JUDGMENT-The petitioners had initiated actions against the respondents for eviction on the ground that Mahalaxmi Bridge at Bombay was to be reconstructed and those premises which are in the shape of Arches at the junction of Clark Road and Hains Road were to be vacated. The notices were therefore served by the petitioners upon the respondents and eviction proceedings under section 105B of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 were taken, before the Small Causes Court at Bombay. During the cross-examination of the witness for the respondents, the Corporation was called upon to produce original letter dated 5-2-1975. Earlier inspection of this letter was granted by the Corporation and I am told that the letter has been filed before the Enquiry Officer of the Corporation. When the respondents called upon the Advocate of the Corporation to produce the original letter dated 5-2-1975, an objection was raised mainly as regards privilege. According to the Corporation, this was a confidential communication by the Legal Adviser of the Corporation and the same was privileged under section 129 of the Evidence Act. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court by his order dated 8th October 1980 held that this communication was not privileged either under section 129 or under section 126 of the Evidence Act. He, therefore, ordered the production of that letter and adjourned the case till 28th October 1980. This order has been challenged in the present petition. 2. Shri R. T. Walawalkar the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the letter dated 5-2-1975 was a confidential communication by the Legal Advisor of the Corporation to his client, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. Under section 129 of the Evidence Act no one shall be compelled to disclose to the Court any confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional adviser, unless he offers himself as a witness, in which case, he may be compelled to disclose any such communication as may appear to the Court necessary to be known in order to explain any evidence which he has given, but no others. Shri Walawalkar therefore argued that the learned Judge was in error in compelling the production of this document by the Corporation. 3. Shri Walawalkar therefore argued that the learned Judge was in error in compelling the production of this document by the Corporation. 3. Shri Korde, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents argued that the Law Officer of the Corporation who has written the said letter dated 5-2-1975, is not covered by either section 126 or 129 of the Evidence Act. A salaried Law Officer of the Corporation is not the Legal Adviser, or even Barrister, Vakil or Attorney. He is a paid employee of the Corporation and there is no relationship between the Corporation and him as that of client and Legal Adviser. He further submitted that what sections 126 and 129 contemplate is that a person who is pracricing law in Courts of law has the privilege under these sections and it is not an employee who acts as a Law Officer who is protected by these sections. He further submitted that sections 126 and 129 are supplementary to each other and they must be construed in the same manner and a Legal Adviser which is mentioned in section 129 must be of the category of Barrister, Vakil or attorney as mentioned in section 126, and not anybody employed by a Corporation or a Company. 4. Section 126 protects the professional communications made by a client to his barrister, attorney, pleader or vakil. It prohibits these persons from disclosing any communication made to them in the Course and for the purpose of their employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil by or on behalf of the client, unless there is an express permission of the client to disclose the same. These persons are also prohibited from stating contents or conditions of any document with which they are acquainted ill the course of and for the purpose of their professional employment. They also cannot be compelled to disclose what advice was tendered by them to the client in the Course of and for the purpose of such employment. However, the section does not protect any disclosure regarding any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose or any fact observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, in the course of his employment as such, showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment. However, the section does not protect any disclosure regarding any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose or any fact observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, in the course of his employment as such, showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment. It is immaterial under this section whether attention of such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf of his client. These obligations not to disclose certain communications as stated above continues even after the employment as such has come to an end. Section 129 gives protection to persons that they shall not be compelled to disclose to the Court any confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional adviser, unless he offers himself as a witness, in which case, he may be compelled to disclose any such communications as may appear to the Court necessary to be known in order to explain any evidence which he has given but no others. Therefore any confidential communications between a client and a legal professional adviser is protected under section 129 and they shall not be compelled to disclose any such communications to the Court unless such person offers himself as a witness and it appears to the Court that such disclosure is necessary in order to explain any evidence which such person bas given and nothing beyond than that. However, the crucial question which arises in this petition is what is the status of a salaried Legal Adviser who is an employee of the Corporation or Company or even for that matter of State and Central Governments. Merely because he does not appear in the Court does he cease to get this protection of law? Is it that only those persons who are professing and practicing law in the Law Courts are entitled to protection under the law of evidence? A close readings of these sections would make it clear that what is protected is a disclosure made in confidence by a client to his legal adviser. Of course, there is no protection to any such statements which is for illegal purpose or for offence for practicing fraud or for committing forgeries. While considering these two sections we must look to the spirit behind the law rather than the letter of law. Of course, there is no protection to any such statements which is for illegal purpose or for offence for practicing fraud or for committing forgeries. While considering these two sections we must look to the spirit behind the law rather than the letter of law. In the recent past a practice of employing legal advisers who are well qualified in law has grown up. Instead of going to the professional lawyers every now and then a practice has come into operation to retain the lawyers in full time employment of the Corporation. Their nature of duty is to advise their employers on the questions which are of a legal character. They advise their employers on all matters pertaining to law and litigation. Their nature of duties is the same as that of barrister, pleader, vakil or attorney except that they do not appear in Courts. If it is so, then I do not see any reason why they should not get same protection of law as the other legal advisers who appear in Courts of law. In my opinion, therefore, a paid or salaried employee who advises his employer, on all questions of law and relating to litigation, must get the same protection of law and therefore any such communication made in confidence by his employer to him for the purpose of seeking legal advice or vice versa should get protection of sections 126 and 129 of the Evidence Act. In L. Tirath Ram v. His Highness Govt. Jammu and Kashmir 1, the learned Judge has observed that a communication made by a Legal Remembrancer of the Government is privileged under section 129. Even though there is no elaborate discussion of this question. I respectfully agree with the statement of law made by the learned judge. What the learned Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir held in 1954 has been elaborated by Lord Denning M. R. The Great Judge in Cromption Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Comrs. (C. A.)2, has observed as follows:- "The law relating to discovery was developed by the Chancery Courts in the first half of the 19th century. At that time nearly all legal advisers were in independent practice on their own account. Nowadays it is very different. Many barristers and solicitors are employed as legal advisers, whole time, by a single employer. Sometimes the employer is a great commercial concern. At that time nearly all legal advisers were in independent practice on their own account. Nowadays it is very different. Many barristers and solicitors are employed as legal advisers, whole time, by a single employer. Sometimes the employer is a great commercial concern. At other times it is a Government department or a local authority. It may even be the Government itself, like the Treasury Solicitor and his staff. In every case these legal advisers do legal work for their employer and for no one else. They are paid, not by fees for each piece of work, but by a fixed annual salary. They are, no doubt, servants or agents of the employer. For that reason Forbes J. thought that they were in a different position from other legal advisers who are in private practice. I do not think this is correct. They are regarded by the law as in every respect in the same position as those who practice on their own account. The only difference is that they act for one client only, and not for several clients. They must uphold the same standards of honour and of etiquette. They are subject to the same duties to their client and to the Court. They must respect the same confidences. They and their clients have the same privileges. I have myself in my early days settled scores of affidavits of documents for the employers of such legal advisers. I have always proceeded on the footing that the communications between the legal advisers and their employer (who is their client) ace the subject of legal professional privilege: and I have never known it questioned. There are many cases in the books of actions against railway companies where privilege has been claimed in this way. The validity of it bas never been doubted. I speak, of course, of their communications in the capacity of legal advisers. It does sometimes happen that such a legal adviser does work for his employer in another capacity, perhaps of an executive nature. Their communications in that capacity would not be the subject of legal professional privilege. So the legal adviser must be scrupulous to make the distinction. Being a servant or agent too, be may be under more pressure from his client. So he must be careful to resist it. He must be as independent in the doing of right as any other legal adviser. So the legal adviser must be scrupulous to make the distinction. Being a servant or agent too, be may be under more pressure from his client. So he must be careful to resist it. He must be as independent in the doing of right as any other legal adviser. It is true, as the Law Reform Committee said in their report in 1967 on privilege in Civil Procedure (Cmd. 3472) that the "system is susceptible to abuse," but I have never known it abused. So much so that I do not think the law should be changed in the way that Forbes J. would have it. There is a safeguard against abuse, It is ready to band. If there is any doubt as to the propriety or validity of a claim for privilege, the master or the Judge should without hesitation inspect the documents himself so as to see if the claim is well founded, or not. He has ample power under R. S. C. Order 24, rule 12. The affidavit should not be treated as conclusive, nor anything like it. A party cannot use the affidavit as a taboo or spell to prevent anyone looking at the documents. When the master or judge sees the documents, he will see if the privilege is rightly claimed-or not-and make an order accordingly." With due respect to the learned Judge, I am in full agreement with the position of law stated in this case. I therefore bold that a salaried employee who advises his employer on all legal questions and also other legal matters would get the same protection as others under sections 126 and 129 of the Evidence Act and even otherwise these communications are properly covered by these sections. 5. It was then contended that since such communication is privileged one the learned Judge was in error in ordering production of that document. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the letter in question is confidential one which is protected by these sections. A reading of this letter makes it clear that the Law Officer of the Corporation had prepared a note for the purpose of sending a reply by the Municipal Commissioner to a letter of the State Government. It refers to the endorsement dated 25-1-1975. The endorsement number is MGC/8959 dated 21-5-1975. A reading of this letter makes it clear that the Law Officer of the Corporation had prepared a note for the purpose of sending a reply by the Municipal Commissioner to a letter of the State Government. It refers to the endorsement dated 25-1-1975. The endorsement number is MGC/8959 dated 21-5-1975. This is an endorsement ;made to the Law Officer that a draft reply for the Municipal Commissioner's approval has to be prepared. Now this was for a reply to the letter from the Government dated 24-1-1975, wherein the Government had made certain queries. It therefore appears that the Law Officer was requested to prepare a draft reply to the letter dated 24th January 1975 for the purpose of Municipal Commissioner who was supposed to reply that letter. It appears that no legal advice was sought from the Law Officer on any question. On the contrary this draft letter discloses the facts as they bad occurred. Sum and substance of this letter is that eviction proceedings under 105/B of the Corporation Act were started against the occupants of the Arches below Mahalaxmi Bridge on the ground of re-construction of Mahalaxmi Bridge, but really they were not covered by the reconstruction of Mahalaxmi Bridge and it was necessary to drop enquiries against those occupiers and it was also decided to create a public purpose i.e. storage of cement etc. for the bridge so as to evict the occupants on the ground of public interest. It was also sought from the Municipal Commissioner whether the Corporation should apprise the State Minister for Urban Development about the real facts of the case as to why the eviction proceedings have been started against the occupants. In my opinion, this document is not in the nature of confidential communication between the client and his legal adviser. On the contrary it discloses certain shocking facts that would destroy the privilege, if any. This shows that the enquiries were started against the occupants on a false ground and pretext that they were required to be evicted because of the reconstruction of Mahalaxmi Bridge. However, since they were not under the Mahalaxmi Bridge the enquiries were dropped and the Corporation was preparing another false ground to evict the occupants as, if it was in the public interest. Certain facts were sought to be suppressed from the Government for which the orders of the Municipal Commissioner were required. However, since they were not under the Mahalaxmi Bridge the enquiries were dropped and the Corporation was preparing another false ground to evict the occupants as, if it was in the public interest. Certain facts were sought to be suppressed from the Government for which the orders of the Municipal Commissioner were required. The text of the entire letter is such that it shocks the consciousness of common man about the manner in which the public bodies like Corporation is behaving. In my opinion, such a document can never get any protection of law either under section 126 or 129 of the Evidence Act. 6. Apart from this, this letter has been produced in another enquiry No. 119/1976, 240/1976 as Exhibit 1. The original document has been produced before the Enquiry Officer. The respondent was also given inspection of the same with the express consent of the Municipal Corporation. Considering these facts, I do not think that any such protection either under section 126 or 129 of the Evidence Act is available to the petitioners. 7. In the result, therefore, I confirm the order passed by the learned Judge, though for different reasons. The application, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Corporation should pay costs of this petition to the respondents and bear its own. Rule discharged.