ORDER R.M. Sahai, J. - By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the declaration granted by three revenue Courts under section 229B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1951 (here- in after referred to as the Act) that one- fourth share of Smt. Janki, widow of Shiv Ram alias Sri Ram which had come to her by way of compromise entered with opposite parties 4 and 5, her stepsons, in a wit for declaration filed by them under section 59/61 of the U.P. Tenancy Act devolved on them, after her death, under section 172 read with S. 171 of the Act as she was limited owner of the land in dispute, is challenged as erroneous on the face of it. 2. Admittedly Shiv Ram, the occupancy tenant died, in 1941 leaving two widows Smt. Janki and Snit. Mahdei and two sons from the latter. Between 1941 and 1949 Smt. Janki appears to have adopted petitioner, although adoption has not been found to be proved and is not in dispute now, which obviously cast cloud on the sole ownership of opposite parties, therefore, they filed a suit for declaration u/s 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act against Smt. Janki and petitioner. The suit was contest and one of the defences raised by Smt. Janki was denial of opposite parties' parentage. Due to this or for family peace the parties in the suit agreed to settle their difference by compromise in 1951 irrespective of the allegations and counter-allegations, as is clear from paragraph 1 of the compromise, and th share was given to each, the petitioner, the two opposite parties and Smt. Janki. It is alleged that Smt. Janki surrendered her share in favour of petitioner in 1954. After her death in 1971 the opposite parties filed the suit out of which this petition has arisen for the share of Smt. Janki. It has been found by all the authorities that Smt. Janki was a limited owner, a finding which has not been supported by learned counsel for respondent even and rightly as the tenancy was occupancy and devolution was governed by S. 35 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. It has been found by all the authorities that Smt. Janki was a limited owner, a finding which has not been supported by learned counsel for respondent even and rightly as the tenancy was occupancy and devolution was governed by S. 35 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. But the whole thrust of argument has been on the word, `inherited' used in Section 172 of the Act and its interpretation by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramjivan v. Phoola, ( AIR 1976 SC 844 ). Section 172 of the Act provides "a Bhumidhar, sirdar, or Asami, who has after the date of vesting, inherited an inherest in any holding (a) as a widow,-- a widow of a male lineal descendant, in the male line of descent, mother or father's mother dies, abandons or surrenders such holding, or part of thereof; or (b) xx xxx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx the holding or a part shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171), the last male Bhumidhar, sirdar or Assami;" According to dictionary, the word `inherit' means, `to make heir', to be the heir of, succeed as heir, to act as heir. Inheritance, therefore, must necessarily be associated with succession or devolution. Property must carry the same impress which the owner had. Can it be said that the share which Smt. Janki got in compromise was as heir of her husband, or in succession to his interest? In Har Prasad Rain Swaroop v. Har Ram, (1952 Rev. Dec. 59) the Board of Revenue held that in a case where the Zamindar agreed for continuance of widow's name after her remarriage, the interest shall be deemed to have originated from her first husband. Drawing inspiration from it although not relying on it the learned counsel for respondent urged that Smt. Janki was given th share of Shiv Ram alias Shri Ram because she was his widow. It shall be deemed that the share which she thus got was of her husband. Consequently she inherited it. The argument suffers from a fallacy. It assumes that Smt. Janki was a successor whereas in law she did not and could not have any interest in the property. On death of Shiv Ram his interest devolved on his sons. No part of it could be inherited by Smt. Janki. Consequently she inherited it. The argument suffers from a fallacy. It assumes that Smt. Janki was a successor whereas in law she did not and could not have any interest in the property. On death of Shiv Ram his interest devolved on his sons. No part of it could be inherited by Smt. Janki. In compromise she might have been given 114th share, may be because she was widow of Shiv Ram or stepmother of opposite parties but that could not be by way of inheritance or succession. 3. The expression, `inherited an interest' in any holding in S. 172 came up for interpretation before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramjiwan's case, ( AIR 1976 SC 844 at p. 351) (supra). It was hell that; "In order to determine the applicability of Section 172 of the Abolition Act we must go to the origin of the title of the Bhumidhar or the main source from which the bhumidhar has derived interest in the holding ......... The statute has not defined the word, `interest' and, therefore, it must be deemed to be of the widest amplitude. It will include not only an absolute interest but also a limited interest a precarious interest and an inchoate interest or the like ..........." The question, therefore, is whether the share which was given to Smt. Janki in compromise in 1951 can be traced to her husband. In other words, can the origin of title of Smt. Janki in the land in dispute be related back to her husband. There is no hesitation in saying that it was not, either in law or in fact. Under Section 35 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, interest of an occupancy tenant devolved only on male descendants. As opposite parties were born on the date Shiv Ram died the property in law shall be deemed to have devolved on them. The denial of their parentage by Smt. Janki in 1949 could not in any manner affect devolution in law. The compromise might have been entered irrespective of allegations and counter-allegations in the plaint and written statement, but the finding of fact recorded now which is not disputed is that opposite parties were sons of Shiv Ram. This finding relates back to the date when Shiv Ram died and succession opened. On that date, therefore, whatever interest Shiv Ram had in the holding in dispute devolved on opposite parties. This finding relates back to the date when Shiv Ram died and succession opened. On that date, therefore, whatever interest Shiv Ram had in the holding in dispute devolved on opposite parties. Smt. Janki therefore, could not and did not inherit any interest of Shiv Ram. The origin of her title, therefore, could not be traced to her husband. What was given to her in compromise could not be described as `absolute, precarious or even inchoate interest or the like.' It had no legal link except of course that compromise was in respect of land which belonged to Shiv Ram. That, however, cannot be considered to be sufficient in law. 4. The revenue courts proceeded on the basis that the compromise was a family settlement the effect of which was that the male lineal descendants i. e. the opposite parties abandoned their claim to the full held by Shiv Ram. The parties thereafter continued in possession over their respective shares and the compromise having been acted upon cannot be denied. It may be that parties to the compromise may not wriggle out of it but that is not helpful to opposite parties. Assuming that it was a family settlement in which the parties related with each other had a possible claim or semblance of title and the opposite parties are bound by that but that by itself was not sufficient unless it is further held that it resulted in inheritance in favour of Smt. Janki. It appears that the revenue courts proceeded in a circle. First they assumed the compromise to be a family settlement then as it related to property of her husband she was held to have inherited his interest. Without going into the question whether on facts found that the petitioner was an outsider and Smt. Janki could not have any semblance of title therefore, the compromise could not be treated as family settlement how could Smt. Janki be deemed to have inherited interest of her husband is not easy to understand. 5. For instance if the opposite parties would have said that Smt. Janki being widow of Shiv Ram, was entitled to inherit his th share could it be said that because of that admission Smt. Janki inherited the interest. The answer would obviously be in the negative. The interest which was given to Smt. Janki could not be traced to her husband. The answer would obviously be in the negative. The interest which was given to Smt. Janki could not be traced to her husband. The legislature has purposely used the word 'interest'. It cannot be equated with possession. Smt. Janki might have continued in possession over the land which once belonged to her husband but her possession cannot be deemed to be in same interest as was held by her husband. At least it cannot be treated to be so in law. The admission by opposite parties or conferment of th share on Smt. Janki could not alter the law of succession as provided in S. 35 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. There is no denial that under the compromise Smt. Janki got th share and the parties to the compromise are bound by it, but that by itself does not create any interest of Smt. Janki in the holding as was held by her husband. What could not take place in law could certainly not be created by Act of parties. The line of succession or devolution could not have been altered. There can thus be no doubt that under the compromise Smt. Janki did not inherit an interest in the holding. On her death therefore, the property could not devolve on the heirs of the last male tenant and the provisions of S. 172 read with S. 171 were not applicable. The succession would be governed by S. 174 of the Act, as it is a residuary clause in respect of female tenants. 6. It was vehemently argued by learned counsel for opposite parties that in Ramjiwan's case, ( AIR 1976 SC 844 ) (supra) the position was more or less identical. According to learned counsel under Oudh Rent Act the tenancy was not inheritable and after death of Ramji his widow Smt. Menda was to continue in possession for a fixed period of 5 years. The learned counsel urged that the Supreme Court held that the interest of the husband was deemed to have devolved on Smt. Menda and it was held that her title related back to the time when her husband died. The argument proceeds on misconception of the Supreme Court's decision. The learned counsel urged that the Supreme Court held that the interest of the husband was deemed to have devolved on Smt. Menda and it was held that her title related back to the time when her husband died. The argument proceeds on misconception of the Supreme Court's decision. The words used in S. 48 of the Oudh Rent Act were : "heir of a tenant and shall be entitled to retain occupation." It was held by the Hon'ble Court that retention of occupation by Smt. Menda en the death of her husband was in no other capacity but as an heir. It, therefore, cannot be said that the same principle applies in the present case. As has been seen above the interest which was given to Smt. Janki in compromise was not as an heir of her husband, therefore, she could not be deemed to have inherited the interest of her husband. 7. It was then urged on behalf of opposite parties that even if S. 174 applies the opposite parties on the facts found being stepsons were entitled to succeed to her interest. According to learned counsel the word 'son' includes `stepsons'. He maintained that the expression has been used because a woman cannot have two husbands. The controversy stands concluded against respondent by numerous authorities. It has been held that where the legislature uses the word `son', and it deliberately omitted from it, stepson then it cannot be deemed to be included by process of interpretation. In Ram Sanehi Lal v. District Judge, (1978 All WC 721) a question arose whether a stepson was included in male lineal descent. It was held that a stepson cannot be considered to be the son. Reliance for this was placed on principles of Hindu Law by Mulla, 14th Edition Page 915. 8. Now the question is who should be held entitled to the share of Smt. Janki. Neither petitioner nor opposite parties can succeed to her interest. It was claimed by petitioner that Smt. Janki surrendered her share in his favour. And in any case he acquired rights by adverse possession. No finding has been recorded on these questions. It was not decided by Courts below as Smt. Janki was held to be a limited owner. In doing so the Courts below misdirected themselves. It was claimed by petitioner that Smt. Janki surrendered her share in his favour. And in any case he acquired rights by adverse possession. No finding has been recorded on these questions. It was not decided by Courts below as Smt. Janki was held to be a limited owner. In doing so the Courts below misdirected themselves. The question to be decided was not whether Smt. Janki had no right, but whether petitioner by virtue of being in possession or because of surrender deed executed in 1954 acquired any right in land in dispute. 9. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by all the three authorities are quashed. The trial Court shall decide the suit afresh on the question of adverse possession and surrender. There shall he no order as to costs.