purpose, the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be said to be attracted. 17. Another decision was referred to also from the Calcutta High Court in (G. Mackartich v. Steuart Co.)3, but I think it is unnecessary to refer to that decision inasmuch as that decision was taken in an appeal to the Supreme Court which decision of the Supreme Court is reported in (G. Mackartich v. Steuart Co.)4. The Supreme Court did not express any considered opinion but proceeded to decide the case on the footing that “it is not exclusiveness of purpose but what is the main or substantial purpose of the lease which has got to be taken into consideration for the purpose of section 106”. The Supreme Court did not express any considered opinion but proceeded to decide the case on the footing that “it is not exclusiveness of purpose but what is the main or substantial purpose of the lease which has got to be taken into consideration for the purpose of section 106”. It may therefore be assumed, and I have approached this case for the purpose of this judgment on the basis that the dominant purpose of the defendant in acquiring these premises on lease was for the purpose of his workshop and that that is the relevant purpose for considering the question of attraction of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and that it was not a composite purpose which would disentitle the defendant from invoking section 106. 18. I, however, think that for the purposes of section 106 what is rele­ vant is the purpose for which the lease was obtained at the time when the lease was obtained. A subsequent change of use and subsequent employment of the premises taken on lease, for a manufacturing purpose where they were not at the commencement taken for that purpose would not entitle a lessee to take advantage of section 106. The purpose of the lease must be found and ascertained with reference to the time when the lease was brought into existence. This seems to me also consistent and in accordance with the other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and law in that behalf. Section 108(a) of the Transfer of Property Act speaks of rights and liabilities of the lessees. In the absence of a contract of local usage to the contrary, a lessee is under an obligation by virtue of section 108 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act to use the leased premises for the purpose for which they were let and is obliged not to use them “for the, purpose other than for which it was leased.” To do so therefore, would be a breach of the terms and conditions of the lease which are implied in the absence of the contract to the- contrary. Section, 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where a lease permits a re-entry on Breach of a condition, then the lessor would be entitled to determine the lease and re-enter. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act also provides for termination of leases. Section, 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where a lease permits a re-entry on Breach of a condition, then the lessor would be entitled to determine the lease and re-enter. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act also provides for termination of leases. A breach of terms and conditions of the lease would entitle a lessor to terminate the lease and to re-enter. In Devji's case (supra} Justice P.B. Mukherjee also observed that “the lease for manufacturing pur-pose must be a lease which at its inception is for that purpose. The lease at: the time of the grant by the landlord must be impressed with the purpose of manufacture.” Per contra-where it is not so impressed and where that was not the purpose at the time when the lease was commenced, the lessee would not be entitled to take advantage of section 106 of the Transfer of Propeety Act. 19. It was then contended that the activity which the defendant was carrying on Was manufacture. Where there is no written instrument of lease then the intention for which the lessee obtained the property can be gathered from the use to which the property is put and the circumstances in which the lease was obtained. Mr. Udhoji contended that the word “manufacture” and expression “manufacturing purpose” has not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. He submitted that the word and the expression, therefore,. should receive such connotation and interpretation and meaning, as is to be found in other enactments using that word. He contended that the word “manufacture” is capable of wide interpretation and meaning. The basic idea-Was transformation of a thing from what it was to something different. Originally manufacture meant do-ing something by means of hand to an article so as to change its form and into a different article. In the present day the meaning has acquired a still wider interpretation and where something is done to an article by which its original shape or form and the state in which it was before changes, or is transferred and becomes a different article, than what it was, a manufacturing process must be deemed to be involved. It was urged that the word “manufacturing purpose” was not related to the lessee and it need not be a manufacturing purpose of the lessee. It was urged that the word “manufacturing purpose” was not related to the lessee and it need not be a manufacturing purpose of the lessee. It can be a manufacturing act done by the lessee for other also. In other words, it-was urged that even a person like the defendant who accepted job works and executed orders for others manufactured parts or did any operations in respect of any article as required by his customer, so that the article changed its form from before, and became a different article when it left the workshop, the defendant was engaged in a manufacturing activity. If, therefore, the activity which the defendant was engaged was a manufacturing activity, that is the purpose of the lease. It cannot be held that simply because the defendant carried out orders from others, he does not carry on a manufacturing activity. The essence of the requirement is not “production” but “manufacture”. He need not 'create' it for himself for “the purpose of sale” and can also “produce” for the pur­poses of others. It is in this context that Mr. Udhoji referred to the docu­ments sought to be produced at the appellate stage. 20. We have already referred to the evidence given by the defendant and plaintiff's witness Nagesh. It may be assumed for the purposes of this case that what the defendant is engaged in, is carrying on job work, fulfilling orders for others, preparing articles in accordance with the specifications, directions given by the persons or customers either with the raw material submitted by them or with the raw material purchased by the defendant and even complete fabrication of units. It is, however, not disputed that what the defendant does is against an order received by him. He is not himself as such engaged in any manufacturing activity for his own purpose. All that he is doing is executing a contract or order of doing something in relation to something or in respect of something for somebody. The question then is whether such a kind of act can be described as a “manufacturing purpose” of the lesssee. 21. I have already pointed out and held above that for the purposes of attracting section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lessee's intention in obtaining the lease what is relevant is that which existed at the time the lease came into existence. 21. I have already pointed out and held above that for the purposes of attracting section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lessee's intention in obtaining the lease what is relevant is that which existed at the time the lease came into existence. That it must also be the purpose for which the lessee obtained the lease. If we consider the present case in that context, then the question which one might ask to oneself is whether when the premises were obtained by the defendant in the year 1952, he obtained them for the purposes of carrying on any manufacturing activity understood in the ordinary sense. The act or the operations which the defendant carries on in this work­shop may under certain enactments and for the purpose of certain definitions amount to manufacturing process. Some of them may also not amount to manufacturing process, where for instance, the article does not undergo any change of form. If at the commencement of the lease the intention of the lessee was, therefore, not to involve himself in a manufacturing activity, but to execute orders placed with him with the help of the machinery, skill and expertise which he possesses, then it is difficult to think and say that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. 22. It cannot be disputed that the word “manufacture” and “manu­ facturing purpose” is capable both of a narrower meaning as well as of an extended meaning. It is true that the expression “manufacturing purpose” has not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. Normally the word acquires its meaning, colour as well as connotation in the light of the context and subject in which it appears. In its ordinary acceptation or popular meaning the word “manufacture” is capable of a wide interpretation and connotation. In the context of Sales Tax Acts it has acquired, apart from the popular and dictionary meaning, a technical meaning also. In construing the provisions of the Excise Act wherein the word “manufacture” occurs, it has been interpreted to mean a change but not every change. The change or transformation must be such that a new and different article emerges acquiring a distinct and different character or complexion. 23. In Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary “manufacture” has been defined as a verb meaning to make by machinery and on a large scale; to fabricate; concoct, to produce unintelligently any quantity. The change or transformation must be such that a new and different article emerges acquiring a distinct and different character or complexion. 23. In Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary “manufacture” has been defined as a verb meaning to make by machinery and on a large scale; to fabricate; concoct, to produce unintelligently any quantity. As noun it means the practice, or act of manufacturing and anything that is manufactured. Here we are concerned with the use of the word as a verb and, therefore, ¦the appli­ cable definition would be to make by means of a machinery and also may be by hand but now as is common by machinery and on a large scale, the activity of producing repetitively a number of articles of the same type in quantities. If that is the normal and dictionary meaning of the word “manufacture” and, therefore of manufacturing purpose is accepted, then it would mean being engaged in the process of turning out or producing similar articles in a repetitive process and in quantities. 24. I will now refer to some of the decisions referred to by Mr. Udhoji. In (H. S. Mehru v. Union of India)5, which was a case under the Sea Customs Act, the question was of chargeability of duty and availability of drawback on export. 'Manufacture' had been given special meaning and its definition ex­tended by “including blending of any goods” or “making of other alterations” therein. What was done by the claimant was to cut cloth into smaller pieces and to carry out embroidery work thereon by means of silk. It was held that this amounted to manufacture inasmuch as it was making of “other alterations therein.” It is obvious that the decision turned upon the statutory meaning given to the word “manufacture”. 25. Mr, Udhoji placed considerable reliance upon a decision in (Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. State of Bombay)6 where the operations carried out-in salt works were treated to be manufacturing process for the purpose of section 2(k) of the Factories Act. Mr. Udhoji contended that in a case of salt works all that the operators do is to impound water in a salt pan, allow it to evaporate by natural process of Sun's rays and then gather the salt and pack it. Mr. Udhoji contended that in a case of salt works all that the operators do is to impound water in a salt pan, allow it to evaporate by natural process of Sun's rays and then gather the salt and pack it. He submitted that if this is considered as manufacturing process, then doing the same on account of somebody, just as a salt pan owner or operator could do it on behalf of somebody else namely, the owner of the land, the person carrying out job work or entering workshop and executing orders for others can also be described as engaged in manufacture and the activity as “manufacturing purpose”. The definition of the word “Factory” and “Manufacturing Process” in the relevant Act so far as is relevant for our purpose meant so far as factory was concerned “any premises including the precincts thereof” where the requisite number of workers are engaged in any manufacturing process. Where therefore, requisite number of workmen were engaged in a manufacturing process on any premises or any part of the manufacturing process was carried on the premises they acquired the meaning of the word “factory” within the definition of the Factories Act. The more relevant expression 'manufacturing process' appearing in section 2(k) laid down as “any process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning etc. or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal”. The activity which was carried on was described by the Supreme Court in this case to be(1) admitting sea water to the reser­voirs by working sluice gates, sometimes even at night with the help of the pump, (2) filling beds, (3) watching the density of brine for the purposes of crystallization, (4) seeing that the density does not exceed certain limits and that salts other than sodium chloride are not formed, (5) scraping and collecting salt crystals, (6) grading and sieving and (7) then packing. All these activities together were considered as being part of a manufacturing process and since the workmen were employed, the premises where that work was done was treated to be factory. The Supreme Court observed that the process came within the definition of “manufacturing process” inasmuch as salt can be said to be manufactured from sea water by process of treatment and adaptation of sea water into salt. The Supreme Court observed that the process came within the definition of “manufacturing process” inasmuch as salt can be said to be manufactured from sea water by process of treatment and adaptation of sea water into salt. Sea water, a non-commercial article has been converted as a commercial article by utilising a natural process. 26. Mr. Udhoji fairly drew my attention to two other cases wherein with reference to a certain activity which was carried on with regard to an article or articles the process was not treated as manufacture. Of these deci­sions of the Supreme Court, the first is that reported in Commissioner of (Sales Tax, U. P. v. Dr. Sukh Deo)7, where a Medical Practitioner dispensed his own prescriptions by mixing drugs for his patients. It was held that the Medical Practitioner supplying such drugs “cannot be said to be a manufacturer of the mixture and the mixture cannot be said to be 'manufactured' “ within the mean­ing of the notification. That was a case under the U. P. Sales Tax Act which brought within its ambit by notification “manufacturers of all medicines and pharmaceutical preparations”. In (P. C. Cheriyan v. Mst. Burfi Devi)8, the question was whether the activity of retreading of tyres could be styled as manufacturing activity. That was also held to be not a manufacturing activity. Noting the expression 'manufacturing purpose' in other enactments which “was considered in its popular meaning, the Supreme Court also administered a caution in adopting or using definitions given in other enactments of the word “manufacture” for the purpose of merging those concepts into section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 27. We are not concerned in the present case with the other decisions which were indicated by the Supreme Court in P. C. Cheriyan's case (supra) with regard to when an activity can be said to be a manufacturing activity, namely, when there is a process by which the original article is completely transformed. The caution administered and the rule laid down by the Supreme Court, however, of adopting the popular meaning and sense of the word 'manufacture' for the purposes of determining whether a [ease was for the purpose of manufacture or otherwise as contemplated in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a more applicable and useful test. The caution administered and the rule laid down by the Supreme Court, however, of adopting the popular meaning and sense of the word 'manufacture' for the purposes of determining whether a [ease was for the purpose of manufacture or otherwise as contemplated in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a more applicable and useful test. If we apply that test, it seems to me that it is not possible to hold that the activity in which the defendant was engaged was a manufacturing purpose and the lease cannot be said to have been acquired for manufacturing purpose when it was first obtained. Merely because on occasions and as a consequence of orders placed, the defendant was also some times required to manufacture and produce parts for the purposes of that order, applying the popular meaning and con­ notation to the expression 'manufacture', the defendant cannot be said to have been engaged in the process of producing any article in quantity by a repetitive process for his own purpose. He was not-producing any articles, and not engaged in producing a number of them which can be said to be his 'manufacturing' that article. Even where the defendant uses his machines like the lathe, the drill and other machines, it is not in every case that the, original character or form, and even shape of the article after it undergoes the process at the defendant's workshop, changes its original character. For instance, as pointed out above, the lathe can be used for the purpose of form­ing, shaping, turning, grinding and surfacing also. Merely because the surface of an article is ground to a fine polish, merely because the article is turned and polished, because holes are drilled into it, it does not change its original shape or form. It does not become a different article. Only certain operations with regard to that article and upon that article are carried out by the defendant. If the defendant's main activity was to engage in carrying out the orders and functions prescribed by his customers, making changes in the article or bringing them to a certain required standard of specifications or form by doing some act thereto, it does not mean thereby that he was engaged in the “manufacture” so as to transform, that article from one into another. It would continue to be the same where for instance 'casting1 after it is form­ed, is polished, cleaned and ground as well as holes drilled into it as specified. It still remains a casting like in the case of an axle or the body of an engine. These activities may be carried out in a workshop. But they can hardly be described as a manufacturing process or a manufacturing activity. The circum­stances that the defendant is engaged at a given time in fabricating or producing an article has no significance, because he is not engaged in doing so for himself, but for somebody-else. The lessee's purpose, therefore, cannot be described to be a manufacturing purpose. It can only be to carry out with the help of the machines and his expertise the jobs of others. Con-sidering, therefore, from any point of view, it is not possible to hold that the defendant is entitled to the advantage of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 28. The consequence is that the appeal must fail and must be dismissed. The suit is for possession of a open plot of land. The defendant has put up his structures thereon and has installed his own machinery. Some time would obviously be necessary for the defendant to remove his structures as well as machinery therefrom. I, therefore, direct that the decree shall not be execut­ ed for a period of 4 months, i. e. till the end of 31-7-1981. As regards costs of this Court, the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.