JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal by defendant against judgment and decree dated 31-3-1979 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, whereby a decree for eviction has been passed on ground under section 12 (l) (e)of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, the Act), after reversing the judgment and decree of dismissal of suit for ejectment passed by the trial Court on 21-4-1977. ( 2. ) FACTS essential for decision of this appeal are as under: it is no longer in dispute between the parties that the plaintiff has purchased the house, of which the suit premises are a part, vide sale-deed dated 2-11-1973 (Ex. P-l ). Prior to purchase of the said house by the plaintiff, the defendant as well as the plaintiff were occupying the respective portions in their possession as tenants of the ex-landlord, Kanta Prasad gupta. The plaintiff brought the suit giving rise to this appeal for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on grounds under section 12 (l) (e)and (c) of the Act on the allegations that the defendant is residing in the suit premises, which consist of three rooms and paying rent at the rate of Rs. 25/-per month. Now the case of the plaintiff is that he bonafidely requires the suit premises for his residence along with members of his family, that the portion in his possession is insufficient for the purpose and that there is no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own within the municipal limits of Shajapur for the purpose, and that the defendant has substantially damaged the suit premises and also hurling abuses day in and day out on the plaintiff and members of his family. ( 3. ) THE claim of the plaintiff for eviction was resisted by the defendant on the grounds that the alleged requirement is not bona fide, that the portion in occupation of the plaintiff is sufficient and that the allegations regarding damaging the suit premises substantially and hurling of abuses by the defendant are false. After trial, the trial Court dismissed the suit for ejectment. Aggrieved by this judgment, and decree, the plaintiff preferred appeal, which has been allowed by the learned Additional District Judge and decree for eviction has been granted on ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the act and the ground under section 12 (1 ) (c) has been negatived. After trial, the trial Court dismissed the suit for ejectment. Aggrieved by this judgment, and decree, the plaintiff preferred appeal, which has been allowed by the learned Additional District Judge and decree for eviction has been granted on ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the act and the ground under section 12 (1 ) (c) has been negatived. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the defendant has preferred this appeal. ( 4. ) IN this appeal, Shri Y. I. Mehta, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, contended that the learned Additional District Judge acted illegally in ordering striking out of the right of the defendant regarding defence against eviction under the Act, and that the reasoning employed by the learned additional District Judge, in holding that the ground under section I2 (l) (e)has been made out, is perverse. Shri S. L. Garg assisted by Shri R. S. Garg, argued in support of the impugned judgment. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the appeal deserves to be dismissed, subject to the modification indicated hereinafter. ( 5. ) THE first question, which arises in this appeal and on which this appeal has been admitted, is as under: "that the Court below chose to strike out the defence for a default in the trial Court about which there was no order passed in the trial Court and this order of closing the defence was passed without any opportunity to the appellant. " The contention advanced by Shri Mehta in this regard appears to have force, but all the same it is without any consequence. In this case, the plaintiff did not elect to invoke power of the Court under section 13 (6) of the Act at the trial stage of the suit. Even though the defendant-appellant may be taken to have committed defaults and not to have complied with the letter of law in the matter of depositing rent according to the mandate of section 13 (1) of the Act, yet it was for the plaintiff-landlord to have moved the trial Court in the matter. Had the plaintiff submitted an application under section 13 (6)before the trial Court, the defendant would have got an opportunity to show the circumstances, in which he could not comply with the mandate of law on the point. Had the plaintiff submitted an application under section 13 (6)before the trial Court, the defendant would have got an opportunity to show the circumstances, in which he could not comply with the mandate of law on the point. In such a situation, the plaintiff was not within his rights and the learned Additional District Judge was not justified in flinging a surprise on the defendant and ordering his defence against eviction under the Act to be struck out, that too by simply hearing arguments on the question. By virtue of section 13 (6) of the Act, a discretion has been conferred on the Courts to order stiking out of defence in case of non-compliance of the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act. But, this discretion is a judicial discretion and cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Had the plaintiff-landlord submitted an application under section 13 (6) of the Act, either before the trial Court or even before the appellate Court, the defendant would have got an opportunity to show the circumstances, which resulted in non-compliance of either of the limbs of the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act. The defendant could have, in that eventuality, prayed for extension of time and or condonation of delay by moving an application for the purpose. In this view of the matter, it appears that the learned Additional District Judge was wholly unjustified in striking out the defence of the defendant-appellant against eviction under the act. The obligation to deposit rent does not extend to appeals either. See 1978 M P L J 362=1978 J L J page 227. However, the illegality committed by the learned Additional District Judge in this behalf is of no consequence inasmuch as the defendant-appellant had availed opportunity to lead evidence at the trial stage of the suit. ( 6. The obligation to deposit rent does not extend to appeals either. See 1978 M P L J 362=1978 J L J page 227. However, the illegality committed by the learned Additional District Judge in this behalf is of no consequence inasmuch as the defendant-appellant had availed opportunity to lead evidence at the trial stage of the suit. ( 6. ) THIS brings me to the second question, which is involved in this appeal and which is as under: "whether the finding regarding genuine and born fide requirement is perverse for the reasons stated in para 2 of the appeal memo?" In this case, the learned Additional District Judge has passed a decree for eviction on ground under section 12 (l) (e) of the Act on the findings that the suit premises are bona fidely required by the plaintiff for occupation as residence for himself and other members of his family; that the accommodation in possession of the plaintiff is not sufficient for the purpose and that there is no other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in his occupation in shajapur for the purpose. The accommodation in possession of the plaintiff has been found to consist of two types of accommodation; i. e. (1) that which is used for oil-expeller (Ghana) and (2) that which is available for residence. In all, the house, of which the suit premises are a part, consists of twelve rooms. As stated by Ganpatlal Rathore (P. W. 6), the dimensions of the various rooms in the said house are as under : (a) 7 rooms are of 16x8 out of which 3 rooms are with the defendant; (b) 3 rooms are of 8 x 8 and (c) 2 rooms are of 8 x 11. Excluding the suit premises, in all, 9 rooms are in occupation of the plaintiff. Out of them, 3 rooms are being used by the plaintiff for his oil-expeller business in the manner that after removing roof between two rooms, the oil-expeller has been put in there and the third room is being used for storing raw material as well as goods manufactured. Thus, 6 rooms have been found to be available to the plaintiff and other members of his family for residential use. Now, as stated by the plaintiff, his family consists of his wife, three sons, their wives and twelve children. Thus, 6 rooms have been found to be available to the plaintiff and other members of his family for residential use. Now, as stated by the plaintiff, his family consists of his wife, three sons, their wives and twelve children. One of his grand-sons is a student of B. A. , one of his grand-daughters is a student of Higher Secondary Classes and another grand-daughter is a student of 8th class; and other grand children are also of school going age. It is true that one of the sons of the plaintiff along with his wife and his 6 children have to live out of Shajapur, at the place of service of that son. But still, other members of the family of the plaintiff live with him in the premises mentioned above. After evaluating the testimony afforded by the plaintiff himself as P. W. I and that of Badrinarayan (PW-2), Ratanlal (PW-3), Ajay Kumar (PW-4), Babulal Jaiswal (PW-5) and ganpatlal Rathore (PW-6) and the evidence led by the defendant in rebuttal thereof, which consists of the statement of the defendant himself as DW- 1, the learned Additional District Judge has concluded that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving availability of ground under section 12 (l) (e) of the Act and has passed a decree for eviction of the defendant, as stated above. ( 7. ) NOW, in order to assail the impugned judgment, it was firstly contended by Shri Y. I. Mehta, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that conversion of three rooms, which were residential in character, into nonresidential accommodation and installing oil-expeller therein ought to have been regarded as a circumstance against genuineness of the alleged requirement of the plaintiff. This contention appears to be attractive on the face of it, but is devoid of substance. No provision in law is shown to the effect that a landlord cannot use residential accommodation for non-residential purpose. The restrictions imposed on the right of landlord by clauses (e) and or (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act are confined to seeking eviction through a Court of law only. Accordingly, a landlord is free to convert residential premises into non-residential one and use them for the purpose of starting and or continuing his business. The restrictions imposed on the right of landlord by clauses (e) and or (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act are confined to seeking eviction through a Court of law only. Accordingly, a landlord is free to convert residential premises into non-residential one and use them for the purpose of starting and or continuing his business. In this case, the factum of three rooms (after removal of the intervening roof, two rooms merely) being in occupation of the plaintiff for non-residential purpose in connection with the oil-expeller business is a fact even admitted by the defendant. The conversion in question is not shown to have been resorted to by way of mere camouflage and or subterfuge, to boost up the alleged requirement. The conversion of the three rooms for non-residential user is not shown to have been just resorted to before the institution of the suit. As such, the factum of user of the aforesaid premises in connection with oil-expeller business could not be regarded and has rightly been not regarded as a circumstance militating against the genuineness of the requirement of the plaintiff, as alleged by him. ( 8. ) FACED with this situation, it was next contended that the learned additional District Judge has acted illegally in overlooking the variance between pleading and proof and it was pointed out that in the plaint, the plaintiff has not averred that three rooms are being used by him for nonresidential purpose, as disclosed at the trial stage of the suit. It is true that in the plaint, it has not been pleaded by the plaintiff that three rooms are being used by him in connection with the aforesaid business. However, nothing turns on omission of a plea on the point. Firstly, it is not the requirement of law that in a suit for eviction falling on ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, the plaintiff must set out a plea showing how much of accommodation in his possession is being used by him for non-residential purpose. In clause (e) of section 12 (I) of the Act, the plea should consist of two-fold allegations; namely (a) that the suit premises are bona fidely required by the landlord for occupation as residence; and (b) that there is no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town for the purpose. In clause (e) of section 12 (I) of the Act, the plea should consist of two-fold allegations; namely (a) that the suit premises are bona fidely required by the landlord for occupation as residence; and (b) that there is no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town for the purpose. Secondly, the plaintiff has, in his deposition stated clearly the entire accommodation is being used for residential as well as non-residential purpose by him as mentioned above. The plaintiff and his witnesses have been cross-examined on the point by the defendant. The defendant also got an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal thereof. In the circumstances, the plaintiff cannot be regarded to be guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi. Paucity of the pleading on the point cannot be regarded infraction of law. It has not been shown to have caused any prejudice, what of material prejudice, to the defendant-appellant. ( 9. ) THE third contention advanced by Shri Mehta was that the learned additional District Judge has overlooked the definition of the expression "members of the family" as given in section 2 (e) of the Act inasmuch as grandsons having not been enumerated to be members of the family of the landlord, it was necessary for the plaintiff-landlord to have averred in the plaint that the grand-children were dependent on him Section 2 (e) of the act defines the expression "member of the family" thus:- (e) "member of the family" in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grand-father, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncles wife or widow, or brothers son or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation dependent on him. " (emphasis supplied)It is true that in case of requirement for grand-children only, a plaintiff-land-, lord may have to set out in the plaint and /or prove that they are dependent on him. In absence of such a plea and proof, the claim for ejectment for his grand-children cannot be entertained. However, the nature of the requirement set out by the plaintiff-respondent in the plaint is not of such a character. His case is that the accommodation in his possession is not sufficient to meet his requirement and that of the members of his family. It is not a case, where the alleged requirement is merely for grand-children. However, the nature of the requirement set out by the plaintiff-respondent in the plaint is not of such a character. His case is that the accommodation in his possession is not sufficient to meet his requirement and that of the members of his family. It is not a case, where the alleged requirement is merely for grand-children. Accordingly, the contention advanced by Shri Mehta in this behalf is of no significance. ( 10. ) IT was further contended that the conduct of the plaintiff in suffering the defendant to continue for a period of three years prior to the institution of the suit in the suit premises has to be taken into account as a circumstance reflecting against genuineness of the alleged requirement. This contention, too, does not merit acceptance. By sub-section (4) of section 12 of the act, a suit for ejectment on ground under section 12 (1) (e) cannot be maintained prior to expiry of a period of one year from the date of the acquisition of the suit premises by a landlord. The suit house was purchased by the plaintiff vide sale deed dated 2-11-1973 (Ex. P-1 ). Moreover, the plaintiff has instituted the suit on 7-4-1975 after serving demand- cum- quit notice dated 26-2-1975 on the defendant-appellant. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot be regarded to be guilty of such a conduct, which may adversely affect the bona fides of his requirement, and the learned Additional District Judge does not appear to have committed any illegality in not holding so. ( 11. ) IT was further contended by Shri Mehta that on account of the non-examination of the persons, for whom the suit premises are needed, an adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the plaintiff to the effect that the alleged requirement is not genuine. I am afraid, this contention too does not merit acceptance. It is not postulate of law that any particular number of witnesses should be examined or that any particular person should be examined to prove any particular fact. The plaintiff and one of his witnesses, i. e. Ganpatlal Rathore (P. W. 6) have been examined in the case and their testimony has been relied upon by the learned Additional District Judge. Accordingly, non-examination of his other members of the family of the plaintiff is of no consequence. The plaintiff and one of his witnesses, i. e. Ganpatlal Rathore (P. W. 6) have been examined in the case and their testimony has been relied upon by the learned Additional District Judge. Accordingly, non-examination of his other members of the family of the plaintiff is of no consequence. In such a situation, no question of drawing any adverse inference against the plaintiff on the count arises. ( 12. ) IT was further contended by Shri Mehta that the inferences regarding status of the plaintiff-respondent and his family are essentially conjectural and based on no evidence. This contention too is without any substance. It is on record that the plaintiff is running oil-expeller business and that his grand-children are college and or school going, as stated above. Moreover, the plaintiff has explained the manner, in which the accommodation available to him is being used and how they are insufficient to meet the requirement, for which the eviction is sought. The learned Additional District Judge has extensively dealt with this point in paras. 13, 15 a 16. The reasoning employed by him on the point is not shown to be vitiated by a mistake of law, misreading of evidence or perversity. Accordingly, if due regard was paid to the social status and standard of living of the plaintiff landlord by the learned Additional District Judge, it cannot be said that his approach in the matter was contrary to any law. It depends upon the standard of living of a person, how much accommodation he wants for his residence and that of the members of his family. On the facts found in the case, it cannot be held that the requirement set out by the plaintiff is spurious and/or mala fide. It has rightly been held by the learned Additional District Judge as bona fide in the circumstances. The findings with regard to the bona fides of the alleged requirement are essentially findings of fact. On the facts found in the case, it cannot be held that the requirement set out by the plaintiff is spurious and/or mala fide. It has rightly been held by the learned Additional District Judge as bona fide in the circumstances. The findings with regard to the bona fides of the alleged requirement are essentially findings of fact. Such findings of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court in appeal under section 100, Civil Procedure code, as it is not shown that in reaching them, a mistake of law was committed or they were based on no evidence or were such as no reasonable man could reach, as held by the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lai (1974 M PL J 752 (S C) = 1975 J L J 1) and in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemichand (1966 MPLJ26 (SC) ). ( 13. ) THE last contention advanced by Shri Mehta was that the finding with regard to the insufficiency of the accommodation available to the plaintiff is illegal. In view of the dimensions of the rooms available to the plaintiff for residence; and in view of the number of members of his family, it could not be held, and has rightly been not held by the learned Additional District judge, that the accommodation available with the plaintiff is sufficient for the purpose. The learned Additional District Judge appears to be right in holding that the accommodation available with the plaintiff is insufficient for his requirement. The alleged requirement cannot be regarded to be arbitrary and or whimsical. Nothing could be pointed out, which may leave the ban imposed by section 100, Civil Procedure Code on the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the finding on the question of insufficiency, which essentially is a finding of fact. Although it is true that one of the sons of the plaintiff, his wife and six children reside outside Shajapur at the place, where he is stationed in connection with his service, yet the accommodation available to the plaintiff has been rightly found to be insufficient even for residence of the plaintiff and other members of his family who reside at shajapur. The plaintiff cannot be denied space to accommodate his son, daughter-in-law and grand-children, who, in connection with service, are living in the present time, out of Shajapur when they visit Shajapur. The plaintiff cannot be denied space to accommodate his son, daughter-in-law and grand-children, who, in connection with service, are living in the present time, out of Shajapur when they visit Shajapur. The requirement in that behalf cannot be regarded as mala fide or unreasonable either. ( 14. ) THUS, all the challenges to the impugned judgment and decree failed. The appeal is thus not shown to involve any substantial question of law on the basis of which the impugned judgment and decree may be vitiated. At this stage, Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, prayed for six months time to enable the defendant to vacate the suit premises; so that in that time, the defendant may shift to some other accommodation. In view of the reasonableness of this request, Shri Garg, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, did not oppose grant of time for the purpose. ( 15. ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed subject to the conditions that the decree for ejectment will not be put in execution prior to expiry of 6 (six) months from today and that the defendant-appellant will hand over possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff-landlord through the Court. On failure to do so, the defendant-appellant will expose himself to the disobedience of the aforesaid directions. Costs of this appeal will be paid by the appellant to the respondent. Counsels fee, according to schedule, if certified. Appea dismissed.